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## **A Treatise Of Human Nature**

Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning Into  
Moral Subjects

Of The Passions

**Hume, David**

**London, 1739**

Sect. II. Experiments to confirm this system.

**urn:nbn:de:gbv:45:1-1219**

ately in ourselves. Since then the same SECT.  
 qualities that produce pride or humility, I.  
 cause love or hatred; all the arguments Of the ob-  
 that have been employ'd to prove, that the jects and  
 causes of the former passions excite a pain causes of  
 or pleasure independent of the passion, will love and  
 be applicable with equal evidence to the hatred.  
 causes of the latter.

## S E C T. II.

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U P O N duly weighing these argu- SECT.  
 ments, no one will make any scru- II.  
 ple to assent to that conclusion I draw from ~~~~~  
 them, concerning the transition along rela-  
 ted impressions and ideas, especially as 'tis  
 a principle, in itself, so easy and natural. But  
 that we may place this system beyond doubt  
 both with regard to love and hatred, pride  
 and humility, 'twill be proper to make some  
 new experiments upon all these passions, as  
 well as to recal a few of these observations,  
 which I have formerly touch'd upon.

I N order to make these experiments, let  
 us suppose I am in company with a person,  
 whom I formerly regarded without any sen-





PART timents either of friendship or enmity. Here  
 II. I have the natural and ultimate object of  
 Of love all these four passions plac'd before me. My-  
 and ha- self am the proper object of pride or humi-  
 tred. lity; the other person of love or hatred.

REGARD now with attention the nature  
 of these passions, and their situation with  
 respect to each other. 'Tis evident here are  
 four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a  
 square or regular connexion with, and dis-  
 tance from each other. The passions of  
 pride and humility, as well as those of love  
 and hatred, are connected together by the  
 identity of their object, which to the first  
 set of passions is self, to the second some  
 other person. These two lines of com-  
 munication or connexion form two oppo-  
 site sides of the square. Again, pride and  
 love are agreeable passions; hatred and hu-  
 mility uneasy. This similitude of sensation  
 betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt  
 humility and hatred form a new connexion,  
 and may be consider'd as the other two  
 sides of the square. Upon the whole, pride  
 is connected with humility, love with ha-  
 tred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with  
 love, humility with hatred, by their sensa-  
 tions or impressions.

I SAY





I SAY then, that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, *viz.* of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself. This we must prove by our experiments.

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FIRST EXPERIMENT. To proceed with the greater order in these experiments, let us first suppose, that being plac'd in the situation above-mention'd, *viz.* in company with some other person, there is an object presented, that has no relation either of impressions or ideas to any of these passions. Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither of us, and causing of itself no emotion, or independent pain and pleasure: 'Tis evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. Let us try it upon each of them successively. Let us apply it to love, to hatred, to humility, to pride; none of them ever arises in the smallest degree imaginable. Let us change the object, as oft as we please; provided still we choose one, that has neither of these two relations. Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions, of which the mind is susceptible. No object, in the vast variety of nature, will, in any disposi-

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tion,





PART II. tion, produce any passion without these relations.

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SECOND EXPERIMENT. Since an object, that wants both these relations can ever produce any passion, let us bestow on it only one of these relations; and see what will follow. Thus suppose, I regard a stone or any common object, that belongs either to me or my companion, and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: 'Tis plain, that to consider the matter *a priori*, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. This reasoning *a priori* is confirm'd by experience. No trivial or vulgar object, that causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever, by its property or other relations, either to ourselves or others, be able to produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred.

THIRD



THIRD EXPERIMENT. 'Tis evident, SECT. II.  
therefore, that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections.

Let us now remove this relation, and in its stead place a relation of impressions, by presenting an object, which is agreeable or disagreeable, but has no relation either to ourself or companion; and let us observe the consequences. To consider the matter first *a priori*, as in the preceding experiment; we may conclude, that the object will have a small, but an uncertain connexion with these passions. For besides, that this relation is not a cold and imperceptible one, it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas, nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions, which by their opposition destroy each other. But if we consider, on the other hand, that this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any principle, that produces a transition of ideas; but, on the contrary, that tho' the one impression be easily transfus'd into the other, yet the change of objects is suppos'd contrary to all the principles, that cause a transition of that kind; we may from thence infer, that nothing will ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion, that is connected with the passion merely by a relation

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PART relation of impressions. What our reason  
 II. would conclude from analogy, after bal-  
*Of Love* *and ha-* *tried.*   
 ancing these arguments, would be, that  
 an object, which produces pleasure or un-  
 easiness, but has no manner of connexion  
 either with ourselves or others, may give  
 such a turn to the disposition, as that it may  
 naturally fall into pride or love, humility  
 or hatred, and search for other objects, up-  
 on which, by a double relation, it can  
 found these affections; but that an object,  
 which has only one of these relations, tho'  
 the most advantageous one, can never give  
 rise to any constant and establish'd passion.

MOST fortunately all this reasoning is  
 found to be exactly conformable to expe-  
 rience, and the phænomena of the passions.  
 Suppose I were travelling with a compa-  
 nion thro' a country, to which we are both  
 utter strangers; 'tis evident, that if the pro-  
 spects be beautiful, the roads agreeable, and  
 the inns commodious, this may put me in-  
 to good humour both with myself and fel-  
 low-traveller. But as we suppose, that this  
 country has no relation either to myself or  
 friend, it can never be the immediate cause of  
 pride or love; and therefore if I found not  
 the passion on some other object, that bears  
 either of us a closer relation, my emotions  
 are



are rather to be consider'd as the overflow-  
ings of an elevate or humane disposition,  
than as an establish'd passion. The case is  
the same where the object produces uneasi-  
ness.

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FOURTH EXPERIMENT. Having found,  
that neither an object without any relation  
of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that  
has only one relation, can ever cause pride  
or humility, love or hatred; reason alone  
may convince us, without any farther ex-  
periment, that whatever has a double rela-  
tion must necessarily excite these passions;  
since 'tis evident they must have some cause.  
But to leave as little room for doubt as pos-  
sible, let us renew our experiments, and  
see whether the event in this case answers  
our expectation. I choose an object, such  
as virtue, that causes a separate satisfaction:  
On this object I bestow a relation to self;  
and find, that from this disposition of af-  
fairs, there immediately arises a passion. But  
what passion? That very one of pride, to  
which this object bears a double relation.  
Its idea is related to that of self, the object  
of the passion: The sensation it causes re-  
sembles the sensation of the passion. That  
I may be sure I am not mistaken in this  
experiment, I remove first one relation; then  
another;





PART another; and find, that each removal destroys the passion, and leaves the object perfectly indifferent. But I am not content with this. I make a still farther trial; and instead of removing the relation, I only change it for one of a different kind. I suppose the virtue to belong to my companion, not to myself; and observe what follows from this alteration. I immediately perceive the affections wheel about, and leaving pride, where there is only one relation, *viz.* of impressions, fall to the side of love, where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and ideas. By repeating the same experiment, in changing anew the relation of ideas, I bring the affections back to pride; and by a new repetition I again place them at love or kindness. Being fully convinc'd of the influence of this relation, I try the effects of the other; and by changing virtue for vice, convert the pleasant impression, which arises from the former, into the disagreeable one, which proceeds from the latter. The effect still answers expectation. Vice, when plac'd on another, excites, by means of its double relations, the passion of hatred, instead of love, which for the same reason arises from virtue. To continue the experiment, I change anew the relation

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of ideas, and suppose the vice to belong to **SECT.**  
 myself. What follows? What is usual. **A II.**  
 A subsequent change of the passion from ha-  
 tred to humility. This humility I convert  
 into pride by a new change of the impref-  
 sion; and find after all that I have com-  
 pleted the round, and have by these changes  
 brought back the passion to that very  
 situation, in which I first found it.

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BUT to make the matter still more cer-  
 tain, I alter the object; and instead of vice  
 and virtue, make the trial upon beauty and  
 deformity, riches and poverty, power and  
 servitude. Each of these objects runs the  
 circle of the passions in the same manner,  
 by a change of their relations: And in what-  
 ever order we proceed, whether thro' pride,  
 love, hatred, humility, or thro' humility,  
 hatred, love, pride, the experiment is not  
 in the least diversify'd. Esteem and con-  
 tempt, indeed, arise on some occasions in-  
 stead of love and hatred; but these are at  
 the bottom the same passions, only diver-  
 sify'd by some causes, which we shall ex-  
 plain afterwards.

**FIFTH EXPERIMENT.** To give greater  
 authority to these experiments, let us change  
 the situation of affairs as much as possible,  
 and place the passions and objects in all the  
 different



PART II. *Of love and hatred.* different positions, of which they are susceptible. Let us suppose, beside the relations above-mention'd, that the person, along with whom I make all these experiments, is closely connected with me either by blood or friendship. He is, we shall suppose, my son or brother, or is united to me by a long and familiar acquaintance. Let us next suppose, that the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person; and let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and relations.

BEFORE we consider what they are in fact, let us determine what they ought to be, conformable to my hypothesis. 'Tis plain, that, according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along requir'd. The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion. But to judge only from the situation of affairs, I shou'd not expect, that the affections wou'd rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression. As there is here a person, who by means of



a double relation is the object of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carry'd farther.

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The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride or humility. 'Tis evident, then, that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred.

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THIS is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis; and am pleas'd to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation. The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility. Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations; as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy. This exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis, upon which we reason.

SIXTH EXPERIMENT. This evidence will be still augmented, if we reverse the experiment, and preserving still the same relations, begin only with a different passion.





PART II. *Of love and hatred.* fion. Suppose, that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother, which causes first love or hatred, and afterwards pride or humility, we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves, without any immediate connexion with the person, who is related to us: Experience shews us, that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke, and that the mind is not convey'd from one passion to another, as in the preceding instance. We never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; tho' 'tis evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility. The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility. This may at first sight be esteem'd contrary to my hypothesis; since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same. Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred. Myself am related to the person. It shou'd, therefore, be expected, that like causes must produce like effects, and a perfect transition arise from the double relation, as in all other cases. This difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflections,

Tis





'TIS evident, that as we are at all times SECT. intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person. But every thing, that strikes upon us with vivacity, and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a manner, into our consideration, and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when it is once present, it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other objects, however strong may be their relation to our first object. The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure. In the one case the relation is aided by another principle: In the other case, 'tis oppos'd by it.

Now I have observ'd, that those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operation, when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object. The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other. The two impulses concur with each

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other,

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PART other, and render the whole transition more  
 II. smooth and easy. But if it shou'd happen,  
*Of love and hatred.* that while the relation of ideas, strictly speaking, continues the same, its influence, in causing a transition of the imagination, shou'd no longer take place, 'tis evident its influence on the passions must also cease, as being dependent entirely on that transition. This is the reason why pride or humility is not transfus'd into love or hatred with the same ease, that the latter passions are chang'd into the former. If a person be my brother I am his likewise: But tho' the relations be reciprocal, they have very different effects on the imagination. The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are every moment conscious. But when the affections are once directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us. This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions, and facilitates or retards their transition; which is a clear proof, that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections.



affections. Besides innumerable experiments that prove this, we here find, that even when the relation remains; if by any particular circumstance its usual effect upon the fancy in producing an association or transference of ideas, is prevented; its usual effect upon the passions, in conveying us from one to another, is in like manner prevented.

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SOME may, perhaps, find a contradiction betwixt this phenomenon and that of sympathy, where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us. But this difficulty will vanish, if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves; as in the present case, where we are suppos'd to be actuated with pride or humility. Ourselves, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us. But when self is the object of a passion, 'tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted; in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate.





PART SEVENTH EXPERIMENT. To put this

II. whole reasoning to a farther trial, let us  
 make a new experiment; and as we have  
 already seen the effects of related passions  
 and ideas, let us here suppose an identity  
 of passions along with a relation of ideas;  
 and let us consider the effects of this new  
 situation. 'Tis evident a transition of the  
 passions from the one object to the other is  
 here in all reason to be expected; since the  
 relation of ideas is suppos'd still to continue,  
 and an identity of impressions must produce  
 a stronger connexion, than the most perfect  
 resemblance, that can be imagin'd. If a  
 double relation, therefore, of impressions and  
 ideas is able to produce a transition from  
 one to the other, much more an identity  
 of impressions with a relation of ideas. Ac-  
 cordingly we find, that when we either love  
 or hate any person, the passions seldom con-  
 tinue within their first bounds; but extend  
 themselves towards all the contiguous ob-  
 jects, and comprehend the friends and re-  
 lations of him we love or hate. Nothing  
 is more natural than to bear a kindness to  
 one brother on account of our friendship for  
 another, without any farther examination  
 of his character. A quarrel with one per-  
 son gives us a hatred for the whole family,  
 tho'

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tho' entirely innocent of that, which displeas us. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with.

THERE is only one difficulty in this experiment, which it will be necessary to account for, before we proceed any farther. 'Tis evident, that tho' all passions pass easily from one object to another related to it, yet this transition is made with greater facility, where the more considerable object is first presented, and the lesser follows it, than where this order is revers'd, and the lesser takes the precedence. Thus 'tis more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father, than the father upon account of the son; the servant for the master, than the master for the servant; the subject for the prince, than the prince for the subject. In like manner we more readily contract a hatred against a whole family, where our first quarrel is with the head of it, than where we are displeas'd with a son, or servant, or some inferior member. In short, our passions, like other objects, descend with greater facility than they ascend.

THAT we may comprehend, wherein consists the difficulty of explaining this phenomenon, we must consider, that the very same reason, which determines the imagi-

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PART II. nation to pass from remote to contiguous objects, with more facility than from contiguous to remote, causes it likewise to change with more ease, the less for the greater, than the greater for the less. Whatever has the greatest influence is most taken notice of; and whatever is most taken notice of, presents itself most readily to the imagination. We are more apt to overlook in any subject, what is trivial, than what appears of considerable moment; but especially if the latter takes the precedence, and first engages our attention. Thus if any accident makes us consider the *Satellites* of *Jupiter*, our fancy is naturally determin'd to form the idea of that planet; but if we first reflect on the principal planet, 'tis more natural for us to overlook its attendants. The mention of the provinces of any empire conveys our thought to the seat of the empire; but the fancy returns not with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces. The idea of the servant makes us think of the master; that of the subject carries our view to the prince. But the same relation has not an equal influence in conveying us back again. And on this is founded that reproach of *Cornelia* to her sons, that they ought to be ashamed she shou'd

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shou'd be more known by the title of the daughter of *Scipio*, than by that of the mother of the *Gracchi*. This was, in other words, exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather, otherwise the imagination of the people, passing from her who was intermediate, and plac'd in an equal relation to both, wou'd always leave them, and denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment. On the same principle is founded that common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands, rather than husbands that of their wives; as also the ceremony of giving the precedency to those, whom we honour and respect. We might find many other instances to confirm this principle, were it not already sufficiently evident.

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Now since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater, as from remote to contiguous, why does not this easy transition of ideas assist the transition of passions in the former case, as well as in the latter? The virtues of a friend or brother produce first love, and then pride; because in that case the imagination passes from remote to contiguous, according to its propensity. Our own virtues produce not first pride, and then love to a friend or





PART brother; because the passage in that case  
 II. would be from contiguous to remote, con-  
 trary to its propensity. But the love or  
 hatred of an inferior cause not readily any  
 passion to the superior, tho' that be the na-  
 tural propensity of the imagination: While  
 the love or hatred of a superior, causes a  
 passion to the inferior, contrary to its pro-  
 pensity. In short, the same facility of tran-  
 sition operates not in the same manner upon  
 superior and inferior as upon contiguous and  
 remote. These two phænomena appear con-  
 tradictory, and require some attention to be  
 reconcil'd.

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 tred.*

As the transition of ideas is here made  
 contrary to the natural propensity of the  
 imagination, that faculty must be over-  
 power'd by some stronger principle of an-  
 other kind; and as there is nothing ever  
 present to the mind but impressions and  
 ideas, this principle must necessarily lie in  
 the impressions. Now it has been observ'd,  
 that impressions or passions are connected  
 only by their resemblance, and that where  
 any two passions place the mind in the  
 same or in similar dispositions, it very na-  
 turally passes from the one to the other:  
 As on the contrary, a repugnance in the dis-  
 positions produces a difficulty in the transi-  
 tion



tion of the passions. But 'tis observable, SECT.  
 that this repugnance may arise from a dif- II.  
 ference of degree as well as of kind; nor  
 do we experience a greater difficulty in pas- Experi-  
 sing suddenly from a small degree of love ments to  
 to a small degree of hatred, than from a small confirm  
 to a great degree of either of these affections. this system.

A man, when calm or only moderately agitated, is so different, in every respect, from himself, when disturbed with a violent passion, that no two persons can be more unlike; nor is it easy to pass from the one extreme to the other, without a considerable interval betwixt them.

THE difficulty is not less, if it be not rather greater, in passing from the strong passion to the weak, than in passing from the weak to the strong, provided the one passion upon its appearance destroys the other, and they do not both of them exist at once. But the case is entirely alter'd, when the passions unite together, and actuate the mind at the same time. A weak passion, when added to a strong, makes not so considerable change in the disposition, as a strong when added to a weak; for which reason there is a closer connexion betwixt the great degree and the small, than betwixt the small degree and the great.

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PART II. THE degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object; and an affection directed to a person, who is considerable in our eyes, fills and possesses the mind much more than one, which has for its object a person we esteem of less consequence. Here then the contradiction betwixt the propensities of the imagination and passion displays itself. When we turn our thought to a great and a small object, the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great, than from the great to the small; but the affections find a greater difficulty: And as the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination, no wonder they prevail over it, and draw the mind to their side. In spite of the difficulty of passing from the idea of great to that of little, a passion directed to the former, produces always a similar passion towards the latter; when the great and little are related together. The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master; but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or good-will to the servant. The strongest passion in this case takes the precedence; and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition,

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fition, the passage is by that means render'd more easy and natural betwixt them. S E C T. II.

As in the foregoing experiment we found, that a relation of ideas, which, by any particular circumstance, ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas, ceases likewise to operate on the passions; so in the present experiment we find the same property of the impressions. Two different degrees of the same passion are surely related together; but if the smaller be first present, it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater; and that because the addition of the great to the little, produces a more sensible alteration on the temper, than the addition of the little to the great. These phenomena, when duly weigh'd, will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis.

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AND these proofs will be confirm'd, if we consider the manner in which the mind here reconciles the contradiction, I have observ'd betwixt the passions and the imagination. The fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater, than from the greater to the less: But on the contrary a violent passion produces more easily a feeble, than that does a violent. In this opposition the passion in the end prevails

over





PART over the imagination; but 'tis commonly  
 I. by complying with it, and by seeking another  
 quality, which may counter-balance that principle, from whence the opposition arises. When we love the father or master of a family, we little think of his children or servants. But when these are present with us, or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them, the nearness and contiguity in this case encreases their magnitude, or at least removes that opposition, which the fancy makes to the transition of the affections. If the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less, it finds an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous, which brings the matter to an equality, and leaves the way open from the one passion to the other.

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tred.*

EIGHTH EXPERIMENT. I have observ'd that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility, is more easy than from pride or humility to love or hatred; and that the difficulty, which the imagination finds in passing from contiguous to remote, is the cause why we scarce have any instance of the latter transition of the affections. I must, however, make one exception, *viz.* when the very cause of the pride and humility is plac'd in some other person.



person. For in that case the imagination is necessitated to consider the person, nor can it possibly confine its view to ourselves. Thus nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person, than his approbation of our conduct and character: As on the other hand, nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred, than his blame or contempt. Here 'tis evident, that the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and that this passion is transfus'd into love or hatred, whose object is some other person, notwithstanding the rule I have already establish'd, *that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote.* But the transition in this case is not made merely on account of the relation betwixt ourselves and the person; but because that very person is the real cause of our first passion, and of consequence is intimately connected with it. 'Tis his approbation that produces pride; and disapprobation, humility. No wonder, then, the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred. This is not a contradiction, but an exception to the rule; and an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself.

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SUCH





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SUCH an exception as this is, therefore, rather a confirmation of the rule. And indeed, if we consider all the eight experiments I have explain'd, we shall find that the same principle appears in all of them, and that 'tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc'd. An object without \* a relation, or † with but one, never produces either of these passions; and 'tis ‡ found that the passion always varies in conformity to the relation. Nay we may observe, that where the relation, by any particular circumstance, has not its usual effect of producing a transition either of \*\* ideas or of impressions, it ceases to operate upon the passions, and gives rise neither to pride nor love, humility nor hatred. This rule we find still to hold good ††, even under the appearance of its contrary; and as relation is frequently experienc'd to have no effect; which upon examination is found to proceed from some particular circumstance, that prevents the transition; so even in instances, where that circumstance, tho' present, prevents not the

\* First Experiment                    † Second and Third Experiments.  
 ‡ Fourth Experiment.                \*\* Sixth Experiment.  
 †† Seventh and Eighth Experiments.

tran-