

**Landesbibliothek Oldenburg**

**Digitalisierung von Drucken**

**A Treatise Of Human Nature**

Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning Into  
Moral Subjects

Of The Passions

**Hume, David**

**London, 1739**

Part II. Of love and hatred.

**urn:nbn:de:gbv:45:1-1219**




## P A R T II.

*Of love and hatred.*

## S E C T. I.

*Of the object and causes of love and hatred.*


 IS altogether impossible to give S E C T. I. any definition of the passions of *love and hatred*; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. 'Twou'd be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them, drawn from their nature, origin, causes and objects; and that both because these are the subjects of our present enquiry, and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. This we have already observ'd concerning pride and humility,

PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

humility, and here repeat it concerning love and hatred; and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions, that we shall be oblig'd to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former, in order to explain the latter.

As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of *self-love*, 'tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress. 'Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others.

BUT tho' the object of love and hatred be always some other person, 'tis plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the *cause* of these passions, or alone sufficient to excite

excite them. For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation, and have the same object in common, if that object were also their cause, it wou'd produce these opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must, from the very first moment, destroy each other, none of them wou'd ever be able to make its appearance. There must, therefore, be some cause different from the object.

IF we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are very much diversify'd, and have not many things in common. The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force, swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the external advantages and disadvantages of family, possessions, cloaths, nation and climate. There is not one of these objects, but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem, or hatred and contempt.

FROM the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the *quality* that operates, and the *subject* on which it

SECT.  
I.  
*Of the objects and causes of love and hatred.*



PART

II.

Of love  
and ha-  
tred.

is plac'd. A prince, that is possess'd of a stately palace, commands the esteem of the people upon that account; and that *first*, by the beauty of the palace, and *secondly*, by the relation of property, which connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one.

'TWO'D be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred, thro' all the observations which we have form'd concerning pride and humility, and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. 'Twill be sufficient to *remark* in general, that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy. We may also *suppose* with some shew of probability, *that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being, and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure, and of the latter a separate uneasiness.*

ONE of these suppositions, *viz.* that the cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested. Virtue and vice, when consider'd in the abstract; beauty and



and deformity, when plac'd on inanimate objects; poverty and riches, when belonging to a third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt towards those, who have no relation to them.

S E C T.

I.

*Of the objects and causes of love and hatred.*

A person looking out at a window, sees me in the street, and beyond me a beautiful palace, with which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend, that this person will pay me the same respect, as if I were owner of the palace.

'Tis not so evident at first sight, that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other, that they become in a manner undistinguishable. But as in pride and humility, we have easily been able to make the separation, and to prove, that every cause of these passions produces a separate pain or pleasure, I might here observe the same method with the same success, in examining particularly the several causes of love and hatred. But as I hasten to a full and decisive proof of these systems, I delay this examination for a moment: And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present purpose all my reasonings concerning pride and humili-

H 2

PART lity, by an argument that is founded on unquestionable experience.

## II.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

THERE are few persons, that are satisfy'd with their own character, or genius, or fortune, who are not desirous of shewing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now 'tis evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy'd. But if love and esteem were not produc'd by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding wou'd be very absurd, nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have entertain'd. 'Tis true, few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflections on their general nature and resemblances. But without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of *presensation*; which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately

ately



ately in ourselves. Since then the same SECT. I.  
 qualities that produce pride or humility, Of the ob-  
 cause love or hatred; all the arguments jects and  
 that have been employ'd to prove, that the causes of  
 causes of the former passions excite a pain love and  
 or pleasure independent of the passion, will hatred.  
 be applicable with equal evidence to the  
 causes of the latter.

## S E C T. II.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

U P O N duly weighing these argu- SECT. II.  
 ments, no one will make any scru-  
 ple to assent to that conclusion I draw from  
 them, concerning the transition along rela-  
 ted impressions and ideas, especially as 'tis  
 a principle, in itself, so easy and natural. But  
 that we may place this system beyond doubt  
 both with regard to love and hatred, pride  
 and humility, 'twill be proper to make some  
 new experiments upon all these passions, as  
 well as to recal a few of these observations,  
 which I have formerly touch'd upon.

I N order to make these experiments, let  
 us suppose I am in company with a person,  
 whom I formerly regarded without any sen-





PART timents either of friendship or enmity. Here  
 II. I have the natural and ultimate object of  
*Of love* all these four passions plac'd before me. My-  
*and ha-* self am the proper object of pride or humi-  
*ted.* lity; the other person of love or hatred.

REGARD now with attention the nature of these passions, and their situation with respect to each other. 'Tis evident here are four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square or regular connexion with, and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square. Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion, and may be consider'd as the other two sides of the square. Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions.

I SAY



I SAY then, that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, *viz.* of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself. This we must prove by our experiments.

SECT.

II.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

FIRST EXPERIMENT. To proceed with the greater order in these experiments, let us first suppose, that being plac'd in the situation above-mention'd, *viz.* in company with some other person, there is an object presented, that has no relation either of impressions or ideas to any of these passions. Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither of us, and causing of itself no emotion, or independent pain and pleasure: 'Tis evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. Let us try it upon each of them successively. Let us apply it to love, to hatred, to humility, to pride; none of them ever arises in the smallest degree imaginable. Let us change the object, as oft as we please; provided still we choose one, that has neither of these two relations. Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions, of which the mind is susceptible. No object, in the vast variety of nature, will, in any disposition,

H 4

tion,



PART II. tion, produce any passion without these relations.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

SECOND EXPERIMENT. Since an object, that wants both these relations can ever produce any passion, let us bestow on it only one of these relations; and see what will follow. Thus suppose, I regard a stone or any common object, that belongs either to me or my companion, and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: 'Tis plain, that to consider the matter *a priori*, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. This reasoning *a priori* is confirm'd by experience. No trivial or vulgar object, that causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever, by its property or other relations, either to ourselves or others, be able to produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred.

THIRD

THIRD EXPERIMENT. 'Tis evident, SECT. II.  
therefore, that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections.

Let us now remove this relation, and in its stead place a relation of impressions, by presenting an object, which is agreeable or disagreeable, but has no relation either to ourself or companion; and let us observe the consequences. To consider the matter first *a priori*, as in the preceding experiment; we may conclude, that the object will have a small, but an uncertain connexion with these passions. For besides, that this relation is not a cold and imperceptible one, it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas, nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions, which by their opposition destroy each other. But if we consider, on the other hand, that this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any principle, that produces a transition of ideas; but, on the contrary, that tho' the one impression be easily transfus'd into the other, yet the change of objects is suppos'd contrary to all the principles, that cause a transition of that kind; we may from thence infer, that nothing will ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion, that is connected with the passion merely by a relation

Experiments to confirm this system.



PART relation of impressions. What our reason

II. *Of Love and hatred.* would conclude from analogy, after balancing these arguments, would be, that an object, which produces pleasure or uneasiness, but has no manner of connexion either with ourselves or others, may give such a turn to the disposition, as that it may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or hatred, and search for other objects, upon which, by a double relation, it can find these affections; but that an object, which has only one of these relations, tho' the most advantageous one, can never give rise to any constant and establish'd passion.

MOST fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable to experience, and the phenomena of the passions. Suppose I were travelling with a companion thro' a country, to which we are both utter strangers; 'tis evident, that if the prospects be beautiful, the roads agreeable, and the inns commodious, this may put me into good humour both with myself and fellow-traveller. But as we suppose, that this country has no relation either to myself or friend, it can never be the immediate cause of pride or love; and therefore if I found not the passion on some other object, that bears either of us a closer relation, my emotions  
are

ROBART

are rather to be consider'd as the overflow-  
ings of an elevate or humane disposition,  
than as an establish'd passion. The case is  
the same where the object produces uneasi-  
ness.

SECT.

II.

*Experi-  
ments to  
confirm  
this system.*

FOURTH EXPERIMENT. Having found,  
that neither an object without any relation  
of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that  
has only one relation, can ever cause pride  
or humility, love or hatred; reason alone  
may convince us, without any farther ex-  
periment, that whatever has a double rela-  
tion must necessarily excite these passions;  
since 'tis evident they must have some cause.  
But to leave as little room for doubt as pos-  
sible, let us renew our experiments, and  
see whether the event in this case answers  
our expectation. I choose an object, such  
as virtue, that causes a separate satisfaction:  
On this object I bestow a relation to self;  
and find, that from this disposition of af-  
fairs, there immediately arises a passion. But  
what passion? That very one of pride, to  
which this object bears a double relation.  
Its idea is related to that of self, the object  
of the passion: The sensation it causes re-  
sembles the sensation of the passion. That  
I may be sure I am not mistaken in this  
experiment, I remove first one relation; then  
another;



PART another; and find, that each removal destroys the passion, and leaves the object perfectly indifferent. But I am not content with this. I make a still farther trial; and instead of removing the relation, I only change it for one of a different kind. I suppose the virtue to belong to my companion, not to myself; and observe what follows from this alteration. I immediately perceive the affections wheel about, and leaving pride, where there is only one relation, *viz.* of impressions, fall to the side of love, where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and ideas. By repeating the same experiment, in changing anew the relation of ideas, I bring the affections back to pride; and by a new repetition I again place them at love or kindness. Being fully convinc'd of the influence of this relation, I try the effects of the other; and by changing virtue for vice, convert the pleasant impression, which arises from the former, into the disagreeable one, which proceeds from the latter. The effect still answers expectation. Vice, when plac'd on another, excites, by means of its double relations, the passion of hatred, instead of love, which for the same reason arises from virtue. To continue the experiment, I change anew the relation

of

II.  
 Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

of ideas, and suppose the vice to belong to SECT. myself. What follows? What is usual. A II. subsequent change of the passion from hatred to humility. This humility I convert into pride by a new change of the impression; and find after all that I have completed the round, and have by these changes brought back the passion to that very situation, in which I first found it.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

BUT to make the matter still more certain, I alter the object; and instead of vice and virtue, make the trial upon beauty and deformity, riches and poverty, power and servitude. Each of these objects runs the circle of the passions in the same manner, by a change of their relations: And in whatever order we proceed, whether thro' pride, love, hatred, humility, or thro' humility, hatred, love, pride, the experiment is not in the least diversify'd. Esteem and contempt, indeed, arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred; but these are at the bottom the same passions, only diversify'd by some causes, which we shall explain afterwards.

FIFTH EXPERIMENT. To give greater authority to these experiments, let us change the situation of affairs as much as possible, and place the passions and objects in all the different



PART II. *Of love and hatred.* different positions, of which they are susceptible. Let us suppose, beside the relations above-mention'd, that the person, along with whom I make all these experiments, is closely connected with me either by blood or friendship. He is, we shall suppose, my son or brother, or is united to me by a long and familiar acquaintance. Let us next suppose, that the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person; and let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and relations.

BEFORE we consider what they are in fact, let us determine what they ought to be, conformable to my hypothesis. 'Tis plain, that, according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along requir'd. The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion. But to judge only from the situation of affairs, I shou'd not expect, that the affections wou'd rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression. As there is here a person, who by means of

a double relation is the object of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carry'd farther.

SECT. II.

The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride or humility. 'Tis evident, then, that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

THIS is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis; and am pleas'd to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation. The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility. Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations; as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy. This exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis, upon which we reason.

SIXTH EXPERIMENT. This evidence will be still augmented, if we reverse the experiment, and preserving still the same relations, begin only with a different passion.



PART II. *Of love and hatred.* fion. Suppose, that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother, which causes first love or hatred, and afterwards pride or humility, we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves, without any immediate connexion with the person, who is related to us: Experience shews us, that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke, and that the mind is not convey'd from one passion to another, as in the preceding instance. We never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; tho' 'tis evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility. The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility. This may at first sight be esteem'd contrary to my hypothesis; since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same. Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred. Myself am related to the person. It shou'd, therefore, be expected, that like causes must produce like effects, and a perfect transition arise from the double relation, as in all other cases. This difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflections,

Tis



'TIS evident, that as we are at all times SECT. intimately conscious of ourselves, our senti- II. ments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person. But every thing, that strikes upon us with vivacity, and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a manner, into our consideration, and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when it is once present, it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other objects, however strong may be their relation to our first object. The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure. In the one case the relation is aided by another principle: In the other case, 'tis oppos'd by it.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

Now I have observ'd, that those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operation, when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object. The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other. The two impulses concur with each

VOL. II.                    I                    other,



PART other, and render the whole transition more  
II. smooth and easy. But if it shou'd happen,  
*Of love and hatred.* that while the relation of ideas, strictly speaking, continues the same, its influence, in causing a transition of the imagination, shou'd no longer take place, 'tis evident its influence on the passions must also cease, as being dependent entirely on that transition. This is the reason why pride or humility is not transfus'd into love or hatred with the same ease, that the latter passions are chang'd into the former. If a person be my brother I am his likewise: But tho' the relations be reciprocal, they have very different effects on the imagination. The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are every moment conscious. But when the affections are once directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us. This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions, and facilitates or retards their transition; which is a clear proof, that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections.

affections. Besides innumerable experiments that prove this, we here find, that even when the relation remains; if by any particular circumstance its usual effect upon the fancy in producing an association or transference of ideas, is prevented; its usual effect upon the passions, in conveying us from one to another, is in like manner prevented.

SECT.  
II.  
*Experiments to confirm this system.*

SOME may, perhaps, find a contradiction betwixt this phenomenon and that of sympathy, where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us. But this difficulty will vanish, if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves; as in the present case, where we are suppos'd to be actuated with pride or humility. Ourselves, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us. But when self is the object of a passion, 'tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted; in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate.



PART SEVENTH EXPERIMENT. To put this

II. whole reasoning to a farther trial, let us  
 make a new experiment; and as we have  
 already seen the effects of related passions  
 and ideas, let us here suppose an identity  
 of passions along with a relation of ideas;  
 and let us consider the effects of this new  
 situation. 'Tis evident a transition of the  
 passions from the one object to the other is  
 here in all reason to be expected; since the  
 relation of ideas is suppos'd still to continue,  
 and an identity of impressions must produce  
 a stronger connexion, than the most perfect  
 resemblance, that can be imagin'd. If a  
 double relation, therefore, of impressions and  
 ideas is able to produce a transition from  
 one to the other, much more an identity  
 of impressions with a relation of ideas. Ac-  
 cordingly we find, that when we either love  
 or hate any person, the passions seldom con-  
 tinue within their first bounds; but extend  
 themselves towards all the contiguous ob-  
 jects, and comprehend the friends and re-  
 lations of him we love or hate. Nothing  
 is more natural than to bear a kindness to  
 one brother on account of our friendship for  
 another, without any farther examination  
 of his character. A quarrel with one per-  
 son gives us a hatred for the whole family,  
 tho'

*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

tho' entirely innocent of that, which displeas us. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with.

THERE is only one difficulty in this experiment, which it will be necessary to account for, before we proceed any farther.

'Tis evident, that tho' all passions pass easily from one object to another related to it, yet this transition is made with greater facility, where the more considerable object is first presented, and the lesser follows it, than where this order is revers'd, and the lesser takes the precedence. Thus 'tis more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father, than the father upon account of the son; the servant for the master, than the master for the servant; the subject for the prince, than the prince for the subject. In like manner we more readily contract a hatred against a whole family, where our first quarrel is with the head of it, than where we are displeas'd with a son, or servant, or some inferior member. In short, our passions, like other objects, descend with greater facility than they ascend.

THAT we may comprehend, wherein consists the difficulty of explaining this phenomenon, we must consider, that the very same reason, which determines the imagi-

SECT.

II.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*





PART II. nation to pass from remote to contiguous objects, with more facility than from contiguous to remote, causes it likewise to change with more ease, the less for the greater, than the greater for the less. Whatever has the greatest influence is most taken notice of; and whatever is most taken notice of, presents itself most readily to the imagination. We are more apt to overlook in any subject, what is trivial, than what appears of considerable moment; but especially if the latter takes the precedence, and first engages our attention. Thus if any accident makes us consider the *Satellites* of *Jupiter*, our fancy is naturally determin'd to form the idea of that planet; but if we first reflect on the principal planet, 'tis more natural for us to overlook its attendants. The mention of the provinces of any empire conveys our thought to the seat of the empire; but the fancy returns not with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces. The idea of the servant makes us think of the master; that of the subject carries our view to the prince. But the same relation has not an equal influence in conveying us back again. And on this is founded that reproach of *Cornelia* to her sons, that they ought to be ashamed she shou'd

## II.

Of love  
and hatred.

shou'd be more known by the title of the daughter of *Scipio*, than by that of the mother of the *Gracchi*. This was, in other words, exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather, otherwise the imagination of the people, passing from her who was intermediate, and plac'd in an equal relation to both, wou'd always leave them, and denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment. On the same principle is founded that common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands, rather than husbands that of their wives; as also the ceremony of giving the precedency to those, whom we honour and respect. We might find many other instances to confirm this principle, were it not already sufficiently evident.

SECT.  
II.  
Experiments to confirm this system.

Now since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater, as from remote to contiguous, why does not this easy transition of ideas assist the transition of passions in the former case, as well as in the latter? The virtues of a friend or brother produce first love, and then pride; because in that case the imagination passes from remote to contiguous, according to its propensity. Our own virtues produce not first pride, and then love to a friend or



PART brother; because the passage in that case  
 II. would be from contiguous to remote, con-  
 trary to its propensity. But the love or  
 hatred of an inferior cause not readily any  
 passion to the superior, tho' that be the na-  
 tural propensity of the imagination: While  
 the love or hatred of a superior, causes a  
 passion to the inferior, contrary to its pro-  
 pensity. In short, the same facility of tran-  
 sition operates not in the same manner upon  
 superior and inferior as upon contiguous and  
 remote. These two phænomena appear con-  
 tradictory, and require some attention to be  
 reconcil'd.

*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

As the transition of ideas is here made  
 contrary to the natural propensity of the  
 imagination, that faculty must be over-  
 power'd by some stronger principle of an-  
 other kind; and as there is nothing ever  
 present to the mind but impressions and  
 ideas, this principle must necessarily lie in  
 the impressions. Now it has been observ'd,  
 that impressions or passions are connected  
 only by their resemblance, and that where  
 any two passions place the mind in the  
 same or in similar dispositions, it very na-  
 turally passes from the one to the other:  
 As on the contrary, a repugnance in the dis-  
 positions produces a difficulty in the transi-  
 tion

tion of the passions. But 'tis observable, SECT.  
that this repugnance may arise from a dif- II.  
ference of degree as well as of kind; nor  
do we experience a greater difficulty in pas- Experi-  
sing suddenly from a small degree of love ments to  
to a small degree of hatred, than from a small confirm  
to a great degree of either of these affections. this system.  
A man, when calm or only moderately ag-  
itated, is so different, in every respect, from  
himself, when disturbed with a violent pas-  
sion, that no two persons can be more un-  
like; nor is it easy to pass from the one ex-  
treme to the other, without a considerable  
interval betwixt them.

THE difficulty is not less, if it be not  
rather greater, in passing from the strong  
passion to the weak, than in passing from  
the weak to the strong, provided the one  
passion upon its appearance destroys the o-  
ther, and they do not both of them exist  
at once. But the case is entirely alter'd,  
when the passions unite together, and actuate  
the mind at the same time. A weak pas-  
sion, when added to a strong, makes not  
so considerable change in the disposition, as  
a strong when added to a weak; for which  
reason there is a closer connexion betwixt  
the great degree and the small, than betwixt  
the small degree and the great.

THE



PART II. THE degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object; and an affection directed to a person, who is considerable in our eyes, fills and possesses the mind much more than one, which has for its object a person we esteem of less consequence. Here then the contradiction betwixt the propensities of the imagination and passion displays itself. When we turn our thought to a great and a small object, the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great, than from the great to the small; but the affections find a greater difficulty: And as the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination, no wonder they prevail over it, and draw the mind to their side. In spite of the difficulty of passing from the idea of great to that of little, a passion directed to the former, produces always a similar passion towards the latter; when the great and little are related together. The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master; but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or good-will to the servant. The strongest passion in this case takes the precedence; and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition,

*Of love  
and hatred.*

fition, the passage is by that means render'd more easy and natural betwixt them. S E C T. II.

As in the foregoing experiment we found, that a relation of ideas, which, by any particular circumstance, ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas, ceases likewise to operate on the passions; so in the present experiment we find the same property of the impressions. Two different degrees of the same passion are surely related together; but if the smaller be first present, it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater; and that because the addition of the great to the little, produces a more sensible alteration on the temper, than the addition of the little to the great. These phenomena, when duly weigh'd, will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

AND these proofs will be confirm'd, if we consider the manner in which the mind here reconciles the contradiction, I have observ'd betwixt the passions and the imagination. The fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater, than from the greater to the less: But on the contrary a violent passion produces more easily a feeble, than that does a violent. In this opposition the passion in the end prevails over

PART over the imagination; but 'tis commonly  
 I. by complying with it, and by seeking another  
 quality, which may counter-balance that principle, from whence the opposition arises. When we love the father or master of a family, we little think of his children or servants. But when these are present with us, or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them, the nearness and contiguity in this case encreases their magnitude, or at least removes that opposition, which the fancy makes to the transition of the affections. If the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less, it finds an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous, which brings the matter to an equality, and leaves the way open from the one passion to the other.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

EIGHTH EXPERIMENT. I have observ'd that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility, is more easy than from pride or humility to love or hatred; and that the difficulty, which the imagination finds in passing from contiguous to remote, is the cause why we scarce have any instance of the latter transition of the affections. I must, however, make one exception, *viz.* when the very cause of the pride and humility is plac'd in some other person.

person. For in that case the imagination is necessitated to consider the person, nor can it possibly confine its view to ourselves. Thus nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, than his approbation of our conduct and character: As on the other hand, nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred, than his blame or contempt. Here 'tis evident, that the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and that this passion is transfus'd into love or hatred, whose object is some other person, notwithstanding the rule I have already establish'd, *that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote.* But the transition in this case is not made merely on account of the relation betwixt ourselves and the person; but because that very person is the real cause of our first passion, and of consequence is intimately connected with it. 'Tis his approbation that produces pride; and disapprobation, humility. No wonder, then, the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred. This is not a contradiction, but an exception to the rule; and an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself.

S E C T.

II.

*Experiments to confirm this system.*

SUCH





PART  
II.*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

SUCH an exception as this is, therefore, rather a confirmation of the rule. And indeed, if we consider all the eight experiments I have explain'd, we shall find that the same principle appears in all of them, and that 'tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc'd. An object without \* a relation, or † with but one, never produces either of these passions; and 'tis ‡ found that the passion always varies in conformity to the relation. Nay we may observe, that where the relation, by any particular circumstance, has not its usual effect of producing a transition either of \*\* ideas or of impressions, it ceases to operate upon the passions, and gives rise neither to pride nor love, humility nor hatred. This rule we find still to hold good ††, even under the appearance of its contrary; and as relation is frequently experienc'd to have no effect; which upon examination is found to proceed from some particular circumstance, that prevents the transition; so even in instances, where that circumstance, tho' present, prevents not the

\* First Experiment                    † Second and Third Experiments.  
 ‡ Fourth Experiment.                    \*\* Sixth Experiment,  
 †† Seventh and Eighth Experiments.

tran-

transition, 'tis found to arise from some other circumstance, which counter-ballances it. Thus not only the variations resolve themselves into the general principle, but even the variations of these variations.

SECT.  
II.  
*Experiments to confirm this system.*

S E C T. III.

*Difficulties solv'd.*

AFTER so many and such undeniable proofs drawn from daily experience and observation, it may seem superfluous to enter into a particular examination of all the causes of love and hatred. I shall, therefore, employ the sequel of this part, *First*, In removing some difficulties, concerning particular causes of these passions. *Secondly*, In examining the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.

SECT.  
III.

NOTHING is more evident, than that any person acquires our kindness, or is expos'd to our ill-will, in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him, and that the passions keep pace exactly with the sensations in all their changes and variations. Whoever can find the means either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render

der

PART

II.

Of love  
and ha-  
tred.

der himself useful or agreeable to us, is sure of our affections: As on the other hand, whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred. When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, moderate, and merciful. If the general of our enemies be successful, 'tis with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man. He is a forcerer: He has a communication with dæmons; as is reported of *Oliver Cromwell*, and the *Duke of Luxembourg*: He is bloody-minded, and takes a pleasure in death and destruction. But if the success be on our side, our commander has all the opposite good qualities, and is a pattern of virtue, as well as of courage and conduct. His treachery we call policy: His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war. In short, every one of his faults we either endeavour to extenuate, or dignify it with the name of that virtue, which approaches it. 'Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro' common life.

THERE are some, who add another condition, and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person, but likewise

wife that it arise knowingly, and with a particular design and intention. A man, who wounds and harms us by accident, becomes not our enemy upon that account, nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one, who does us any service after the same manner. By the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred.

BUT here we must make a distinction. If that quality in another, which pleases or displeases, be constant and inherent in his person and character, it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention: But otherwise a knowledge and design is requisite, in order to give rise to these passions. One that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is the object of our aversion, tho' nothing be more certain, than that he has not the least intention of displeasing us by these qualities. But if the uneasiness proceed not from a quality, but an action, which is produc'd and annihilated in a moment, 'tis necessary, in order to produce some relation, and connect this action sufficiently with the person, that it be deriv'd from a particular fore-thought and design. 'Tis not enough, that the action arise from the

VOL. II.

K

person,

SECT.  
II.  
*Difficulties  
sol'd.*



PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

person, and have him for its immediate cause and author. This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions. It reaches not the sensible and thinking part, and neither proceeds from any thing *durable* in him, nor leaves any thing behind it; but passes in a moment, and is as if it had never been. On the other hand, an intention shews certain qualities, which remaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person, and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other. We can never think of him without reflecting on these qualities; unless repentance and a change of life have produc'd an alteration in that respect: In which case the passion is likewise alter'd. This therefore is one reason, why an intention is requisite to excite either love or hatred.

BUT we must farther consider, that an intention, besides its strengthening the relation of ideas, is often necessary to produce a relation of impressions, and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness. For 'tis observable, that the principal part of an injury is the contempt and hatred, which it shews in the person, that injures us; and without that, the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness.

uneasiness. In like manner, a good office SECT.  
 is agreeable, chiefly because it flatters our III.  
 vanity, and is a proof of the kindness and Difficulties  
 esteem of the person, who performs it. John d.

The removal of the intention, removes the mortification in the one case, and vanity in the other; and must of course cause a remarkable diminution in the passions of love and hatred.

I GRANT, that these effects of the removal of design, in diminishing the relations of impressions and ideas, are not entire, nor able to remove every degree of these relations. But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? Experience, I am sure, informs us of the contrary, nor is there any thing more certain, than that men often fall into a violent anger for injuries, which they themselves must own to be entirely involuntary and accidental. This emotion, indeed, cannot be of long continuance; but still is sufficient to shew, that there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger, and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas. But when the violence of the impression is once a little abated, the defect of the relation begins to be better felt;



PART and as the character of a person is no wise  
 II. interested in such injuries as are casual and  
 involuntary, it seldom happens that on  
 their account, we entertain a lasting en-  
 mity.

*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

To illustrate this doctrine by a parallel instance, we may observe, that not only the uneasiness, which proceeds from another by accident, has but little force to excite our passion, but also that which arises from an acknowledg'd necessity and duty. One that has a real design of harming us, proceeding not from hatred and ill-will, but from justice and equity, draws not upon him our anger, if we be in any degree reasonable; notwithstanding he is both the cause, and the knowing cause of our sufferings. Let us examine a little this phenomenon.

'Tis evident in the first place, that this circumstance is not decisive; and tho' it may be able to diminish the passions, 'tis seldom it can entirely remove them. How few criminals are there, who have no ill-will to the person, that accuses them, or to the judge, that condemns them, even tho' they be conscious of their own deserts? In like manner our antagonist in a law-suit, and our competitor for any office,

office, are commonly regarded as our ene-  
 mies; tho' we must acknowledge, if we  
 wou'd but reflect a moment, that their mo-  
 tive is entirely as justifiable as our own.

SECT.

III.

*Difficulties  
 solv'd.*

BESIDES we may consider, that when  
 we receive harm from any person, we are  
 apt to imagine him criminal, and 'tis with  
 extreme difficulty we allow of his justice  
 and innocence. This is a clear proof, that,  
 independent of the opinion of iniquity, any  
 harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency  
 to excite our hatred, and that afterwards we  
 seek for reasons upon which we may justi-  
 fy and establish the passion. Here the idea  
 of injury produces not the passion, but arises  
 from it.

NOR is it any wonder that passion shou'd  
 produce the opinion of injury; since other-  
 wise it must suffer a considerable diminu-  
 tion, which all the passions avoid as much  
 possible. The removal of injury may re-  
 move the anger, without proving that the  
 anger arises only from the injury. The  
 harm and the justice are two contrary ob-  
 jects, of which the one has a tendency to  
 produce hatred, and the other love; and  
 'tis according to their different degrees, and  
 our particular turn of thinking, that either





PART of the objects prevails, and excites its proper  
 II. passion.

Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

## S E C T. IV.

*Of the love of relations.*

S E C T. IV. **H**AVING given a reason, why several actions, that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness, excite not any degree, or but a small one, of the passion of love or hatred towards the actors; 'twill be necessary to shew, wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects, which we find by experience to produce these passions.

ACCORDING to the preceding system there is always requir'd a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred. But tho' this be universally true, 'tis remarkable that the passion of love may be excited by only one *relation* of a different kind, *viz.* betwixt ourselves and the object; or more properly speaking, that this relation is always attended with both the others. Whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities. Thus  
 the

the relation of blood produces the strongest S E C T.  
 tie the mind is capable of in the love of IV.  
 parents to their children, and a lesser degree  
 of the same affection, as the relation les- *Of the*  
 sens. Nor has consanguinity alone this ef- *love of re-*  
 fect, but any other relation without excep- *lations.*  
 tion. We love our country-men, our neigh-  
 bours, those of the same trade, profession,  
 and even name with ourselves. Every one  
 of these relations is esteem'd some tie, and  
 gives a title to a share of our affection.

THERE is another phænomenon, which  
 is parallel to this, *viz.* that *acquaintance*,  
 without any kind of relation, gives rise to  
 love and kindness. When we have contrac-  
 ted a habitude and intimacy with any per-  
 son; tho' in frequenting his company we  
 have not been able to discover any very va-  
 luable quality, of which he is possess'd; yet  
 we cannot forbear preferring him to stran-  
 gers, of whose superior merit we are fully  
 convinc'd. These two phænomena of the  
 effects of relation and acquaintance will give  
 mutual light to each other, and may be  
 both explain'd from the same principle.

THOSE, who take a pleasure in declaim-  
 ing against human nature, have observ'd,  
 that man is altogether insufficient to support  
 himself; and that when you loosen all the



**PART** holds, which he has of external objects, he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair. From this, say they, proceeds that continual search after amusement in gaming, in hunting, in business; by which we endeavour to forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain'd by some brisk and lively emotion. To this method of thinking I so far agree, that I own the mind to be insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments. Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, *viz.* a rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus'd by any object. Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that

II.  
Of love  
and ha-  
rred.

that of a passion, because such an idea be-  
comes a kind of passion, and gives a more  
sensible agitation to the mind, than any o-  
ther image or conception.

SECT.

IV.

*Of the  
love of re-  
lations.*

THIS being once admitted, all the rest is  
easy. For as the company of strangers is  
agreeable to us for a *short time*, by inli-  
vening our thought; so the company of  
our relations and acquaintance must be pe-  
culiarly agreeable, because it has this effect  
in a greater degree, and is of more *durable*  
influence. Whatever is related to us is con-  
ceiv'd in a lively manner by the easy tran-  
sition from ourselves to the related object.  
Custom also, or acquaintance facilitates the  
entrance, and strengthens the conception of  
any object. The first case is parallel to our  
reasonings from cause and effect; the second  
to education. And as reasoning and educa-  
tion concur only in producing a lively and  
strong idea of any object; so is this the  
only particular, which is common to rela-  
tion and acquaintance. This must, there-  
fore, be the influencing quality, by which  
they produce all their common effects; and  
love or kindness being one of these effects, it  
must be from the force and liveliness of  
conception, that the passion is deriv'd. Such  
a conception is peculiarly agreeable, and  
makes

PART makes us have an affectionate regard for every thing, that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and good-will.

II.  
Of love  
and ha-  
tred.

'TIS obvious, that people associate together according to their particular tempers and dispositions, and that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay ; as the serious bear an affection to the serious. This not only happens, where they remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others, but also by the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy, which always arises betwixt similar characters. Where they remark the resemblance, it operates after the manner of a relation, by producing a connexion of ideas. Where they do not remark it, it operates by some other principle ; and if this latter principle be similar to the former, it must be receiv'd as a confirmation of the foregoing reasoning.

THE idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression ; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produc'd  
with

with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark. And as in both cases a love or affection arises from the resemblance, we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to *relation, acquaintance, and resemblance.*

THE great propensity men have to pride may be consider'd as another similar phenomenon. It often happens, that after we have liv'd a considerable time in any city; however at first it might be disagreeable to us; yet as we become familiar with the objects, and contract an acquaintance, tho' merely with the streets and buildings, the aversion diminishes by degrees, and at last changes into the opposite passion. The mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects, to which it is accustom'd, and naturally prefers them to others, which, tho',

SECT.

IV.

*Of the  
love of re-  
lations.*



PART tho', perhaps, in themselves more valuable,  
 II. are less known to it. By the same quality  
 of the mind we are seduc'd into a good  
 opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, that  
 belong to us. They appear in a stronger  
 light; are more agreeable; and consequently  
 fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any  
 other.

*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

IT may not be amiss, in treating of the affection we bear our acquaintance and relations, to observe some pretty curious phænomena, which attend it. 'Tis easy to remark in common life, that children esteem their relation to their mother to be weaken'd, in a great measure, by her second marriage, and no longer regard her with the same eye, as if she had continu'd in her state of widow-hood. Nor does this happen only, when they have felt any inconveniencies from her second marriage, or when her husband is much her inferior; but even without any of these considerations, and merely because she has become part of another family. This also takes place with regard to the second marriage of a father; but in a much less degree: And 'tis certain the ties of blood are not so much loosen'd in the latter case as by the marriage of a mother. These two phænomena are remarkable.

markable in themselves, but much more so when compar'd.

SECT.  
IV.

IN order to produce a perfect relation betwixt two objects, 'tis requisite, not only that the imagination be convey'd from one to the other by resemblance, contiguity or causation, but also that it return back from the second to the first with the same ease and facility. At first sight this may seem a necessary and unavoidable consequence. If one object resemble another, the latter object must necessarily resemble the former. If one object be the cause of another, the second object is effect to its cause. 'Tis the same case with contiguity: And therefore the relation being always reciprocal, it may be thought, that the return of the imagination from the second to the first must also, in every case, be equally natural as its passage from the first to the second. But upon farther examination we shall easily discover our mistake. For supposing the second object, beside its reciprocal relation to the first, to have also a strong relation to a third object; in that case the thought, passing from the first object to the second, returns not back with the same facility, tho' the relation continues the same; but is readily carry'd on to the third object, by means  
of

*Of the  
love of re-  
lations.*





PART of the new relation, which presents itself, and gives a new impulse to the imagination. This new relation, therefore, weakens the tie betwixt the first and second objects. The fancy is by its very nature wavering and inconstant; and considers always two objects as more strongly related together, where it finds the passage equally easy both in going and returning, than where the transition is easy only in one of these motions. The double motion is a kind of a double tie, and binds the objects together in the closest and most intimate manner.

II.  
*Of love  
 and hatred.*

THE second marriage of a mother breaks not the relation of child and parent; and that relation suffices to convey my imagination from myself to her with the greatest ease and facility. But after the imagination is arriv'd at this point of view, it finds its object to be surrounded with so many other relations, which challenge its regard, that it knows not which to prefer, and is at a loss what new object to pitch upon. The ties of interest and duty bind her to another family, and prevent that return of the fancy from her to myself, which is necessary to support the union. The thought has no longer the vibration, requisite to set it perfectly

fectly at ease, and indulge its inclination to S E C T.  
change. It goes with facility, but returns IV.  
with difficulty; and by that interruption  
finds the relation much weaken'd from what  
it wou'd be were the passage open and easy  
on both sides.

*Of the  
love of re-  
lations.*

Now to give a reason, why this effect follows not in the same degree upon the second marriage of a father: we may reflect on what has been prov'd already, that tho' the imagination goes easily from the view of a lesser object to that of a greater, yet it returns not with the same facility from the greater to the less. When my imagination goes from myself to my father, it passes not so readily from him to his second wife, nor considers him as entering into a different family, but as continuing the head of that family, of which I am myself a part. His superiority prevents the easy transition of the thought from him to his spouse, but keeps the passage still open for a return to myself along the same relation of child and parent. He is not sunk in the new relation he acquires; so that the double motion or vibration of thought is still easy and natural. By this indulgence of the fancy in its inconstancy, the tie of child and parent still preserves its full force and influence.

A



PART  
II.*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

A MOTHER thinks not her tie to a son weaken'd, because 'tis shar'd with her husband: Nor a son his with a parent, because 'tis shar'd with a brother. The third object is here related to the first, as well as to the second; so that the imagination goes and comes along all of them with the greatest facility.

## S E C T. V.

*Of our esteem for the rich and  
powerful.*

S E C T.  
V.

**N**OTHING has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness: And as esteem and contempt are to be consider'd as species of love and hatred, 'twill be proper in this place to explain these phenomena.

HERE it happens most fortunately, that the greatest difficulty is not to discover a principle capable of producing such an effect, but to choose the chief and predominant among several, that present themselves. The *satisfaction* we take in the riches of others, and

and the *esteem* we have for the possessors may be ascrib'd to three different causes. SECT.  
V.

*First*, To the objects they possess; such as houses, gardens, equipages; which, being agreeable in themselves, necessarily produce a sentiment of pleasure in every one, that either considers or surveys them. *Secondly*, To the expectation of advantage from the rich and powerful by our sharing their possessions. *Thirdly*, To sympathy, which makes us partake of the satisfaction of every one, that approaches us. All these principles may concur in producing the present phenomenon. The question is, to which of them we ought principally to ascribe it.

*Of our esteem for the rich and powerful*

'TIS certain, that the first principle, *viz.* the reflection on agreeable objects, has a greater influence, than what, at first sight, we may be apt to imagine. We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho' these sensations appear not much in our common indolent way of thinking, 'tis easy, either in reading or conversation, to discover them. Men of wit always turn the discourse on subjects that are entertaining to the imagination; and poets never present any objects but such as are of the same nature. Mr.



PART II. *Philips* has chosen *Cyder* for the subject of an excellent poem. Beer wou'd not have been so proper, as being neither so agreeable to the taste nor eye. But he wou'd certainly have preferr'd wine to either of them, cou'd his native country have afforded him so agreeable a liquor. We may learn from thence, that every thing, which is agreeable to the senses, is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an image of that satisfaction, which it gives by its real application to the bodily organs.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

BUT tho' these reasons may induce us to comprehend this delicacy of the imagination among the causes of the respect, which we pay the rich and powerful, there are many other reasons, that may keep us from regarding it as the sole or principal. For as the ideas of pleasure can have an influence only by means of their vivacity, which makes them approach impressions, 'tis most natural those ideas shou'd have that influence, which are favour'd by most circumstances, and have a natural tendency to become strong and lively; such as our ideas of the passions and sensations of any human creature. Every human creature resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other object, in operating on the imagination. II. 30 BE-

BESIDES, if we consider the nature of that faculty, and the great influence which all relations have upon it, we shall easily be persuaded, that however the ideas of the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys, may become lively and agreeable, the fancy will not confine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects; and in particular, to the person, who possesses them. And this is the more natural, that the pleasant idea or image produces here a passion towards the person, by means of his relation to the object; so that 'tis unavoidable but he must enter into the original conception, since he makes the object of the derivative passion. But if he enters into the original conception, and is consider'd as enjoying these agreeable objects, 'tis *sympathy*, which is properly the cause of the affection; and the *third* principle is more powerful and universal than the *first*.

ADD to this, that riches and power alone, even tho' unemploy'd, naturally cause esteem and respect: And consequently these passions arise not from the idea of any beautiful or agreeable objects. 'Tis true; money implies a kind of representation of such objects, by the power it affords of obtaining them; and for that reason may still be esteem'd proper to convey those agreeable

V.  
 Of our  
 esteem for  
 the rich  
 and pow-  
 erful



PART images, which may give rise to the passion.

II. But as this prospect is very distant, 'tis more natural for us to take a contiguous object, *viz.* the satisfaction, which this power affords the person, who is possess'd of it. And of this we shall be farther satisfy'd, if we consider, that riches represent the goods of life, only by means of the will; which employs them; and therefore imply in their very nature an idea of the person, and cannot be consider'd without a kind of sympathy with his sensations and enjoyments.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

THIS we may confirm by a reflection, which to some will, perhaps, appear too subtle and refin'd. I have already observ'd, that power, as distinguish'd from its exercise, has either no meaning at all, or is nothing but a possibility or probability of existence; by which any object approaches to reality, and has a sensible influence on the mind. I have also observ'd, that this approach, by an illusion of the fancy, appears much greater, when we ourselves are possess'd of the power, than when it is enjoy'd by another; and that in the former case the objects seem to touch upon the very verge of reality, and convey almost an equal satisfaction, as if actually in our possession. Now I assert, that where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter

enter into this sentiment of the proprietor, and that without such a sympathy the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, wou'd have but a feeble influence upon us. An avaritious man is respected for his money, tho' he scarce is possess'd of a *power*; that is, there scarce is a *probability* or even *possibility* of his employing it in the acquisition of the pleasures and conveniences of life. To himself alone this power seems perfect and entire; and therefore we must receive his sentiments by sympathy, before we can have a strong intense idea of these enjoyments, or esteem him upon account of them.

THUS we have found, that the *first* principle, *viz. the agreeable idea of those objects, which riches afford the enjoyment of*; resolves itself in a great measure into the *third*, and becomes a *sympathy* with the person we esteem or love. Let us now examine the *second* principle, *viz. the agreeable expectation of advantage*, and see what force we may justly attribute to it.

'TIS obvious, that tho' riches and authority undoubtedly give their owner a power of doing us service, yet this power is not to be consider'd as on the same footing with that, which they afford him, of

SECT.

V.

*Of our  
esteem for  
the rich  
and powerful.*





PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

pleasing himself, and satisfying his own appetites. Self-love approaches the power and exercise very near each other in the latter case; but in order to produce a similar effect in the former, we must suppose a friendship and good-will to be conjoin'd with the riches. Without that circumstance 'tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others, tho' there is nothing more certain, than that we naturally esteem and respect the rich, even before we discover in them any such favourable disposition towards us.

BUT I carry this farther, and observe, not only that we respect the rich and powerful, where they shew no inclination to serve us, but also when we lie so much out of the sphere of their activity, that they cannot even be suppos'd to be endow'd with that power. Prisoners of war are always treated with a respect suitable to their condition; and 'tis certain riches go very far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth and quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument of the same kind. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one who is descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who acquires our esteem by his relation to persons

sons whom we esteem? His ancestors, therefore, tho' dead, are respected, in some measure, on account of their riches, and consequently without any kind of expectation.

SECT.  
V.

*Of our esteem for the rich and powerful.*

BUT not to go so far as prisoners of war and the dead to find instances of this disinterested esteem for riches, let us observe with a little attention those phænomena that occur to us in common life and conversation. A man, who is himself of a competent fortune, upon coming into a company of strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect and deference, as he is inform'd of their different fortunes and conditions; tho' 'tis impossible he can ever propose, and perhaps wou'd not accept of any advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In short, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated by riches, and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintance.

THERE is, indeed, an answer to these arguments, drawn from the influence of *general rules*. It may be pretended, that being accusom'd to expect succour and protection



PART II. *Of love and hatred.* protection from the rich and powerful, and to esteem them upon that account, we extend the same sentiments to those, who resemble them in their fortune, but from whom we can never hope for any advantage. The general rule still prevails, and by giving a bent to the imagination draws along the passion, in the same manner as if its proper object were real and existent.

BUT that this principle does not here take place, will easily appear, if we consider, that in order to establish a general rule, and extend it beyond its proper bounds, there is requir'd a certain uniformity in our experience, and a great superiority of those instances, which are conformable to the rule, above the contrary. But here the case is quite otherwise. Of a hundred men of credit and fortune I meet with, there is not, perhaps, one from whom I can expect advantage; so that 'tis impossible any custom can ever prevail in the present case.

UPON THE WHOLE, there remains nothing, which can give us an esteem for power and riches, and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except the principle of *sympathy*, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness. Riches  
give

give satisfaction to their possessor; and this S E C T. satisfaction is convey'd to the beholder by V. the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity. This agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. It proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises, according to my hypothesis.

THE best method of reconciling us to this opinion is to take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy thro' the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another. In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment

we

V.  
Of our  
esteem for  
the rich  
and pow-  
erful.



PART we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes

II. when enjoy'd a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou'd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others. Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: He will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

THIS conclusion from a general view of human nature, we may confirm by particular instances, wherein the force of sympathy is very remarkable. Most kinds of beauty are deriv'd from this origin; and tho' our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, 'tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures. A man, who shews us any house or building, takes particular

ticular care among other things to point out the convenience of the apartments, the advantages of their situation, and the little room lost in the stairs, anti-chambers and passages; and indeed 'tis evident, the chief part of the beauty consists in these particulars. The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a beauty. But after what manner does it give pleasure? 'Tis certain our own interest is not in the least concern'd; and as this is a beauty of interest, not of form, so to speak, it must delight us merely by communication, and by our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. We enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in him.

THIS observation extends to tables, chairs, seritoires, chimneys, coaches, fadles, ploughs, and indeed to every work of art; it being an universal rule, that their beauty is chiefly deriv'd from their utility, and from their fitness for that purpose, to which they are destin'd. But this is an advantage, that concerns only the owner, nor is there any thing but sympathy, which can interest the spectator,

'TIS

SECT.

V.

*Of our  
esteem for  
the rich  
and pow-  
erful.*



## PART

## I.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

'Tis evident, that nothing renders a field more agreeable than its fertility, and that scarce any advantages of ornament or situation will be able to equal this beauty. 'Tis the same case with particular trees and plants, as with the field on which they grow. I know not but a plain, overgrown with furze and broom, may be, in itself, as beautiful as a hill cover'd with vines or olive-trees; tho' it will never appear so to one, who is acquainted with the value of each. But this is a beauty merely of imagination, and has no foundation in what appears to the senses. Fertility and value have a plain reference to use; and that to riches, joy, and plenty; in which tho' we have no hope of partaking, yet we enter into them by the vivacity of the fancy, and share them, in some measure, with the proprietor.

THERE is no rule in painting more reasonable than that of ballancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not justly ballanc'd, is disagreeable; and that because it conveys the ideas of its fall, of harm, and of pain: Which ideas are painful, when by sympathy

thy they acquire any degree of force and S E C T.  
vivacity.

A D D to this, that the principal part of  
personal beauty is an air of health and vi-  
gour, and such a construction of members  
as promises strength and activity. This  
idea of beauty cannot be accounted for but  
by sympathy.

I N general we may remark, that the  
minds of men are mirrors to one another,  
not only because they reflect each others e-  
motions, but also because those rays of pas-  
sions, sentiments and opinions may be often  
reverberated, and may decay away by in-  
sensible degrees. Thus the pleasure, which  
a rich man receives from his possessions, being  
thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure  
and esteem; which sentiments again, being  
perceiv'd and sympathiz'd with, encrease the  
pleasure of the possessor; and being once  
more reflected, become a new foundation  
for pleasure and esteem in the beholder.  
There is certainly an original satisfaction in  
riches deriv'd from that power, which they  
bestow, of enjoying all the pleasures of life;  
and as this is their very nature and essence,  
it must be the first source of all the pas-  
sions, which arise from them. One of the  
most considerable of these passions is that of  
love

V.  
*Of our  
esteem for  
the rich  
and pow-  
erful.*

IV





PART love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflexion of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a third rebound of the original pleasure; after which 'tis difficult to distinguish the images and reflexions, by reason of their faintness and confusion.

II.  
 Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

### S E C T. VI.

*Of benevolence and anger.*

S E C T. VI. **I**DEAS may be compar'd to the extension and solidity of matter, and impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells and other sensible qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow'd with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable

pable of forming a compound by their SECT.  
conjunction, not by their mixture. On VI.  
the other hand, impressions and passions are  
susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. Some of the most curious phenomena of the human mind are deriv'd from this property of the passions.

*Of benevolence and anger.*

IN examining those ingredients, which are capable of uniting with love and hatred, I begin to be sensible, in some measure, of a misfortune, that has attended every system of philosophy, with which the world has been yet acquainted. 'Tis commonly found, that in accounting for the operations of nature by any particular hypothesis; among a number of experiments, that quadrate exactly with the principles we wou'd endeavour to establish; there is always some phenomenon, which is more stubborn, and will not so easily bend to our purpose. We need not be surpriz'd, that this shou'd happen in natural philosophy. The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we must necessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them,

PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

them, involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities. But as the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known, and I have us'd all imaginable caution in forming conclusions concerning them, I have always hop'd to keep clear of those contradictions, which have attended every other system. Accordingly the difficulty, which I have at present in my eye, is no-wise contrary to my system; but only departs a little from that simplicity, which has been hitherto its principal force and beauty.

THE passions of love and hatred are always follow'd by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger. 'Tis this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person below'd, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated. So remarkable a difference betwixt these two sets



sets of passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, which in so many other particulars correspond to each other, merits our attention.

SECT.  
VI.  
Of bene-  
volence  
and anger.

THE conjunction of this desire and aversion with love and hatred may be accounted for by two different hypotheses. The first is, that love and hatred have not only a *cause*, which excites them, *viz.* pleasure and pain; and an *object*, to which they are directed, *viz.* a person or thinking being; but likewise an *end*, which they endeavour to attain, *viz.* the happiness or misery of the person belov'd or hated; all which views, mixing together, make only one passion. According to this system, love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable but the same.

BUT this is evidently contrary to experience. For tho' 'tis certain we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination,

PART and are not absolutely essential to love and  
 II. hatred. They are the most obvious and nat-  
*Of love*  
*and ha-*  
*tred.*  
 tural sentiments of these affections, but not  
 the only ones. The passions may express  
 themselves in a hundred ways, and may  
 subsist a considerable time, without our re-  
 flecting on the happiness or misery of their  
 objects; which clearly proves, that these de-  
 sires are not the same with love and hatred,  
 nor make any essential part of them.

WE may, therefore, infer, that bene-  
 volence and anger are passions different  
 from love and hatred, and only conjoin'd  
 with them, by the original constitution of  
 the mind. As nature has given to the body  
 certain appetites and inclinations, which she  
 encreases, diminishes, or changes according  
 to the situation of the fluids or solids; she  
 has proceeded in the same manner with  
 the mind. According as we are possess'd  
 with love or hatred, the correspondent  
 desire of the happiness or misery of the per-  
 son, who is the object of these passions, a-  
 rises in the mind, and varies with each va-  
 riation of these opposite passions. This or-  
 der of things, abstractedly consider'd, is not  
 necessary. Love and hatred might have  
 been unattended with any such desires, or  
 their

their particular connexion might have been entirely revers'd. If nature had so pleas'd, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love, and of happiness to hatred. If the sensation of the passion and desire be opposite, nature cou'd have alter'd the sensation without altering the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each other.

S E C T.  
VI.

*Of benevolence and anger.*

S E C T. VII.

*Of compassion.*

**B**UT tho' the desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them, be an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature, we find it may be counterfeited on many occasions, and may arise from secondary principles. *Pity* is a concern for, and *malice* a joy in the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy. We pity even strangers, and such as are perfectly indifferent to us: And if our ill-will to another proceed

S E C T.  
VII.

M 2

from



PART from any harm or injury, it is not, properly speaking, malice, but revenge. But if we examine these affections of pity and malice we shall find them to be secondary ones, arising from original affections, which are varied by some particular turn of thought and imagination.

II.  
Of love  
and hatred.

'TWILL be easy to explain the passion of *pity*, from the precedent reasoning concerning *sympathy*. We have a lively idea of every thing related to us. All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow. These have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure or enjoyment.

A SPECTATOR of a tragedy passes thro' a long train of grief, terror, indignation, and other affections, which the poet represents in the persons he introduces. As many tragedies end happily, and no excellent one can be compos'd without some re-  
verses

verses of fortune, the spectator must sympathize with all these changes, and receive the fictitious joy as well as every other passion. Unless, therefore, it be asserted, that

SECT.  
VII.

*Of com-  
passion.*

every distinct passion is communicated by a distinct original quality, and is not deriv'd from the general principle of sympathy above-explain'd, it must be allow'd, that all of them arise from that principle. To except any one in particular must appear highly unreasonable. As they are all first present in the mind of one person, and afterwards appear in the mind of another; and as the manner of their appearance, first as an idea, then as an impression, is in every case the same, the transition must arise from the same principle. I am at least sure, that this method of reasoning wou'd be consider'd as certain, either in natural philosophy or common life.

ADD to this, that pity depends, in a great measure, on the contiguity, and even sight of the object; which is a proof, that 'tis deriv'd from the imagination. Not to mention that women and children are most subject to pity, as being most guided by that faculty. The same infirmity, which makes them faint at the sight of a naked



PART sword, tho' in the hands of their best friend,  
 II. makes them pity extremely those, whom  
 they find in any grief or affliction. Those  
 philosophers, who derive this passion from I  
 know not what subtle reflections on the  
 instability of fortune, and our being liable  
 to the same miseries we behold, will find  
 this observation contrary to them among  
 a great many others, which it were easy  
 to produce.

Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

THERE remains only to take notice of  
 a pretty remarkable phænomenon of this  
 passion; which is, that the communicated  
 passion of sympathy sometimes acquires  
 strength from the weakness of its original,  
 and even arises by a transition from affec-  
 tions, which have no existence. Thus when  
 a person obtains any honourable office, or  
 inherits a great fortune, we are always the  
 more rejoic'd for his prosperity, the less  
 sense he seems to have of it, and the great-  
 er equanimity and indifference he shews in its  
 enjoyment. In like manner a man, who  
 is not dejected by misfortunes, is the more  
 lamented on account of his patience; and if  
 that virtue extends so far as utterly to remove  
 all sense of uneasiness, it still farther encreases  
 our compassion. When a person of merit  
 falls

falls into what is vulgarly esteem'd a great S E C T. VII. misfortune, we form a notion of his condition; and carrying our fancy from the cause to the usual effect, first conceive a lively idea of his sorrow, and then feel an impression of it, entirely over-looking that greatness of mind, which elevates him above such emotions, or only considering it so far as to encrease our admiration, love and tenderness for him. We find from experience, that such a degree of passion is usually connected with such a misfortune; and tho' there be an exception in the present case, yet the imagination is affected by the *general rule*, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person were really actuated by it. From the same principles we blush for the conduct of those, who behave themselves foolishly before us; and that tho' they shew no sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly. All this proceeds from sympathy; but 'tis of a partial kind, and views its objects only on one side, without considering the other, which has a contrary effect, and wou'd entirely destroy that emotion, which arises from the first appearance.

PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

WE have also instances, wherein an indiffer-  
ence and insensibility under misfortune  
encreases our concern for the misfortunate,  
even tho' the indiffer-ence proceed not from  
any virtue and magnanimity. 'Tis an ag-  
gravation of a murder, that it was committed  
upon persons asleep and in perfect security;  
as historians readily observe of any infant  
prince, who is captive in the hands of his  
enemies, that he is more worthy of com-  
passion the less sensible he is of his miserable  
condition. As we ourselves are here ac-  
quainted with the wretched situation of the  
person, it gives us a lively idea and sensation  
of sorrow, which is the passion that *gene-  
rally* attends it; and this idea becomes still  
more lively, and the sensation more violent  
by a contrast with that security and indif-  
ference, which we observe in the person him-  
self. A contrast of any kind never fails to  
affect the imagination, especially when pre-  
sented by the subject; and 'tis on the ima-  
gination that pity entirely depends\*.

\* To prevent all ambiguity, I must observe, that where  
I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean in gene-  
ral the faculty that presents our fainter ideas. In all o-  
ther places, and particularly when it is oppos'd to the un-  
derstanding, I understand the same faculty, excluding only  
our demonstrative and probable reasonings.

SECT.

## S E C T. VIII.

*Of malice and envy.*

WE must now proceed to account for S E C T.  
the passion of *malice*, which imi- VIII.  
tates the effects of hatred, as pity does  
those of love; and gives us a joy in the  
iufferings and miseries of others, without any  
offence or injury on their part.

So little are men govern'd by reason in their sentiments and opinions, that they always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value. When the mind considers, or is accustom'd to, any degree of perfection, whatever falls short of it, tho' really esteemable, has notwithstanding the same effect upon the passions, as what is defective and ill. This is an *original* quality of the soul, and similar to what we have every day experience of in our bodies. Let a man heat one hand and cool the other; the same water will, at the same time, seem both hot and cold, according to the disposition of the different organs. A small degree of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation,



PART II. fation, as if less than it really is, and even sometimes as the opposite quality. Any gentle pain, that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather becomes a pleasure; as on the other hand a violent pain, succeeding a gentle one, is doubly grievous and uneasy.

Of love  
and hatred.

THIS no one can doubt of with regard to our passions and sensations. But there may arise some difficulty with regard to our ideas and objects. When an object augments or diminishes to the eye or imagination from a comparison with others, the image and idea of the object are still the same, and are equally extended in the *retina*, and in the brain or organ of perception. The eyes refract the rays of light, and the optic nerves convey the images to the brain in the very same manner, whether a great or small object has preceded; nor does even the imagination alter the dimensions of its object on account of a comparison with others. The question then is, how from the same impression and the same idea we can form such different judgments concerning the same object, and at one time admire its bulk, and at another despise its littleness. This variation in our judgments must

must certainly proceed from a variation in SECT.  
some perception; but as the variation lies VIII.  
not in the immediate impressi<sup>on</sup> or idea of Of malice  
the object, it must lie in some other im- and envy.  
pressi<sup>on</sup>, that accompanies it.

IN order to explain this matter, I shall  
just touch upon two principles, one of which  
shall be more fully explain'd in the pro-  
gress of this treatise; the other has been  
already accounted for. I believe it may  
safely be establish'd for a general maxim,  
that no object is presented to the senses,  
nor image form'd in the fancy, but what  
is accompany'd with some emotion or move-  
ment of spirits proportion'd to it; and how-  
ever custom may make us insensible of  
this sensation, and cause us to confound  
it with the object or idea, 'twill be easy, by  
careful and exact experiments, to separate  
and distinguish them. For to instance only  
in the cases of extension and number; 'tis  
evident, that any very bulky object, such  
as the ocean, an extended plain, a vast chain  
of mountains, a wide forest; or any very  
numerous collection of objects, such as an  
army, a fleet, a crowd, excite in the mind  
a sensible emotion; and that the admiration,  
which arises on the appearance of such ob-  
jects,

PART II. jects, is one of the most lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

Now as this admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects, we may conclude, according to our foregoing \* principles, that 'tis a compound effect, proceeding from the conjunction of the several effects, which arise from each part of the cause. Every part, then, of extension, and every unite of number has a separate emotion attending it, when conceiv'd by the mind; and tho' that emotion be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with others, and by its agitating the spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production of admiration, which is always agreeable. If this be allow'd with respect to extension and number, we can make no difficulty with respect to virtue and vice, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery, and other objects of that kind, which are always attended with an evident emotion.

THE second principle I shall take notice of is that of our adherence to *general rules*; which has such a mighty influence on the actions and understanding, and is able to

\* Book I. Part III. Sect. 15.

impose

impose on the very senses. When an object is found by experience to be always accom-pany'd with another; whenever the first object appears, tho' chang'd in very material circumstances; we naturally fly to the conception of the second, and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infer'd its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding. Nothing can undeceive us, not even our senses, which, instead of correcting this false judgment, are often perverted by it, and seem to authorize its errors.

S E C T.  
VIII.  
*Of malice  
and envy.*

THE conclusion I draw from these two principles, join'd to the influence of comparison above-mention'd, is very short and decisive. Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it; a great object with a great emotion, a small object with a small emotion. A great *object*, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great *emotion* succeed a small one. Now a great emotion succeeding a small one becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary proportion. But as there is a certain degree of an emotion, which commonly attends every magnitude of an object; when the emotion encreases,



PART encreases, we naturally imagine that the object has likewise encreas'd. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object; nor do we consider, that comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object. Those, who are acquainted with the metaphysical part of optics, and know how we transfer the judgments and conclusions of the understanding to the senses, will easily conceive this whole operation.

II.  
Of love  
and hatred.

BUT leaving this new discovery of an impression, that secretly attends every idea; we must at least allow of that principle, from whence the discovery arose, *that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others.* We have so many instances of this, that it is impossible we can dispute its veracity; and 'tis from this principle I derive the passions of malice and envy.

'TIS evident we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy, in proportion to the degrees of riches, and power, and merit, and reputation, which we think ourselves possess

felt of. Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but form our notions of them from a comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight; and the latter uneasiness.

HERE then is a kind of pity reverse, or contrary sensations arising in the beholder, from those which are felt by the person, whom he considers. In general we may observe, that in all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar'd, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. A small object makes a great one appear still greater. A great object makes a little one appear less. Deformity of itself produces uneasiness; but makes us receive new pleasure by its contrast with a beautiful object, whose beauty is augmented by it; as on the other hand, beauty, which of itself produces pleasure, makes us receive

SECT.  
VIII.*Of malice  
and envy.*

PART a new pain by the contrast with any thing  
 II. ugly, whose deformity it augments. The  
*Of love* case, therefore, must be the same with hap-  
*and ha-* piness and misery. The direct survey of an-  
*tred.* other's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure,  
 and therefore produces pain when compar'd  
 with our own. His pain, consider'd  
 in itself, is painful to us, but augments the  
 idea of our own happiness, and gives us  
 pleasure.

NOR will it appear strange, that we may  
 feel a reverse sensation from the happiness  
 and misery of others; since we find the same  
 comparison may give us a kind of malice  
 against ourselves, and make us rejoice for  
 our pains, and grieve for our pleasures. Thus  
 the prospect of past pain is agreeable, when  
 we are satisfy'd with our present condition;  
 as on the other hand our past pleasures give  
 us uneasiness, when we enjoy nothing at  
 present equal to them. The comparison be-  
 ing the same, as when we reflect on the  
 sentiments of others, must be attended with  
 the same effects.

NAY a person may extend this malice  
 against himself, even to his present fortune,  
 and carry it so far as designedly to seek af-  
 fliction, and encrease his pains and sorrows.

This

This may happen upon two occasions. *First*, SECT. VIII.  
 Upon the distress and misfortune of a friend,  
 or person dear to him. *Secondly*, Upon the Of malice  
and envy.  
 feeling any remorse for a crime, of which  
 he has been guilty. 'Tis from the principle  
 of comparison that both these irregular  
 appetites for evil arise. A person, who in-  
 dulges himself in any pleasure, while his  
 friend lies under affliction, feels the reflected  
 uneasiness from his friend more sensibly by  
 a comparison with the original pleasure,  
 which he himself enjoys. This contrast,  
 indeed, ought also to inliven the present  
 pleasure. But as grief is here suppos'd to be  
 the predominant passion, every addition falls  
 to that side, and is swallow'd up in it, with-  
 out operating in the least upon the contrary  
 affection. 'Tis the same case with those  
 penances, which men inflict on themselves  
 for their past sins and failings. When a  
 criminal reflects on the punishment he de-  
 serves, the idea of it is magnify'd by a com-  
 parison with his present ease and satisfac-  
 tion; which forces him, in a manner, to seek  
 uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable  
 a contrast.

THIS reasoning will account for the ori-  
 gin of *envy* as well as of *malice*. The only



PART difference betwixt these passions lies in this,  
 II. that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own: Whereas malice is the unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison. The enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own. A superiority naturally seems to overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison. But even in the case of an inferiority, we still desire a greater distance, in order to augment still more the idea of ourself. When this distance diminishes, the comparison is less to our advantage; and consequently gives us less pleasure, and is even disagreeable. Hence arises that species of envy, which men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the pursuit of glory or happiness. In this envy we may see the effects of comparison twice repeated. A man, who compares himself to his inferior, receives a pleasure from the comparison: And when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what shou'd only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, by a new comparison with its preceding condition.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

T I S



'TIS worthy of observation concerning that envy, which arises from a superiority in others, that 'tis not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another, which produces it; but on the contrary, our proximity. A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or corporal; nor does an eminent writer meet with so great jealousy in common hackney scriblers, as in authors, that more nearly approach him. It may, indeed, be thought, that the greater the disproportion is, the greater must be the uneasiness from the comparison. But we may consider on the other hand, that the great disproportion cuts off the relation, and either keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us, or diminishes the effects of the comparison. Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of ideas; and where you destroy these ties, however other accidents may bring two ideas together; as they have no bond or connecting quality to join them in the imagination; 'tis impossible they can remain long united, or have any considerable influence on each other.

I HAVE observ'd in considering the nature of ambition, that the great feel a double



PART II. pleasure in authority from the comparison of their own condition with that of their slaves; and that this comparison has a double influence, because 'tis natural, and presented by the subject. When the fancy, in the comparison of objects, passes not easily from the one object to the other, the action of the mind is, in a great measure, broke, and the fancy, in considering the second object, begins, as it were, upon a new footing. The impression, which attends every object, seems not greater in that case by succeeding a less of the same kind; but these two impressions are distinct, and produce their distinct effects, without any communication together. The want of relation in the ideas breaks the relation of the impressions, and by such a separation prevents their mutual operation and influence.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

To confirm this we may observe, that the proximity in the degree of merit is not alone sufficient to give rise to envy, but must be assisted by other relations. A poet is not apt to envy a philosopher, or a poet of a different kind, of a different nation, or of a different age. All these differences prevent or weaken the comparison, and consequently the passion.

THIS

THIS too is the reason, why all objects appear great or little, merely by a comparison with those of the same species. A mountain neither magnifies nor diminishes a horse in our eyes; but when a *Flemish* and a *Welsb* horse are seen together, the one appears greater and the other less, than when view'd apart.

SECT.  
VIII.  
*Of malice  
and envy.*

FROM the same principle we may account for that remark of historians, that any party in a civil war always choose to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard rather than submit to their fellow-citizens. *Guicciardin* applies this remark to the wars in *Italy*, where the relations betwixt the different states are, properly speaking, nothing but of name, language, and contiguity. Yet even these relations, when join'd with superiority, by making the comparison more natural, make it likewise more grievous, and cause men to search for some other superiority, which may be attended with no relation, and by that means may have a less sensible influence on the imagination. The mind quickly perceives its several advantages and disadvantages; and finding its situation to be most uneasy, where superiority is conjoin'd with other relations, seeks its

3011

N 3

repose





PART repose as much as possible, by their separation, and by breaking that association of ideas, which renders the comparison so much more natural and efficacious. When it cannot break the association, it feels a stronger desire to remove the superiority; and this is the reason why travellers are commonly so lavish of their praises to the *Chinese* and *Persians*, at the same time, that they depreciate those neighbouring nations, which may stand upon a foot of rivalship with their native country.

II.  
Of love  
and hatred.

THESE examples from history and common experience are rich and curious; but we may find parallel ones in the arts, which are no less remarkable. Shou'd an author compose a treatise, of which one part was serious and profound, another light and humorous, every one wou'd condemn so strange a mixture, and wou'd accuse him of the neglect of all rules of art and criticism. These rules of art are founded on the qualities of human nature; and the quality of human nature, which requires a consistency in every performance, is that which renders the mind incapable of passing in a moment from one passion and disposition to a quite different one. Yet this makes us not

not blame Mr. *Prior* for joining his *Alma* SECT.  
 and his *Solomon* in the same volume; tho' VIII.  
 that admirable poet has succeeded perfectly Of malice  
 well in the gaiety of the one, as well as and envy.  
 in the melancholy of the other. Even sup-  
 posing the reader shou'd peruse these two  
 compositions without any interval, he wou'd  
 feel little or no difficulty in the change of  
 passions: Why, but because he considers  
 these performances as entirely different, and  
 by this break in the ideas, breaks the pro-  
 gress of the affections, and hinders the one  
 from influencing or contradicting the other?

AN heroic and burlesque design, united  
 in one picture, wou'd be monstrous; tho' we  
 place two pictures of so opposite a character  
 in the same chamber, and even close by each  
 other, without any scruple or difficulty.

IN a word, no ideas can affect each  
 other, either by comparison, or by the pas-  
 sions they separately produce, unless they be  
 united together by some relation, which may  
 cause an easy transition of the ideas, and  
 consequently of the emotions or impressions,  
 attending the ideas; and may preserve the  
 one impression in the passage of the ima-  
 gination to the object of the other. This  
 principle is very remarkable, because it is

N 4. analogous



PART analogous to what we have observ'd both  
 II. concerning the *understanding* and the *pas-*  
 sions. Suppose two objects to be presented  
 Of love and ha- to me, which are not connected by any  
 tred. kind of relation. Suppose that each of these  
 objects separately produces a passion; and  
 that these two passions are in themselves  
 contrary: We find from experience, that  
 the want of relation in the objects or ideas  
 hinders the natural contrariety of the passi-  
 ons, and that the break in the transition of  
 the thought removes the affections from each  
 other, and prevents their opposition. 'Tis  
 the same case with comparison; and from  
 both these phænomena we may safely  
 conclude, that the relation of ideas must  
 forward the transition of impressions; since  
 its absence alone is able to prevent it, and to  
 separate what naturally shou'd have operated  
 upon each other. When the absence of an  
 object or quality removes any usual or na-  
 tural effect, we may certainly conclude that  
 its presence contributes to the production of  
 the effect.

S E C T.

S E C T. IX.

*Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice.*

T H U S we have endeavour'd to ac-  
 count for *pity* and *malice*. Both  
 these affections arise from the imagination,  
 according to the light, in which it places its  
 object. When our fancy considers directly  
 the sentiments of others, and enters deep  
 into them, it makes us sensible of all the  
 passions it surveys, but in a particular man-  
 ner of grief or sorrow. On the contrary,  
 when we compare the sentiments of others  
 to our own, we feel a sensation directly op-  
 posite to the original one, *viz.* a joy from  
 the grief of others, and a grief from their  
 joy. But these are only the first founda-  
 tions of the affections of *pity* and *malice*.  
 Other passions are afterwards confounded  
 with them. There is always a mixture of  
 love or tenderness with *pity*, and of hatred  
 or anger with *malice*. But it must be con-  
 fess'd, that this mixture seems at first sight  
 to be contradictory to my system. For as  
 pity

S E C T.  
 IX.



PART pity is an uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity shou'd naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and malice, love. This contradiction I endeavour to reconcile, after the following manner.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

IN order to cause a transition of passions, there is requir'd a double relation of impressions and ideas, nor is one relation sufficient to produce this effect. But that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must consider, that 'tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along suppos'd in the preceding cases; but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent. This cannot take place with regard to pride and humility; because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action. We are, therefore, to look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite

tite or desire; such as those of love and ha- S E C T.  
tred. IX.

BENEVOLENCE or the appetite, which attends love, is a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery; as anger or the appetite, which attends hatred, is a desire of the misery of the person hated, and an aversion to his happiness. A desire, therefore, of the happiness of another, and aversion to his misery, are similar to benevolence; and a desire of his misery and aversion to his happiness are correspondent to anger. Now pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery; as malice is the contrary appetite. Pity, then, is related to benevolence; and malice to anger: And as benevolence has been already found to be connected with love, by a natural and original quality, and anger with hatred; 'tis by this chain the passions of pity and malice are connected with love and hatred.

THIS hypothesis is founded on sufficient experience. A man, who from any motives has entertain'd a resolution of performing an action, naturally runs into every other view or motive, which may fortify that resolution, and give it authority and influence



PART influence on the mind. To confirm us in  
 II. any design, we search for motives drawn  
 from interest, from honour, from duty.  
 What wonder, then, that pity and benevo-  
 lence, malice, and anger, being the same  
 desires arising from different principles,  
 shou'd so totally mix together as to be un-  
 distinguishable? As to the connexion be-  
 twixt benevolence and love, anger and ha-  
 tred, being *original* and primary, it admits  
 of no difficulty.

Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

WE may add to this another experi-  
 ment, *viz.* that benevolence and anger, and  
 consequently love and hatred, arise when our  
 happiness or misery have any dependance on  
 the happiness or misery of another person,  
 without any farther relation. I doubt not  
 but this experiment will appear so singular  
 as to excuse us for stopping a moment to  
 consider it.

SUPPOSE, that two persons of the same  
 trade shou'd seek employment in a town,  
 that is not able to maintain both, 'tis plain  
 the success of one is perfectly incompat-  
 ible with that of the other, and that what-  
 ever is for the interest of either is contrary  
 to that of his rival, and so *vice versa*. Sup-  
 pose again, that two merchants, tho' living  
 in

in different parts of the world, shou'd enter into co-partnership together, the advantage or loss of one becomes immediately the advantage or loss of his partner, and the same fortune necessarily attends both. Now 'tis evident, that in the first case, hatred always follows upon the contrariety of interests; as in the second, love arises from their union. Let us consider to what principle we can ascribe these passions.

'TIS plain they arise not from the double relations of impressions and ideas, if we regard only the present sensation. For taking the first case of rivalry; tho' the pleasure and advantage of an antagonist necessarily causes my pain and loss, yet to counter-balance this, his pain and loss causes my pleasure and advantage; and supposing him to be unsuccessful, I may by this means receive from him a superior degree of satisfaction. In the same manner the success of a partner rejoices me, but then his misfortunes afflict me in an equal proportion; and 'tis easy to imagine, that the latter sentiment may in many cases preponderate. But whether the fortune of a rival or partner be good or bad, I always hate the former and love the latter.

THIS

SECT.  
IX.  
*Of the  
mixture of  
benevo-  
lence, &c.*





PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

THIS love of a partner cannot proceed from the relation or connexion betwixt us; in the same manner as I love a brother or countryman. A rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner. For as the pleasure of the latter causes my pleasure, and his pain my pain; so the pleasure of the former causes my pain, and his pain my pleasure. The connexion, then, of cause and effect is the same in both cases; and if in the one case, the cause and effect has a farther relation of resemblance, they have that of contrariety in the other; which, being also a species of resemblance, leaves the matter pretty equal.

THE only explication, then, we can give of this phænomenon is deriv'd from that principle of a parallel direction above-mention'd. Our concern for our own interest gives us a pleasure in the pleasure, and a pain in the pain of a partner, after the same manner as by sympathy we feel a sensation correspondent to those, which appear in any person, who is present with us. On the other hand, the same concern for our interest makes us feel a pain in the pleasure, and a pleasure in the pain of a rival; and in short the same contrariety of senti-

sentiments as arises from comparison and malice. Since, therefore, a parallel direction of the affections, proceeding from interest, can give rise to benevolence or anger, no wonder the same parallel direction, deriv'd from sympathy and from comparison, shou'd have the same effect.

SECT.  
IX.

*Of the  
mixture of  
benevo-  
lence, &c.*

IN general we may observe, that 'tis impossible to do good to others, from whatever motive, without feeling some touches of kindness and good-will towards 'em; as the injuries we do, not only cause hatred in the person, who suffers them, but even in ourselves. These phænomena, indeed, may in part be accounted for from other principles.

BUT here there occurs a considerable objection, which 'twill be necessary to examine before we proceed any farther. I have endeavour'd to prove, that power and riches, or poverty and meanness; which give rise to love or hatred, without producing any original pleasure or uneasiness; operate upon us by means of a secondary sensation deriv'd from a sympathy with that pain or satisfaction, which they produce in the person, who possesses them. From a sympathy with his pleasure there arises love; from that with his uneasiness, hatred. But 'tis



PART

II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

a maxim, which I have just now establish'd, and which is absolutely necessary to the explication of the phænomena of pity and malice, "That 'tis not the present  
 " sensation or momentary pain or pleasure,  
 " which determines the character of any  
 " passion, but the general bent or tendency  
 " of it from the beginning to the end." For this reason, pity or a sympathy with pain produces love, and that because it interests us in the fortunes of others, good or bad, and gives us a secondary sensation correspondent to the primary; in which it has the same influence with love and benevolence. Since then this rule holds good in one case, why does it not prevail throughout, and why does sympathy in uneasiness ever produce any passion beside good-will and kindness? Is it becoming a philosopher to alter his method of reasoning, and run from one principle to its contrary, according to the particular phænomenon, which he wou'd explain?

I HAVE mention'd two different causes, from which a transition of passion may arise, *viz.* a double relation of ideas and impressions, and what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any  
 two

two desires, which arise from different principles. Now I assert, that when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces hatred or contempt by the former cause; when strong, it produces love or tenderness by the latter. This is the solution of the foregoing difficulty, which seems so urgent; and this is a principle founded on such evident arguments, that we ought to have establish'd it, even tho' it were not necessary to the explication of any phenomenon.

SECT.  
IX.

*Of the  
mixture of  
benevo-  
lence, &c.*

THIS certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination. For supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me, who, while asleep in the fields, was in danger of being trod under foot by horses, I shou'd immediately run to his assistance; and in this I shou'd be actuated by the same principle of sympathy, which makes me concern'd for the present sorrows of a stranger. The bare mention of this is sufficient. Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis



PART II. evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence.

*Of love  
and hatred.*

BUT however we may look forward to the future in sympathizing with any person, the extending of our sympathy depends in a great measure upon our sense of his present condition. 'Tis a great effort of imagination, to form such lively ideas even of the present sentiments of others as to feel these very sentiments; but 'tis impossible we could extend this sympathy to the future, without being aided by some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon us in a lively manner. When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the vivacity of the conception is not confin'd merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain. By means of this lively notion I  
am

am interested in them ; take part with them ; S E C T.  
and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast, IX.

If I diminish the vivacity of the first concep-  
tion, I diminish that of the related ideas ; as *Of the mixture of benevo- lence, &c.*

pipes can convey no more water than what  
arises at the fountain. By this diminution  
I destroy the future prospect, which is ne-  
cessary to interest me perfectly in the for-  
tune of another. I may feel the present  
impression, but carry my sympathy no far-  
ther, and never transfuse the force of the  
first conception into my ideas of the related  
objects. If it be another's misery, which  
is presented in this feeble manner, I receive  
it by communication, and am affected with  
all the passions related to it : But as I am  
not so much interested as to concern my-  
self in his good fortune, as well as his bad,  
I never feel the extensive sympathy, nor the  
passions related to *it*.

Now in order to know what passions are  
related to these different kinds of sympathy,  
we must consider, that benevolence is an  
original pleasure arising from the pleasure of  
the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding  
from his pain : From which correspondence  
of impressions there arises a subsequent de-



PART fire of his pleasure, and aversion to his  
 II. pain. In order, then, to make a passion  
 run parallel with benevolence, 'tis requisite  
 we shou'd feel these double impressions,  
 correspondent to those of the person, whom  
 we consider; nor is any one of them alone  
 sufficient for that purpose. When we sym-  
 pathize only with one impression, and that  
 a painful one, this sympathy is related to  
 anger and to hatred, upon account of the  
 uneasiness it conveys to us. But as the ex-  
 tensive or limited sympathy depends upon  
 the force of the first sympathy; it follows,  
 that the passion of love or hatred depends  
 upon the same principle. A strong impres-  
 sion, when communicated, gives a double  
 tendency of the passions; which is related  
 to benevolence and love by a similarity of  
 direction; however painful the first impres-  
 sion might have been. A weak impression,  
 that is painful, is related to anger and hatred  
 by the resemblance of sensations. Benevo-  
 lence, therefore, arises from a great degree  
 of misery, or any degree strongly sympa-  
 thiz'd with: Hatred or contempt from a  
 small degree, or one weakly sympathiz'd  
 with; which is the principle I intended to  
 prove and explain.

*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

NOR



NOR have we only our reason to trust to for this principle, but also experience. A certain degree of poverty produces contempt; but a degree beyond causes compassion and good-will. We may under-value a peasant or servant; but when the misery of a beggar appears very great, or is painted in very lively colours, we sympathize with him in his afflictions, and feel in our heart evident touches of pity and benevolence. The same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees. The passions, therefore, must depend upon principles, that operate in such certain degrees, according to my hypothesis. The encrease of the sympathy has evidently the same effect as the encrease of the misery.

SECT.

IX.

*Of the  
mixture of  
benevo-  
lence, &c.*

A BARREN or desolate country always seems ugly and disagreeable, and commonly inspires us with contempt for the inhabitants. This deformity, however, proceeds in a great measure from a sympathy with the inhabitants, as has been already observ'd; but it is only a weak one, and reaches no farther than the immediate sensation, which is disagreeable. The view of a city in ashes conveys benevolent sentiments; because we there enter so deep into the inter-





PART rests of the miserable inhabitants, as to wish  
 II. for their prosperity, as well as feel their ad-  
 Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

BUT tho' the force of the impressiion ge-  
 nerally produces pity and benevolence, 'tis  
 certain, that by being carry'd too far it ceases  
 to have that effect. This, perhaps, may be  
 worth our notice. When the uneasiness is  
 either small in itself, or remote from us, it  
 engages not the imagination, nor is able to  
 convey an equal concern for the future  
 and contingent good, as for the present and  
 real evil. Upon its acquiring greater force,  
 we become so interested in the concerns of  
 the person, as to be sensible both of his  
 good and bad fortune; and from that com-  
 plet sympathy there arises pity and bene-  
 volence. But 'twill easily be imagin'd, that  
 where the present evil strikes with more  
 than ordinary force, it may entirely en-  
 gage our attention, and prevent that double  
 sympathy, above-mention'd. Thus we  
 find, that tho' every one, but especially  
 women, are apt to contract a kindness  
 for criminals, who go to the scaffold, and  
 readily imagine them to be uncommonly  
 handsome and well-shap'd; yet one, who  
 is present at the cruel execution of the  
 rack,

rack, feels no such tender emotions; but is in a manner overcome with horror, and has no leisure to temper this uneasy sensation by any opposite sympathy.

SECT.

IX.

*Of the mixture of benevolence, &c.*

BUT the instance, which makes the most clearly for my hypothesis, is that wherein by a change of the objects we separate the double sympathy even from a midling degree of the passion; in which case we find, that pity, instead of producing love and tenderness as usual, always gives rise to the contrary affection. When we observe a person in misfortunes, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of that misfortune becomes the object of our strongest hatred, and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion. Now for what reason shou'd the same passion of pity produce love to the person, who suffers the misfortune, and hatred to the person, who causes it; unless it be because in the latter case the author bears a relation only to the misfortune; whereas in considering the sufferer we carry our view on every side, and wish for his prosperity, as well as are sensible of his affliction?

O 4

I SHALL



PART I SHALL just observe, before I leave the present subject, that this phænomenon of the double sympathy, and its tendency to cause love, may contribute to the production of the kindness, which we naturally bear our relations and acquaintance. Custom and relation make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others; and whatever fortune we suppose to attend them, is render'd present to us by the imagination, and operates as if originally our own. We rejoice in their pleasures, and grieve for their sorrows, merely from the force of sympathy. Nothing that concerns them is indifferent to us; and as this correspondence of sentiments is the natural attendant of love, it readily produces that affection,

II.  
Of love  
and ha-  
tred.

SECT.

BOOK I.



## S E C T. X.

*Of respect and contempt.*

THERE now remains only to explain S E C T.  
X.  
 the passions of *respect* and *contempt*,  
 along with the *amorous* affection, in order  
 to understand all the passions which have  
 any mixture of love or hatred. Let us be-  
 gin with respect and contempt.

IN considering the qualities and circum-  
 stances of others, we may either regard them  
 as they really are in themselves; or may  
 make a comparifon betwixt them and our  
 own qualities and circumstances; or may  
 join these two methods of confideration.  
 The good qualities of others, from the first  
 point of view, produce love; from the se-  
 cond, humility; and from the third, respect;  
 which is a mixture of these two passions.  
 Their bad qualities, after the same manner,  
 cause either hatred, or pride, or contempt,  
 according to the light in which we survey  
 them.

THAT there is a mixture of pride in con-  
 tempt, and of humility in respect, is, I think,

too



PART too evident, from their very feeling or appearance, to require any particular proof.

II. *Of love and hatred.* That this mixture arises from a tacit comparison of the person contemn'd or respected with ourselves is no less evident. The same man may cause either respect, love, or contempt by his condition and talents, according as the person, who considers him, from his inferior becomes his equal or superior.

In changing the point of view, tho' the object may remain the same, its proportion to ourselves entirely alters; which is the cause of an alteration in the passions. These passions, therefore, arise from our observing the proportion; that is, from a comparison.

I HAVE already observ'd, that the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility, and have endeavour'd, from the principles of human nature, to assign a cause for this phenomenon. Whether my reasoning be receiv'd or not, the phenomenon is undisputed, and appears in many instances. Among the rest, 'tis the reason why there is a much greater mixture of pride in contempt, than of humility in respect, and why we are more elevated with the view of one below us, than mortify'd with the presence of one above us. Con-  
tempt

tempt or scorn has so strong a tincture of SECT.  
 pride, that there scarce is any other passion X.  
 discernable: Whereas in esteem or respect, Of respect  
 love makes a more considerable ingredient and con-  
 than humility. The passion of vanity is so tempt.  
 prompt, that it rouzes at the least call;  
 while humility requires a stronger impulse  
 to make it exert itself.

BUT here it may reasonably be ask'd,  
 why this mixture takes place only in some  
 cases, and appears not on every occasion. All  
 those objects, which cause love, when plac'd  
 on another person, are the causes of pride,  
 when transfer'd to ourselves; and conse-  
 quently ought to be causes of humility, as  
 well as love, while they belong to others,  
 and are only compar'd to those, which we  
 ourselves possess. In like manner every qua-  
 lity, which, by being directly consider'd,  
 produces hatred, ought always to give rise  
 to pride by comparision, and by a mixture  
 of these passions of hatred and pride ought  
 to excite contempt or scorn. The difficulty  
 then is, why any objects ever cause pure  
 love or hatred, and produce not always the  
 mixt passions of respect and contempt.

I HAVE suppos'd all along, that the pas-  
 sions of love and pride, and those of hu-  
 mility

PART II. *Of love and hatred.* milicity and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful. But tho' this be universally true, 'tis observable, that the two agreeable, as well as the two painful passions, have some differences, and even contrarieties, which distinguish them. Nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity; tho' at the same time love or tenderness is rather found to weaken and infeeble it. The same difference is observable betwixt the uneasy passions. Anger and hatred bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions; while humility and shame deject and discourage us. Of these qualities of the passions, 'twill be necessary to form a distinct idea. Let us remember, that pride and hatred invigorate the soul; and love and humility infeeble it.

FROM this it follows, that tho' the conformity betwixt love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects, yet this other contrariety is the reason, why they are excited in very different degrees. Genius and learning are *pleasant* and *magnificent* objects, and by both these circumstances

stances are adapted to pride and vanity; but SECT.  
 have a relation to love by their pleasure on- X.  
 ly. Ignorance and simplicity are *disagree-* *Of respect*  
*able* and *mean*, which in the same manner *and con-*  
 gives them a double connexion with hu- *tempt.*  
 mility, and a single one with hatred. We  
 may, therefore, consider it as certain, that  
 tho' the same object always produces  
 love and pride, humility and hatred, ac-  
 cording to its different situations, yet it fel-  
 dom produces either the two former or the  
 two latter passions in the same proportion.

"TIS here we must seek for a solution  
 of the difficulty above-mention'd, why any  
 object ever excites pure love or hatred, and  
 does not always produce respect or contempt,  
 by a mixture of humility or pride. No  
 quality in another gives rise to humility by  
 comparifon, unless it wou'd have produc'd  
 pride by being plac'd in ourselves; and  
*vice versa* no object excites pride by com-  
 parifon, unless it wou'd have produc'd  
 humility by the direct survey. This is evi-  
 dent, objects always produce by *comparifon*  
 a sensation directly contrary to their *origi-*  
*nal* one. Suppose, therefore, an object to  
 be presented, which is peculiarly fitted to  
 produce love, but imperfectly to excite pride;  
 this



PART this object, belonging to another, gives rise directly to a great degree of love, but to a

## II.

*Of love  
and ha-  
tred.*

small one of humility by comparison; and consequently that latter passion is scarce felt in the compound, nor is able to convert the love into respect. This is the case with good nature, good humour, facility, generosity, beauty, and many other qualities. These have a peculiar aptitude to produce love in others; but not so great a tendency to excite pride in ourselves: For which reason the view of them, as belonging to another person, produces pure love, with but a small mixture of humility and respect. 'Tis easy to extend the same reasoning to the opposite passions.

BEFORE we leave this subject, it may not be amiss to account for a pretty curious phenomenon, *viz.* why we commonly keep at a distance such as we contemn, and allow not our inferiors to approach too near even in place and situation. It has already been observ'd, that almost every kind of idea is attended with some emotion, even the ideas of number and extension, much more those of such objects as are esteem'd of consequence in life, and fix our attention. 'Tis not with entire indifference we can survey

vey



vey either a rich man or a poor one, but SECT.  
must feel some faint touches, at least, of X.  
respect in the former case, and of contempt in Of respect  
and con-  
tempt.  
the latter. These two passions are contrary  
to each other; but in order to make this  
contrariety be felt, the objects must be some-  
way related; otherwise the affections are to-  
tally separate and distinct, and never en-  
counter. The relation takes place wherever  
the persons become contiguous; which is  
a general reason why we are uneasy at see-  
ing such disproportion'd objects, as a rich  
man and a poor one, a nobleman and a  
porter, in that situation.

THIS uneasiness, which is common to  
every spectator, must be more sensible to the  
superior; and that because the near approach  
of the inferior is regarded as a piece of ill-  
breeding, and shews that he is not sensible  
of the disproportion, and is no way affected  
by it. A sense of superiority in another  
breeds in all men an inclination to keep  
themselves at a distance from him, and de-  
termines them to redouble the marks of re-  
spect and reverence, when they are oblig'd  
to approach him; and where they do not  
observe that conduct, 'tis a proof they are  
not sensible of his superiority. From hence  
too



PART

II.  
 Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.

too it proceeds, that any great *difference* in the degrees of any quality is call'd a *distance* by a common metaphor, which, however trivial it may appear, is founded on natural principles of the imagination. A great difference inclines us to produce a distance. The ideas of distance and difference are, therefore, connected together. Connected ideas are readily taken for each other; and this is in general the source of the metaphor, as we shall have occasion to observe afterwards.

## S E C T. XI.

*Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes.*

OF all the compound passions, which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections, no one better deserves our attention, than that love, which arises betwixt the sexes, as well on account of its force and violence, as those curious principles of philosophy, for which it affords us an uncontestable argument. 'Tis plain, that this affection, in its most natural

ral state, is deriv'd from the conjunction SECT.  
of three different impreffions or passions, XI.  
*viz.* The pleasing sensation arising from Of the a-  
beauty; the bodily appetite for generation; morous pas-  
and a generous kindness or good-will. The sion, &c.  
origin of kindness from beauty may be  
explain'd from the foregoing reasoning.  
The question is how the bodily appetite is  
excited by it.


THE appetite of generation, when con-  
fin'd to a certain degree, is evidently of the  
pleasant kind, and has a strong connexion  
with all the agreeable emotions. Joy, mirth,  
vanity, and kindness are all incentives to this  
desire; as well as music, dancing, wine, and  
good cheer. On the other hand, sorrow,  
melancholy, poverty, humility are destruc-  
tive of it. From this quality 'tis easily con-  
ceiv'd why it shou'd be connected with the  
sense of beauty.

BUT there is another principle that con-  
tributes to the same effect. I have observ'd  
that the parallel direction of the desires is a  
real relation, and no less than a resemblance  
in their sensation, produces a connexion  
among them. That we may fully com-  
prehend the extent of this relation, we must  
consider, that any principal desire may be



PART attended with subordinate ones, which are connected with it, and to which if other desires are parallel, they are by that means related to the principal one. Thus hunger may oft be consider'd as the primary inclination of the soul, and the desire of approaching the meat as the secondary one; since 'tis absolutely necessary to the satisfying that appetite. If an object, therefore, by any separate qualities, inclines us to approach the meat, it naturally encreases our appetite; as on the contrary, whatever inclines us to set our victuals at a distance, is contradictory to hunger, and diminishes our inclination to them. Now 'tis plain that beauty has the first effect, and deformity the second: Which is the reason why the former gives us a keener appetite for our victuals, and the latter is sufficient to disgust us at the most savoury dish, that cookery has invented. All this is easily applicable to the appetite for generation.

FROM these two relations, *viz.* resemblance and a parallel desire, there arises such a connexion betwixt the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite, and benevolence, that they become in a manner inseparable: And we find from experience, that 'tis indifferent

II.  
  
*Of love  
 and hatred.*

different which of them advances first; since any of them is almost sure to be attended with the related affections. One, who is inflam'd with lust, feels at least a momentary kindness towards the object of it, and at the same time fancies her more beautiful than ordinary; as there are many, who begin with kindness and esteem for the wit and merit of the person, and advance from that to the other passions. But the most common species of love is that which first arises from beauty, and afterwards diffuses itself into kindness and into the bodily appetite. Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite easily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin'd passion of the soul; the other the most gross and vulgar. The love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds, that 'tis so singularly fitted to produce both.

THIS account of love is not peculiar to my system, but is unavoidable on any hypothesis. The three affections, which compose this passion, are evidently distinct, and has each of them its distinct object. 'Tis certain, therefore, that 'tis only by their re-

SECT.  
XI.

*Of the  
amorous  
passion, &c.*



PART lation they produce each other. But the  
 II. relation of passions is not alone sufficient,  
 Of love 'Tis likewise necessary, there shou'd be a  
 and ha- relation of ideas. The beauty of one per-  
 tred. son never inspires us with love for another.  
 This then is a sensible proof of the double  
 relation of impressions and ideas. From one  
 instance so evident as this we may form a  
 judgment of the rest.

THIS may also serve in another view to  
 illustrate what I have insisted on concern-  
 ing the origin of pride and humility, love  
 and hatred. I have observ'd, that tho' self  
 be the object of the first set of passions, and  
 some other person of the second, yet these  
 objects cannot alone be the causes of the  
 passions; as having each of them a relation  
 to two contrary affections, which must from  
 the very first moment destroy each other.  
 Here then is the situation of the mind, as  
 I have already describ'd it. It has certain  
 organs naturally fitted to produce a passion;  
 that passion, when produc'd, naturally turns  
 the view to a certain object. But this not  
 being sufficient to produce the passion, there  
 is requir'd some other emotion, which by  
 a double relation of impressions and ideas  
 may set these principles in action, and be-  
 stow

flow on them their first impulse. This si- S E C T.  
 tuation is still more remarkable with regard XI.  
 to the appetite of generation. Sex is not *Of the a-*  
 only the object, but also the cause of the *morous pas-*  
 appetite. We not only turn our view to it, *sion, &c.*  
 when actuated by that appetite; but the re-  
 flecting on it suffices to excite the appetite.  
 But as this cause loses its force by too great  
 frequency, 'tis necessary it shou'd be quick-  
 en'd by some new impulse; and that im-  
 pulse we find to arise from the *beauty* of  
 the *person*; that is, from a double relation  
 of impressions and ideas. Since this double  
 relation is necessary where an affection has  
 both a distinct cause, and object, how much  
 more so, where it has only a distinct ob-  
 ject, without any determinate cause?

## S E C T. XII.

*Of the love and hatred of ani-  
 mals.*

**B**UT to pass from the passions of love S E C T.  
 and hatred, and from their mixtures XII.  
 and compositions, as they appear in man, *~~~~~*  
 to the same affections, as they display them-



PART selves in brutes; we may observe, not only that love and hatred are common to the whole sensitive creation, but likewise that their causes, as above-explain'd, are of so simple a nature, that they may easily be suppos'd to operate on mere animals. There is no force of reflection or penetration requir'd. Every thing is conducted by springs and principles, which are not peculiar to man, or any one species of animals. The conclusion from this is obvious in favour of the foregoing system.

II.  
*Of love  
 and ha-  
 tred.*

LOVE in animals, has not for its only object animals of the same species, but extends itself farther, and comprehends almost every sensible and thinking being. A dog naturally loves a man above his own species, and very commonly meets with a return of affection.

As animals are but little susceptible either of the pleasures or pains of the imagination, they can judge of objects only by the sensible good or evil, which they produce, and from *that* must regulate their affections towards them. Accordingly we find, that by benefits or injuries we produce their love or hatred; and that by feeding and cherishing any animal, we quickly acquire his

his affections; as by beating and abusing him we never fail to draw on us his enmity and ill-will. S E C T.  
XII.

— LOVE in beasts is not caus'd so much by relation, as in our species; and that because their thoughts are not so active as to trace relations, except in very obvious instances. Yet 'tis easy to remark, that on some occasions it has a considerable influence upon them. Thus acquaintance, which has the same effect as relation, always produces love in animals either to men or to each other. For the same reason any likeness among them is the source of affection. An ox confin'd to a park with horses, will naturally join their company, if I may so speak, but always leaves it to enjoy that of his own species, where he has the choice of both.

THE affection of parents to their young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species.

'TIS evident, that *sympathy*, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without their knowledge of that



PART II. *Of love and hatred.* cause, which produc'd the original passion. Grief likewise is receiv'd by sympathy; and produces almost all the same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows. And 'tis remarkable, that tho' almost all animals use in play the same member, and nearly the same action as in fighting; a lion, a tyger, a cat their paws; an ox his horns; a dog his teeth; a horse his heels: Yet they most carefully avoid harming their companion, even tho' they have nothing to fear from his resentment; which is an evident proof of the sense brutes have of each other's pain and pleasure.

EVERY one has observ'd how much more dogs are animated when they hunt in a pack, than when they pursue their game apart; and 'tis evident this can proceed from nothing but from sympathy. 'Tis also well known to hunters, that this effect follows in a greater degree, and even in too great a degree, where two packs, that are strangers to each other, are join'd together. We might, perhaps, be at a loss to explain this phenomenon, if we had

had not experience of a simular in our- S E C T.  
selves. XII.

ENVY and malice are passions very re-  
markable in animals. They are perhaps  
more common than pity ; as requiring less  
effort of thought and imagination.

*Of the  
love and  
hatred of  
animals.*



P A R T

had not experience of a kind in our  
island, and in our country, and  
the very same method of reasoning very  
inadequate in animals. They are perhaps  
more sensible than they are reputed to  
be, and perhaps they are more

PART

