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Sect. 2. Of the Figures and Modes of pure Syllogisms.

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position, in which the term which is contradictory to the predicate is put for the subject, and the quality of the proposition is changed; as, All animals are sentient; therefore, What is insentient is not an animal. A fourth rule of conversion therefore is, That an universal affirmative, and a particular negative, may be converted by contraposition.

SECT. 2. Of the Figures and Modes of pure Syllogifms.

A fyllogism is an argument, or reasoning, consisting of three propositions, the last of which, called the conclusion, is inferred from the two preceding, which are called the premises. The conclusion having two terms, a fubject and a predicate, its predicate is called the major term, and its subject the minor term. In order to prove the conclusion, each of its terms is in the premises compared with a third term, called the middle term. By this means one of the premifes will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and this premise is called the major premise, or the major proposition of the fyllogism. The other premise must have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term, and it is called the minor proposition. Thus the fyllogism consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of the major, the minor, and the conclusion: and altho' each of these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and is also either the fubject or predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term never enters into the conclusion, but stands in both premises, either in the position of subject or of predicate.

According to the various positions which the middle term may

have in the premises, syllogisms are said to be of various sigures. Now all the possible positions of the middle term are only sour: for, first, it may be the subject of the major proposition, and the predicate of the minor, and then the syllogism is of the first sigure; or it may be the predicate of both premises, and then the syllogism is of the second sigure; or it may be the subject of both, which makes a syllogism of the third sigure; or it may be the predicate of the major proposition, and the subject of the minor, which makes the sourth sigure. Aristotle takes no notice of the fourth sigure. It was added by the samous Galen, and is often called the Galenical sigure.

There is another division of fyllogisms according to their modes. The mode of a fyllogism is determined by the quality and quantity of the propositions of which it consists. Each of the three propositions must be either an universal affirmative, or an universal negative, or a particular affirmative, or a particular negative. These four kinds of propositions, as was before observed, have been named by the four vowels, A, E, I, O; by which means the mode of a syllogism is marked by any three of those four vowels. Thus A, A, A denotes that mode in which the major, minor, and conclusion, are all universal affirmatives; E, A, E, denotes that mode in which the major and conclusion are universal negatives, and the minor is an universal affirmative.

To know all the possible modes of fyllogism, we must find how many different combinations may be made of three out of the four vowels, and from the art of combination the number is found to be fixty-four. So many possible modes there are in every figure, consequently in the three figures of Aristotle there are one hundred and ninety-two, and in all the four figures two hundred and fifty-fix.

Now the theory of fyllogism requires, that we shew what are the particular modes in each figure, which do, or do not, form a just just and conclusive fyllogism, that so the legitimate may be adopted, and the spurious rejected. This Aristotle has shewn in the first three sigures, examining all the modes one by one, and passing sentence upon each; and from this examination he collects some rules which may aid the memory in distinguishing the sales from the true, and point out the properties of each sigure.

The first figure has only four legitimate modes. The major proposition in this figure must be universal, and the minor affirmative; and it has this property, that it yields conclusions of all kinds, affirmative and negative, universal and particular.

The fecond figure has also four legitimate modes. Its major proposition must be universal, and one of the premises must be negative. It yields conclusions both universal and particular, but all negative.

The third figure has fix legitimate modes. Its minor must always be affirmative; and it yields conclusions both affirmative and negative, but all particular.

Besides the rules that are proper to each figure, Aristotle has given some that are common to all, by which the legitimacy of syllogisms may be tried. These may, I think, be reduced to five.

1. There must be only three terms in a syllogism. As each term occurs in two of the propositions, it must be precisely the same in both: if it be not, the syllogism is said to have four terms, which makes a vitious syllogism.

2. The middle term must be taken universally in one of the premises.

3. Both premises must not be particular propositions, nor both negative.

4. The conclusion must be particular, if either of the premises be particular; and negative, if either of the premises be negative.

5. No term can be taken universally in the premises.

For understanding the second and fifth of these rules, it is necessary to observe, that a term is said to be taken universally, not