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A Treatise Of Human Nature

Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning Into
Moral Subjects

Of The Passions

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Sect. X. Of respect and contempt.

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S E C T. X.

Of respect and contempt.

THERE now remains only to explain S E C T. X.
 the passions of *respect* and *contempt*,
 along with the *amorous* affection, in order
 to understand all the passions which have
 any mixture of love or hatred. Let us be-
 gin with respect and contempt.

IN considering the qualities and circum-
 stances of others, we may either regard them
 as they really are in themselves; or may
 make a comparison betwixt them and our
 own qualities and circumstances; or may
 join these two methods of consideration.
 The good qualities of others, from the first
 point of view, produce love; from the se-
 cond, humility; and from the third, respect;
 which is a mixture of these two passions.
 Their bad qualities, after the same manner,
 cause either hatred, or pride, or contempt,
 according to the light in which we survey
 them.

THAT there is a mixture of pride in con-
 tempt, and of humility in respect, is, I think,

too

PART too evident, from their very feeling or appearance, to require any particular proof.

II. *Of love and hatred.* That this mixture arises from a tacit comparison of the person contemn'd or respected with ourselves is no less evident. The same man may cause either respect, love, or contempt by his condition and talents, according as the person, who considers him, from his inferior becomes his equal or superior. In changing the point of view, tho' the object may remain the same, its proportion to ourselves entirely alters; which is the cause of an alteration in the passions. These passions, therefore, arise from our observing the proportion; that is, from a comparison.

I HAVE already observ'd, that the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility, and have endeavour'd, from the principles of human nature, to assign a cause for this phenomenon. Whether my reasoning be receiv'd or not, the phenomenon is undisputed, and appears in many instances. Among the rest, 'tis the reason why there is a much greater mixture of pride in contempt, than of humility in respect, and why we are more elevated with the view of one below us, than mortify'd with the presence of one above us. Con-
tempt

tempt or scorn has so strong a tincture of SECT.
 pride, that there scarce is any other passion X.
 discernable: Whereas in esteem or respect, Of respect
 love makes a more considerable ingredient and con-
 than humility. The passion of vanity is so tempt.
 prompt, that it rouses at the least call;
 while humility requires a stronger impulse
 to make it exert itself.

BUT here it may reasonably be ask'd,
 why this mixture takes place only in some
 cases, and appears not on every occasion. All
 those objects, which cause love, when plac'd
 on another person, are the causes of pride,
 when transfer'd to ourselves; and conse-
 quently ought to be causes of humility, as
 well as love, while they belong to others,
 and are only compar'd to those, which we
 ourselves possess. In like manner every qua-
 lity, which, by being directly consider'd,
 produces hatred, ought always to give rise
 to pride by comparision, and by a mixture
 of these passions of hatred and pride ought
 to excite contempt or scorn. The difficulty
 then is, why any objects ever cause pure
 love or hatred, and produce not always the
 mixt passions of respect and contempt.

I HAVE suppos'd all along, that the pas-
 sions of love and pride, and those of hu-
 mility

PART II. *Of love and hatred.* milicity and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful. But tho' this be universally true, 'tis observable, that the two agreeable, as well as the two painful passions, have some differences, and even contrarieties, which distinguish them. Nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity; tho' at the same time love or tenderness is rather found to weaken and infeeble it. The same difference is observable betwixt the uneasy passions. Anger and hatred bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions; while humility and shame deject and discourage us. Of these qualities of the passions, 'twill be necessary to form a distinct idea. Let us remember, that pride and hatred invigorate the soul; and love and humility infeeble it.

FROM this it follows, that tho' the conformity betwixt love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects, yet this other contrariety is the reason, why they are excited in very different degrees. Genius and learning are *pleasant* and *magnificent* objects, and by both these circumstances

stances are adapted to pride and vanity; but SECT.
 have a relation to love by their pleasure on- X.
 ly. Ignorance and simplicity are *disagree-*
able and *mean*, which in the same manner *Of respect*
 gives them a double connexion with *and con-*
 humility, and a single one with hatred. We *tempt.*
 may, therefore, consider it as certain, that
 tho' the same object always produces
 love and pride, humility and hatred, ac-
 cording to its different situations, yet it sel-
 dom produces either the two former or the
 two latter passions in the same proportion.

"TIS here we must seek for a solution
 of the difficulty above-mention'd, why any
 object ever excites pure love or hatred, and
 does not always produce respect or contempt,
 by a mixture of humility or pride. No
 quality in another gives rise to humility by
 comparison, unless it wou'd have produc'd
 pride by being plac'd in ourselves; and
vice versa no object excites pride by com-
 parison, unless it wou'd have produc'd
 humility by the direct survey. This is evi-
 dent, objects always produce by *comparison*
 a sensation directly contrary to their *origi-*
nal one. Suppose, therefore, an object to
 be presented, which is peculiarly fitted to
 produce love, but imperfectly to excite pride;
 this

PART this object, belonging to another, gives rise
 II. directly to a great degree of love, but to a
Of love small one of humility by comparison; and
and ha- consequently that latter passion is scarce felt
tried. in the compound, nor is able to convert
 the love into respect. This is the case with
 good nature, good humour, facility, gene-
 rosity, beauty, and many other qualities.
 These have a peculiar aptitude to produce
 love in others; but not so great a tendency
 to excite pride in ourselves: For which
 reason the view of them, as belonging to
 another person, produces pure love, with
 but a small mixture of humility and respect.
 'Tis easy to extend the same reasoning to
 the opposite passions.

BEFORE we leave this subject, it may
 not be amiss to account for a pretty curious
 phenomenon, *viz.* why we commonly keep
 at a distance such as we contemn, and al-
 low not our inferiors to approach too near
 even in place and situation. It has al-
 ready been observ'd, that almost every kind
 of idea is attended with some emotion, even
 the ideas of number and extension, much
 more those of such objects as are esteem'd
 of consequence in life, and fix our attention.
 'Tis not with entire indifference we can sur-
 vey

vey either a rich man or a poor one, but S E C T.
 must feel some faint touches, at least, of X.
 respect in the former case, and of contempt in Of respect
 the latter. These two passions are contrary and con-
 to each other; but in order to make this tempt.
 contrariety be felt, the objects must be some-
 way related; otherwise the affections are to-
 tally separate and distinct, and never en-
 counter. The relation takes place wherever
 the persons become contiguous; which is
 a general reason why we are uneasy at see-
 ing such disproportion'd objects, as a rich
 man and a poor one, a nobleman and a
 porter, in that situation.

THIS uneasiness, which is common to
 every spectator, must be more sensible to the
 superior; and that because the near approach
 of the inferior is regarded as a piece of ill-
 breeding, and shews that he is not sensible
 of the disproportion, and is no way affected
 by it. A sense of superiority in another
 breeds in all men an inclination to keep
 themselves at a distance from him, and de-
 termines them to redouble the marks of re-
 spect and reverence, when they are oblig'd
 to approach him; and where they do not
 observe that conduct, 'tis a proof they are
 not sensible of his superiority. From hence
 too