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Sect. 7. On Syllogisms that do not belong to Figure and Mode.

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most acute philosopher would have saved the great labour he has bestowed on this subject.

Burgersdick, after enumerating five classes of modal syllogisms, observes, that they require many rules and cautions, which Aristotle hath handled diligently; but as the use of them is not great, and their rules are very difficult, he thinks it not worth while to enter into the discussion of them; recommending to those who would understand them, the most learned paraphrase of Joannes Monlorius, upon the first book of the First Analytics.

All the writers of logic for two hundred years back that have fallen into my hands, have passed over the rules of modal syllogisms with as little ceremony. So that this great branch of the doctrine of syllogism, so diligently handled by Aristotle, fell into neglect, if not contempt, even while the doctrine of pure syllogisms continued in the highest esteem. Moved by these authorities, I shall let this doctrine rest in peace, without giving the least disturbance to its ashes.

SECT. 7. *On Syllogisms that do not belong to Figure and Mode.*

Aristotle gives some observations upon imperfect syllogisms: such as, the Enthimema, in which one of the premises is not expressed but understood: Induction, wherein we collect an universal from a full enumeration of particulars: and Examples, which are an imperfect induction. The logicians have copied Aristotle upon these kinds of reasoning, without any considerable improvement. But to compensate the modal syllogisms, which they have laid aside, they have given rules for several kinds of syllogism, of which Aristotle takes no notice. These may be reduced to two classes.

The first class comprehends the syllogisms into which any exclu-
five,



five, restrictive, exceptive, or reduplicative proposition enters. Such propositions are by some called *exponible*, by others *imperfectly modal*. The rules given with regard to these are obvious, from a just interpretation of the propositions.

The second class is that of hypothetical syllogisms, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical proposition for one or both premises. Most logicians give the name of *hypothetical* to all complex propositions which have more terms than one subject and one predicate. I use the word in this large sense; and mean by hypothetical syllogisms, all those in which either of the premises consists of more terms than two. How many various kinds there may be of such syllogisms, has never been ascertained. The logicians have given names to some; such as, the copulative, the conditional, by some called hypothetical, and the disjunctive.

Such syllogisms cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules peculiar to it. Logicians have given rules for some kinds; but there are many that have not so much as a name.

The Dilemma is considered by most logicians as a species of the disjunctive syllogism. A remarkable property of this kind is, that it may sometimes be happily retorted: it is, it seems, like a hand-grenade, which, by dextrous management, may be thrown back, so as to spend its force upon the assailant. We shall conclude this tedious account of syllogisms, with a dilemma mentioned by *A. Gellius*, and from him by many logicians, as insoluble in any other way.

“ Euathlus, a rich young man, desirous of learning the art of
 “ pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated sophist, to instruct
 “ him, promising a great sum of money as his reward; one half
 “ of which was paid down; the other half he bound himself to
 “ pay as soon as he should plead a cause before the judges, and
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“ gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt scholar ; but, after
“ he had made good progress, he was in no haste to plead cau-
“ ses. The master, conceiving that he intended by this means to
“ shift off his second payment, took, as he thought, a sure me-
“ thod to get the better of his delay. He sued Euathlus before
“ the judges ; and, having opened his cause at the bar, he pleaded
“ to this purpose. O most foolish young man, do you not see,
“ that, in any event, I must gain my point ? for if the judges
“ give sentence for me, you must pay by their sentence ; if a-
“ gainst me, the condition of our bargain is fulfilled, and you
“ have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained
“ a cause. To which Euathlus answered. O most wise master,
“ I might have avoided the force of your argument, by not
“ pleading my own cause. But, giving up this advantage, do
“ you not see, that whatever sentence the judges pass, I am safe ?
“ If they give sentence for me, I am acquitted by their sentence ;
“ if against me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by
“ my pleading a cause, and losing it. The judges, thinking the
“ arguments unanswerable on both sides, put off the cause to a
“ long day.”

C H A P.

