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### **A Treatise Of Human Nature**

Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects

Of The Passions

Hume, David London, 1739

Sect. XI. Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes.

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Of love and batred.

PART too it proceeds, that any great difference in the degrees of any quality is call'd a distance by a common metaphor, which, however trivial it may appear, is founded on natural principles of the imagination. A great difference inclines us to produce a distance. The ideas of distance and difference are. Connected therefore, connected together. ideas are readily taken for each other; and this is in general the fource of the metaphor, as we shall have occasion to observe afterwards.

# SECT. XI.

Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the fexes.

F all the compound passions, which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections, no one better deferves our attention, than that love, which arises betwixt the sexes, as well on account of its force and violence, as those curious principles of philosophy, for which it affords us an uncontestable argument. plain, that this affection, in its most natuBOOK II. Of the Passions.

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ral state, is deriv'd from the conjunction SECT. of three different impressions or passions, XI. viz. The pleasing sensation arising from of the abeauty; the bodily appetite for generation; morouspassand a generous kindness or good-will. The origin of kindness from beauty may be explain'd from the foregoing reasoning. The question is how the bodily appetite is excited by it.

THE appetite of generation, when confin'd to a certain degree, is evidently of the pleasant kind, and has a strong connexion with all the agreeable emotions. Joy, mirth, vanity, and kindness are all incentives to this desire; as well as music, dancing, wine, and good cheer. On the other hand, forrow, melancholy, poverty, humility are destructive of it. From this quality 'tis easily conceiv'd why it shou'd be connected with the sense of beauty.

But there is another principle that contributes to the same effect. I have observed that the parallel direction of the desires is a real relation, and no less than a resemblance in their sensation, produces a connexion among them. That we may fully comprehend the extent of this relation, we must consider, that any principal desire may be Vol. II.

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PART attended with fubordinate ones, which are connected with it, and to which if other defires are parallel, they are by that means related to the principal one. Thus hunger may oft be confider'd as the primary inclination of the foul, and the defire of approaching the meat as the fecondary one; fince 'tis absolutely necessary to the satisfying that appetite. If an object, therefore, by any feparate qualities, inclines us to approach the meat, it naturally encreases our appetite; as on the contrary, whatever inclines us to fet our victuals at a distance, is contradictory to hunger, and diminishes our inclination to them. Now 'tis plain that beauty has the first effect, and deformity the second: Which is the reason why the former gives us a keener appetite for our victuals, and the latter is sufficient to disgust us at the most favoury dish, that cookery has invented. All this is eafily applicable to the appetite for generation.

FROM these two relations, viz. resemblance and a parallel defire, there arises such a connexion betwixt the fense of beauty, the bodily appetite, and benevolence, that they become in a manner inseparable: And we find from experience, that 'tis in-

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different which of them advances first; fince SECT any of them is almost fure to be attended XI. with the related affections. One, who is of the inflam'd with luft, feels at least a momen-amorous tary kindness towards the object of it, and passion, &c. at the same time fancies her more beautiful than ordinary; as there are many, who begin with kindness and esteem for the wit and merit of the person, and advance from that to the other passions. But the most common species of love is that which first arises from beauty, and afterwards diffuses itself into kindness and into the bodily appetite. Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite eafily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin'd passion of the foul; the other the most gross and vulgar. love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds, that'tis fo fingularly fitted to produce both.

This account of love is not peculiar to my fystem, but is unavoidable on any hypothesis. The three affections, which compose this passion, are evidently distinct, and has each of them its distinct object. 'Tis certain, therefore, that 'tis only by their re-

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PART lation they produce each other. relation of passions is not alone sufficient. 'Tis likewise necessary, there shou'd be a relation of ideas. The beauty of one perfon never inspires us with love for another. This then is a fenfible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas. From one instance so evident as this we may form a judgment of the rest.

THIS may also serve in another view to illustrate what I have infifted on concerning the origin of pride and humility, love and hatred. I have observ'd, that tho' felf be the object of the first set of passions, and fome other person of the second, yet these objects cannot alone be the causes of the paffions; as having each of them a relation to two contrary affections, which must from the very first moment destroy each other. Here then is the fituation of the mind, as I have already describ'd it. It has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a paffion; that paffion, when produc'd, naturally turns the view to a certain object. But this not being fufficient to produce the passion, there is requir'd fome other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions and ideas may fet these principles in action, and beflow