An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations

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Book V. Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

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BOOK V.

Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

CHAP. I.

Of the Expences of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

PART FIRST.

Of the Expence of Defence.

CHAP. I.

THE first duty of the ſovereign, that of protecting the ſociety from the violence and invaſion of other independent ſocieties, can be performed only by means of a military force. But the expence both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different in the different ſtates of ſociety, in the different periods of improvement.

AMONG nations of hunters, the loweſt and rudeſt ſtate of ſociety, ſuch as we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his ſociety, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other ſocieties, he maintains himſelf by his own labour in the ſame manner as when he lives at home. His ſociety, for in this ſtate of things there is properly neither ſovereign nor commonwealth, is at no ſort of expence, either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

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AMONG nations of ſhepherds, a more advanced ſtate of ſociety, ſuch as we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the ſame manner, a warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents or in a ſort of covered waggons which are eaſily tranſported from place to place. The whole tribe or nation changes its ſituation according to the different ſeaſons of the year, as well as according to other accidents. When its herds and flocks have conſumed the forage of one part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In the dry ſeaſon, it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet ſeaſon it retires to the upper country. When ſuch a nation goes to war, the warriors will not truſt their herds and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and their old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence and without ſubſiſtence. The whole nation, beſides, being accuſtomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, eaſily takes the field in time of war. Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdſmen, the way of life is nearly the ſame, though the object propoſed by it is very different. They all go to war together, therefore, and every one does as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to the hoſtile tribe is the recompence of the victory. But if they are vanquiſhed, all is loſt, and not only their herds and flocks, but their women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater part of thoſe who ſurvive the action are obliged to ſubmit to him for the ſake of immediate ſubſiſtence. The reſt are commonly diſſipated and diſperſed in the deſart.

THE ordinary life, the ordinary exerciſes of a Tartar or Arab, prepare him ſufficiently for war. Running, wreſtling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javeling, drawing the bow, &c. are the common

paſtimes of thoſe who live in the open air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks which he carries with him, in the ſame manner as in peace. His chief or ſovereign, for thoſe nations have all chiefs or ſovereigns, is at no ſort of expence in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

An army of hunters can ſeldom exceed two or three hundred men. The precarious ſubſiſtence which the chace affords could ſeldom allow a greater number to keep together for any conſiderable time. An army of ſhepherds, on the contrary, may ſometimes amount to two or three hundred thouſand. As long as nothing ſtops their progreſs, as long as they can go on from one diſtrict, of which they have conſumed the forage, to another which is yet entire; there ſeems to be ſcarce any limit to the number who can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the civilized nations in their neighbourhood. A nation of ſhepherds may. Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America. Nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invaſion has frequently been in Aſia. The judgement of Thucidides, that both Europe and Aſia could not reſiſt the Scythians united, has been verified by the experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extenſive, but defenceleſs plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the dominion of the chief of ſome conquering horde or clan; and the havock and devaſtation of Aſia have always ſignalized their union. The inhabitants of the inhoſpitable deſarts of Arabia, the other great nation of ſhepherds, have never been united but once; under Mahomet and his immediate ſucceſſors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthuſiaſm than of conqueſt, was ſignalized in the ſame manner. If the hunting nations of America

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ſhould ever become ſhepherds, their neighbourhood would be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at preſent.

In a yet more advanced ſtate of ſociety, among thoſe nations of huſbandmen who have little foreign commerce and no other manufactures but thoſe coarſe and houſhold ones which almoſt every private family prepares for its own uſe, every man, in the ſame manner, either is a warrior or eaſily becomes ſuch. They who live by agriculture generally paſs the whole day in the open air, expoſed to all the inclemencies of the ſeaſons. The hardineſs of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to ſome of which their neceſſary occupations bear a good deal of analogy. The neceſſary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and to fortify a camp as well as to encloſe a field. The ordinary paſtimes of ſuch huſbandmen are the ſame as thoſe of ſhepherds, and are in the ſame manner the images of war. But as huſbandmen have leſs leiſure than ſhepherds, they are not ſo frequently employed in thoſe paſtimes. They are ſoldiers, but ſoldiers not quite ſo much maſters of their exerciſe. Such as they are, however, it ſeldom coſts the ſovereign or commonwealth any expence to prepare them for the field.

Agriculture, even in its rudeſt and loweſt ſtate, ſuppoſes a ſettlement; ſome ſort of fixed habitation which cannot be abandoned without great loſs. When a nation of mere huſbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and children, at leaſt muſt remain at home to take care of the habitation. All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in ſmall nations of this kind have frequently done ſo. In every nation the men of the military age are ſuppoſed to amount to about a fourth or fifth part of the whole body of the people. If the campaign too ſhould begin after ſeed time

time and end before harveſt, both the huſbandman and his principal labourers can be ſpared from the farm without much loſs. He truſts that the work which muſt be done in the meantime can be well enough executed by the old men, the women and the children. He is not unwilling, therefore, to ſerve without pay during ſo ſhort a campaign, and it frequently coſts the ſovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different ſtates of antient Greece ſeem to have ſerved in this manner till after the ſecond Perſian war; and the people of Peloponeſus till after the Peloponeſian war. The Peloponeſians, Thucidides obſerves, generally left the field in the ſummer and returned home to reap the harveſt. The Roman people under their kings and during the firſt ages of the republick ſerved in the ſame manner. It was not till the ſiege of Veii, that they who ſtaid at home began to contribute ſomething towards maintaining thoſe who went to war. In the European monarchies which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before and for ſome time after the eſtabliſhment of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords with all their immediate dependents uſed to ſerve the crown at their own expence. In the field, in the ſame manner as at home, they maintained themſelves by their own revenue, and not by any ſtipend or pay which they received from the king upon that particular occaſion.

In a more advanced ſtate of ſociety, two different cauſes contribute to render it altogether impoſſible that they who take the field ſhould maintain themſelves at their own expence. Thoſe two cauſes are, the progreſs of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

Though a huſbandman ſhould be employed in an expedition, provided it begins after ſeed time and ends before harveſt, the inter-

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ruption of his buſineſs will not always occaſion any conſiderable diminution of his revenue. Without the intervention of his labour, nature does herſelf the greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an artificer, a ſmith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his workhouſe, the ſole ſource of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does nothing for him, he does all for himſelf. When he takes the field, therefore, in defence of the publick, as he has no revenue to maintain himſelf, he muſt neceſſarily be maintained by the publick. But in a country of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war muſt be drawn from thoſe claſſes, and muſt therefore be maintained by the publick as long as they are employed in its ſervice.

When the art of war too has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and complicated ſcience, when the event of war ceaſes to be determined, as in the firſt ages of ſociety, by a ſingle irregular ſkirmiſh or battle, but when the conteſt is generally ſpun out through ſeveral different campaigns, each of which laſts during the greater part of the year; it becomes univerſally neceſſary that the publick ſhould maintain thoſe who ſerve the publick in war, at leaſt while they are employed in that ſervice. Whatever in time of peace might be the ordinary occupation of thoſe who go to war, ſo very tedious and expenſive a ſervice would otherwiſe be by far too heavy a burden upon them. After the ſecond Perſian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens ſeem to have been generally compoſed of mercenary troops; conſiſting indeed partly of citizens, but partly too of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and paid at the expence of the ſtate. From the time of the ſeige of Veii the armies of Rome received pay for their ſervice during the time which they remained in the field. Under the feudal governments the military ſervice both of the great lords and of their immediate dependents

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was, after a certain period, univerſally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to maintain thoſe who ſerved in their ſtead.

THE number of thoſe who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the people, is neceſſarily much ſmaller in a civilized than in a rude ſtate of ſociety. In a civilized ſociety, as the ſoldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of thoſe who are not ſoldiers, the number of the former never can exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above maintaining in a manner ſuitable to their reſpective ſtations both themſelves and the other officers of government, and law, whom they are obliged to maintain. In the little Agrarian ſtates of antient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people conſidered themſelves as ſoldiers, and would ſometimes, it is ſaid, take the field. Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as ſoldiers, without ruin to the country at whoſe expence they are employed.

THE expence of preparing the army for the field ſeems not to have become conſiderable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the ſovereign or commonwealth. In all the different republicks of antient Greece, to learn his military exerciſes was a neceſſary part of education impoſed by the ſtate upon every free citizen. In every city there ſeems to have been a publick field, in which, under the protection of the publick magiſtrate, the young people were taught their different exerciſes by different maſters. In this very ſimple inſtitution conſiſted the whole expence which any Grecian ſtate ſeems ever to have been at in preparing its citizens for war. In antient Rome the exerciſes of the Campus Martius anſwered the

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ſame purpoſe with thoſe of the Gymnaſium in antient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many publick ordinances that the citizens of every diſtrict ſhould practiſe archery as well as ſeveral other military exerciſes, were intended for promoting the ſame purpoſe, but do not ſeem to have promoted it ſo well. Either from want of intereſt in the officers entruſted with the execution of thoſe ordinances, or from ſome other cauſe, they appear to have been univerſally neglected; and in the progreſs of all thoſe governments, military exerciſes ſeem to have gone gradually into diſuſe among the great body of the people.

In the republicks of antient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their exiſtence, and under the feudal governments for a conſiderable time after their firſt eſtabliſhment, the trade of a ſoldier was not a ſeparate diſtinct trade which conſtituted the ſole or principal occupation of a particular claſs of citizens. Every ſubject of the ſtate, whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, conſidered himſelf upon all ordinary occaſions as fit likewiſe to exerciſe the trade of a ſoldier, and upon many extraordinary occaſions as bound to exerciſe it.

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the nobleſt of all arts, ſo in the progreſs of improvement it neceſſarily becomes one of the moſt complicated among them. The ſtate of the mechanical, as well as of ſome other arts with which it is neceſſarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is neceſſary that it ſhould become the ſole or principal occupation of a particular claſs of citizens, and the diviſion of labour is as neceſſary for the improvement of this as of every other art. Into other arts the diviſion of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote

promote their private intereſt better by confining themſelves to a particular trade, than by exerciſing a great number. But it is the wiſdom of the ſtate only which can render the trade of a ſoldier a particular trade ſeparate and diſtinct from all others. A private citizen who, in time of profound peace and without any particular encouragement from the publick, ſhould ſpend the greater part of his time in military exerciſes, might, no doubt, both improve himſelf very much in them, and amuſe himſelf very well; but he certainly would not promote his own intereſt. It is the wiſdom of the ſtate only which can render it for his intereſt to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation: and ſtates have not always had this wiſdom, even when their circumſtances had become ſuch that the preſervation of their exiſtence required that they ſhould have it. CHAP. I.

A SHEPHERD has a great deal of leiſure; a huſbandman, in the rude ſtate of huſbandry, has ſome; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The firſt may, without any loſs, employ a great deal of his time in martial exerciſes; the ſecond may employ ſome part of it; but the laſt cannot employ a ſingle hour in them without ſome loſs, and his attention to his own intereſt naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Thoſe improvements in huſbandry too, which the progreſs of arts and manufactures neceſſarily introduces, leave the huſbandman as little leiſure as the artificer. Military exerciſes come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by thoſe of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the ſame time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which in reality is no more than the accumulated produce of thoſe improvements, provokes the invaſion of all their neighbours. An induſtrious, and upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the moſt likely to be attacked; and unleſs the ſtate

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takes ſome new meaſures for the publick defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themſelves.

In theſe circumſtances there ſeem to be but two methods by which the ſtate can make any tolerable proviſion for the publick defence.

It may either, firſt, by means of a very rigorous police, and in ſpite of the whole bent of the intereſt, genius and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military exerciſes, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in ſome meaſure the trade of a ſoldier to whatever other trade or profeſſion they may happen to carry on.

Or, ſecondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the conſtant practice of military exerciſes, it may render the trade of a ſoldier a particular trade, ſeparate and diſtinct from all others.

If the ſtate has recourſe to the firſt of thoſe two expedients, its military force is ſaid to conſiſt in a militia; if to the ſecond, it is ſaid to conſiſt in a ſtanding army. The practice of military exerciſes is the ſole or principal occupation of the ſoldiers of a ſtanding army, and the maintenance or pay which the ſtate affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their ſubſiſtence. The practice of military exerciſes is only the occaſional occupation of the ſoldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of their ſubſiſtence from ſome other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer or tradeſman, predominates over that of the ſoldier: in a ſtanding army, that of the ſoldier predominates over every other character; and in this diſtinction ſeems to conſiſt

the eſſential difference between thoſe two different ſpecies of military force. CHAP. I.

MILITIAS have been of ſeveral different kinds. In ſome countries the citizens deſtined for defending the ſtate, ſeem to have been exerciſed only, without being, if I may ſay ſo, regimented; that is, without being divided into ſeparate and diſtinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its exerciſes under its own proper and permanent officers. In the republicks of antient Greece and Rome each citizen, as long as he remained at home, ſeems to have practiſed his exerciſes either ſeparately and independently, or with ſuch of his equals as he liked beſt; and not to have been attached to any particular body of troops till he was actually called upon to take the field. In other countries, the militia has not only been exerciſed, but regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military force of this kind has been eſtabliſhed, every militia-man is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which performs its exerciſes under its own proper and permanent officers.

BEFORE the invention of fire-arms, that army was ſuperior in which the ſoldiers had, each individually, the greateſt ſkill and dexterity in the uſe of their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the higheſt conſequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this ſkill and dexterity in the uſe of their arms, could be acquired only in the ſame manner as fencing is acquired at preſent, by practiſing, not in great bodies, but each man ſeparately, in a particular ſchool under a particular maſter, or with his own particular equals and companions. Since the invention of fire-arms, ſtrength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and ſkill in the uſe of arms, though they are far from being of no conſequence, are, however, of leſs conſequence. The nature of the weapon, though

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it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the ſkilful, puts him more nearly ſo than he ever was before. All the dexterity and ſkill, it is ſuppoſed, which are neceſſary for uſing it, can be well enough acquired by practiſing in great bodies.

REGULARITY, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles than the dexterity and ſkill of the ſoldiers in the uſe of their arms. But the noiſe of fire-arms, the ſmoke, and the inviſible death to which every man feels himſelf every moment expoſed, as ſoon as he comes within cannon-ſhot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well ſaid to be engaged, muſt render it very difficult to maintain any conſiderable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle. In an antient battle there was no noiſe but what aroſe from the human voice; there was no ſmoke, there was no inviſible cauſe of wounds or death. Every man, till ſome mortal weapon actually did approach him, ſaw clearly that no ſuch weapon was near him. In theſe circumſtances, and among troops who had ſome confidence in their own ſkill and dexterity in the uſe of their arms, it muſt have been a good deal leſs difficult to preſerve ſome degree of regularity and order, not only in the beginning, but through the whole progreſs of an antient battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops which are exerciſed in great bodies.

A MILITIA, however, in whatever manner it may be either diſciplined or exerciſed, muſt always be much inferior to a well diſciplined and well exerciſed ſtanding army.

THE ſoldiers, who are exerciſed only once a week or once a month, can never be ſo expert in the uſe of their arms, as thoſe who

who are exerciſed every day or every other day; and though this circumſtance may not be of ſo much conſequence in modern, as it was in antient times; yet the acknowledged ſuperiority of the Pruſſian troops, owing, it is ſaid, very much to their ſuperior expertneſs in their exerciſe, may ſatisfy us that it is, even at this day, of very conſiderable conſequence.

THE ſoldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a week or once a month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being in any reſpect accountable to him, can never be under the ſame awe in his preſence, can never have the ſame diſpoſition to ready obedience, with thoſe whoſe whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even riſe and go to bed, or at leaſt retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called diſcipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia muſt always be ſtill more inferior to a ſtanding army, than it may ſometimes be in what is called the manual exerciſe, or in the management and uſe of its arms. But in modern war the habit of ready and inſtant obedience is of much greater conſequence than a conſiderable ſuperiority in the management of arms.

THOSE militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the ſame chieftains whom they are accuſtomed to obey in peace, are by far the beſt. In reſpect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach neareſt to ſtanding armies. The highland militia, when it ſerved under its own chieftains, had ſome advantage of the ſame kind. As the highlanders, however, were not wandering, but ſtationary ſhepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times, accuſtomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; ſo in time of war they were leſs willing to follow him to any conſiderable diſtance, or to continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any booty they

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they were eager to return home, and his authority was ſeldom ſufficient to detain them. In point of obedience they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the highlanders too, from their ſtationary life, ſpend leſs of their time in the open air, they were always leſs accuſtomed to military exerciſes, and were leſs expert in the uſe of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are ſaid to be.

A MILITIA of any kind, it muſt be obſerved, however, which has ſerved for ſeveral ſucceſſive campaigns in the field, becomes in every reſpect a ſtanding army. The ſoldiers are every day exerciſed in the uſe of their arms, and, being conſtantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the ſame prompt obedience which takes place in ſtanding armies. What they were before they took the field, is of little importance. They neceſſarily become in every reſpect a ſtanding army, after they have paſſed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become in every reſpect a match for that ſtanding army, of which, in the laſt war, the valour appeared at leaſt not inferior to that of the hardieſt veterans of France and Spain.

THIS diſtinction being well underſtood, the hiſtory of all ages, it will be found, bears teſtimony to the irreſiſtible ſuperiority which a well regulated ſtanding army has over every ſort of militia.

ONE of the firſt ſtanding armies of which we have any diſtinct account, in any well authenticated hiſtory, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Theſſalians, and ſome of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact diſcipline of a ſtanding army. When he was at peace, which he was very ſeldom, and never for any long

long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle indeed, the galant and well exercised militias of the principal republicks of antient Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republicks and of the Persian empire, was the effect of the irresistable superiority which a standing army has over every sort of militia. It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account. CHAP. I.

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republicks may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar, his son in law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal; first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa, and, lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans in the mean time, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ, were militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

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THE ſtanding army which Annibal left behind him in Spain, had the like ſuperiority over the militia which the Romans ſent to oppoſe it, and in a few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Aſdrubal, expelled them almoſt entirely from that country.

ANNIBAL was ill ſupplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the field, became in the progreſs of the war a well diſciplined and well exerciſed ſtanding army; and the ſuperiority of Annibal grew every day leſs and leſs. Aſdrubal judged it neceſſary to lead the whole, or almoſt the whole of the ſtanding army which he commanded in Spain, to the aſſiſtance of his brother in Italy. In his march he is ſaid to have been miſled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was ſurprized and attacked by another ſtanding army, in every reſpect equal or ſuperior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

WHEN Aſdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppoſe him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and ſubdued that militia, and, in the courſe of the war, his own militia neceſſarily became a well diſciplined and well exerciſed ſtanding army. That ſtanding army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppoſe it. In order to defend Carthage it became neceſſary to recall the ſtanding army of Annibal. The diſheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, compoſed the greater part of the troops of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival republicks.

FROM the end of the ſecond Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republick, the armies of Rome were in every reſpect ſtanding armies. The ſtanding army of Macedon made ſome reſiſtance

reſiſtance to their arms. In the height of their grandeur it coſt them two great wars, and three great battles, to ſubdue that little kingdom; of which the conqueſt would probably have been ſtill more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its laſt king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble reſiſtance to the ſtanding armies of Rome. The militias of ſome barbarous nations defended themſelves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caſpian ſeas, were the moſt formidable enemies which the Romans had to encounter after the ſecond Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias too were always reſpectable, and, upon ſeveral occaſions, gained very conſiderable advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much ſuperior; and if the Romans did not purſue the final conqueſt either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably becauſe they judged that it was not worth while to add thoſe two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large. The antient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their anceſtors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of wandering ſhepherds, who went to war under the ſame chiefs whom they were accuſtomed to follow in peace. Their militia was exactly of the ſame kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom too they were probably deſcended.

MANY different cauſes contributed to relax the diſcipline of the Roman armies. Its extreme ſeverity was, perhaps, one of thoſe cauſes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of oppoſing them, their heavy armour was laid aſide as

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unneceſſarily burdenſome, their laborious exerciſes were neglected as unneceſſarily toilſome. Under the Roman emperors beſides, the ſtanding armies of Rome, thoſe particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their maſters, againſt whom they uſed frequently to ſet up their own generals. In order to render them leſs formidable, according to ſome authors, Diocleſian, according to others, Conſtantine, firſt withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and diſperſed them in ſmall bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were ſcarce ever removed, but when it became neceſſary to repel an invaſion. Small bodies of ſoldiers quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and ſeldom removed from thoſe quarters, became themſelves tradeſmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character; and the ſtanding armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and undiſciplined militia, incapable of reſiſting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which ſoon afterwards invaded the weſtern empire. It was only by hiring the militia of ſome of thoſe nations, to oppoſe to that of others, that the emperors were for ſome time able to defend themſelves. The fall of the weſtern empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which antient hiſtory has preſerved any diſtinct or circumſtantial account. It was brought about by the irreſiſtable ſuperiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of ſhepherds has over that of a nation of huſbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been, not over ſtanding armies, but over other militias in exerciſe and diſcipline inferior to themſelves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Perſian empire; and ſuch too were thoſe which in

in later times the Swiſs militia gained over that of the Auſtrians and Burgundians. CHAP. I.

THE military force of the German and Scythian nations who eſtabliſhed themſelves upon the ruins of the weſtern empire, continued for ſome time to be of the ſame kind in their new ſettlements as it had been in their original country. It was a militia of ſhepherds and huſbandmen, which, in time of war, took the field under the command of the ſame chieftains whom it was accuſtomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well exerciſed, and tolerably well diſciplined. As arts and induſtry advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had leſs time to ſpare for military exerciſes. Both the diſcipline and the exerciſe of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and ſtanding armies were gradually introduced to ſupply the place of it. When the expedient of a ſtanding army, beſides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it became neceſſary that all its neighbours ſhould follow the example. They ſoon found that their ſafety depended upon their doing ſo, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of reſiſting the attack of ſuch an army.

THE ſoldiers of a ſtanding army, though they may never have ſeen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to poſſeſs all the courage of veteran troops, and the very moment that they took the field to have been fit to face the hardieſt and moſt experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Ruſſian army marched into Poland, the valour of the Ruſſian ſoldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Pruſſians, at that time ſuppoſed to be the hardieſt and moſt experienced veterans in Europe. The Ruſſian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could at that time have very few ſoldiers who had ever ſeen an enemy. When the

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the Spaniſh war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for about eight and twenty years. The valour of her ſoldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more diſtinguiſhed than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the firſt unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war. In a long peace the generals, perhaps, may ſometimes forget their ſkill; but, where a well regulated ſtanding army has been kept up, the ſoldiers ſeem never to forget their valour.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times expoſed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conqueſts of all the civilized countries in Aſia by the Tartars, ſufficiently demonſtrate the natural ſuperiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A well regulated ſtanding army is ſuperior to every militia. Such an army, as it can beſt be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, ſo it can alone defend ſuch a nation againſt the invaſion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a ſtanding army, therefore, that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preſerved for any conſiderable time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated ſtanding army that a civilized country can be defended, ſo it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be ſuddenly and tolerably civilized. A ſtanding army eſtabliſhes, with an irreſiſtible force, the law of the ſovereign through the remoteſt provinces of the empire, and maintains ſome degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwiſe admit of any. Whoever examines, with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Ruſſian empire, will find that they almoſt all reſolve themſelves into the eſtabliſhment of a well regulated ſtanding army. It is the inſtru-

ment which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace which that empire has ever ſince enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

MEN of republican principles have been jealous of a ſtanding army as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is ſo wherever the intereſt of the general and that of the principal officers are not neceſſarily connected with the ſupport of the conſtitution of the ſtate. The ſtanding army of Ceſar deſtroyed the Roman republick. The ſtanding army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors. But where the ſovereign is himſelf the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of thoſe who have the greateſt intereſt in the ſupport of the civil authority, becauſe they have themſelves the greateſt ſhare of that authority, a ſtanding army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may in ſome caſes be favourable to liberty. The ſecurity which it gives to the ſovereign renders unneceſſary that troubleſome jealouſy which in ſome modern republicks ſeems to watch over the minuteſt actions, and to be at all times ready to diſturb the peace of every citizen. Where the ſecurity of the magiſtrate, though ſupported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular diſcontent; where a ſmall tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government muſt be employed to ſuppreſs and puniſh every murmur and complaint againſt it. To a ſovereign, on the contrary, who feels himſelf ſupported, not only by the natural ariſtocracy of the country, but by a well regulated ſtanding army, the rudeſt, the moſt groundleſs, and the moſt licentious remonſtrances can give little diſturbance. He can ſafely pardon or neglect them, and his conſciouſneſs of his own ſuperiority naturally diſpoſes him to do ſo.

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ſo. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiouſneſs can be tolerated only in countries where the ſovereign is ſecured by a well regulated ſtanding army. It is in ſuch countries only that the publick ſafety does not require that the ſovereign ſhould be truſted with any diſcretionary power for ſuppreſſing even the impertinent wantonneſs of this licentious liberty.

THE firſt duty of the ſovereign, therefore, that of defending the ſociety from the violence and injuſtice of other independent ſocieties, grows gradually more and more expenſive as the ſociety advances in civilization. The military force of the ſociety, which originally coſt the ſovereign no expence either in time of peace or in time of war, muſt, in the progreſs of improvement, firſt be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

THE great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire arms, has enhanced ſtill further both the expence of exerciſing and diſciplining any particular number of ſoldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expenſive. A muſquet is a more expenſive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a baliſta or a catapulta. The powder which is ſpent in a modern review is loſt irrecoverably, and occaſions a very conſiderable expence. The javelins and arrows which were thrown or ſhot in an antient one, could eaſily be picked up again, and were beſides of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are, not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the baliſta or catapulta, and require a greater expence not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it. As the ſuperiority of the modern artillery too over that of the antients is very great; it has become much more

difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town so as to resist even for a few weeks the attack of that superior artillery. In modern times many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

In modern war the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expence; and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a poor and barbarous nation. In antient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.

Part II.

Of the Expence of Justice.

THE second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires too very different degrees of expence in the different periods of society.

Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any established magistrate or any regular administration of justice. Men who have no property can injure one

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another only in their perſons or reputations. But when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the injury is done ſuffers, he who does it receives no benefit. It is otherwiſe with the injuries to property. The benefit of the perſon who does the injury is often equal to the loſs of him who ſuffers it. Envy, malice, or reſentment, are the only paſſions which can prompt one man to injure another in his perſon or reputation. But the greater part of men are not very frequently under the influence of thoſe paſſions; and the very worſt men are ſo only occaſionally. As their gratification too, how agreeable ſoever it may be to certain characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is in the greater part of men commonly reſtrained by prudential conſiderations. Men may live together in ſociety with ſome tolerable degree of ſecurity, though there is no civil magiſtrate to protect them from the injuſtice of thoſe paſſions. But avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of preſent eaſe and enjoyment, are the paſſions which prompt to invade property, paſſions much more ſteady in their operation, and much more univerſal in their influence. Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there muſt be at leaſt five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few ſuppoſes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his poſſeſſions. It is only under the ſhelter of the civil magiſtrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many ſucceſſive generations, can ſleep a ſingle night in ſecurity. He is at all times ſurrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appeaſe, and from whoſe injuſtice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magiſtrate continually held up to chaſtiſe it. The acqui-

ſition of valuable or extenſive property, therefore, neceſſarily requires the eſtabliſhment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at leaſt none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not ſo neceſſary.

Civil government ſuppoſes a certain ſubordination. But as the neceſſity of civil government gradually grows up with the acquiſition of valuable property, ſo the principal cauſes which naturally introduce ſubordination gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property.

The cauſes or circumſtances which naturally introduce ſubordination, or which naturally, and antecedent to any civil inſtitution, give ſome men ſome ſuperiority over the greater part of their brethren, ſeem to be four in number.

The firſt of thoſe cauſes or circumſtances is the ſuperiority of perſonal qualifications, of ſtrength, beauty, and agility of body; of wiſdom, and virtue, of prudence, juſtice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The qualifications of the body, unleſs ſupported by thoſe of the mind, can give little authority in any period of ſociety. He is a very ſtrong man who by mere ſtrength of body can force two weak ones to obey him. The qualifications of the mind can alone give very great authority. They are, however, inviſible qualities; always diſputable, and generally diſputed. No ſociety, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to ſettle the rules of precedency, of rank and ſubordination, according to thoſe inviſible qualities; but according to ſomething that is more plain and palpable.

The ſecond of thoſe cauſes or circumſtances is the ſuperiority of age. An old man, provided his age is not ſo far advanced as to give ſuſpicion of dotage, is every where more reſpected than a

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young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities. Among nations of hunters, ſuch as the native tribes of North America, age is the ſole foundation of rank and precedency. Among them, father is the appellation of a ſuperior; brother, of an equal; and ſon, of an inferior. In the moſt opulent and civilized nations, age regulates rank among thoſe who are in every other reſpect equal, and among whom therefore there is nothing elſe to regulate it. Among brothers and among ſiſters, the eldeſt always take place; and in the ſucceſſion of the paternal eſtate every thing which cannot be divided, but muſt go entire to one perſon, ſuch as a title of honour, is in moſt caſes given to the eldeſt. Age is a plain and palpable quality which admits of no diſpute.

The third of thoſe cauſes or circumſtances is the ſuperiority of fortune. The authority of riches, however, though great in every age of ſociety, is perhaps greateſt in the rudeſt age of ſociety which admits of any conſiderable inequality of fortune. A Tartar chief, the increaſe of whoſe herds and flocks is ſufficient to maintain a thouſand men, cannot well employ that increaſe in any other way than in maintaining a thouſand men. The rude ſtate of his ſociety does not afford him any manufactured produce, any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of his rude produce which is over and above his own conſumption. The thouſand men whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for their ſubſiſtence, muſt both obey his orders in war, and ſubmit to his juriſdiction in peace. He is neceſſarily both their general and their judge, and his chieftainſhip is the neceſſary effect of the ſuperiority of his fortune. In an opulent and civilized ſociety, a man may poſſeſs a much greater fortune, and yet not be able to command a dozen of people. Though the produce of his eſtate may be ſufficient to maintain, and may perhaps actually maintain, more than a thouſand people,

yet as thoſe people pay for every thing which they get from him, as he gives ſcarce any thing to any body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is ſcarce any body who conſiders himſelf as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority extends only over a few menial ſervants. The authority of fortune, however, is very great even in an opulent and civilized ſociety. That it is much greater than that either of age or of perſonal qualities, has been the conſtant complaint of every period of ſociety which admitted of any conſiderable inequality of fortune. The firſt period of ſociety, that of hunters, admits of no ſuch inequality. Univerſal poverty eſtabliſhes there univerſal equality, and the ſuperiority either of age or of perſonal qualities are the feeble, but the ſole foundations of authority and ſubordination. There is therefore little or no authority or ſubordination in this period of ſociety. The ſecond period of ſociety, that of ſhepherds, admits of very great inequalities of fortune, and there is no period in which the ſuperiority of fortune gives ſo great authority to thoſe who poſſeſs it. There is no period accordingly in which authority and ſubordination are more perfectly eſtabliſhed. The authority of an Arabian ſcherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether deſpotical.

The fourth of thoſe cauſes or circumſtances is the ſuperiority of birth. Superiority of birth ſuppoſes an antient ſuperiority of fortune in the family of the perſon who claims it. All families are equally antient; and the anceſtors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be more numerous than thoſe of the beggar. Antiquity of family means every where the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatneſs which is commonly either founded upon wealth or accompanied with it. Upſtart greatneſs is every where leſs reſpected than antient greatneſs. The hatred of uſurpers, the love for the family of an antient monarch,

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are in a great measure founded upon the contempt which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the latter. As a military officer submits without reluctance to the authority of a superior by whom he has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set over his head; so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their ancestors have always submitted, but are fired with indignation when another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any such superiority, assumes a dominion over them.

The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward. The difference, however, will not be very great; and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world whose illustration was intirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.

The distinction of birth not only may, but always does take place among nations of shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every sort of luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be dissipated among them by improvident profusion. There are no nations accordingly who abound more in families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a long race of great and illustrious ancestors; because there are no nations among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families.

Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one man above another. They are the two great sources of

of perſonal diſtinction, and are therefore the principal cauſes which naturally eſtabliſh authority and ſubordination among men. Among nations of ſhepherds both thoſe cauſes operate with their full force. The great ſhepherd or herdſman, reſpected on account of his great wealth, and of the great number of thoſe who depend upon him for ſubſiſtence, and revered on account of the nobleneſs of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity of his illuſtrious family, has a natural authority over all the inferior ſhepherds or herdſmen of his horde or clan. He can command the united force of a greater number of people than any of them. His military power is greater than that of any of them. In time of war they are all of them naturally diſpoſed to muſter themſelves under his banner, rather than under that of any other perſon, and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him ſome ſort of executive power. By commanding too the united force of a greater number of people than any of them, he is beſt able to compel any one of them who may have injured another to compenſate the wrong. He is the perſon, therefore, to whom all thoſe who are too weak to defend themſelves naturally look up for protection. It is to him that they naturally complain of the injuries which they imagine have been done to them, and his interpoſition in ſuch caſes is more eaſily ſubmitted to, even by the perſon complained of, than that of any other perſon would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him ſome ſort of judicial authority.

It is in the age of ſhepherds, in the ſecond period of ſociety, that the inequality of fortune firſt begins to take place, and introduces among men a degree of authority and ſubordination which could not poſſibly exiſt before. It thereby introduces ſome degree of that civil government which is indiſpenſably neceſſary for its own preſervation: and it ſeems to do this naturally, and even independent of the conſideration of that neceſſity. The conſideration of that neceſſity

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neceſſity comes no doubt afterwards to contribute very much to maintain and ſecure that authority and ſubordination. The rich, in particular, are neceſſarily intereſted to ſupport that order of things which can alone ſecure them in the poſſeſſion of their own advantages. Men of inferior wealth combine to defend thoſe of ſuperior wealth in the poſſeſſion of their property, in order that men of ſuperior wealth may combine to defend them in the poſſeſſion of theirs. All the inferior ſhepherds and herdſmen feel that the ſecurity of their own herds and flocks depends upon the ſecurity of thoſe of the great ſhepherd or herdſman; that the maintenance of their leſſer authority depends upon that of his greater authority, and that upon their ſubordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in ſubordination to them. They conſtitute a ſort of little nobility, who feel themſelves intereſted to defend the property and to ſupport the authority of their own little ſovereign, in order that he may be able to defend their property and to ſupport their authority. Civil government, ſo far as it is inſtituted for the ſecurity of property, is in reality inſtituted for the defence of the rich againſt the poor, or of thoſe who have ſome property againſt thoſe who have none at all.

THE judicial authority of ſuch a ſovereign, however, far from being a cauſe of expence, was for a long time a ſource of revenue to him. The perſons who applied to him for juſtice were always willing to pay for it, and a preſent never failed to accompany a petition. After the authority of the ſovereign too was thoroughly eſtabliſhed, the perſon found guilty, over and above the ſatisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was likewiſe forced to pay an amercement to the ſovereign. He had given trouble, he had diſturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord the king, and for thoſe offences an amercement was thought due. In the Tartar governments

ments of Aſia, in the governments of Europe which were founded by the German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the adminiſtration of juſtice was a conſiderable ſource of revenue both to the ſovereign and to all the leſſer chiefs or lords who exerciſed under him any particular juriſdiction, either over ſome particular tribe or clan, or over ſome particular territory or diſtrict. Originally both the ſovereign and the inferior chiefs uſed to exerciſe this juriſdiction in their own perſons. Afterwards they univerſally found it convenient to delegate it to ſome ſubſtitute, bailiff, or judge. This ſubſtitute, however, was ſtill obliged to account to his principal or conſtituent for the profits of the juriſdiction. Whoever reads the inſtructions * which were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II. will ſee clearly that thoſe judges were a ſort of itinerant factors, ſent round the country for the purpoſe of levying certain branches of the king's revenue. In thoſe days the adminiſtration of juſtice not only afforded a certain revenue to the ſovereign, but to procure this revenue ſeems to have been one of the principal advantages which he propoſed to obtain by the adminiſtration of juſtice.

THIS ſcheme of making the adminiſtration of juſtice ſubſervient to the purpoſes of revenue, could ſcarce fail to be productive of ſeveral very groſs abuſes. The perſon who applied for juſtice with a large preſent in his hand was likely to get ſomething more than juſtice; while he who applied for it with a ſmall one was likely to get ſomething leſs. Juſtice too might frequently be delayed, in order that this preſent might be repeated. The amercement, beſides, of the perſon complained of, might frequently ſuggeſt a very ſtrong reaſon for finding him in the wrong, even when he had not really been ſo. That ſuch abuſes were far from being uncommon, the antient hiſtory of every country in Europe bears witneſs.

* They are to be found in Tyrrell's Hiſtory of England.

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When the ſovereign or chief exerciſed his judicial authority in his own perſon, how much ſoever he might abuſe it, it muſt have been ſcarce poſſible to get any redreſs; becauſe there could ſeldom be any body powerful enough to call him to account. When he exerciſed it by a bailiff, indeed, redreſs might ſometimes be had. If it was for his own benefit only that the bailiff had been guilty of any act of injuſtice, the ſovereign himſelf might not always be unwilling to puniſh him, or to oblige him to repair the wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his ſovereign, if it was in order to make court to the perſon who appointed him and who might prefer him, that he had committed any act of oppreſſion, redreſs would upon moſt occaſions be as impoſſible as if the ſovereign had committed it himſelf. In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all thoſe antient governments of Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the adminiſtration of juſtice appears for a long time to have been extremely corrupt; far from being quite equal and impartial even under the beſt monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worſt.

Among nations of ſhepherds, where the ſovereign or chief is only the greateſt ſhepherd or herdſman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the ſame manner as any of his vaſſals or ſubjects, by the increaſe of his own herds or flocks. Among thoſe nations of huſbandmen who are but juſt come out of the ſhepherd ſtate, and who are not much advanced beyond that ſtate; ſuch as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian anceſtors when they firſt ſettled upon the ruins of the weſtern empire; the ſovereign or chief is in the ſame manner only the greateſt landlord of the country, and is maintained, in the ſame manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private eſtate, or from what in modern Europe was called the demeſne of the crown. His ſubjects upon ordinary occaſions contribute nothing to his

his ſupport, except when they ſtand in need of the interpoſition of his authority in order to protect them from the oppreſſion of ſome of their fellow ſubjects. The preſents which they make him upon ſuch occaſions conſtitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except perhaps upon ſome very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles for his friendſhip the ſovereignty of ſeven Greek cities, the ſole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him with preſents. As long as ſuch preſents, as long as the emoluments of juſtice, or what may be called the fees of court, conſtituted in this manner the whole ordinary revenue which the ſovereign derived from his ſovereignty, it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be propoſed that he ſhould give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was propoſed, that he ſhould regulate and aſcertain them. But after they had been ſo regulated and aſcertained, how to hinder a perſon who was all-powerful from extending them beyond thoſe regulations, was ſtill very difficult, not to ſay impoſſible. During the continuance of this ſtate of things, therefore, the corruption of juſtice, naturally reſulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of thoſe preſents, ſcarce admitted of any effectual remedy.

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But when from different cauſes, chiefly from the continually increaſing expence of defending the nation againſt the invaſion of other nations, the private eſtate of the ſovereign had become altogether inſufficient for defraying the expence of the ſovereignty; and when it had become neceſſary that the people ſhould, for their own ſecurity, contribute towards this expence by taxes of different kinds, it ſeems to have been very commonly ſtipulated that no preſent for the adminiſtration of juſtice ſhould, under any pretence, be accepted either by the ſovereign, or by his bailiffs and ſubſtitutes,

ſtitutes, the judges. Thoſe preſents, it ſeems to have been ſuppoſed, could more eaſily be aboliſhed altogether, than effectually regulated and aſcertained. Fixed ſalaries were appointed to the judges, which were ſuppoſed to compenſate to them the loſs of whatever might have been their ſhare of the antient emoluments of juſtice; as the taxes more than compenſated to the ſovereign the loſs of his. Juſtice was then ſaid to be adminiſtered gratis.

JUSTICE, however, never was in reality adminiſtered gratis in any country. Lawyers and attornies, at leaſt, muſt always be paid by the parties; and, if they were not, they would perform their duty ſtill worſe than they actually perform it. The fees annually paid to lawyers and attornies amount, in every court, to a much greater ſum than the ſalaries of the judges. The circumſtance of thoſe ſalaries being paid by the crown, can no where much diminiſh the neceſſary expence of a law-ſuit. But it was not ſo much to diminiſh the expence, as to prevent the corruption of juſtice, that the judges were prohibited from receiving any preſent or fee from the parties.

THE office of judge is in itſelf ſo very honourable, that men are willing to accept of it, though accompanied with very ſmall emoluments. The inferior office of juſtice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in moſt caſes with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater part of our country gentlemen. The ſalaries of all the different judges, high and low, together with the whole expence of the adminiſtration and execution of juſtice, even where it is not managed with very good œconomy, makes, in any civilized country, but a very inconſiderable part of the whole expence of government.

THE whole expence of juſtice too might eaſily be defrayed by the fees of court; and, without expoſing the adminiſtration of juſtice

to

to any real hazard of corruption, the public revenue might thus be entirely discharged from a certain, though, perhaps, but a small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is to share in them, and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from them. It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap any benefit from them. The law can very easily oblige the judge to respect the regulation, though it might not always be able to make the sovereign respect it. Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained, where they are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions among the different judges after the process is decided, and not till it is decided, there seems to be no more danger of corruption than where such fees are prohibited altogether. Those fees, without occasioning any considerable increase in the expence of a law-suit, might be rendered fully sufficient for defraying the whole expence of justice. By not being paid to the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the diligence of the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which consisted of a considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the number of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either in the court or in a committee by order of the court, those fees might give some encouragement to the diligence of each particular judge. Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them. In the different parliaments of France, the fees of court (called Epices and vacations) constitute the far greater part of the emoluments of the judges. After all deductions are made, the neat salary paid by the crown to a counsellor or judge in the parliament of Toulouse, in rank and dignity the second

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ſecond parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to a hundred and fifty livres, about ſix pounds eleven ſhillings ſterling a year. About ſeven years ago that ſum was in the ſame place the ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The diſtribution of thoſe Epices too is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent judge gains a comfortable, though moderate revenue by his office: An idle one gets little more than his ſalary. Thoſe parliaments are perhaps, in many reſpects, not very convenient courts of juſtice; but they have never been accuſed; they ſeem never even to have been ſuſpected of corruption.

THE fees of court ſeem originally to have been the principal ſupport of the different courts of juſtice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itſelf as much buſineſs as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many ſuits which were not originally intended to fall under its juriſdiction. The court of king's bench, inſtituted for the trial of criminal cauſes only, took cognizance of civil ſuits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him juſtice, had been guilty of ſome treſpaſs or miſdemeanor. The court of exchequer, inſtituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of ſuch debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alledging that he could not pay the king, becauſe the defendant would not pay him. In conſequence of ſuch fictions it came, in many caſes, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would chuſe to have their cauſe tried; and each court endeavoured, by ſuperior diſpatch and impartiality, to draw to itſelf as many cauſes as it could. The preſent admirable conſtitution of the courts of juſtice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great meaſure formed by this emulation which antiently took place between their reſpective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the ſpeedieſt and moſt

effectual remedy, which the law would admit, for every ſort of injuſtice. Originally the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract. The court of chancery, as a court of conſcience, firſt took upon it to enforce the ſpecific performance of agreements. When the breach of contract conſiſted in the non-payment of money, the damage ſuſtained could be compenſated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a ſpecific performance of the agreement. In ſuch caſes, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was ſufficient. It was not ſo in others. When the tenant ſued his lord for having unjuſtly outed him of his leaſe, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the poſſeſſion of the land. Such cauſes, therefore, for ſome time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no ſmall loſs of the courts of law. It was to draw back ſuch cauſes to themſelves that the courts of law are ſaid to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, the moſt effectual remedy for an unjuſt outer or diſpoſſeſſion of land.

A STAMP-DUTY upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be levied by that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges and other officers belonging to it, might, in the ſame manner, afford a revenue ſufficient for defraying the expence of the adminiſtration of juſtice, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the ſociety. The judges indeed might, in this caſe, be under the temptation of multiplying unneceſſarily the proceedings upon every cauſe, in order to increaſe, as much as poſſible, the produce of ſuch a ſtamp-duty. It has been the cuſtom in modern Europe to regulate, upon moſt occaſions, the payment of the attornies and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they had occaſion to write; the court, however, requiring that each page ſhould contain ſo many lines, and each line ſo many words. In order to increaſe their payment, the

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the attornies and clerks have contrived to multiply words beyond all neceſſity, to the corruption of the law language of, I believe, every court of juſtice in Europe. A like temptation might perhaps occaſion a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.

But whether the adminiſtration of juſtice be ſo contrived as to defray its own expence, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed ſalaries paid to them from ſome other fund, it does not ſeem neceſſary that the perſon or perſons entruſted with the executive power ſhould be charged with the management of that fund, or with the payment of thoſe ſalaries. That fund might ariſe from the rent of landed eſtates, the management of each eſtate being entruſted to the particular court which was to be maintained by it. That fund might ariſe even from the intereſt of a ſum of money, the lending out of which might, in the ſame manner, be entruſted to the court which was to be maintained by it. A part, though indeed but a ſmall part, of the ſalary of the judges of the court of ſeſſion in Scotland, ariſes from the intereſt of a ſum of money. The neceſſary inſtability of ſuch a fund ſeems, however, to render it an improper one for the maintenance of an inſtitution which ought to laſt forever.

The ſeparation of the judicial from the executive power ſeems originally to have ariſen from the increaſing buſineſs of the ſociety, in conſequence of its increaſing improvement. The adminiſtration of juſtice became ſo laborious and ſo complicated a duty as to require the undivided attention of the perſons to whom it was entruſted. The perſon entruſted with the executive power not having leiſure to attend to the deciſion of private cauſes himſelf, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his ſtead. In the progreſs of the Roman greatneſs, the conſul was too much occupied with the political affairs of the ſtate to attend to the adminiſtration of juſtice.

A prætor, therefore, was appointed to administer it in his stead. In the progress of the European monarchies which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great lords came universally to consider the administration of justice as an office both too laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own persons. They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it by appointing a deputy, bailiff, or judge.

When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to, what is vulgarly called, politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good-will, or even upon the good œconomy of that power.

Part III.

Of the Expence of publick Works and publick Institutions.

The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a

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nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or ſmall number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or ſmall number of individuals ſhould erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires too very different degrees of expence in the different periods of ſociety.

AFTER the publick inſtitutions and publick works neceſſary for the defence of the ſociety, and for the adminiſtration of juſtice, both of which have already been mentioned, the other works and inſtitutions of this kind are chiefly thoſe for facilitating the commerce of the ſociety, and thoſe for promoting the inſtruction of the people. The inſtitutions for inſtruction are of two kinds; thoſe for the education of the youth, and thoſe for the inſtruction of people of all ages. The conſideration of the manner in which the expence of thoſe different ſorts of publick work and inſtitutions may be moſt properly defrayed, will divide this third part of the preſent chapter into three different articles.

ARTICLE I.

Of the publick Works and Inſtitutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society.

THAT the erection and maintenance of the publick works which facilitate the commerce of any country, ſuch as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, &c. muſt require very different degrees of expence in the different periods of ſociety, is evident without any proof. The expence of making and maintaining the publick roads of any country muſt evidently increaſe with the annual produce of the land and labour of that country, or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes neceſſary to fetch and carry upon thoſe roads. The ſtrength of a bridge muſt be ſuited to the number and weight of the carriages which are likely to paſs over it. The depth and the ſupply of water for a navigable canal muſt be proportioned to the number and tunnage of the lighters which are likely to carry goods

goods upon it; the extent of a harbour to the number of the ſhipping which are likely to take ſhelter in it. CHAP. I.

It does not ſeem neceſſary that the expence of thoſe publick works ſhould be defrayed from that publick revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the collection and application is in moſt countries aſſigned to the executive power. The greater part of ſuch publick works may eaſily be ſo managed as to afford a particular revenue ſufficient for defraying their own expence, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the ſociety.

A HIGHWAY, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may in moſt caſes be both made and maintained by a ſmall toll upon the carriages which make uſe of them: a harbour, by a moderate port duty upon the tunnage of the ſhipping which load or unload in it. The coinage, another inſtitution for facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own expence, but affords a ſmall revenue or ſeignorage to the ſovereign. The poſt office, another inſtitution for the ſame purpoſe, over and above defraying its own expence, affords in almoſt all countries a very conſiderable revenue to the ſovereign.

When the carriages which paſs over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters which ſail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for the maintenance of thoſe publick works exactly in proportion to the tear and wear which they occaſion of them. It ſeems ſcarce poſſible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining ſuch works. This tax or toll too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is finally paid by the conſumer, to whom it muſt always be charged in the price of the goods. As the expence of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means of ſuch publick works, the goods, notwithſtanding the toll, come cheaper

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to the conſumer than they could otherwiſe have done; their price not being ſo much raiſed by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapneſs of the carriage. The perſon who finally pays this tax, therefore, gains, by the application, more than he loſes by the payment of it. His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is in reality no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up in order to get the reſt. It ſeems impoſſible to imagine a more equitable method of raiſing a tax.

When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches, poſt-chaiſes, &c. is made ſomewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than upon carriages of neceſſary uſe, ſuch as carts, waggons, &c. the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very eaſy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the tranſportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.

When high roads, bridges, canals, &c. are in this manner made and ſupported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where that commerce requires them, and conſequently where it is proper to make them. Their expence too, their grandeur and magnificence muſt be ſuited to what that commerce can afford to pay. They muſt be made conſequently as it is proper to make them. A magnificent high road cannot be made through a deſart country where there is little or no commerce, or merely becauſe it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of ſome great lord to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody paſſes, or merely to embelliſh the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace: things which ſometimes happen in countries where works of this kind are carried on by any other revenue than that which they themſelves are capable of affording.

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In ſeveral different parts of Europe the toll or lock-duty upon a canal is the property of private perſons, whoſe private intereſt obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation neceſſarily ceaſes altogether, and along with it the whole profit which they can make by the tolls. If thoſe tolls were put under the management of commiſſioners, who had themſelves no intereſt in them, they might be leſs attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc coſt the king of France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of ſilver, the value of French money in the end of the laſt century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. When that great work was finiſhed, the moſt likely method, it was found, of keeping it in conſtant repair was to make a preſent of the tolls to Riquet the engineer, who planned and conducted the work. Thoſe tolls conſtitute at preſent a very large eſtate to the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who have therefore a great intereſt to keep the work in conſtant repair. But had thoſe tolls been put under the management of commiſſioners who had no ſuch intereſt, they might perhaps have been diſſipated in ornamental and unneceſſary expences, while the moſt eſſential parts of the work were allowed to go to ruin.

The tolls for the maintenance of a high road, cannot with any ſafety be made the property of private perſons. A high road, though entirely neglected, does not become altogether impaſſable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the tolls upon a high road, therefore, might neglect altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the ſame tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the maintenance of ſuch a work ſhould be put under the management of commiſſioners or truſtees.

In

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In Great Britain, the abuſes which the truſtees have committed in the management of thoſe tolls, have in many caſes been very juſtly complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been ſaid, the money levied is more than double of what is neceſſary for executing in the compleateſt manner the work which is often executed in a very ſlovenly manner, and ſometimes not executed at all. The ſyſtem of repairing the high roads by tolls of this kind, it muſt be obſerved, is not of very long ſtanding. We ſhould not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought to that degree of perfection of which it ſeems to be capable. If mean and improper perſons are frequently appointed truſtees; and if proper courts of inſpection and account have not yet been eſtabliſhed for controuling their conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely ſufficient for executing the work to be done by them; the recency of the inſtitution both accounts and apologizes for thoſe defects, of which, by the wiſdom of parliament, the greater part may in due time be gradually remedied.

The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain is ſuppoſed to exceed ſo much what is neceſſary for repairing the roads, that the ſavings, which with proper oeconomy might be made from it, have been conſidered, even by ſome miniſters, as a very great reſource which might at ſome time or another be applied to the exigencies of the ſtate. Government, it has been ſaid, by taking the management of the turnpikes into its own hands, and by employing the ſoldiers, who would work for a very ſmall addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order at a much leſs expence than it can be done by truſtees who have no other workmen to employ, but ſuch as derive their whole ſubſiſtence from their wages. A great revenue, half a million perhaps, it has been pretended, might in this manner be gained without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turn-

pike roads might be made to contribute to the general expence of the ſtate, in the ſame manner as the poſt-office does at preſent.

THAT a conſiderable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no doubt, though probably not near ſo much, as the projectors of this plan have ſuppoſed. The plan itſelf, however, ſeems liable to ſeveral very important objections.

FIRST, if the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes ſhould ever be conſidered as one of the reſources for ſupplying the exigencies of the ſtate, they would certainly be augmented as thoſe exigencies were ſuppoſed to require. According to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they would probably be augmented very faſt. The facility with which a great revenue could be drawn from them, would probably encourage adminiſtration to recur very frequently to this reſource. Though it may perhaps be more than doubtful whether half a million could by any oeconomy be ſaved out of the preſent tolls, it can ſcarce be doubted but that a million might be ſaved out of them if they were doubled, and perhaps two millions if they were tripled. This great revenue too might be levied without the appointment of a ſingle new officer to collect and receive it. But the turnpike tolls being continually augmented in this manner, inſtead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at preſent, would ſoon become a very great encumbrance upon it. The expence of tranſporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another would ſoon be ſo much increaſed, the market for all ſuch goods conſequently would ſoon be ſo much narrowed, that their production would be in a great meaſure diſcouraged, and the moſt important branches of the domeſtic induſtry of the country annihilated altogether.

SECONDLY,

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SECONDLY, a tax upon carriages in proportion to their weight, though a very equal tax when applied to the ſole purpoſe of repairing the roads, is a very unequal one, when applied to any other purpoſe, or to ſupply the common exigencies of the ſtate. When it is applied to the ſole purpoſe above mentioned, each carriage is ſuppoſed to pay exactly for the tear and wear which that carriage occaſions of the roads. But when it is applied to any other purpoſe, each carriage is ſuppoſed to pay for more than that tear and wear, and contributes to the ſupply of ſome other exigency of the ſtate. But as the turnpike toll raiſes the price of goods in proportion to their weight, and not to their value, it is chiefly paid by the conſumers of coarſe and bulky, not by thoſe of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency of the ſtate therefore this tax might be intended to ſupply, that exigency would be chiefly ſupplied at the expence of the poor, not of the rich; at the expence of thoſe who are leaſt able to ſupply it, not of thoſe who are moſt able.

THIRDLY, if government ſhould at any time neglect the reparation of the high roads, it would be ſtill more difficult than it is at preſent to compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to the only purpoſe to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanneſs and poverty of the truſtees of turnpike roads render it ſometimes difficult at preſent to oblige them to repair their wrong; their wealth and greatneſs would render it ten times more ſo in the caſe which is here ſuppoſed.

IN France the funds deſtined for the reparation of the high roads are under the immediate direction of the executive power. Thoſe funds conſiſt partly in the ſix days labour which the country people are in moſt parts of Europe obliged to give to the repa-

ration of the highways; and partly in such a portion of the general revenue of the state as the king chuses to spare from his other expences. CHAP. I.

By the antient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe, the six days labour was under the direction of a local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the king's council. But by the present practice both the six days labour, and whatever other fund the king may chuse to assign for the reparation of the high roads in any particular province or generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is appointed and removed by the king's council, who receives his orders from it, and is in constant correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism the authority of the executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and assumes to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined for any public purpose. In France, however, the great post roads, the roads which make the communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in general kept in good order; and in some provinces are even a good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike roads of England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far greater part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules are the only conveyance which can safely be trusted. The proud minister of an ostentatious court may frequently take pleasure in executing a work of splendor and magnificence, such as a great highway which is frequently seen by the principal nobility, whose applauses, not only flatter his vanity, but even contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number of little works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and

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which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business which appears in every respect too mean and paultry to merit the attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an administration, therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected.

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power charges itself both with the reparation of the high roads, and with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgement which the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police accordingly is said to be very much attended to in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the high roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and wondering travellers, frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not perhaps appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very much short of what had been reported of them by other travellers more disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too perhaps be in those countries as it is in France, where the great roads, the great communications which are likely to be the subjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land-tax or land-rent, which rises or falls with

with the rise or fall of the annual produce of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country, which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign does not in any part of Europe arise chiefly from a land-tax or land-rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: But that dependency is neither so immediate, nor so evident. In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value, of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.

Even those public works which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue under the management of a local or provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the management. Were the

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ſtreets of London to be lighted and paved at the expence of the treaſury, is there any probability that they would be ſo well lighted and paved as they are at preſent, or even at ſo ſmall an expence? The expence beſides, inſtead of being raiſed by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular ſtreet, pariſh, or diſtrict in London, would, in this caſe, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the ſtate, and would conſequently be raiſed by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no ſort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the ſtreets of London.

THE abuſes which ſometimes creep into the local and provincial adminiſtration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous ſoever they may appear, are in reality, however, almoſt always very trifling in compariſon of thoſe which commonly take place in the adminiſtration and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, beſides, much more eaſily corrected. Under the local or provincial adminiſtration of the juſtices of the peace in Great Britain, the ſix days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not always perhaps very judiciouſly applied, but it is ſcarce ever exacted with any circumſtance of cruelty or oppreſſion. In France, under the adminiſtration of the intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the moſt cruel and oppreſſive. Such Corvées, as they are called, make one of the principal inſtruments of tyranny by which the intendant chaſtiſes any pariſh or communauté which has had the misfortune to fall under his diſpleaſure. *v. Addition.*

ARTICLE II.

Of the Expence of the Inſtitutions for the Education of the Youth.

THE inſtitutions for the education of the youth may in the ſame manner furniſh a revenue ſufficient for defraying their own expence.

expence. The fee or honorary which the ſcholar pays to the maſter naturally conſtitutes a revenue of this kind.

Even where the reward of the maſter does not ariſe altogether from this natural revenue, it ſtill is not neceſſary that it ſhould be derived from that general revenue of the ſociety of which the collection and application is in moſt countries aſſigned to the executive power. Through the greater part of Europe accordingly the endowment of ſchools and colleges makes either no charge upon that general revenue, or but a very ſmall one. It every where ariſes chiefly from ſome local or provincial revenue, from the rent of ſome landed eſtate, or from the intereſt of ſome ſum of money allotted and put under the management of truſtees for this particular purpoſe, ſometimes by the ſovereign himſelf, and ſometimes by ſome private donor.

Have thoſe public endowments contributed in general to promote the end of their inſtitution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence, and to improve the abilities of the teachers? Have they directed the courſe of education towards objects more uſeful, both to the individual and to the public, than thoſe to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord? It ſhould not ſeem very difficult to give at leaſt a probable anſwer to each of thoſe queſtions.

In every profeſſion the exertion of the greater part of thoſe who exerciſe it is always in proportion to the neceſſity they are under of making that exertion. This neceſſity is greateſt with thoſe to whom the emoluments of their profeſſion are the only ſource from which they expect their fortune, or even their ordinary revenue and ſubſiſtence. In order to acquire this fortune, or even to get this ſubſiſtence, they muſt, in the courſe of the year, execute a certain quantity

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quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is free, the rivalſhip of competitors, who are all endeavouring to juſtle one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a certain degree of exactneſs. The greatneſs of the objects which are to be acquired by ſucceſs in ſome particular profeſſions may, no doubt, ſometimes animate the exertion of a few men of extraordinary ſpirit and ambition. Great objects, however, are evidently not neceſſary in order to occaſion the greateſt exertions. Rivalſhip and emulation render excellency, even in mean profeſſions, an object of ambition, and frequently occaſion the very greateſt exertions. Great objects, on the contrary, alone and unſupported by the neceſſity of application, have ſeldom been ſufficient to occaſion any conſiderable exertion. In England, ſucceſs in the profeſſion of the law leads to ſome very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men, born to eaſy fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that profeſſion!

The endowments of ſchools and colleges have neceſſarily diminiſhed more or leſs the neceſſity of application in the teachers. Their ſubſiſtence, ſo far as it ariſes from their ſalaries, is evidently derived from a fund altogether independent of their ſucceſs and reputation in their particular profeſſions.

In ſome univerſities the ſalary makes but a part, and frequently but a ſmall part of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part ariſes from the honoraries or fees of his pupils. The neceſſity of application, though always more or leſs diminiſhed, is not in this caſe entirely taken away. Reputation in his profeſſion is ſtill of ſome importance to him, and he ſtill has ſome dependency upon the affection, gratitude, and favourable report of thoſe who have attended upon his inſtructions, and theſe favourable ſentiments

ments he is likely to gain in no way ſo well as by deſerving them, that is, by the abilities and diligence with which he diſcharges every part of his duty.

In other univerſities the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee from his pupils, and his ſalary conſtitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his office. His intereſt is, in this caſe, ſet as directly in oppoſition to his duty as it is poſſible to ſet it. It is the intereſt of every man to live as much at his eaſe as he can; and if his emoluments are to be preciſely the ſame whether he does, or does not perform ſome very laborious duty, it is certainly his intereſt, at leaſt as intereſt is vulgarly underſtood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is ſubject to ſome authority which will not ſuffer him to do this, to perform it in as careleſs and ſlovenly a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active and a lover of labour, it is his intereſt to employ that activity in any way, from which he can derive ſome advantage, rather than in the performance of his duty, from which he can derive none.

If the authority to which he is ſubject reſides in the body corporate, the college, or univerſity, of which he himſelf is a member, and in which the greater part of the other members are, like himſelf, perſons who either are or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cauſe, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to conſent that his neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himſelf is allowed to neglect his own. In the univerſity of Oxford, the greater part of the public profeſſors have, for theſe many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching.

If the authority to which he is ſubject reſides, not ſo much in the body corporate of which he is a member, as in ſome other extra-

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neous perſons, in the biſhop of the dioceſe, for example; in the governor of the province; or, perhaps, in ſome miniſter of ſtate, it is not indeed in this caſe very likely that he will be ſuffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that ſuch ſuperiors, however, can force him to do is to attend upon his pupils a certain number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the week or in the year. What thoſe lectures ſhall be, muſt ſtill depend upon the diligence of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned to the motives which he has for exerting it. An extraneous juriſdiction of this kind, beſides, is liable to be exerciſed both ignorantly and capriciouſly. In its nature it is arbitrary and diſcretionary, and the perſons who exerciſe it, neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themſelves, nor perhaps underſtanding the ſciences which it is his buſineſs to teach, are ſeldom capable of exerciſing it with judgement. From the inſolence of office too they are frequently indifferent how they exerciſe it, and are very apt to cenſure or deprive him of his office wantonly, and without any juſt cauſe. The perſon ſubject to ſuch juriſdiction is neceſſarily degraded by it, and, inſtead of being one of the moſt reſpectable, is rendered one of the meaneſt and moſt contemptible perſons in the ſociety. It is by powerful protection only that he can effectually guard himſelf againſt the bad uſage to which he is at all times expoſed; and this protection he is moſt likely to gain, not by ability or diligence in his profeſſion, but by obſequiouſneſs to the will of his ſuperiors, and by being ready, at all times, to ſacrifice to that will the rights, the intereſt, and the honour of the body corporate of which he is a member. Whoever has attended for any conſiderable time to the adminiſtration of a French univerſity, muſt have had occaſion to remark the effects which naturally reſult from an arbitrary and extraneous juriſdiction of this kind.

WHATEVER forces a certain number of ſtudents to any college or univerſity, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers,

tends more or leſs to diminiſh the neceſſity of that merit or reputation. CHAP. I.

THE privileges of graduates in arts, in law, in phyſic, and divinity, when they can be obtained only by reſiding a certain number of years in certain univerſities, neceſſarily force a certain number of ſtudents to ſuch univerſities independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers. The privileges of graduates are a ſort of ſtatutes of apprenticeſhip, which have contributed to the improvement of education, juſt as other ſtatutes of apprenticeſhip have to that of arts and manufactures.

THE charitable foundations of ſcholarſhips, exhibitions, burſaries, &c. neceſſarily attach a certain number of ſtudents to certain colleges, independent altogether of the merit of thoſe particular colleges. Were the ſtudents upon ſuch charitable foundations left free to chuſe what college they liked beſt, ſuch liberty might perhaps contribute to excite ſome emulation among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, which prohibited even the independent members of every particular college from leaving it, and going to any other, without leave firſt aſked and obtained of that which they meant to abandon, would tend very much to extinguiſh that emulation.

IF in each college the tutor or teacher who was to inſtruct each ſtudent in all arts and ſciences, ſhould not be voluntarily choſen by the ſtudent, but appointed by the head of the college; and if in caſe of neglect, inability, or bad uſage, the ſtudent ſhould not be allowed to change him for another without leave firſt aſked and obtained; ſuch a regulation would not only tend very much to extinguiſh all emulation among the different tutors of the

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ſame college, but to diminiſh very much in all of them the neceſſity of diligence and of attention to their reſpective pupils. Such teachers, though very well paid by their ſtudents, might be as much diſpoſed to neglect them as thoſe who are not paid by them at all, or who have no other recompence but their ſalary.

If the teacher happens to be a man of ſenſe, it muſt be an unpleaſant thing to him to be conſcious, while he is lecturing his ſtudents, that he is either ſpeaking or reading nonſenſe, or what is very little better than nonſenſe. It muſt too be unpleaſant to him to obſerve that the greater part of his ſtudents deſert his lectures; or perhaps attend upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt and deriſion. If he is obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, theſe motives alone, without any other intereſt, might diſpoſe him to take ſome pains to give tolerably good ones. Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon which will effectually blunt the edge of all thoſe incitements to diligence. The teacher, inſtead of explaining to his pupils himſelf, the ſcience in which he propoſes to inſtruct them, may read ſome book upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own; or, what would give him ſtill leſs trouble, by making them interpret it to him, and by now and then making an occaſional remark upon it, he may flatter himſelf that he is giving a lecture. The ſlighteſt degree of knowledge and application will enable him to do this without expoſing himſelf to contempt or deriſion, or ſaying any thing that is really fooliſh, abſurd, or ridiculous. The diſcipline of the college at the ſame time may enable him to force all his pupils to the moſt regular attendance upon this ſham-lecture, and to maintain the moſt decent and reſpectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance.

The

THE diſcipline of colleges and univerſities is in general contrived not for the benefit of the ſtudents, but for the intereſt, or more properly ſpeaking, for the eaſe of the maſters. Its object is in all caſes to maintain the authority of the maſter, and whether he neglects or performs his duty, to oblige the ſtudents in all caſes to behave to him as if he performed it with the greateſt diligence and ability. It ſeems to preſume perfect wiſdom and virtue in the one order, and the greateſt weakneſs and folly in the other. Where the maſters, however, really perform their duty, there are no examples, I believe, that the greater part of the ſtudents ever neglect theirs. No diſcipline is ever requiſite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is well known where-ever any ſuch lectures are given. Force and reſtraint may no doubt be in ſome degree requiſite in order to oblige children or very young boys to attend to thoſe parts of education which it is thought neceſſary for them to acquire during that early period of life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the maſter does his duty, force or reſtraint can ſcarce ever be neceſſary to carry on any part of education. Such is the generoſity of the greater part of young men, that, ſo far from being diſpoſed to neglect or deſpiſe the inſtructions of their maſter, provided he ſhows ſome ſerious intention of being of uſe to them, they are generally inclined to pardon a great deal of incorrectneſs in the performance of his duty, and ſometimes even to conceal from the publick a good deal of groſs negligence.

THOSE parts of education, it is to be obſerved, for the teaching of which there are no publick inſtitutions, are generally the beſt taught. When a young man goes to a fencing or a dancing ſchool, he does not indeed always learn to fence or to dance very well; but he ſeldom fails of learning to fence or to dance. The good effects of the riding ſchool are not commonly ſo evident. The expence of a

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riding ſchool is ſo great, that in moſt places it is a publick inſtitution. The three moſt eſſential parts of literary education, to read, write, and account, it ſtill continues to be more common to acquire in private than in publick ſchools; and it very ſeldom happens that any body fails of acquiring them to the degree in which it is neceſſary to acquire them.

In England the publick ſchools are much leſs corrupted than the univerſities. In the ſchools the youth are taught, or at leaſt may be taught, Greek and Latin, that is, every thing which the maſters pretend to teach, or which, it is expected, they ſhould teach. In the univerſities the youth neither are taught, nor always can find any proper means of being taught, the ſciences which it is the buſineſs of thoſe incorporated bodies to teach. The reward of the ſchoolmaſter in moſt caſes depends principally, in ſome caſes almoſt entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his ſcholars. Schools have no excluſive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it is not neceſſary that a perſon ſhould bring a certificate of his having ſtudied a certain number of years at a publick ſchool. If upon examination he appears to underſtand what is taught there, no queſtions are aſked about the place where he learnt it.

The parts of education which are commonly taught in univerſities, it may perhaps be ſaid, are not very well taught. But had it not been for thoſe inſtitutions they would not have been commonly taught at all, and both the individual and the public would have ſuffered a good deal from the want of thoſe important parts of education.

The preſent univerſities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them, eccleſiaſtical corporations; inſtituted for the education of churchmen. They were founded by the authority of the

pope, and were ſo entirely under his immediate protection, that their members, whether maſters or ſtudents, had all of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from the civil juriſdiction of the countries in which their reſpective univerſities were ſituated, and were amenable only to the eccleſiaſtical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of thoſe univerſities was, ſuitable to the end of their inſtitution, either theology, or ſomething that was merely preparatory to theology.

When chriſtianity was firſt eſtabliſhed by law, a corrupted latin had become the common language of all the weſtern parts of Europe. The ſervice of the church accordingly, and the tranſlation of the Bible, which was read in churches, were both in that corrupted latin, that is, in the common language of the country. After the irruption of the barbarous nations who overturned the Roman empire, latin gradually ceaſed to be the language of any part of Europe. But the reverence of the people naturally preſerves the eſtabliſhed forms and ceremonies of religion, long after the circumſtances which firſt introduced and rendered them reaſonable are no more. Though latin, therefore, was no longer underſtood any where by the great body of the people, the whole ſervice of the church ſtill continued to be performed in that language. Two different languages were thus eſtabliſhed in Europe, in the ſame manner as in antient Egypt; a language of the prieſts, and a language of the people; a ſacred and a profane; a learned and an unlearned language. But it was neceſſary that the prieſts ſhould underſtand ſomething of that ſacred and learned language in which they were to officiate; and the ſtudy of the latin language therefore made from the beginning an eſſential part of univerſity education.

It was not ſo with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language. The infallible decrees of the church had pronounced the

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the latin tranſlation of the Bible, commonly called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated by divine inſpiration, and therefore of equal authority with the Greek and Hebrew originals. The knowledge of thoſe two languages, therefore, not being indiſpenſibly requiſite to a churchman, the ſtudy of them did not for a long time make a neceſſary part of the common courſe of univerſity education. There are ſome Spaniſh univerſities, I am aſſured, in which the ſtudy of the Greek language has never yet made any part of that courſe. The firſt reformers found the Greek text of the new teſtament and even the Hebrew text of the old more favourable to their opinions than the vulgate tranſlation, which, as might naturally be ſuppoſed, had been gradually accommodated to ſupport the doctrines of the catholic church. They ſet themſelves therefore to expoſe the many errors of that tranſlation, which the Roman catholic clergy were thus put under the neceſſity of defending or explaining. But this could not well be done without ſome knowledge of the original languages, of which the ſtudy was therefore gradually introduced into the greater part of univerſities; both of thoſe which embraced and of thoſe which rejected the doctrines of the reformation. The Greek language was connected with every part of that claſſical learning, which, though at firſt principally cultivated by catholics and Italians, happened to come into faſhion much about the ſame time that the doctrines of the reformation were ſet on foot. In the greater part of univerſities therefore that language was taught previous to the ſtudy of philoſophy, and as ſoon as the ſtudent had made ſome progreſs in the latin. The Hebrew language having no connection with claſſical learning, and, except the holy ſcriptures, being the language of not a ſingle book in any eſteem, the ſtudy of it did not commonly commence till after that of philoſophy, and when the ſtudent had entered upon the ſtudy of theology.

ORIGINALLY

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ORIGINALLY the firſt rudiments both of the Greek and Latin languages were taught in univerſities, and they ſtill continue to be ſo in ſome univerſities. In others it is expected that the ſtudent ſhould have previouſly acquired at leaſt the rudiments of one or both of thoſe languages, of which the ſtudy continues to make every where a very conſiderable part of univerſity education.

THE antient Greek philoſophy was divided into three great branches; phyſics, or natural philoſophy; ethics, or moral philoſophy; and logic. This general diviſion ſeems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

THE great phenomena of nature, the revolution of the heavenly bodies, eclipſes, comets, thunder, lightning, and other extraordinary meteors, the generation, the life, growth, and diſſolution of plants and animals, are objects which, as they naturally excite the wonder, ſo they neceſſarily call forth the curioſity of mankind to enquire into their cauſes. Superſtition firſt attempted to ſatisfy this curioſity by referring all thoſe wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philoſophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them, from more familiar cauſes, or from ſuch as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As thoſe great phenomena are the firſt objects of human curioſity, ſo the ſcience which pretends to explain them muſt naturally have been the firſt branch of philoſophy that was cultivated. The firſt philoſophers accordingly of whom hiſtory has preſerved any account, appear to have been natural philoſophers.

IN every age and country of the world men muſt have attended to the characters, deſigns, and actions of one another, and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life, muſt have been laid down and approved of by common conſent. As

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ſoon as writing came into faſhion, wiſe men, or thoſe who fancied themſelves ſuch, would naturally endeavour to increaſe the number of thoſe eſtabliſhed and reſpected maxims, and to expreſs their own ſenſe of what was either proper or improper conduct, ſometimes in the more artificial form of apologues, like what are called the fables of Æſop; and ſometimes in the more ſimple one of apophthegms, or wiſe ſayings, like the Proverbs of Solomon, the verſes of Theognis and Phocyllides, and ſome part of the works of Heſiod. They might continue in this manner for a long time merely to multiply the number of thoſe maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange them in any very diſtinct or methodical order, much leſs to connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible like effects from their natural cauſes. The beauty of a ſyſtematical arrangement of different obſervations connected by a few common principles, was firſt ſeen in the rude eſſays of thoſe antient times towards a ſyſtem of natural philoſophy. Something of the ſame kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of common life were arranged in ſome methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles, in the ſame manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The ſcience which pretends to inveſtigate and explain thoſe connecting principles, is what is properly called moral philoſophy.

DIFFERENT authors gave different ſyſtems both of natural and moral philoſophy. But the arguments by which they ſupported thoſe different ſyſtems, far from being always demonſtrations, were frequently at beſt but very ſlender probabilities, and ſometimes mere ſophiſms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative ſyſtems have in all ages of the world been adopted for reaſons too frivolous to have determined the judgement of any man of common ſenſe, in a matter

a matter of the ſmalleſt pecuniary intereſt. Groſs ſophiſtry has ſcarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philoſophy and ſpeculation; and in theſe it has frequently had the greateſt. The patrons of each ſyſtem of natural and moral philoſophy naturally endeavoured to expoſe the weakneſs of the arguments adduced to ſupport the ſyſtems which were oppoſite to their own. In examining thoſe arguments, they were neceſſarily led to conſider the difference between a probable and a demonſtrative argument, between a fallacious and a concluſive one; and Logic, or the ſcience of the general principles of good and bad reaſoning, neceſſarily aroſe out of the obſervations which a ſcrutiny of this kind gave occaſion to. Though in its origin poſterior both to phyſics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the antient ſchools of philoſophy, previouſly to either of thoſe ſciences. The ſtudent, it ſeems to have been thought, ought to underſtand well the difference between good and bad reaſoning, before he was led to reaſon upon ſubjects of ſo great importance. CHAP. I.

THIS antient diviſion of philoſophy into three parts was in the greater part of the univerſities of Europe, changed for another into five.

IN the antient philoſophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the ſyſtem of phyſics. Thoſe beings, in whatever their eſſence might be ſuppoſed to conſiſt, were parts of the great ſyſtem of the univerſe, and parts too productive of the moſt important effects. Whatever human reaſon could either conclude or conjecture concerning them made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the ſcience which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great ſyſtem

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of the univerſe. But in the univerſities of Europe, where philoſophy was taught only as ſubſervient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon thoſe two chapters than upon any other of the ſcience. Thoſe two chapters were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters, till at laſt the doctrine of ſpirits, of which ſo little can be known, came to take up as much room in the ſyſtem of philoſophy as the doctrine of bodies, of which ſo much can be known. The doctrines concerning thoſe two ſubjects were conſidered as making two diſtinct ſciences. What was called Metaphyſics or Pneumatics was ſet in oppoſition to Phyſics, and was cultivated not only as the more ſublime, but, for the purpoſes of a particular profeſſion, as the more uſeful ſcience of the two. The proper ſubject of experiment and obſervation, a ſubject in which a careful attention is capable of making ſo many uſeful diſcoveries, was almoſt entirely neglected. The ſubject in which, after a few very ſimple and almoſt obvious truths, the moſt careful attention can diſcover nothing but obſcurity and uncertainty, and can conſequently produce nothing but ſubtleties and ſophiſms, was greatly cultivated.

When thoſe two ſciences had thus been ſet in oppoſition to one another, the compariſon between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called Ontology, or the ſcience which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the ſubjects of the other two ſciences. But if ſubtleties and ſophiſms compoſed the greater part of the Metaphyſics or Pneumatics of the ſchools, they compoſed the whole of this cobweb ſcience of Ontology, which was likewiſe ſometimes called Metaphyſics.

Wherein conſiſted the happineſs and perfection of a man, conſidered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a ſtate, and of the great ſociety of mankind, was the object

object which the antient moral philoſophy propoſed to inveſtigate. In that philoſophy the duties of human life were treated of as ſubſervient to the happineſs and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philoſophy, came to be taught only as ſubſervient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly ſubſervient to the happineſs of a life to come. In the antient philoſophy the perfection of virtue was repreſented as neceſſarily productive, to the perſon who poſſeſſed it, of the moſt perfect happineſs in this life. In the modern philoſophy it was frequently repreſented as generally, or rather as almoſt always inconſiſtent with any degree of happineſs in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the auſterities and abaſement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, and ſpirited conduct of a man. Caſuiſtry and an aſcetic morality made up in moſt caſes the greater part of the moral philoſophy of the ſchools. By far the moſt important of all the different branches of philoſophy, became in this manner by far the moſt corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common courſe of philoſophical education in the greater part of the univerſities of Europe. Logic was taught firſt: Ontology came in the ſecond place: Pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human ſoul and of the Deity, in the third: In the fourth followed a debaſed ſyſtem of Moral philoſophy, which was conſidered as immediately connected with the doctrines of Pneumatology, with the immortality of the human ſoul, and with the rewards and puniſhments which, from the juſtice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: A ſhort and ſuperficial ſyſtem of Phyſics uſually concluded the courſe.

The alterations which the univerſities of Europe thus introduced into the antient courſe of philoſophy, were all meant for the

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education of eccleſiaſtics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the ſtudy of theology. But the additional quantity of ſubtlety and ſophiſtry; the caſuiſtry and the aſcetic morality which thoſe alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the underſtanding, or to mend the heart.

This courſe of philoſophy is what ſtill continues to be taught in the greater part of the univerſities of Europe; with more or leſs diligence, according as the conſtitution of each particular univerſity happens to render diligence more or leſs neceſſary to the teachers. In ſome of the richeſt and beſt endowed univerſities the tutors content themſelves with teaching a few unconnected ſhreds and parcels of this corrupted courſe; and even theſe they commonly teach very negligently and ſuperficially.

The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in ſeveral different branches of philoſophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in univerſities; though ſome no doubt have. The greater part of univerſities have not even been very forward to adopt thoſe improvements after they were made; and ſeveral of thoſe learned ſocieties have choſen to remain for a long time the ſanctuaries in which exploded ſyſtems and obſolete prejudices found ſhelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other corner of the world. In general, the richeſt and beſt endowed univerſities have been the ſloweſt in adopting thoſe improvements, and the moſt averſe to permit any conſiderable change in the eſtabliſhed plan of education. Thoſe improvements were more eaſily introduced into ſome of the poorer univerſities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their ſubſiſtence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.

6

But

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But though the publick ſchools and univerſities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profeſſion, that of churchmen; and though they were not always very diligent in inſtructing their pupils even in the ſciences which were ſuppoſed neceſſary for that profeſſion, yet they gradually drew to themſelves the education of almoſt all other people, particularly of almoſt all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it ſeems, could be fallen upon of ſpending, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earneſt to the real buſineſs of the world, the buſineſs which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in ſchools and univerſities, however, does not ſeem to be the moſt proper preparation for that buſineſs.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the cuſtom to ſend young people to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving ſchool, and without ſending them to any univerſity. Our young people, it is ſaid, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at ſeventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the courſe of his travels he generally acquires ſome knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is ſeldom ſufficient to enable him either to ſpeak or write them with propriety. In other reſpects he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more diſſipated, and more incapable of any ſerious application either to ſtudy or to buſineſs, than he could well have become in ſo ſhort a time had he lived at home. By travelling ſo very young, by ſpending in the moſt frivolous diſſipation the moſt precious years of his life, at a diſtance from the inſpection

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tion and controul of his parents and relations, every uſeful habit which the earlier parts of his education might have had ſome tendency to form in him, inſtead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almoſt neceſſarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but the diſcredit into which the univerſities are allowing themſelves to fall, could ever have brought into repute ſo very abſurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By ſending his ſon abroad, a father delivers himſelf, at leaſt for ſome time, from ſo diſagreeable an object as that of a ſon unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

Such have been the effects of ſome of the modern inſtitutions for education.

Different plans and different inſtitutions for education ſeem to have taken place in other ages and nations.

In the republics of antient Greece, every free citizen was inſtructed, under the direction of the public magiſtrate, in gymnaſtic exerciſes and in muſic. By gymnaſtic exerciſes it was intended to harden his body, to ſharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the beſt that ever was in the world, this part of their public education muſt have anſwered completely the purpoſe for which it was intended. By the other part, muſic, it was propoſed, at leaſt by the philoſophers and hiſtorians who have given us an account of thoſe inſtitutions, to humanize the mind, to ſoften the temper, and to diſpoſe it for performing all the ſocial and moral duties both of public and private life.

In antient Rome the exerciſes of the Campus Martius anſwered the ſame purpoſe as thoſe of the Gymnazium in antient Greece,

and they ſeem to have anſwered it equally well. But among the Romans there was nothing which correſponded to the muſical education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and public life, ſeem to have been not only equal, but, upon the whole, a good deal ſuperior to thoſe of the Greeks. That they were ſuperior in private life we have the expreſs teſtimony of Polybius and of Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus; two authors well acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman hiſtory bears witneſs to the ſuperiority of the public morals of the Romans. The good temper and moderation of contending factions ſeems to be the moſt eſſential circumſtance in the public morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almoſt always violent and ſanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been ſhed in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi the Roman republic may be conſidered as in reality diſſolved. Notwithſtanding, therefore, the very reſpectable authority of Plato, Ariſtotle, and Polybius, and notwithſtanding the very ingenious reaſons by which Mr. Monteſquieu endeavours to ſupport that authority, it ſeems probable that the muſical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending their morals, ſince, without any ſuch education, thoſe of the Romans were upon the whole ſuperior. The reſpect of thoſe antient ſages for the inſtitutions of their anceſtors had probably diſpoſed them to find much political wiſdom in what was, perhaps, merely an antient cuſtom, continued without interruption from the earlieſt period of thoſe ſocieties to the times in which they had arrived at a conſiderable degree of refinement. Muſic and dancing are the great amuſements of almoſt all barbarous nations, and the great accompliſhments which are ſuppoſed to fit any man for entertaining his ſociety. It is ſo at this day among the negroes on the coaſt of Africa. It was ſo among the antient Celtes, among the antient Scandinavians, and, as we may learn from Homer, among the

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the antient Greeks in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themſelves into little republics, it was natural that the ſtudy of thoſe accompliſhments ſhould for a long time make a part of the public and common education of the people.

The maſters who inſtructed the young people either in muſic or in military exerciſes, do not ſeem to have been paid, or even appointed by the ſtate, either in Rome, or even in Athens, the Greek republic of whoſe laws and cuſtoms we are the beſt informed. The ſtate required that every free citizen ſhould fit himſelf for defending it in war, and ſhould, upon that account, learn his military exerciſes. But it left him to learn them of ſuch maſters as he could find, and it ſeems to have advanced nothing for this purpoſe but a public field or place of exerciſe, in which he ſhould practiſe and perform them.

In the early ages both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education ſeem to have conſiſted in learning to read, write, and account, according to the arithmetic of the times. Theſe accompliſhments the richer citizens ſeem frequently to have acquired at home by the aſſiſtance of ſome domeſtic pedagogue, who was generally either a ſlave or a freed-man; and the poorer citizens in the ſchools of ſuch maſters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the ſtate ever aſſumed any inſpection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining in their old age thoſe parents who had neglected to inſtruct them in ſome profitable trade or buſineſs.

In the progreſs of refinement, when philoſophy and rhetoric came into faſhion, the better ſort of people uſed to ſend their children

dren to the ſchools of philoſophers and rhetoricians, in order to be inſtructed in thoſe faſhionable ſciences. But thoſe ſchools were not ſupported by the public. They were for a long time barely tolerated by it. The demand for philoſophy and rhetoric was for a long time ſo ſmall, that the firſt profeſſed teachers of either could not find conſtant employment in any one city, but were obliged to travel about from place to place. In this manner lived Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. As the demand increaſed, the ſchools both of philoſophy and rhetoric became ſtationary; firſt in Athens, and afterwards in ſeveral other cities. The ſtate however ſeems never to have encouraged them further than by aſſigning to ſome of them a particular place to teach in, which was ſometimes done too by private donors. The ſtate ſeems to have aſſigned the Academy to Plato, the Lyceum to Ariſtotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta the founder of the Stoics. But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his own ſchool. Till about the time of Marcus Antoninus however, no teacher appears to have had any ſalary from the public, or to have had any other emoluments, but what aroſe from the honoraries or fees of his ſcholars. The bounty which that philoſophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, beſtowed upon the teachers of philoſophy, probably laſted no longer than his own life. There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation, and to have attended any of thoſe ſchools was not neceſſary, in order to be permitted to practiſe any particular trade or profeſſion. If the opinion of their own utility could not draw ſcholars to them, the law neither forced any body to go to them, nor rewarded any body for having gone to them. The teachers had no juriſdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority beſides that natural authority which ſuperior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from young people towards thoſe who are entruſted with any part of their education.

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At Rome, the ſtudy of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the greater part of the citizens, but of ſome particular families. The young people however, who wiſhed to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public ſchool to go to, and had no other method of ſtudying it than by frequenting the company of ſuch of their relations and friends, as were ſuppoſed to underſtand it. It is perhaps worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were many of them copied from thoſe of ſome antient Greek republics, yet law never ſeems to have grown up to be a ſcience in any republic of antient Greece. In Rome it became a ſcience very early, and gave a conſiderable degree of illuſtration to thoſe citizens who had the reputation of underſtanding it. In the republics of antient Greece, particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of juſtice conſiſted of numerous and therefore diſorderly bodies of people, who frequently decided almoſt at random, or as clamour, faction, and party ſpirit happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjuſt deciſion, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thouſand, or fifteen hundred people, (for ſome of their courts were ſo very numerous) could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of juſtice conſiſted either of a ſingle judge, or of a ſmall number of judges, whoſe characters, eſpecially as they deliberated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any raſh or unjuſt deciſion. In doubtful caſes, ſuch courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to ſhelter themſelves under the example or precedent of the judges who had ſat before them either in the ſame or in ſome other court. This attention to practice and precedent neceſſarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly ſyſtem in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where ſuch attention has taken place. The ſuperiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, ſo much

much remarked by Polybius and Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, was probably more owing to the better conſtitution of their courts of juſtice, than to any of the circumſtances to which thoſe authors aſcribe it. The Romans are ſaid to have been particularly diſtinguiſhed for their ſuperior reſpect to an oath. But the people who were accuſtomed to make oath only before ſome diligent and well informed court of juſtice, would naturally be much more attentive to what they ſwore, than they who were accuſtomed to do the ſame thing before mobbiſh and diſorderly aſſemblies.

THE abilities both civil and military of the Greeks and Romans will readily be allowed to have been at leaſt equal to thoſe of any modern nation. Our prejudice is perhaps rather to over-rate them. But except in what related to military exerciſes, the ſtate ſeems to have been at no pains to form thoſe great abilities: for I cannot be induced to believe that the muſical education of the Greeks could be of much conſequence in forming them. Maſters, however, had been found, it ſeems, for inſtructing the better ſort of people among thoſe nations in every art and ſcience in which the circumſtances of their ſociety rendered it neceſſary or convenient for them to be inſtructed. The demand for ſuch inſtruction produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unreſtrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. In the attention which the antient philoſophers excited, in the empire which they acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they poſſeſſed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and converſation of thoſe auditors; they appear to have been much ſuperior to any modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or leſs corrupted by the circumſtances, which render them more or leſs independent of their ſucceſs and reputation in their particular profeſſions. Their ſalaries too put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into competition with

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them, in the ſame ſtate with a merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty, in competition with thoſe who trade with a conſiderable one. If he ſells his goods at nearly the ſame price, he cannot have the ſame profit, and poverty and beggary at leaſt, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he attempts to ſell them much dearer, he is likely to have ſo few cuſtomers that his circumſtances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, beſides, are in many countries neceſſary, or at leaſt extremely convenient to moſt men of learned profeſſions, that is, to the far greater part of thoſe who have occaſion for a learned education. But thoſe privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public teachers. The moſt careful attendance upon the ableſt inſtructions of any private teacher, cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from theſe different cauſes that the private teacher of any of the ſciences which are commonly taught in univerſities, is in modern times generally conſidered as in the very loweſt order of men of letters. A man of real abilities can ſcarce find out a more humiliating or a more unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowments of ſchools and colleges have in this manner not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have rendered it almoſt impoſſible to have any good private ones.

Were there no public inſtitutions for education, no ſyſtem, no ſcience would be taught for which there was not ſome demand; or which the circumſtances of the times did not render it, either neceſſary, or convenient, or at leaſt faſhionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his account in teaching either an exploded and antiquated ſyſtem of a ſcience acknowleged to be uſeful, or a ſcience univerſally believed to be a mere uſeleſs and pedantic heap of ſophiſtry and nonſenſe. Such ſyſtems, ſuch ſciences, can ſubſiſt no where but in thoſe incorporated ſocieties for education whoſe proſperity and revenue are in a great meaſure independent of their reputation, and altogether

gether independent of their induſtry. Were there no public inſtitutions for education, a gentleman, after going through with application and abilities the moſt complete courſe of education, which the circumſtances of the times were ſuppoſed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of every thing which is the common ſubject of converſation among gentlemen and men of the world.

THERE are no public inſtitutions for the education of women, and there is accordingly nothing uſeleſs, abſurd, or fantaſtical in the common courſe of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it neceſſary or uſeful for them to learn; and they are taught nothing elſe. Every part of their education tends evidently to ſome uſeful purpoſe; either to improve the natural attractions of their perſon, or to form their mind to reſerve, to modeſty, to chaſtity, and to oeconomy: to render them both likely to become the miſtreſſes of a family, and to behave properly when they have become ſuch. In every part of her life a woman feels ſome conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It ſeldom happens that a man in any part of his life derives any conveniency or advantage from ſome of the moſt laborious and troubleſome parts of his education.

OUGHT the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be aſked, to the education of the people? Or if it ought to give any, what are the different parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?

IN ſome caſes the ſtate of the ſociety neceſſarily places the greater part of individuals in ſuch ſituations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almoſt all the abilities and virtues which that ſtate requires, or perhaps can admit of.

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of. In other cafes the ſtate of the ſociety does not place the greater part of individuals in ſuch ſituations, and ſome attention of government is neceſſary in order to prevent the almoſt entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people.

In the progreſs of the diviſion of labour, the employment of the far greater part of thoſe who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a very few ſimple operations; frequently to one or two. But the underſtandings of the greater part of men are neceſſarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whoſe whole life is ſpent in performing a few ſimple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the ſame, or very nearly the ſame, has no occaſion to exert his underſtanding, or to exerciſe his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loſes, therefore, the habit of ſuch exertion, and generally becomes as ſtupid and ignorant as it is poſſible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of reliſhing or bearing a part in any rational converſation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender ſentiment, and conſequently of forming any juſt judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extenſive intereſts of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging; and unleſs very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwiſe, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his ſtationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a ſoldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his ſtrength with vigour and perſeverance in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade ſeems in this manner to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual,

ſocial, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized ſociety this is the ſtate into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, muſt neceſſarily fall, unleſs government takes ſome pains to prevent it.

IT is otherwiſe in the barbarous ſocieties, as they are commonly called, of hunters, of ſhepherds, and even of huſbandmen in that rude ſtate of huſbandry which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extenſion of foreign commerce. In ſuch ſocieties the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. Invention is kept alive, and the minds of men are not ſuffered to fall into that drowſy ſtupidity which in a civilized ſociety ſeems to benumb the underſtanding of almoſt all the inferior ranks of people. In thoſe barbarous ſocieties, as they are called, every man, it has already been obſerved, is a warrior. Every man too is in ſome meaſure a ſtateſman, and can form a tolerable judgement concerning the intereſt of the ſociety, and the conduct of thoſe who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the obſervation of almoſt every ſingle man among them. In ſuch a ſociety indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined underſtanding which a few men ſometimes poſſeſs in a more civilized ſtate. Though in a rude ſociety there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every individual, there is not a great deal in thoſe of the whole ſociety. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almoſt every thing which any other man does or is capable of doing. Every man has a conſiderable degree of knowledge, ingenuity and invention; but ſcarce any man has a great degree. The degree, however, which is commonly poſſeſſed, is generally ſufficient for conducting the whole ſimple buſineſs of the ſociety. In a civilized ſtate, on the contrary, though there is little variety in the occupations of the

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greater part of individuals, there is an almoſt infinite variety in thoſe of the whole ſociety. Theſe varied occupations preſent an almoſt infinite variety of objects to the contemplation of thoſe few who, being attached to no particular occupation themſelves, have leiſure and inclination to examine the occupations of other people. The contemplation of ſo great a variety of objects neceſſarily exerciſes their minds in endleſs compariſons and combinations, and renders their underſtandings in an extraordinary degree both acute and comprehenſive. Unleſs thoſe few, however, happen to be placed in ſome very particular ſituations, their great abilities, though honourable to themſelves, may contribute very little to the good government or happineſs of their ſociety. Notwithſtanding the great abilities of thoſe few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be in a great meaſure obliterated and extinguiſhed in the great body of the people.

The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial ſociety, the attention of the public more than that of people of ſome rank and fortune. People of ſome rank and fortune are generally eighteen or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular buſineſs, profeſſion, or trade, by which they propoſe to diſtinguiſh themſelves in the world. They have before that full time to acquire, or at leaſt to fit themſelves for afterwards acquiring, every accompliſhment which can recommend them to the public eſteem, or render them worthy of it. Their parents or guardians are generally ſufficiently anxious that they ſhould be ſo accompliſhed, and are in moſt caſes willing enough to lay out the expence which is neceſſary for that purpoſe. If they are not always properly educated, it is ſeldom from the want of expence laid out upon their education; but from the improper application of that expence. It is ſeldom from the want of maſters; but from the negligence and incapacity of the maſters who are to be had, and

from the difficulty, or rather from the impoſſibility which there is in the preſent ſtate of things of finding any better. The employments too in which people of ſome rank or fortune ſpend the greater part of their lives are not, like thoſe of the common people, ſimple and uniform. They are almoſt all of them extremely complicated, and ſuch as exerciſe the head more than the hands. The underſtandings of thoſe who are engaged in ſuch employments can ſeldom grow torpid from want of exerciſe. The employments of people of ſome rank and fortune, beſides, are ſeldom ſuch as harraſs them from morning to night. They generally have a good deal of leiſure, during which they may perfect themſelves in every branch either of uſeful or ornamental knowledge of which they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have acquired ſome taſte in the earlier part of life.

It is otherwiſe with the common people. They have little time to ſpare for education. Their parents can ſcarce afford to maintain them even in infancy. As ſoon as they are able to work, they muſt apply to ſome trade by which they can earn their ſubſiſtence. That trade too is generally ſo ſimple and uniform as to give little exerciſe to the underſtanding, while at the ſame time their labour is both ſo conſtant and ſo ſevere, that it leaves them little leiſure and leſs inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing elſe.

But though the common people cannot in any civilized ſociety be ſo well inſtructed as people of ſome rank and fortune, the moſt eſſential parts of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at ſo early a period of life, that the greater part even of thoſe who are to be bred to the loweſt occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in thoſe occupations. For a very ſmall expence the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impoſe upon almoſt the whole body of

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the people, the neceſſity of acquiring thoſe moſt eſſential parts of education.

The public can facilitate this acquiſition by eſtabliſhing in every pariſh or diſtrict a little ſchool, where children may be taught for a reward ſo moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the maſter being partly, but not wholly paid by the public; becauſe if he was wholly, or even principally paid by it, he would ſoon learn to neglect his buſineſs. In Scotland the eſtabliſhment of ſuch pariſh ſchools has taught almoſt the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England the eſtabliſhment of charity ſchools has had an effect of the ſame kind, though not ſo univerſally, becauſe the eſtabliſhment is not ſo univerſal. If in thoſe little ſchools the books by which the children are taught to read were a little more inſtructive than they commonly are; and if, inſtead of the little ſmattering of Latin, which the children of the common people are ſometimes taught there, and which can ſcarce ever be of any uſe to them, they were inſtructed in the elementary parts of geometry and mechanics, the literary education of this rank of people would perhaps be as complete as it is capable of being. There is ſcarce a common trade which does not afford ſome opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not therefore gradually exerciſe and improve the common people in thoſe principles, the neceſſary introduction to the moſt ſublime as well as to the moſt uſeful ſciences.

The public can encourage the acquiſition of thoſe moſt eſſential parts of education by giving ſmall premiums, and little badges of diſtinction, to the children of the common people who excel in them.

The public can impoſe upon almoſt the whole body of the people the neceſſity of acquiring thoſe moſt eſſential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an examination or probation in them before

before he can obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to ſet up any trade either in a village or town corporate.

It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquiſition of their military and gymnaſtic exerciſes, by encouraging it, and even by impoſing upon the whole body of the people the neceſſity of learning thoſe exerciſes, that the Greek and Roman republics maintained the martial ſpirit of their reſpective citizens. They facilitated the acquiſition of thoſe exerciſes by appointing a certain place for learning and practiſing them, and by granting to certain maſters the privilege of teaching in that place. Thoſe maſters do not appear to have had either ſalaries or excluſive privileges of any kind. Their reward conſiſted altogether in what they got from their ſcholars; and a citizen who had learnt his exerciſes in the public Gymnaſia, had no ſort of legal advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learnt them equally well. Thoſe republics encouraged the acquiſition of thoſe exerciſes by beſtowing little premiums and badges of diſtinction upon thoſe who excelled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Iſthmian or Nemæan games, gave illuſtration not only to the perſon who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under to ſerve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, ſufficiently impoſed the neceſſity of learning thoſe exerciſes without which he could not be fit for that ſervice.

That in the progreſs of improvement the practice of military exerciſes, unleſs government takes proper pains to ſupport it, goes gradually to decay, and, together with it, the martial ſpirit of the great body of the people, the example of modern Europe ſufficiently demonſtrates. But the ſecurity of every ſociety muſt always depend, more or leſs, upon the martial ſpirit of the great body of the people. In the preſent times, indeed, that martial ſpirit alone,

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and unſupported by a well diſciplined ſtanding army, would not perhaps be ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of any ſociety. But where every citizen had the ſpirit of a ſoldier, a ſmaller ſtanding army would ſurely be requiſite. That ſpirit beſides would neceſſarily diminiſh very much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a ſtanding army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army againſt a foreign invader, ſo it would obſtruct them as much if unfortunately they ſhould ever be directed againſt the conſtitution of the ſtate.

THE antient inſtitutions of Greece and Rome ſeem to have been much more effectual for maintaining the martial ſpirit of the great body of the people than the eſtabliſhment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more ſimple. When they were once eſtabliſhed, they executed themſelves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the moſt perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain even in tolerable execution the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without which they are conſtantly falling into total neglect and diſuſe. The influence beſides of the antient inſtitutions was much more univerſal. By means of them the whole body of the people was completely inſtructed in the uſe of arms. Whereas it is but a very ſmall part of them who can ever be ſo inſtructed by the regulations of any modern militia; except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himſelf, evidently wants one of the moſt eſſential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of ſome of its moſt eſſential members, or has loſt the uſe of thoſe members. He is evidently the more wretched and miſerable of the two; becauſe happineſs and miſery,

misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity and wretchedness which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them; though perhaps no other public good might result from such attention besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man, without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if possible, more contemptible than even a coward, and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people besides are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves each individually more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are therefore more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to

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examine, and more capable of ſeeing through, the intereſted complaints of faction and ſedition, and they are, upon that account, leſs apt to be miſled into any wanton or unneceſſary oppoſition to the meaſures of government. In free countries, where the ſafety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgement which the people may form of its conduct, it muſt ſurely be of the higheſt importance that they ſhould not be diſpoſed to judge raſhly or capriciouſly concerning it.

ARTICLE III.

Of the Expence of the Inſtitutions for the Inſtruction of People of all Ages.

THE inſtitutions for the inſtruction of people of all ages are chiefly thoſe for religious inſtruction. This is a ſpecies of inſtruction of which the object is not ſo much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come. The teachers of the doctrine which contains this inſtruction, in the ſame manner as other teachers, may either depend altogether for their ſubſiſtence upon the voluntary contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from ſome other fund to which the law of their country may entitle them; ſuch as a landed eſtate, a tythe or land-tax, an eſtabliſhed ſalary or ſtipend. Their exertion, their zeal and induſtry, are likely to be much greater in the former ſituation than in the latter. In this reſpect the teachers of new religions have always had a conſiderable advantage in attacking thoſe antient and eſtabliſhed ſyſtems of which the clergy, repoſing themſelves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people; and having given themſelves up to indolence, were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own eſtabliſhment. The clergy of an eſtabliſhed and well endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who poſſeſs all the virtues of gentlemen, or which

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can recommend them to the eſteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to loſe the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original cauſes of the ſucceſs and eſtabliſhment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked by a ſet of popular and bold, though perhaps ſtupid and ignorant enthuſiaſts, feel themſelves as perfectly defenceleſs as the indolent, effeminate, and full-fed nations of the ſouthern parts of Aſia, when they were invaded by the active, hardy, and hungry Tartars of the North. Such a clergy, upon ſuch an emergency, have commonly no other reſource than to call upon the civil magiſtrate to perſecute, deſtroy, or drive out their adverſaries as diſturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman catholic clergy called upon the civil magiſtrate to perſecute the proteſtants; and the church of England to perſecute the diſſenters; and that in general every religious ſect, when it has once enjoyed for a century or two the ſecurity of a legal eſtabliſhment, has found itſelf incapable of making any vigorous defence againſt any new ſect which choſe to attack its doctrine or diſcipline. Upon ſuch occaſions the advantage in point of learning and good writing may ſometimes be on the ſide of the eſtabliſhed church. But the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proſelytes, are conſtantly on the ſide of its adverſaries. In England thoſe arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the eſtabliſhed church, and are at preſent chiefly culitvated by the diſſenters and by the methodiſts. The independent proviſions, however, which in many places have been made for diſſenting teachers, by means of voluntary ſubſcriptions, of truſt-rights, and other evaſions of the law, ſeem very much to have abated the zeal and activity of thoſe teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious, and reſpectable men; but they have in general ceaſed to be very popular preachers. The methodiſts, without half the learning of the diſſenters, are much more in vogue.

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In the church of Rome the induſtry and zeal of the inferior clergy is kept more alive by the powerful motive of ſelf-intereſt than perhaps in any eſtabliſhed proteſtant church. The parochial clergy derive, many of them, a very conſiderable part of their ſubſiſtence from the voluntary oblations of the people; a ſource of revenue which confeſſion gives them many opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole ſubſiſtence from ſuch oblations. It is with them, as with the huſſars and light infantry of ſome armies, no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like thoſe teachers whoſe reward depends partly upon their ſalary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their pupils, and theſe muſt always depend more or leſs upon their induſtry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like thoſe teachers whoſe ſubſiſtence depends altogether upon their induſtry. They are obliged, therefore, to uſe every art which can animate the devotion of the common people. The eſtabliſhment of the two great mendicant orders of St. Dominick and St. Francis, it is obſerved by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the languiſhing faith and devotion of the catholic church. In Roman catholic countries the ſpirit of devotion is ſupported altogether by the monks and by the poorer parochial clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all the accompliſhments of gentlemen and men of the world, and ſometimes with thoſe of men of learning, are careful enough to maintain the neceſſary diſcipline over their inferiors, but ſeldom give themſelves any trouble about the inſtruction of the people.

"Most of the arts and profeſſions in a ſtate," ſays, by far the moſt illuſtrious philoſopher and hiſtorian of the preſent age, "are "of ſuch a nature, that, while they promote the intereſts of the "ſociety, they are alſo uſeful or agreeable to ſome individuals; "and in that caſe, the conſtant rule of the magiſtrate, except, "perhaps,

" perhaps, on the firſt introduction of any art, is, to leave the " profeſſion to itſelf, and truſt its encouragement to the indivi- " duals who reap the benefit of it. The artizans finding their " profits to riſe by the favour of their cuſtomers, increaſe, as " much as poſſible, their ſkill and induſtry; and as matters are " not diſturbed by any injudicious tampering, the commodity is " always ſure to be at all times nearly proportioned to the " demand.

" But there are alſo ſome callings, which, though uſeful and " even neceſſary in a ſtate, bring no advantage or pleaſure to any " individual, and the ſupreme power is obliged to alter its conduct " with regard to the retainers of thoſe profeſſions. It muſt give " them publick encouragement in order to their ſubſiſtence; and it " muſt provide againſt that negligence to which they will naturally " be ſubject, either by annexing particular honours to the profeſ- " ſion, by eſtabliſhing a long ſubordination of ranks and a ſtrict " dependance, or by ſome other expedient. The perſons employed " in the finances, fleets, and magiſtracy, are inſtances of this order " of men."

" It may naturally be thought, at firſt ſight, that the eccle- " ſiaſtics belong to the firſt claſs, and that their encouragement, as " well as that of lawyers and phyſicians, may ſafely be entruſted to " the liberality of individuals, who are attached to their doctrines, " and who find benefit or conſolation from their ſpiritual miniſtry " and aſſiſtance. Their induſtry and vigilance will, no doubt, be " whetted by ſuch an additional motive; and their ſkill in the " profeſſion, as well as their addreſs in governing the minds of the " people, muſt receive daily increaſe, from their increaſing practice, " ſtudy, and attention.

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"But if we conſider the matter more cloſely, we ſhall find, that "this intereſted diligence of the clergy is what every wiſe legiſlator "will ſtudy to prevent; becauſe in every religion except the true, "it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to "pervert the true, by infuſing into it a ſtrong mixture of ſuper-"ſtition, folly, and deluſion. Each ghoſtly practitioner, in order "to render himſelf more precious and ſacred in the eyes of his "retainers, will inſpire them with the moſt violent abhorrence of "all other ſects, and continually endeavour, by ſome novelty, to "excite the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be "paid to truth, morals, or decency in the doctrines inculcated. "Every tenet will be adopted that beſt ſuits the diſorderly affections "of the human frame. Cuſtomers will be drawn to each conven-"ticle by new induſtry and addreſs in practiſing on the paſſions "and credulity of the populace. And in the end, the civil "magiſtrate will find, that he has dearly paid for his pretended "frugality, in ſaving a fixed eſtabliſhment for the prieſts; and "that in reality the moſt decent and advantageous compoſition, "which he can make with the ſpiritual guides, is to bribe their "indolence, by aſſigning ſtated ſalaries to their profeſſion, and "rendering it ſuperfluous for them to be farther active, than "merely to prevent their flock from ſtraying in queſt of new "paſtures. And in this manner eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhments, though "commonly they aroſe at firſt from religious views, prove in the "end advantageous to the political intereſts of ſociety."

But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent proviſion of the clergy; it has, perhaps, been very ſeldom beſtowed upon them from any view to thoſe effects. Times of violent religious controverſy have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon ſuch occaſions each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for its intereſt to league

"itſelf

itſelf with ſome one or other of the contending religious ſects. But this could be done only by adopting, or at leaſt by favouring, the tenets of that particular ſect. The ſect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party, neceſſarily ſhared in the victory of its ally, by whoſe favour and protection it was ſoon enabled in ſome degree to ſilence and ſubdue all its adverſaries. Thoſe adverſaries had generally leagued themſelves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular ſect having thus become complete maſters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its higheſt vigour, they were powerful enough to over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magiſtrate to reſpect their opinions and inclinations. Their firſt demand was generally, that he ſhould ſilence and ſubdue all their adverſaries; and their ſecond, that he ſhould beſtow an independent proviſion on themſelves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the victory, it ſeemed not unreaſonable that they ſhould have ſome ſhare in the ſpoil. They were weary beſides of humouring the people, and of depending upon their caprice for a ſubſiſtence. In making this demand therefore they conſulted their own eaſe and comfort, without troubling themſelves about the effect which it might have in future times upon the influence and authority of their order. The civil magiſtrate, who could comply with this demand only by giving them ſomething which he would have choſen much rather to take or to keep to himſelf, was ſeldom very forward to grant it. Neceſſity, however, always forced him to ſubmit at laſt, though frequently not till after many delays, evaſions, and affected excuſes.

But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of one ſect more than thoſe of another, when it had gained the victory, it would proba-

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bly have dealt equally and impartially with all the different ſects, and have allowed every man to chuſe his own prieſt and his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this caſe, no doubt, have been a great multitude of religious ſects. Almoſt every different congregation might probably have made a little ſect by itſelf, or have entertained ſome peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher would no doubt have felt himſelf under the neceſſity of making the utmoſt exertion, and of uſing every art both to preſerve and to increaſe the number of his diſciples. But as every other teacher would have felt himſelf under the ſame neceſſity; the ſucceſs of no one teacher, or ſect of teachers, could have been very great. The intereſted and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troubleſome only where there is either but one ſect tolerated in the ſociety, or where the whole of a large ſociety is divided into two or three great ſects; the teachers of each ſect acting by concert, and under a regular diſcipline and ſubordination. But that zeal muſt be altogether innocent where the ſociety is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thouſand ſmall ſects, of which no one could be conſiderable enough to diſturb the publick tranquillity. The teachers of each ſect, ſeeing themſelves ſurrounded on all ſides with more adverſaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is ſo ſeldom to be found among the teachers of thoſe great ſects, whoſe tenets being ſupported by the civil magiſtrate, are held in veneration by almoſt all the inhabitants of extenſive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore ſee nothing round them but followers, diſciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little ſect, finding themſelves almoſt alone, would be obliged to reſpect thoſe of almoſt every other ſect, and the conceſſions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of abſurdity, impoſture, or fanaticiſm,

fanaticiſm, ſuch as wiſe men have in all ages of the world wiſhed to ſee eſtabliſhed; but ſuch as poſitive law has perhaps never yet eſtabliſhed, and probably never will eſtabliſh in any country: becauſe with regard to religion, poſitive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or leſs influenced by popular ſuperſtition and enthuſiaſm. This plan of eccleſiaſtical government, or more properly of no eccleſiaſtical government, was what the ſect called independents, a ſect no doubt of very wild enthuſiaſts, propoſed to eſtabliſh in England towards the end of the civil war. If it had been eſtabliſhed, though of a very unphiloſophical origin, it would probably by this time have been productive of the moſt philoſophical good temper and moderation with regard to every ſort of religious principle. It has been eſtabliſhed in Penſylvania, where, though the quakers happen to be the moſt numerous ſect, the law in reality favours no one ſect more than another, and it is there ſaid to have been productive of this philoſophical good temper and moderation.

But though this equality of treatment ſhould not be productive of this good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious ſects of a particular country; yet provided thoſe ſects were ſufficiently numerous, and each of them conſequently too ſmall to diſturb the publick tranquillity, the exceſſive zeal of each ſect for its particular tenets, could not well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the contrary, of ſeveral good ones: and if the government was perfectly decided both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger that they would not of their own accord ſubdivide themſelves faſt enough, ſo as ſoon to become ſufficiently numerous.

In every civilized ſociety, in every ſociety where the diſtinction of ranks has once been completely eſtabliſhed, there have been always

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always two different ſchemes or ſyſtems of morality current at the ſame time; of which the one may be called the ſtrict or auſtere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the looſe ſyſtem. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: The latter is commonly more eſteemed and adopted by what are called people of faſhion. The degree of diſapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to ariſe from great proſperity, and from the exceſs of gaiety and good humour, ſeems to conſtitute the principal diſtinction between thoſe two oppoſite ſchemes or ſyſtems. In the liberal or looſe ſyſtem, luxury, wanton and even diſorderly mirth, the purſuit of pleaſure to ſome degree of intemperance, the breach of chaſtity, at leaſt in one of the two ſexes, &c. provided they are not accompanied with groſs indecency, and do not lead to falſhood or injuſtice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are eaſily either excuſed or pardoned altogether. In the auſtere ſyſtem, on the contrary, thoſe exceſſes are regarded with the utmoſt abhorrence and deteſtation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people, and a ſingle week's thoughtleſneſs and diſſipation is often ſufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him through deſpair upon committing the moſt enormous crimes. The wiſer and better ſort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmoſt abhorrence and deteſtation of ſuch exceſſes, which their experience tells them are ſo immediately fatal to people of their condition. The diſorder and extravagance of ſeveral years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of faſhion, and people of that rank are very apt to conſider the power of indulging in ſome degree of exceſs as one of the advantages of their fortune, and the liberty of doing ſo without cenſure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their ſtation. In people of their own ſtation, therefore, they regard ſuch exceſſes with but a ſmall degree of diſapprobation, and cenſure them either very ſlightly or not at all.

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ALMOST all religious ſects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earlieſt, as well as their moſt numerous proſelytes. The auſtere ſyſtem of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by thoſe ſects almoſt conſtantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been ſome. It was the ſyſtem by which they could beſt recommend themſelves to that order of people to whom they firſt propoſed their plan of reformation upon what had been before eſtabliſhed. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this auſtere ſyſtem, and by carrying it to ſome degree of folly and extravagance; and this exceſſive rigour has frequently recommended them more than any thing elſe to the reſpect and veneration of the common people.

A MAN of rank and fortune is by his ſtation the diſtinguiſhed member of a great ſociety, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himſelf. His authority and conſideration depend very much upon the reſpect which this ſociety bears to him. He dare not do any thing which would diſgrace or diſcredit him in it, and he is obliged to a very ſtrict obſervation of that ſpecies of morals, whether liberal or auſtere, which the general conſent of this ſociety preſcribes to perſons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a diſtinguiſhed member of any great ſociety. While he remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himſelf. In this ſituation, and in this ſituation only, he may have what is called a character to loſe. But as ſoon as he comes into a great city, he is ſunk in obſcurity and darkneſs. His conduct is obſerved and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himſelf, and to abandon himſelf to every ſort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges ſo effectually from this obſcurity, his conduct never excites ſo much the

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the attention of any reſpectable ſociety, as by his becoming the member of a ſmall religious ſect. He from that moment acquires a degree of conſideration which he never had before. All his brother ſectaries are, for the credit of the ſect, intereſted to obſerve his conduct, and if he gives occaſion to any ſcandal, if he deviates very much from thoſe auſtere morals which they almoſt always require of one another, to puniſh him by what is always a very ſevere puniſhment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulſion or excommunication from the ſect. In little religious ſects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almoſt always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more ſo than in the eſtabliſhed church. The morals of thoſe little ſects indeed have frequently been rather diſagreeably rigorous and unſocial.

THERE are two very eaſy and effectual remedies, however, by whoſe joint operation the ſtate might, without violence, correct whatever was unſocial or diſagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little ſects into which the country was divided.

THE firſt of thoſe remedies is the ſtudy of ſcience and philoſophy, which the ſtate might render almoſt univerſal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving ſalaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by inſtituting ſome ſort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult ſciences, to be undergone by every perſon before he was permitted to exerciſe any liberal profeſſion, or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of truſt or profit. If the ſtate impoſed upon this order of men the neceſſity of learning, it would have no occaſion to give itſelf any trouble about providing them with proper teachers. They would ſoon find better teachers for themſelves than any whom the ſtate could provide for them. Science is the

great antidote to the poiſon of enthuſiaſm and ſuperſtition; and where all the ſuperior ranks of people were ſecured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much expoſed to it.

The ſecond of thoſe remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diverſions. The ſtate, by encouraging, that is by giving entire liberty to all thoſe who for their own intereſt would attempt, without ſcandal or indecency, to amuſe and divert the people by painting, poetry, muſic, dancing; by all ſorts of dramatic repreſentations and exhibitions, would eaſily diſſipate in the greater part of them that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almoſt always the nurſe of popular ſuperſtition and enthuſiaſm. Public diverſions have always been the objects of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters of thoſe popular frenzies. The gaiety and good humour which thoſe diverſions inſpire were altogether inconſiſtent with that temper of mind, which was fitteſt for their purpoſe, or which they could beſt work upon. Dramatic repreſentations beſides, frequently expoſing their artifices to public ridicule, and ſometimes even to public execration, were upon that account more than all other diverſions the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than thoſe of another, it would not be neceſſary that any of them ſhould have any particular or immediate dependency upon the ſovereign or executive power; or that he ſhould have any thing to do either in appointing or in diſmiſſing them from their offices. In ſuch a ſituation he would have no occaſion to give himſelf any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them in the ſame manner as among the reſt of his ſubjects; that is, to hinder them from perſecuting, abuſing, or oppreſſing one another. But it is quite otherwiſe in countries where there is an eſtabliſhed or

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governing religion. The ſovereign can in this caſe never be ſecure, unleſs he has the means of influencing in a conſiderable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

The clergy of every eſtabliſhed church conſtitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and purſue their intereſt upon one plan and with one ſpirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under ſuch direction. Their intereſt as an incorporated body is never the ſame with that of the ſovereign, and is ſometimes directly oppoſite to it. Their great intereſt is to maintain their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the ſuppoſed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the ſuppoſed neceſſity of adopting every part of it with the moſt implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal miſery. Should the ſovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himſelf of the moſt trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect thoſe who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy who have no ſort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to proſcribe him as a profane perſon, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to ſome more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppoſe any of their pretenſions or uſurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel againſt the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too with the additional crime of hereſy, notwithſtanding their ſolemn proteſtations of their faith and humble ſubmiſſion to every tenet which ſhe thought proper to preſcribe to them. But the authority of religion is ſuperior to every other authority. The fears which it ſuggeſts conquer all other fears. When the authoriſed teachers of religion propagate through the great body of the people

people doctrines ſubverſive of the authority of the ſovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a ſtanding army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a ſtanding army cannot in this caſe give him any laſting ſecurity; becauſe if the ſoldiers are not foreigners, which can ſeldom be the caſe, but drawn from the great body of the people, which muſt almoſt always be the caſe, they are likely to be ſoon corrupted by thoſe very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually occaſioning at Conſtantinople as long as the eaſtern empire ſubſiſted; the convulſions which, during the courſe of ſeveral centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occaſioning in every part of Europe, ſufficiently demonſtrate how precarious and inſecure muſt always be the ſituation of the ſovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the eſtabliſhed and governing religion of his country.

Articles of faith, as well as all other ſpiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal ſovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is ſeldom ſuppoſed to be ſo for inſtructing the people. With regard to ſuch matters, therefore, his authority can ſeldom be ſufficient to counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the eſtabliſhed church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own ſecurity, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning ſuch matters. As he can ſeldom directly oppoſe their deciſion, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Thoſe fears and expectations may conſiſt in the fear of deprivation or other puniſhment, and in the expectation of further preferment.

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In all christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life, or good behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people, who would then consider them as mercenary dependants upon the court, in the sincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign attempt irregularly, and by violence to deprive any number of clergymen of their freeholds on account, perhaps, of their having propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine, he would only render, by such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous than they had been before. Fear is in almost all cases a wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them serves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in an opposition which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce them either to soften or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government usually employed in order to oblige all their parliaments or sovereign courts of justice to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded. The means commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one would think were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Steuart sometimes employed the like means in order to influence some of the members of the parliament of England; and they generally found them equally intractable. The parliament of England is now managed in another manner; and a very small experiment which the duke of Choiseul made about twelve years ago upon the parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently that all the

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parliaments of France might have been managed ſtill more eaſily in the ſame manner. That experiment was not purſued. For though management and perſuaſion are always the eaſieſt and the ſafeſt inſtruments of government, as force and violence are the worſt and the moſt dangerous, yet ſuch, it ſeems, is the natural inſolence of man, that he almoſt always diſdains to uſe the good inſtrument, except when he cannot or dare not uſe the bad one. The French government could and durſt uſe force, and therefore diſdained to uſe management and perſuaſion. But there is no order of men, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all ages, upon whom it is ſo dangerous, or rather ſo perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the reſpected clergy of any eſtabliſhed church. The rights, the privileges, the perſonal liberty of every individual eccleſiaſtic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are even in the moſt deſpotic governments more reſpected than thoſe of any other perſon of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is ſo in every gradation of deſpotiſm, from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of Conſtantinople. But though this order of men can ſcarce ever be forced, they may be managed as eaſily as any other; and the ſecurity of the ſovereign, as well as of the public tranquillity, ſeems to depend very much upon the means which he has of managing them; and thoſe means ſeem to conſiſt altogether in the preferment which he has to beſtow upon them.

In the antient conſtitution of the Roman catholic church, the biſhop of each dioceſe was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the epiſcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almoſt always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in ſuch ſpiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, ſoon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found

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found it eaſier to elect their own biſhops themſelves. The abbot, in the ſame manner, was elected by the monks of the monaſtery, at leaſt in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior eccleſiaſtical benefices comprehended within the dioceſe were collated by the biſhop, who beſtowed them upon ſuch eccleſiaſtics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the diſpoſal of the church. The ſovereign, though he might have ſome indirect influence in thoſe elections, and though it was ſometimes uſual to aſk both his conſent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or ſufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not ſo much to his ſovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

THROUGH the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himſelf firſt the collation of almoſt all biſhopricks and abbacies, or of what were called Conſiſtorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each dioceſe; little more being left to the biſhop than what was barely neceſſary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the ſovereign was ſtill worſe than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a ſort of ſpiritual army, diſperſed in different quarters indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be conſidered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could eaſily be ſupported and ſeconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the ſovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependant upon a foreign

foreign ſovereign, who could at any time turn its arms againſt the ſovereign of that particular country, and ſupport them by the arms of all the other detachments. CHAP. I.

THOSE arms were the moſt formidable that can well be imagined. In the antient ſtate of Europe, before the eſtabliſhment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the ſame ſort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their reſpective vaſſals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed eſtates which the miſtaken piety both of princes and private perſons had beſtowed upon the church, juriſdictions were eſtabliſhed of the ſame kind with thoſe of the great barons; and for the ſame reaſon. In thoſe great landed eſtates, the clergy or their bailiffs could eaſily keep the peace without the ſupport or aſſiſtance either of the king or of any other perſon; and neither the king nor any other perſon could keep the peace there without the ſupport and aſſiſtance of the clergy. The juriſdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally excluſive of the authority of the king's courts, as thoſe of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like thoſe of the great barons, almoſt all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleaſure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of thoſe eſtates, the clergy poſſeſſed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other eſtates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues ariſing from both thoſe ſpecies of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themſelves conſume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the ſurplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immenſe

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ſurplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like ſurplus of their revenues, in the moſt profuſe hoſpitality, and in the moſt extenſive charity. Both the hoſpitality and the charity of the antient clergy, accordingly, are ſaid to have been very great. They not only maintained almoſt the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of ſubſiſtence than by travelling about from monaſtery to monaſtery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hoſpitality of the clergy. The retainers of ſome particular prelates were often as numerous as thoſe of the greateſt lay-lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than thoſe of all the lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular diſcipline and ſubordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular diſcipline or ſubordination, but almoſt always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been leſs numerous than thoſe of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably much leſs numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hoſpitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increaſed very much the weight of their ſpiritual weapons. Thoſe virtues procured them the higheſt reſpect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were conſtantly, and almoſt all occaſionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to ſo popular an order, its poſſeſſions, its privileges, its doctrines, neceſſarily appeared ſacred in the eyes of the common people, and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the higheſt act of ſacrilegious wickedneſs and profaneneſs. In this ſtate of things, if the ſovereign frequently found it difficult to reſiſt the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he ſhould

ſhould find it ſtill more ſo to reſiſt the united force of the clergy of his own dominions ſupported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In ſuch circumſtances the wonder is, not that he was ſometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to reſiſt.

The privileges of the clergy in thoſe antient times (which to us who live in the preſent times appear the moſt abſurd) their total exemption from the ſecular juriſdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy; were the natural or rather the neceſſary conſequences of this ſtate of things. How dangerous muſt it have been for the ſovereign to attempt to puniſh a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were diſpoſed to protect him, and to repreſent either the proof as inſufficient for convicting ſo holy a man, or the puniſhment as too ſevere to be inflicted upon one whoſe perſon had been rendered ſacred by religion. The ſovereign could, in ſuch circumſtances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the eccleſiaſtical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were intereſted to reſtrain, as much as poſſible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occaſion to ſuch groſs ſcandal as might diſguſt the minds of the people.

In the ſtate in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and for ſome time both before and after that period, the conſtitution of the church of Rome may be conſidered as the moſt formidable combination that ever was formed againſt the authority and ſecurity of civil government, as well as againſt the liberty, reaſon and happineſs of mankind, which can flouriſh only where civil government is able to protect them. In that conſtitution the groſſeſt deluſions of ſuperſtition were ſupported in ſuch a manner by

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the private intereſts of ſo great a number of people as put them out of all danger from any aſſault of human reaſon: becauſe though human reaſon might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, ſome of the deluſions of ſuperſtition; it could never have diſſolved the ties of private intereſt. Had this conſtitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reaſon, it muſt have endured forever. But that immenſe and well built fabric, which all the wiſdom and virtue of man could never have ſhaken, much leſs have over-turned, was by the natural courſe of things, firſt weakened, afterwards in part deſtroyed, and is now likely, in the courſe of a few centuries more, perhaps to crumble into ruins altogether.

THE gradual improvements of arts, manufactures and commerce, the ſame cauſes which deſtroyed the power of the great barons, deſtroyed in the ſame manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found ſomething for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby diſcovered the means of ſpending their whole revenues upon their own perſons, without giving any conſiderable ſhare of them to other people. Their charity became gradually leſs extenſive, their hoſpitality leſs liberal or leſs profuſe. Their retainers became conſequently leſs numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wiſhed to get a better rent from their landed eſtates, in order to ſpend it, in the ſame manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increaſe of rent could be got only by granting leaſes to their tenants, who thereby became in a great meaſure independent of them. The ties of intereſt, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and diſſolved. They were even broken and

diſſolved ſooner than thoſe which bound the ſame ranks of people to the great barons: becauſe the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much ſmaller than the eſtates of the great barons, the poſſeſſor of each benefice was much ſooner able to ſpend the whole of its revenue upon his own perſon. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the abſolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to what aroſe from her ſpiritual authority; and even that ſpiritual authority was much weakened when it ceaſed to be ſupported by the charity and hoſpitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their diſtreſs, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and diſguſted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to ſpend upon their own pleaſures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

In this ſituation of things, the ſovereigns in the different ſtates of Europe endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the diſpoſal of the great benefices of the church, by procuring to the deans and chapters of each dioceſe the reſtoration of their antient right of electing the biſhop, and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-eſtabliſhing of this antient order was the object of ſeveral ſtatutes enacted in England during the courſe of the fourteenth century, and of the pragmatic ſanction eſtabliſhed in France in the fifteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was neceſſary that the ſovereign ſhould both conſent to it before-hand, and afterwards approve of

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the perſon elected; and though the election was ſtill ſuppoſed to be free, he had, however, all the indirect means which his ſituation neceſſarily afforded him of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other regulations of a ſimilar tendency were eſtabliſhed in other parts of Europe. But the power of the pope in the collation of the great benefices of the church ſeems, before the reformation, to have been no where ſo effectually and ſo univerſally reſtrained as in France and England. The Concordat afterwards, in the ſixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the abſolute right of preſenting to all the great and conſiſtorial benefices of the Gallican church.

SINCE the eſtabliſhment of the Pragmatic ſanction and of the Concordat, the clergy of France have in general ſhown leſs reſpect to the decrees of the papal court than the clergy of any other catholic country. In all the diſputes which their ſovereign has had with the pope, they have almoſt conſtantly taken party with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome, ſeems to be principally founded upon the Pragmatic ſanction and the Concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the pope as thoſe of any other country. When Robert, the ſecond Prince of the Capetian race, was moſt unjuſtly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own ſervants, it is ſaid, threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and refuſed to taſte any thing themſelves which had been polluted by the contact of a perſon in his ſituation. They were taught to do ſo, it may very ſafely be preſumed, by the clergy of his own dominions.

THE claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in defence of which the court of Rome had frequently ſhaken and ſometimes overturned the thrones of ſome of the greateſt ſovereigns

reigns in Chriſtendom, was in this manner either reſtrained or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the reformation. As the clergy had now leſs influence over the people, ſo the ſtate had more influence over the clergy. The clergy therefore had both leſs power and leſs inclination to diſturb the ſtate.

THE authority of the church of Rome was in this ſtate of declenſion when the diſputes which gave birth to the reformation began in Germany, and ſoon ſpread themſelves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were every where received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthuſiaſtic zeal which commonly animates the ſpirit of party when it attacks eſtabliſhed authority. The teachers of thoſe doctrines, though perhaps in other reſpects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the eſtabliſhed church, ſeem in general to have been better acquainted with eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, and with the origin and progreſs of that ſyſtem of opinions upon which the authority of the church was eſtabliſhed, and they had thereby ſome advantage in almoſt every diſpute. The auſterity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contraſted the ſtrict regularity of their conduct with the diſorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They poſſeſſed too in a much higher degree than their adverſaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proſelytes, arts which the lofty and dignified ſons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great meaſure uſeleſs. The reaſon of the new doctrines recommended them to ſome, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the eſtabliſhed clergy to a ſtill greater number; but the zealous, paſſionate and fanatical, though frequently coarſe and ruſtic eloquence with which they were almoſt every where inculcated, recommended them to by far the greateſt number.

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The ſucceſs of the new doctrines was almoſt every where ſo great, that the princes who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were by means of them eaſily enabled, in their own dominions, to over-turn the church, which having loſt the reſpect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make ſcarce any reſiſtance. The court of Rome had diſobliged ſome of the ſmaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably conſidered as too inſignificant to be worth the managing. They univerſally, therefore, eſtabliſhed the reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Chriſtiern II. and of Troll archbiſhop of Upſal, enabled Guſtavus Vaſa to expel them both from Sweden. The pope favoured the tyrant and the archbiſhop, and Guſtavus Vaſa found no difficulty in eſtabliſhing the reformation in Sweden. Chriſtiern II. was afterwards depoſed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The pope, however, was ſtill diſpoſed to favour him, and Frederic of Holſtein, who had mounted the throne in his ſtead, revenged himſelf by following the example of Guſtavus Vaſa. The magiſtrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the pope, eſtabliſhed with great eaſe the reformation in their reſpective cantons, where juſt before ſome of the clergy had, by an impoſture ſomewhat groſſer than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical ſituation of its affairs the papal court was at ſufficient pains to cultivate the friendſhip of the powerful ſovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their aſſiſtance it was enabled, though not without great difficulty and much bloodſhed, either to ſuppreſs altogether or to obſtruct very much the progreſs of the reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined too to be complaiſant to the king of England. But from the circumſtances

ſtances of the times it could not be ſo without giving offence to a ſtill greater ſovereign, Charles V. king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII. accordingly, though he did not embrace himſelf the greater part of the doctrines of the reformation, was yet enabled, by the general prevalence of thoſe doctrines, to ſuppreſs all the monaſteries, and to aboliſh the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he ſhould go ſo far, though he went no further, gave ſome ſatisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who having got poſſeſſion of the government in the reign of his ſon and ſucceſſor, completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In ſome countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly eſtabliſhed, the reformation was ſtrong enough to overturn, not only the church, but the ſtate likewiſe for attempting to ſupport the church.

Among the followers of the reformation, diſperſed in all the different countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal which, like that of the court of Rome, or an œcumenical council, could ſettle all diſputes among them, and with irreſiſtable authority preſcribe to all of them the preciſe limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the diſpute could never be decided; and many ſuch diſputes aroſe among them. Thoſe concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring eccleſiaſtical benefices, were perhaps the moſt intereſting to the peace and welfare of civil ſociety. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or ſects among the followers of the reformation, the Lutheran and Calviniſtic ſects, the only ſects among them, of which the doctrine and diſcipline have ever yet been eſtabliſhed by law in any part of Europe.

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The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preſerved more or leſs of the epiſcopal government, eſtabliſhed ſubordination among the clergy, gave the ſovereign the diſpoſal of all the biſhopricks, and other conſiſtorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the biſhop of the right of collating to the ſmaller benefices within his dioceſe, they, even to thoſe benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of preſentation both in the ſovereign and in all other lay-patrons. This ſyſtem of church government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to ſubmiſſion to the civil ſovereign. It has never accordingly been the occaſion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been eſtabliſhed. The church of England in particular has always valued herſelf, with great reaſon, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under ſuch a government the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themſelves to the ſovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whoſe influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to thoſe patrons, ſometimes, no doubt, by the vileſt flattery and aſſentation, but frequently too by cultivating all thoſe arts which beſt deſerve, and which are therefore moſt likely to gain them the eſteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of uſeful and ornamental learning, by the decent liberality of their manners, by the ſocial good humour of their converſation, and by their avowed contempt of thoſe abſurd and hypocritical auſterities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practiſe, in order to draw upon themſelves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practiſe them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining

their influence and authority with the lower. They are liſtened to, eſteemed and reſpected by their ſuperiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually and to the conviction of ſuch hearers, their own ſober and moderate doctrines againſt the moſt ignorant enthuſiaſt who chuſes to attack them. CHAP. I.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly thoſe of Calvin, on the contrary, beſtowed upon the people of each pariſh, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own paſtor; and eſtabliſhed at the ſame time the moſt perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this inſtitution, as long as it remained in vigour, ſeems to have been productive of nothing but diſorder and confuſion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part ſeems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each pariſh preſerved the right of electing their own paſtors, they acted almoſt always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the moſt factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preſerve their influence in thoſe popular elections, became, or affected to become many of them, fanatics themſelves, encouraged fanaticiſm among the people, and gave the preference almoſt always to the moſt fanatical candidate. So ſmall a matter as the appointment of a pariſh prieſt occaſioned almoſt always a violent conteſt, not only in one pariſh, but in all the neighbouring pariſhes, who ſeldom failed to take party in the quarrel. When the pariſh happened to be ſituated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened either to conſtitute itſelf a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as is the caſe with many of the conſiderable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry diſpute of this kind, over and above

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exaſperating the animoſity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it both a new ſchiſm in the church, and a new faction in the ſtate. In thoſe ſmall republics, therefore, the magiſtrate very ſoon found it neceſſary, for the ſake of preſerving the public peace, to aſſume to himſelf the right of preſenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the moſt extenſive country in which this preſbyterian form of church government has ever been eſtabliſhed, the rights of patronage were in effect aboliſhed by the act which eſtabliſhed preſbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. That act at leaſt put it in the power of certain claſſes of people in each pariſh to purchaſe for a very ſmall price the right of electing their own paſtor. The conſtitution which this act eſtabliſhed was allowed to ſubſiſt for about two and twenty years, but was aboliſhed by the 10th of queen Ann, ch. 12. on account of the confuſions and diſorders which this more popular mode of election had almoſt every where occaſioned. In ſo extenſive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote pariſh was not ſo likely to give diſturbance to government, as in a ſmaller ſtate. The 10th of queen Ann reſtored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law gives the benefice without any exception to the perſon preſented by the patron; yet the church requires ſometimes (for ſhe has not in this reſpect been very uniform in her deciſions) a certain concurrence of the people, before ſhe will confer upon the preſentee what is called the cure of ſouls, or the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction in the pariſh. She ſometimes at leaſt, from an affected concern for the peace of the pariſh, delays the ſettlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of ſome of the neighbouring clergy, ſometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate in order to enable them upon ſuch occaſions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the cauſes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical ſpirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.

THE equality which the preſbyterian form of church government eſtabliſhes among the clergy, conſiſts, firſt, in the equality of authority or eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction; and, ſecondly, in the equality of benefice. In all preſbyterian churches the equality of authority is perfect: that of benefice is not ſo. The difference however, between one benefice and another, is ſeldom ſo conſiderable as commonly to tempt the poſſeſſor even of the ſmall benefice to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and aſſentation, in order to get a better. In all the preſbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly eſtabliſhed, it is by nobler and better arts that the eſtabliſhed clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their ſuperiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent diſcharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their ſpirit, which they are apt to conſtrue into ingratitude for paſt favours, but which at worſt perhaps is ſeldom any more than that indifference which naturally ariſes from the conſciouſneſs that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is ſcarce perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and reſpectable ſet of men, than the greater part of the preſbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

WHERE the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great, and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too far, has, however, ſome very agreeable effects. Nothing but the moſt exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of ſmall fortune. The vices of levity and vanity neceſſarily render him ridiculous, and are, beſides, almoſt as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that ſyſtem of morals which the common people reſpect the moſt. He gains their eſteem

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and affection by that plan of life which his own intereſt and ſituation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindneſs with which we naturally regard one who approaches ſomewhat to our own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindneſs naturally provokes his kindneſs. He becomes careful to inſtruct them, and attentive to aſſiſt and relieve them. He does not even deſpiſe the prejudices of people who are diſpoſed to be ſo favourable to him, and never treats them with thoſe contemptuous and arrogant airs which we ſo often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed churches. The preſbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other eſtabliſhed church. It is accordingly in preſbyterian countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without perſecution, completely, and almoſt to a man, to the eſtabliſhed church.

In countries where church benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a univerſity is generally a better eſtabliſhment than a church benefice. The univerſities have, in this caſe, the picking and chuſing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, conſtitute by far the moſt numerous claſs of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very conſiderable, the church naturally draws from the univerſities the greater part of their eminent men of letters; who generally find ſome patron who does himſelf honour by procuring them church preferment. In the former ſituation we are likely to find the univerſities filled with the moſt eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter we are likely to find few eminent men among them, and thoſe few among the youngeſt members of the ſociety, who are likely too to be drained away from it before they can have acquired experience

rience and knowledge enough to be of much uſe to it. It is obſerved by Mr. de Voltaire that father Porrée, a jeſuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only profeſſor they had ever had in France whoſe works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced ſo many eminent men of letters, it muſt appear ſomewhat ſingular that ſcarce one of them ſhould have been a profeſſor in a univerſity. The famous Gaſſendi was, in the beginning of his life, a profeſſor in the univerſity of Aix. Upon the firſt dawning of his genius it was repreſented to him that by going into the church he could eaſily find a much more quiet and comfortable ſubſiſtence, as well as a better ſituation for purſuing his ſtudies; and he immediately followed the advice. The obſervation of Mr. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a profeſſor in a univerſity, except, perhaps, in the profeſſions of law and phyſic; profeſſions from which the church is not ſo likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England, is by far the richeſt and beſt endowed church in Chriſtendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the univerſities of all their beſt and ableſt members; and an old college tutor, who is known and diſtinguiſhed in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the proteſtant cantons of Switzerland, in the proteſtant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the moſt eminent men of letters whom thoſe countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been profeſſors in univerſities. In thoſe countries the univerſities are continually draining the church of all its moſt eminent men of letters.

It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark, that, if we except the poets, a few orators, and a few hiſtorians, the far greater part of

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of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers; generally either of philoſophy or of rhetoric. This remark will be found to hold true from the days of Lyſias and Iſocrates, of Plato and Ariſtotle, down to thoſe of Plutarch and Epictetus, of Suetonius and Quintilian. Several of thoſe whom we do not know with certainty to have been public teachers, appear to have been private tutors. Polybius, we know, was private tutor to Scipio Æmilianus. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, there are ſome probable reaſons for believing, was ſo to the children of Marcus and Quintus Cicero. To impoſe upon any man the neceſſity of teaching, year after year, any particular branch of ſcience, ſeems, in reality, to be the moſt effectual method for rendering him completely maſter of it himſelf. By being obliged to go every year over the ſame ground, if he is good for any thing, he neceſſarily becomes, in a few years, well acquainted with every part of it: and if upon any particular point he ſhould form too haſty an opinion one year, when he comes in the courſe of his lectures to re-conſider the ſame ſubject the year thereafter, he is very likely to correct it. As to be a teacher of ſcience is certainly the natural employment of a mere man of letters; ſo is it likewiſe, perhaps, the education which is moſt likely to render him a man of ſolid learning and knowledge. The mediocrity of church benefices naturally tends to draw the greater part of men of letters, in the country where it takes place, to the employment in which they can be the moſt uſeful to the public, and, at the ſame time, to give them the beſt education, perhaps, they are capable of receiving. It tends to render their learning both as ſolid as poſſible, and as uſeful as poſſible.

THE revenue of every eſtabliſhed church, ſuch parts of it excepted as may ariſe from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be obſerved, of the general revenue of the ſtate, which is

is thus diverted to a purpoſe very different from the defence of the ſtate. The tythe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute ſo largely towards the defence of the ſtate as they otherwiſe might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to ſome, the ſole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigencies of the ſtate muſt be ultimately ſupplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the leſs, it is evident, can be ſpared to the ſtate. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being ſuppoſed equal, the richer the church, the poorer muſt neceſſarily be, either the ſovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all caſes, the leſs able muſt the ſtate be to defend itſelf. In ſeveral proteſtant countries, particularly in all the proteſtant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which antiently belonged to the Roman catholic church, the tythes and church lands, has been found a fund ſufficient not only to afford competent ſalaries to the eſtabliſhed clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expences of the ſtate. The magiſtrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated out of the ſavings from this fund a very large ſum, ſuppoſed to amount to ſeveral millions, part of which is depoſited in a public treaſure, and part is placed at intereſt in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in thoſe of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expence which the church, either of Berne, or of any other proteſtant canton, coſts the ſtate, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manſes or dwelling houſes, eſtimated according to a reaſonable valuation, amounted only to 68,514l. 1s. 5d. $\frac{1}{12}$. This very moderate revenue affords a decent ſubſiſtence to nine hundred and forty-four

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four miniſters. The whole expence of the church, including what is occaſionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the manſes of miniſters, cannot well be ſuppoſed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thouſand pounds a year. The moſt opulent church in Chriſtendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the ſpirit of order, regularity, and auſtere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an eſtabliſhed church can be ſuppoſed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the proteſtant churches of Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce thoſe effects in a ſtill higher degree. In the greater part of the proteſtant cantons, there is not a ſingle perſon to be found who does not profeſs himſelf to be of the eſtabliſhed church. If he profeſſes himſelf to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But ſo ſevere, or rather indeed ſo oppreſſive a law, could never have been executed in ſuch free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy before-hand converted to the eſtabliſhed church the whole body of the people, with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In ſome parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a proteſtant and roman catholic country, the converſion has not been ſo complete, both religions are not only tolerated, but eſtabliſhed by law.

THE proper performance of every ſervice ſeems to require that its pay or recompence ſhould be, as exactly as poſſible, proportioned to the nature of the ſervice. If any ſervice is very much under-paid, it is very apt to ſuffer by the meanneſs and incapacity of the greater part of thoſe who are employed in it. If it is very much over-paid, it is apt to ſuffer, perhaps, ſtill more by their negligence and idleneſs. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be

to his profeſſion, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to ſpend a great part of his time in feſtivity, in vanity, and in diſſipation. But in a clergyman this train of life not only conſumes the time which ought to be employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the common people deſtroys almoſt entirely that ſanctity of character which can alone enable him to perform thoſe duties with proper weight and authority.

PART IV.

Of the Expence of ſupporting the Dignity of the Sovereign.

OVER and above the expence neceſſary for enabling the ſovereign to perform his ſeveral duties, a certain expence is requiſite for the ſupport of his dignity. This expence varies both with the different periods of improvement, and with the different forms of government.

IN an opulent and improved ſociety, where all the different orders of people are growing every day more expenſive in their houſes, in their furniture, in their tables, in their dreſs, and in their equipage; it cannot well be expected that the ſovereign ſhould alone hold out againſt the faſhion. He naturally, therefore, or rather neceſſarily becomes more expenſive in all thoſe different articles too. His dignity even ſeems to require that he ſhould become ſo.

As in point of dignity, a monarch is more raiſed above his ſubjects than the chief magiſtrate of any republic is ever ſuppoſed to be above his fellow citizens; ſo a greater expence is neceſſary for ſupporting that higher dignity. We naturally expect more ſplendor in the court of a king than in the manſion-houſe of a doge or burgo-maſter.

Conclusion.

THE expence of defending the ſociety, and that of ſupporting the dignity of the chief magiſtrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole ſociety. It is reaſonable, therefore, that they ſhould be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole ſociety, all the different members contributing, as nearly as poſſible, in proportion to their reſpective abilities.

THE expence of the adminiſtration of juſtice too may, no doubt, be conſidered as laid out for the benefit of the whole ſociety. There is no impropriety, therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole ſociety. The perſons, however, who give occaſion to this expence are thoſe, who, by their injuſtice in one way or another, make it neceſſary to ſeek redreſs or protection from the courts of juſtice. The perſons again moſt immediately benefited by this expence, are thoſe whom the courts of juſtice either reſtore to their rights or maintain in their rights. The expence of the adminiſtration of juſtice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other or both of thoſe two different ſets of perſons according as different occaſions may require, that is, by the fees of court. It cannot be neceſſary to have recourſe to the general contribution of the whole ſociety, except for the conviction of thoſe criminals who have not themſelves any eſtate or fund ſufficient for paying thoſe fees.

THOSE local or provincial expences of which the benefit is local or provincial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or diſtrict) ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the ſociety. It is unjuſt that the whole ſociety ſhould contribute towards an expence of which the benefit is confined to a part of the ſociety.

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THE expence of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt, beneficial to the whole ſociety, and may, therefore, without any injuſtice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole ſociety. This expence, however, is moſt immediately and directly beneficial to thoſe who travel or carry goods from one place to another, and to thoſe who conſume ſuch goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon thoſe two different ſetts of people, and thereby diſcharge the general revenue of the ſociety from a very conſiderable burden.

THE expence of the inſtitutions for education and religious inſtruction, is likewiſe, no doubt, beneficial to the whole ſociety, and may, therefore, without injuſtice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole ſociety. This expence, however, might perhaps with equal propriety, and even with ſome advantage, be defrayed altogether by thoſe who receive the immediate benefit of ſuch education and inſtruction, or by the voluntary contribution of thoſe who think they have occaſion for either the one or the other.

WHEN the inſtitutions or public works which are beneficial to the whole ſociety, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained altogether by the contribution of ſuch particular members of the ſociety as are moſt immediately benefited by them, the deficiency muſt in moſt caſes be made up by the general contribution of the whole ſociety. The general revenue of the ſociety, over and above defraying the expence of defending the ſociety and of ſupporting the dignity of the chief magiſtrate, muſt make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of revenue. The ſources of this general or public revenue, I ſhall endeavour to explain in the following chapter.

CHAP. II.

Of the Sources of the general or publick Revenue of the Society.

THE revenue which muſt defray, not only the expence of defending the ſociety and of ſupporting the dignity of the chief magiſtrate, but all the other neceſſary expences of government, for which the conſtitution of the ſtate has not provided any particular revenue, may be drawn, either, firſt, from ſome fund which peculiarly belongs to the ſovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue of the people; or, ſecondly, from the revenue of the people.

PART I.

Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may peculiarly belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

THE funds or ſources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the ſovereign or commonwealth muſt conſiſt either in ſtock or in land.

THE ſovereign, like any other owner of ſtock, may derive a revenue from it, either by employing it himſelf, or by lending it. His revenue is in the one caſe, profit; in the other, intereſt.

THE revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief conſiſts in profit. It ariſes principally from the milk and increaſe of his own herds and flocks, of which he himſelf ſuper-intends the management, and is the principal ſhepherd or herdſman of his own horde or tribe. It is, however, in this earlieſt and rudeſt ſtate of civil government only

only that profit has ever made the principal part of the public revenue of a monarchical ſtate.

SMALL republics have ſometimes derived a conſiderable revenue from the profit of mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburgh is ſaid to do ſo from the profits of a public wine cellar and apothecaries ſhop *. The ſtate cannot be very great of which the ſovereign has leiſure to carry on the trade of a wine merchant or apothecary. The profit of a public bank has been a ſource of revenue to more conſiderable ſtates. It has been ſo not only to Hamburgh, but to Venice and Amſterdam. A revenue of this kind has even by ſome people been thought not below the attention of ſo great an empire as that of Great Britain. Reckoning the ordinary dividend of the bank of England at five and a half per cent. and its capital at ten millions ſeven hundred and eighty thouſand pounds, the neat annual profit, after paying the expence of management, muſt amount, it is ſaid, to five hundred and ninety-two thouſand nine hundred pounds. Government, it is pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent. intereſt, and by taking the management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear profit of two hundred and ſixty-nine thouſand five hundred pounds a year. The orderly, vigilant and parſimonious adminiſtration of ſuch ariſtocracies as thoſe of Venice and Amſterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind. But whether ſuch a government as that of England; which, whatever may be its virtues, has never

* See Memoires concernant les Droits & Impoſitions en Europe: tome 1. page 73. This work was compiled by the order of the court for the uſe of a commiſſion employed for ſome years paſt in conſidering the proper means for reforming the finances of France. The account of the French taxes, which takes up three volumes in quarto, may be regarded as perfectly authentic. That of thoſe of other European nations was compiled from ſuch informations as the French miniſters at the different courts could procure. It is much ſhorter, and probably not quite ſo exact as that of the French taxes.

been

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been famous for good œconomy, which in time of peace has generally conducted itſelf with the ſlothful and negligent profuſion that is perhaps natural to monarchies; and in time of war has conſtantly acted with all the thoughtleſs extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into; could be ſafely truſted with the management of ſuch a project muſt at leaſt be a good deal more doubtful.

The poſt office is properly a mercantile project. The government advances the expence of eſtabliſhing the different offices, and of buying or hiring the neceſſary horſes or carriages, and is repaid with a large profit by the duties upon what is carried. It is perhaps the only mercantile project which has been ſucceſsfully managed by, I believe, every ſort of government. The capital to be advanced is not very conſiderable. There is no myſtery in the buſineſs. The returns are not only certain, but immediate.

Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile projects, and have been willing, like private perſons, to mend their fortunes by becoming adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have ſcarce ever ſucceeded. The profuſion with which the affairs of princes are always managed, renders it almoſt impoſſible that they ſhould. The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their maſter as inexhauſtible; are careleſs at what price they buy; are careleſs at what price they ſell; are careleſs at what expence they tranſport his goods from one place to another. Thoſe agents frequently live with the profuſion of princes, and ſometimes too, in ſpite of that profuſion, and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes of princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the agents of Lorenzo of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his trade. The republic of Florence was ſeveral times obliged to pay the debt into which their extrava-

gance had involved him. He found it convenient, accordingly, to give up the buſineſs of merchant, the buſineſs to which his family had originally owed their fortune, and in the latter part of his life to employ both what remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the ſtate of which he had the diſpoſal, in projects and expences more ſuitable to his ſtation.

No two characters ſeem more inconſiſtent than thoſe of trader and ſovereign. If the trading ſpirit of the Engliſh Eaſt India company renders them very bad ſovereigns; the ſpirit of ſovereignty ſeems to have rendered them equally bad traders. While they were traders only, they managed their trade ſucceſsfully, and were able to pay from their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors of their ſtock. Since they became ſovereigns, with a revenue which, it is ſaid, was originally more than three millions ſterling, they have been obliged to beg the extraordinary aſſiſtance of government in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy. In their former ſituation, their ſervants in India conſidered themſelves as the clerks of merchants: In their preſent ſituation, thoſe ſervants conſider themſelves as the miniſters of ſovereigns.

A STATE may ſometimes derive ſome part of its public revenue from the intereſt of money, as well as from the profits of ſtock. If it has amaſſed a treaſure, it may lend a part of that treaſure, either to foreign ſtates, or to its own ſubjects.

THE canton of Berne derives a conſiderable revenue by lending a part of its treaſure to foreign ſtates, that is, by placing it in the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, chiefly in thoſe of France and England. The ſecurity of this revenue muſt depend, firſt, upon the ſecurity of the funds in which it is placed, or upon the good faith of the government which has the management of them; and, ſecondly, upon the certainty or probability,

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bability of the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the caſe of a war, the very firſt act of hoſtility, on the part of the debtor nation, might be the forfeiture of the funds of its creditor. This policy of lending money to foreign ſtates is, ſo far as I know, peculiar to the canton of Berne.

The city of Hamburgh * has eſtabliſhed a ſort of public pawn-ſhop, which lends money to the ſubjects of the ſtate upon pledges at ſix per cent. intereſt. This pawn-ſhop or Lombard, as it is called, affords a revenue, it is pretended, to the ſtate of a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns, which, at four and ſixpence the crown, amounts to 33,750 l. ſterling.

The government of Penſylvania, without amaſſing any treaſure, invented a method of lending, not money indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its ſubjects. By advancing to private people, at intereſt, and upon land ſecurity to double the value, paper bills of credit to be redeemed fifteen years after their date, and in the mean time made transferable from hand to hand like bank notes, and declared by act of aſſembly to be a legal tender in all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another, it raiſed a moderate revenue, which went a conſiderable way towards defraying an annual expence of about 4500 l. the whole ordinary expence of that frugal and orderly government. The ſucceſs of an expedient of this kind muſt have depended upon three different circumſtances; firſt, upon the demand for ſome other inſtrument of commerce, beſides gold and ſilver money, or upon the demand for ſuch a quantity of conſumable ſtock as could not be had without ſending abroad the greater part of their gold and ſilver money, in order to purchaſe it; ſecondly, upon the good credit of the government which made uſe of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon the moderation with

* See id. ibid.

which

which it was uſed, the whole value of the paper bills of credit never exceeding that of the gold and ſilver money which would have been neceſſary for carrying on their circulation had there been no paper bills of credit. The ſame expedient was upon different occaſions adopted by ſeveral other American colonies; but, from want of this moderation, it produced, in the greater part of them, much more diſorder than conveniency.

The unſtable and periſhable nature of ſtock and credit, however, render them unfit to be truſted to as the principal funds of that ſure, ſteady, and permanent revenue, which can alone give ſecurity and dignity to government. The government of no great nation, that was advanced beyond the ſhepherd ſtate, ſeems ever to have derived the greater part of its public revenue from ſuch ſources.

Land is a fund of a more ſtable and permanent nature; and the rent of public lands, accordingly, has been the principal ſource of the public revenue of many a great nation that was much advanced beyond the ſhepherd ſtate. From the produce or rent of the public lands, the antient republics of Greece and Italy derived for a long time the greater part of that revenue which defrayed the neceſſary expences of the commonwealth. The rent of the crown lands conſtituted for a long time the greater part of the revenue of the antient ſovereigns of Europe.

War and the preparation for war, are the two circumſtances which in modern times occaſion the greater part of the neceſſary expence of all great ſtates. But in the antient republics of Greece and Italy every citizen was a ſoldier, who both ſerved and prepared himſelf for ſervice at his own expence. Neither of thoſe two circumſtances, therefore, could occaſion any very conſiderable expence to the ſtate. The rent of a very moderate landed

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eſtate might be fully ſufficient for defraying all the other neceſſary expences of government.

In the antient monarchies of Europe, the manners and cuſtoms of the times ſufficiently prepared the great body of the people for war; and when they took the field they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be maintained either at their own expence, or at that of their immediate lords, without bringing any new charge upon the ſovereign. The other expences of government were, the greater part of them, very moderate. The adminiſtration of juſtice, it has been ſhown, inſtead of being a cauſe of expence, was a ſource of revenue. The labour of the country people for three days before and for three days after harveſt, was thought a fund ſufficient for making and maintaining all the bridges, highways, and other public works which the commerce of the country was ſuppoſed to require. In thoſe days the principal expence of the ſovereign ſeems to have conſiſted in the maintenance of his own family and houſhold. The officers of his houſhold, accordingly, were then the great officers of ſtate. The lord treaſurer received his rents. The lord ſteward and lord chamberlain looked after the expence of his family. The care of his ſtables was committed to the lord conſtable and the lord marſhal. His houſes were all built in the form of caſtles, and ſeem to have been the principal fortreſſes which he poſſeſſed. The keepers of thoſe houſes or caſtles might be conſidered as a ſort of military governors. They ſeem to have been the only military officers whom it was neceſſary to maintain in time of peace. In theſe circumſtances the rent of a great landed eſtate might, upon ordinary occaſions, very well defray all the neceſſary expences of government.

In the preſent ſtate of the greater part of the civilized monarchies of Europe, the rent of all the lands in the country, managed

managed as they probably would be if they all belonged to one proprietor, would ſcarce perhaps amount to the ordinary revenue which they levy upon the people even in peaceable times. The ordinary revenue of Great Britain, for example, including not only what is neceſſary for defraying the current expence of the year, but for paying the intereſt of the public debts, and for ſinking a part of the capital of thoſe debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a year. But the land-tax, at four ſhillings in the pound, falls ſhort of two millions a year. This land-tax, as it is called, however, is ſuppoſed to be one-fifth, not only of the rent of all the land, but of that of all the houſes, and of the intereſt of all the capital ſtock of Great Britain, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed as farming ſtock in the cultivation of land. A very conſiderable part of the produce of this tax ariſes from the rent of houſes, and the intereſt of capital ſtock. The land-tax of the city of London, for example, at four ſhillings in the pound, amounts to 123,399 l. 6 s. 7 d. That of the city of Weſtminſter, to 63,092 l. 1 s. 5 d. That of the palaces of Whitehall and St. James's, to 30,754 l. 6 s. 3 d. A certain proportion of the land-tax is in the ſame manner aſſeſſed upon all the other cities and towns corporate in the kingdom, and ariſes almoſt altogether either from the rent of houſes or from what is ſuppoſed to be the intereſt of trading and capital ſtock. According to the eſtimation, therefore, by which Great Britain is rated to the land-tax, the whole maſs of revenue ariſing from the rent of all the lands, from that of all the houſes, and from the intereſt of all the capital ſtock, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public or employed in the cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions ſterling a year, the ordinary revenue which government levies upon the people even in peaceable times. The eſtimation by which Great Britain is rated to the land-tax is, no doubt, taking the whole kingdom at an average, very much below the real value; though in ſeveral par-

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ticular counties and diſtricts it is ſaid to be nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands alone, excluſive of that of houſes, and of the intereſt of ſtock, has by many people been eſtimated at twenty millions, an eſtimation made in a great meaſure at random, and which, I apprehend, is as likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands of Great Britain, in the preſent ſtate of their cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than twenty millions a year, they could not well afford the half, moſt probably not the fourth part of that rent, if they all belonged to a ſingle proprietor, and were put under the negligent, expenſive, and oppreſſive management of his factors and agents. The crown lands of Great Britain do not at preſent afford the fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn from them if they were the property of private perſons. If the crown lands were more extenſive, it is probable they would be ſtill worſe managed.

THE revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is in proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual produce of the land of every country, if we except what is reſerved for ſeed, is either annually conſumed by the great body of the people, or exchanged for ſomething elſe that is conſumed by them. Whatever keeps down the produce of the land below what it would otherwiſe riſe to, keeps down the revenue of the great body of the people ſtill more than it does that of the proprietors of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which belongs to the proprietors, is ſcarce any where in Great Britain ſuppoſed to be more than a third part of the whole produce. If the land, which in one ſtate of cultivation affords a rent of ten millions ſterling a year, would in another afford a rent of twenty millions; the rent being, in both caſes, ſuppoſed a third part of the produce; the revenue of the proprietors would be leſs than it otherwiſe might be by ten millions a year only; but the revenue of the great body of the people

ple would be leſs than it otherwiſe might be by thirty millions a year, deducting only what would be neceſſary for ſeed. The population of the country would be leſs by the number of people which thirty millions a year, deducting always the ſeed, could maintain, according to the particular mode of living and expence which might take place in the different ranks of men among whom the remainder was diſtributed.

THOUGH there is not at preſent, in Europe, any civilized ſtate of any kind which derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands which are the property of the ſtate; yet, in all the great monarchies of Europe, there are ſtill many large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They are generally foreſt; and ſometimes foreſt where, after travelling ſeveral miles, you will ſcarce find a ſingle tree; a mere waſte and loſs of country in reſpect both of produce and population. In every great monarchy of Europe the ſale of the crown lands would produce a very large ſum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which thoſe lands have ever afforded to the crown. In countries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, and yielding at the time of ſale as great a rent as can eaſily be got from them, commonly ſell at thirty years purchaſe; the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands might well be expected to ſell at forty, fifty, or ſixty years purchaſe. The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from mortgage. In the courſe of a few years it would probably enjoy another revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the courſe of a few years, become well-improved and well-cultivated. The increaſe of their produce would increaſe the population of the country, by augmenting the revenue and conſumption of the people. But the revenue which the crown derives

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derives from the duties of cuſtoms and exciſe, would neceſſarily increaſe with the revenue and conſumption of the people.

THE revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown derives from the crown lands, though it appears to coſt nothing to individuals, in reality coſts more to the ſociety than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys. It would, in all caſes, be for the intereſt of the ſociety to replace this revenue to the crown by ſome other equal revenue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could not well be done better, perhaps, than by expoſing them to public ſale.

LANDS, for the purpoſes of pleaſure and magnificence, parks, gardens, public walks, &c. poſſeſſions which are every where conſidered as cauſes of expence, not as ſources of revenue, ſeem to be the only lands which, in a great and civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.

PUBLIC ſtock and public lands, therefore, the two ſources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the ſovereign or common-wealth, being both improper and inſufficient funds for defraying the neceſſary expence of any great and civilized ſtate; it remains that this expence muſt, the greater part of it, be defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing a part of their own private revenue in order to make up a public revenue to the ſovereign or common-wealth.

PART II.

Of Taxes.

THE private revenue of individuals, it has been ſhewn in the firſt book of this inquiry, ariſes ultimately from three different ſources; Rent, Profit, and Wages. Every tax muſt finally be paid from

from ſome one or other of thoſe three different ſorts of revenue, or from all of them indifferently. I ſhall endeavour to give the beſt account I can, firſt, of thoſe taxes which, it is intended, ſhould fall upon rent; ſecondly, of thoſe which, it is intended, ſhould fall upon profit; thirdly, of thoſe which, it is intended, ſhould fall upon wages; and, fourthly, of thoſe which, it is intended, ſhould fall indifferently upon all thoſe three different ſources of private revenue. The particular conſideration of each of theſe four different ſorts of taxes will divide the ſecond part of the preſent chapter into four articles, three of which will require ſeveral other ſubdiviſions. Many of thoſe taxes, it will appear from the following review, are not finally paid from the fund or ſource of revenue upon which it was intended they ſhould fall.

Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is neceſſary to premiſe the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

I. The ſubjects of every ſtate ought to contribute towards the ſupport of the government, as nearly as poſſible, in proportion to their reſpective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they reſpectively enjoy under the protection of the ſtate. The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the joint tenants of a great eſtate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their reſpective intereſts in the eſtate. In the obſervation or neglect of this maxim conſiſts what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it muſt be obſerved once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three ſorts of revenue above-mentioned is neceſſarily unequal, in ſo far as it does not affect the other two. In the following examination of different taxes I ſhall ſeldom take much further notice of this ſort of inequality, but ſhall, in

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in moſt caſes, confine my obſervations to that inequality which is occaſioned by a particular tax falling unequally even upon that particular ſort of private revenue which is affected by it.

II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other perſon. Where it is otherwiſe, every perſon ſubject to the tax is put more or leſs in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of ſuch aggravation, ſome preſent or perquiſite to himſelf. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the inſolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither inſolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of ſo great importance, that a very conſiderable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near ſo great an evil as a very ſmall degree of uncertainty.

III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in which it is moſt likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houſes, payable at the ſame term at which ſuch rents are uſually paid, is levied at the time when it is moſt likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is moſt likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon ſuch conſumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the conſumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occaſion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too either to buy or not to buy as he pleaſes, it muſt be his own fault if he ever ſuffers any conſiderable inconveniency from ſuch taxes.

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IV. EVERY tax ought to be ſo contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as poſſible, over and above what it brings into the public treaſury of the ſtate. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treaſury, in the four following ways. Firſt, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whoſe ſalaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whoſe perquiſites may impoſe another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obſtruct the induſtry of the people, and diſcourage them from applying to certain branches of buſineſs which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminiſh, or perhaps deſtroy ſome of the funds, which might enable them more eaſily to do ſo. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which thoſe unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unſucceſsfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to ſmuggling. But the penalties of ſmuggling muſt riſe in proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of juſtice, firſt creates the temptation, and then puniſhes thoſe who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the puniſhment too in proportion to the very circumſtance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime*. Fourthly, by ſubjecting the people to the frequent viſits, and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expoſe them to much unneceſſary trouble, vexation, and oppreſſion; and though vexation is not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himſelf from it. It is in ſome one or other of theſe four different ways that taxes are frequently ſo much more burdenſome to the people than they are beneficial to the ſovereign.

* See Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man, page 474. & ſeq.

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THE evident juſtice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them more or leſs to the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavoured, to the beſt of their judgement, to render their taxes as equal, as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both in the time and in the mode of payment, and, in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the prince, as little burdenſome to the people as they could contrive. The following ſhort review of ſome of the principal taxes which have taken place in different ages and countries will ſhow that the endeavours of all nations have not in this reſpect been equally ſucceſsful.

ARTICLE I.

Taxes upon Rent. Taxes upon the Rent of Land.

A TAX upon the rent of land may either be impoſed according to a certain canon, every diſtrict being valued at a certain rent, which valuation is not afterwards to be altered; or it may be impoſed in ſuch a manner as to vary with every variation in the real rent of the land, and to riſe or fall with the improvement or declenſion of its cultivation.

A LAND tax which, like that of Great Britain, is impoſed according to a certain invariable canon, though it ſhould be equal at the time of its firſt eſtabliſhment, neceſſarily becomes unequal in proceſs of time according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different parts of the country. In England, the valuation according to which the different counties and pariſhes were aſſeſſed to the land-tax by the 4th of William and Mary was very unequal even at its firſt eſtabliſhment. This tax, therefore, ſo far offends againſt the firſt of the four maxims above-mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the ſame as that for the rent, is as

convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord is in all cases the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. This tax is levied by a much smaller number of officers than any other which affords nearly the same revenue. As the tax does not rise with the rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in the profits of the landlord's improvements. The tax, therefore, does not discourage those improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to. As it has no tendency to diminish the quantity, it can have none to raise the price of that produce. It does not obstruct the industry of the people. It subjects the landlord to no other inconveniency besides the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

The advantage, however, which the landlord has derived from the invariable constancy of the valuation by which all the lands of Great Britain are rated to the land-tax, has been principally owing to some circumstances altogether extraneous to the nature of the tax.

It has been owing in part to the great prosperity of almost every part of the country, the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since the time when this valuation was first established, been continually rising, and scarce any of them having fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost all gained the difference between the tax which they would have paid, according to the present rent of their estates, and that which they actually pay according to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the country been different, had rents been gradually falling in consequence of the declension of cultivation, the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In the state of things which has happened to take place since the revolution, the constancy of the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and hurtful to the sovereign. In a different state of things

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it might have been advantageous to the ſovereign and hurtful to the landlord.

As the tax is made payable in money, ſo the valuation of the land is expreſſed in money. Since the eſtabliſhment of this valuation the value of ſilver has been pretty uniform, and there has been no alteration in the ſtandard of the coin either as to weight or fineneſs. Had ſilver riſen conſiderably in its value, as it ſeems to have done in the courſe of the two centuries which preceeded the diſcovery of the mines of America, the conſtancy of the valuation might have proved very oppreſſive to the landlord. Had ſilver fallen conſiderably in its value, as it certainly did for about a century at leaſt after the diſcovery of thoſe mines, the ſame conſtancy of valuation would have reduced very much this branch of the revenue of the ſovereign. Had any conſiderable alteration been made in the ſtandard of the money, either by ſinking the ſame quantity of ſilver to a lower denomination, or by raiſing it to a higher; had an ounce of ſilver, for example, inſtead of being coined into five ſhillings and twopence, been coined either into pieces which bore ſo low a denomination as two ſhillings and ſeven-pence, or into pieces which bore ſo high a one as ten ſhillings and fourpence, it would in the one caſe have hurt the revenue of the proprietor, in the other that of the ſovereign.

In circumſtances, therefore, ſomewhat different from thoſe which have actually taken place, this conſtancy of valuation might have been a very great inconveniency, either to the contributors, or to the commonwealth. In the courſe of ages ſuch circumſtances, however, muſt, at ſome time or other, happen. But though empires, like all the other works of men, have all hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire aims at immortality. Every conſtitution, therefore, which it is meant ſhould be as permanent as the empire itſelf, ought to be convenient, not in certain circumſtances only, but

but in all circumſtances; or ought to be ſuited, not to thoſe circumſtances which are tranſitory, occaſional, or accidental, but to thoſe which are neceſſary and therefore always the ſame.

A TAX upon the rent of land which varies with every variation of the rent, or which riſes and falls according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation, is recommended by that ſect of men of letters in France, who call themſelves, the oeconomiſts, as the moſt equitable of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend, fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and ought therefore to be impoſed equally upon the fund which muſt finally pay them. That all taxes ought to fall as equally as poſſible upon the fund which muſt finally pay them, is certainly true. But without entering into the diſagreeable diſcuſſion of the metaphyſical arguments by which they ſupport their very ingenious theory, it will ſufficiently appear from the following review, what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land, and what are thoſe which fall finally upon ſome other fund.

IN the Venetian territory all the arable lands which are given in leaſe to farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent *. The leaſes are recorded in a public regiſter which is kept by the officers of revenue in each province or diſtrict. When the proprietor cultivates his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable eſtimation and he is allowed a deduction of one-fifth of the tax, ſo that for ſuch lands he pays only eight inſtead of ten per cent. of the ſuppoſed rent.

A LAND-TAX of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of England. It might not perhaps be altogether ſo certain, and the aſſeſſment of the tax might frequently occaſion a

* Memoires concernant les Droits. p. 240, 241.

good

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good deal more trouble to the landlord. It might too be a good deal more expenſive in the levying.

Such a ſyſtem of adminiſtration, however, might perhaps be contrived as would in a great meaſure both prevent this uncertainty and moderate this expence.

The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record their leaſe in a public regiſter. Proper penalties might be enacted againſt concealing or miſrepreſenting any of the conditions; and if part of thoſe penalties was to be paid to either of the two parties who informed againſt and convicted the other of ſuch concealment or miſrepreſentation, it would effectually deter them from combining together in order to defraud the public revenue. All the conditions of the leaſe might be ſufficiently known from ſuch a record.

Some landlords, inſtead of raiſing the rent, take a fine for the renewal of the leaſe. This practice is in moſt caſes the expedient of a ſpendthrift, who for a ſum of ready money ſells a future revenue of much greater value. It is in moſt caſes, therefore, hurtful to the landlord. It is frequently hurtful to the tenant, and it is always hurtful to the community. It frequently takes from the tenant ſo great a part of his capital, and thereby diminiſhes ſo much his ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more difficult to pay a ſmall rent than it would otherwiſe have been to pay a great one. Whatever diminiſhes his ability to cultivate, neceſſarily keeps down below what it would otherwiſe have been the moſt important part of the revenue of the community. By rendering the tax upon ſuch fines a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary rent, this hurtful practice might be diſcouraged to the no ſmall advantage of

of all the different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the tenant, of the ſovereign, and of the whole community. CHAP. II.

Some leaſes preſcribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation, and a certain ſucceſſion of crops during the whole continuance of the leaſe. This condition (which is generally the effect of the landlords conceit of his own ſuperior knowledge, a conceit in moſt caſes very ill founded) ought always to be conſidered as an additional rent; as a rent in ſervice inſtead of a rent in money. In order to diſcourage the practice, which is generally a fooliſh one, this ſpecies of rent might be valued rather high, and conſequently taxed ſomewhat higher than common money rents.

Some landlords, inſtead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in corn, cattle, poultry, wine, oil, &c. others again require a rent in ſervice. Such rents are always more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord. They either take more or keep more out of the pocket of the former than they put into that of the latter. In every country where they take place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according to the degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the ſame manner, ſuch rents rather high, and conſequently taxing them ſomewhat higher than common money-rents, a practice which is hurtful to the whole community might perhaps be ſufficiently diſcouraged.

When the landlord choſe to occupy himſelf a part of his own lands, the rent might be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him in the ſame manner as in the Venetian territory; provided the rent of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain ſum. It is of importance that the landlord ſhould be encouraged to cultivate a part of his

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his own land. His capital is generally greater than that of the tenant, and with leſs ſkill he can frequently raiſe a greater produce. The landlord can afford to try experiments, and is generally diſpoſed to do ſo. His unſucceſsful experiments occaſion only a moderate loſs to himſelf. His ſucceſsful ones contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the whole country. It might be of importance however, that the abatement of the tax ſhould encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the landlords ſhould the greater part of them be tempted to farm the whole of their own lands, the country, (inſtead of ſober and induſtrious tenants, who are bound by their own intereſt to cultivate as well as their capital and ſkill will allow them) would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whoſe abuſive management would ſoon degrade the cultivation and reduce the annual produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the revenue of their maſters, but of the moſt important part of that of the whole ſociety.

Such a ſyſtem of adminiſtration might perhaps free a tax of this kind from any degree of uncertainty which could occaſion either oppreſſion or inconveniency to the contributor; and might at the ſame time ſerve to introduce into the common management of land, ſuch a plan or policy as might contribute a good deal to the general improvement and good cultivation of the country.

The expence of levying a land-tax, which varied with every variation of the rent, would no doubt be ſomewhat greater than that of levying one which was always rated according to a fixed valuation. Some additional expence would neceſſarily be incurred both by the different regiſter offices which it would be proper to eſtabliſh in the different diſtricts of the country, and by the different valuations which might occaſionally be made of

the lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The expence of all this, however, might be very moderate, and much below what is incurred in the levying of many other taxes which afford a very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be drawn from a tax of this kind.

The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to the improvement of land seems to be the most important objection which can be made to it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve when the sovereign, who contributed nothing to the expence, was to share in the profit of the improvement. Even this objection might perhaps be obviated by allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the actual value of his lands according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of landlords and farmers in the neighbourhood equally chosen by both parties; and by rating him according to this valuation for such a number of years, as might be fully sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of the sovereign towards the improvement of the land, from a regard to the increase of his own revenue, is one of the principal advantages proposed by this species of land-tax. The term, therefore, allowed for the indemnification of the landlord ought not to be a great deal longer than what was necessary for that purpose; lest the remoteness of the interest should discourage too much this attention. It had better, however, be somewhat too long than in any respect too short. No encitement to the attention of the sovereign can ever counter-balance the smallest discouragement to that of the landlord. The attention of the sovereign can be at best but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is likely to be the most advan-

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tageous application of every inch of ground upon his eſtate. The principal attention of the ſovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer; by allowing both to purſue their own intereſt in their own way, and according to their own judgement; by giving to both the moſt perfect ſecurity that they ſhall enjoy the full recompence of their own induſtry; and by procuring to both the moſt extenſive market for every part of their produce in conſequence of eſtabliſhing the eaſieſt and ſafeſt communications both by land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as the moſt unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.

If by ſuch a ſyſtem of adminiſtration a tax of this kind could be ſo managed as to give, not only no diſcouragement, but, on the contrary, ſome encouragement to the improvement of land, it does not appear likely to occaſion any other inconveniency to the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax.

In all the variations of the ſtate of the ſociety, in the improvement and in the declenſion of agriculture; in all the variations in the value of ſilver, and in all thoſe in the ſtandard of the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord and without any attention of government, readily ſuit itſelf to the actual ſituation of things, and would be equally juſt and equitable in all thoſe different changes. It would, therefore, be much more proper to be eſtabliſhed as a perpetual and unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of the common-wealth, than any tax which was always to be levied according to a certain valuation.

Some ſtates, inſtead of the ſimple and obvious expedient of a regiſter of leaſes, have had recourſe to the laborious and expenſive

one of an actual survey and valuation of all the lands in the country. They have suspected, probably, that the lessor and lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue, might combine to conceal the real terms of the lease. Doomsday book seems to have been the result of a very accurate survey of this kind.

In the antient dominions of the king of Prussia the land-tax is assessed according to an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered from time to time *. According to that valuation the lay proprietors pay from twenty to twenty-five per cent. of their revenue. Ecclesiastics from forty to forty-five per cent. The survey and valuation of Silesia was made by order of the present king; it is said with great accuracy. According to that valuation the lands belonging to the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five per cent. of their rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions, at fifty per cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order and of that of Malta, at forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-third per cent. Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.

The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of more than a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748, by the orders of the present empress queen †. The survey of the dutchy of Milan, which was begun in the time of Charles VI. was not perfected till after 1760. It is esteemed one of the most accurate that has ever been made. The survey of Savoy and Piemont was executed under the orders of the late king of Sardinia ‡.

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tome i. p. 114, 115, 116, &c.

† Id. p. 83, 84. ‡ Id. p. 280, &c. also p. 285, &c. to 316.

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In the dominions of the king of Pruſſia the revenue of the church is taxed much higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is, the greater part of it, a burden upon the rent of land. It ſeldom happens that any part of it is applied towards the improvement of land; or is ſo employed as to contribute in any reſpect towards increaſing the revenue of the great body of the people. His Pruſſian majeſty had probably, upon that account, thought it reaſonable that it ſhould contribute a good deal more towards relieving the exigencies of the ſtate. In ſome countries the lands of the church are exempted from all taxes. In others they are taxed more lightly than other lands. In the dutchy of Milan, the lands which the church poſſeſſed before 1575, are rated to the tax at a third only of their value.

In Sileſia lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent. higher than thoſe held by a baſe tenure. The honours and privileges of different kinds annexed to the former, his Pruſſian majeſty had probably imagined, would ſufficiently compenſate to the proprietor a ſmall aggravation of the tax; while at the ſame time the humiliating inferiority of the latter would be in ſome meaſure alleviated by being taxed ſomewhat more lightly. In other countries the ſyſtem of taxation, inſtead of alleviating, aggravates this inequality. In the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and in thoſe provinces of France which are ſubject to what is called the Real or predial taille, the tax falls altogether upon the lands held by a baſe tenure. Thoſe held by a noble one are exempted.

A LAND-TAX aſſeſſed according to a general ſurvey and valuation, how equal ſoever it may be at firſt, muſt, in the courſe of a very moderate period of time, become unequal. To prevent its becoming ſo would require the continual and painful attention of government to all the variations in the ſtate and produce of

every different farm in the country. The governments of Pruſſia, of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the dutchy of Milan, actually exert an attention of this kind; an attention ſo unſuitable to the nature of government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is continued, will probably in the long-run occaſion much more trouble and vexation than it can poſſibly bring relief to the contributors.

In 1666, the generality of Montauban was aſſeſſed to the Real or predial taille according, it is ſaid, to a very exact ſurvey and valuation *. By 1727, this aſſeſſment had become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency, government has found no better expedient than to impoſe upon the whole generality an additional tax of a hundred and twenty thouſand livres. This additional tax is rated upon all the different diſtricts ſubject to the taille according to the old aſſeſſment. But it is levied only upon thoſe which in the actual-ſtate of things are by that aſſeſſment under-taxed, and it is applied to the relief of thoſe which by the ſame aſſeſſment are over-taxed. Two diſtricts, for example, one of which ought in the actual ſtate of things to be taxed at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are by the old aſſeſſment both taxed at a thouſand livres. Both theſe diſtricts are by the additional tax rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only upon the diſtrict undercharged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of that over-charged, which conſequently pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loſes by the additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities ariſing from the old aſſeſſment. The application is pretty much regulated according to the diſcretion of the intendant of the generality, and muſt, therefore, be in a great meaſure arbitrary.

* Id. tome ii. p. 139, &c.

Taxes which are proportioned, not to the Rent, but to the produce of Land.

TAXES upon the produce of land are in reality taxes upon the rent; and though they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord. When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the farmer computes, as well as he can, what the value of this portion is, one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute beforehand what the church-tythe, which is a land-tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to.

THE tythe, and every other land-tax of this kind, under the appearance of perfect equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce being, in different ſituations, equivalent to a very different portion of the rent. In ſome very rich lands the produce is ſo great, that the one half of it is fully ſufficient to replace to the farmer his capital employed in cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming ſtock in the neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the ſame thing, the value of the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no tythe. But if a tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tythe, he muſt require an abatement of the fifth part of this rent, otherwiſe he cannot get back his capital with the ordinary profit. In this caſe the rent of the landlord, inſtead of amounting to a half, or five-tenths of the whole produce, will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, on the contrary, the produce is ſometimes ſo ſmall, and the expence of cultivation ſo great, that it requires four-fifths of the whole produce to replace to the farmer his capital with the ordinary profit. In this caſe,

eaſe, though there was no tythe, the rent of the landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or two-tenths of the whole produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce in the way of tythe, he muſt require an equal abatement of the rent of the landlord, which will thus be reduced to one-tenth only of the whole produce. Upon the rent of rich lands, the tythe may ſometimes be a tax of no more than one-fifth part, or four ſhillings in the pound; whereas, upon that of poorer lands, it may ſometimes be a tax of one-half, or of ten ſhillings in the pound.

The tythe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, ſo it is always a great diſcouragement both to the improvements of the landlord and to the cultivation of the farmer. The one cannot venture to make the moſt important, which are generally the moſt expenſive improvements; nor the other to raiſe the moſt valuable, which are generally too the moſt expenſive crops; when the church, which lays out no part of the expence, is to ſhare ſo very largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was for a long time confined by the tythe to the United Provinces, which, being preſbyterian countries, and upon that account exempted from this deſtructive tax, enjoyed a ſort of monopoly of that uſeful dying drug againſt the reſt of Europe. The late attempts to introduce the culture of this plant into England, have been made only in conſequence of the ſtatute which enacted that five ſhillings an acre ſhould be received in lieu of all manner of tythe upon madder.

As through the greater part of Europe, the church, ſo in many different countries of Aſia the ſtate, is principally ſupported by a land-tax, proportioned, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. In China, the principal revenue of the ſovereign conſiſts in a tenth part of the produce of all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is eſtimated ſo very moderately, that, in many provinces,

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vinces, it is ſaid not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce. The land-tax or land rent which uſed to be paid to the Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the hands of the Engliſh Eaſt India company, is ſaid to have amounted to about a fifth part of the produce. The land-tax of antient Egypt is ſaid likewiſe to have amounted to a fifth part.

In Aſia, this ſort of land-tax is ſaid to intereſt the ſovereign in the improvement and cultivation of land. The ſovereigns of China, thoſe of Bengal while under the Mahometan government, and thoſe of antient Egypt, are ſaid accordingly to have been extremely attentive to the making and maintaining of good roads and navigable canals, in order to increaſe, as much as poſſible, both the quantity and value of every part of the produce of the land, by procuring to every part of it the moſt extenſive market which their own dominions could afford. The tythe of the church is divided into ſuch ſmall portions, that no one of its proprietors can have any intereſt of this kind. The parſon of a pariſh could never find his account in making a road or canal to a diſtant part of the country, in order to extend the market for the produce of his own particular pariſh. Such taxes, when deſtined for the maintenance of the ſtate, have ſome advantages which may ſerve in ſome meaſure to balance their inconveniency. When deſtined for the maintenance of the church, they are attended with nothing but inconveniency.

Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied, either in kind; or, according to a certain valuation, in money.

The parſon of a pariſh, or a gentleman of ſmall fortune who lives upon his eſtate, may ſometimes, perhaps, find ſome advantage in receiving, the one his tythe, and the other his rent, in kind.

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The quantity to be collected, and the district within which it is to be collected, are so small, that they both can oversee, with their own eyes, the collection and disposal of every part of what is due to them. A gentleman of great fortune, who lived in the capital, would be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, and more by the fraud of his factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant province were to be paid to him in this manner. The loss of the sovereign, from the abuse and depredation of his tax-gatherers, would necessarily be much greater. The servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps, more under the eye of their master than those of the most careful prince; and a public revenue, which was paid in kind, would suffer so much from the mismanagement of the collectors, that a very small part of what was levied upon the people would ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. Some part of the public revenue of China, however, is said to be paid in this manner. The Mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money.

A Tax upon the produce of land which is levied in money, may be levied either according to a valuation which varies with all the variations of the market price; or according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for example, being always valued at one and the same money price, whatever may be the state of the market. The produce of a tax levied in the former way, will vary only according to the variations in the real produce of the land, according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation. The produce of a tax levied in the latter way will vary, not only according to the variations in the produce of the land, but according to both those in the value of the precious metals, and those in the quantity of those metals which is at different times contained in

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coin of the ſame denomination. The produce of the former will always bear the ſame proportion to the value of the real produce of the land. The produce of the latter may, at different times, bear very different proportions to that value.

When, inſtead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the price of a certain portion, a certain ſum of money is to be paid in full compenſation for all tax or tythe; the tax becomes, in this caſe, exactly of the ſame nature with the land-tax of England. It neither riſes nor falls with the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor diſcourages improvement. The tythe in the greater part of thoſe pariſhes which pay what is called a Modus in lieu of all other tythe, is a tax of this kind. During the Mahometan government of Bengal, inſtead of the payment in kind of a fifth part of the produce, a modus, and, it is ſaid, a very moderate one, was eſtabliſhed in the greater part of the diſtricts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the ſervants of the Eaſt India company, under pretence of reſtoring the public revenue to its proper value, have, in ſome provinces, exchanged this modus for a payment in kind. Under their management this change is likely both to diſcourage cultivation, and to give new opportunities for abuſe in the collection of the public revenue, which has fallen very much below what it was ſaid to have been when it firſt fell under the management of the company. The ſervants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by this change, but at the expence, it is probable, both of their maſters and of the country.

Taxes upon the Rent of Houſes.

THE rent of a houſe may be diſtinguiſhed into two parts, of which the one may very properly be called the Building rent; the other is commonly called the Ground rent.

THE building rent is the intereſt or profit of the capital expended in building the houſe. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other trades, it is neceſſary that this rent ſhould be ſufficient, firſt, to pay him the ſame intereſt which he would have got for his capital if he had lent it upon good ſecurity; and, ſecondly, to keep the houſe in conſtant repair, or, what comes to the ſame thing, to replace, within a certain term of years, the capital which had been employed in building it. The building rent, or the ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, every where regulated by the ordinary intereſt of money. Where the market rate of intereſt is four per cent. the rent of a houſe which, over and above paying the ground rent, affords ſix, or ſix and a half per cent. upon the whole expence of building, may perhaps afford a ſufficient profit to the builder. Where the market rate of intereſt is five per cent. it may perhaps require ſeven or ſeven and a half per cent. If, in proportion to the intereſt of money, the trade of the builder affords at any time a much greater profit than this, it will ſoon draw ſo much capital from other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it affords at any time much leſs than this, other trades will ſoon draw ſo much capital from it as will again raiſe that profit.

WHATEVER part of the whole rent of a houſe is over and above what is ſufficient for affording this reaſonable profit, naturally goes to the ground-rent; and where the owner of the ground and the owner of the building are two different perſons, is, in moſt caſes, completely paid to the former. This ſurplus rent is the price which the inhabitant of the houſe pays for ſome real or ſuppoſed advantage of the ſituation. In country houſes, at a diſtance from any great town, where there is plenty of ground to chuſe upon, the ground rent is ſcarce any thing, or no more than what the ground which the houſe ſtands upon would pay if employed in

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agriculture. In country villas in the neighbourhood of ſome great town, it is ſometimes a good deal higher; and the peculiar conveniency or beauty of ſituation is there frequently very well paid for. Ground rents are generally higheſt in the capital, and in thoſe particular parts of it where there happens to be the greateſt demand for houſes, whatever be the reaſon of that demand, whether for trade and buſineſs, for pleaſure and ſociety, or for mere vanity and faſhion.

A TAX upon houſe-rent, payable by the tenant and proportioned to the whole rent of each houſe, could not, for any conſiderable time at leaſt, affect the building rent. If the builder did not get his reaſonable profit, he would be obliged to quit the trade; which, by raiſing the demand for building, would in a ſhort time bring back his profit to its proper level with that of other trades. Neither would ſuch a tax fall altogether upon the ground rent; but it would divide itſelf in ſuch a manner as to fall, partly upon the inhabitant of the houſe, and partly upon the owner of the ground.

LET us ſuppoſe, for example, that a particular perſon judges that he can afford for houſe-rent an expence of ſixty pounds a year; and let us ſuppoſe too that a tax of four ſhillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the inhabitant, is laid upon houſe-rent. A houſe of ſixty pounds rent will in this caſe coſt him ſeventy-two pounds a year, which is twelve pounds more than he thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, content himſelf with a worſe houſe, or a houſe of fifty pounds rent, which, with the additional ten pounds that he muſt pay for the tax, will make up the ſum of ſixty pounds a year, the expence which he judges he can afford; and in order to pay the tax he will give up a part of the additional conveniency which he might have had from a houſe of ten pounds a year more rent. He will give up, I ſay, a part of this

this additional conveniency; for he will ſeldom be obliged to give up the whole, but will, in conſequence of the tax, get a better houſe for fifty pounds a year, than he could have got if there had been no tax. For as a tax of this kind, by taking away this particular competitor, muſt diminiſh the competition for houſes of ſixty pounds rent, ſo it muſt likewiſe diminiſh it for thoſe of fifty pounds rent, and in the ſame manner for thoſe of all other rents, except the loweſt rent, for which it would for ſome time increaſe the competition. But the rents of every claſs of houſes for which the competition was diminiſhed, would neceſſarily be more or leſs reduced. As no part of this reduction, however, could, for any conſiderable time at leaſt, affect the building rent; the whole of it muſt in the long-run neceſſarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final payment of this tax, therefore, would fall, partly upon the inhabitant of the houſe, who, in order to pay his ſhare, would be obliged to give up a part of his conveniency; and partly upon the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay his ſhare, would be obliged to give up a part of his revenue. In what proportion this final payment would be divided between them, it is not perhaps very eaſy to aſcertain. The diviſion would probably be very different in different circumſtances, and a tax of this kind might, according to thoſe different circumſtances, affect very unequally both the inhabitant of the houſe and the owner of the ground.

The inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners of different ground rents, would ariſe altogether from the accidental inequality of this diviſion. But the inequality with which it might fall upon the inhabitants of different houſes would ariſe, not only from this, but from another cauſe. The proportion of the expence of houſe-rent to the whole expence of living, is different in the different degrees of fortune. It is perhaps higheſt in the higheſt degree, and it diminiſhes gradually through the infe-

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rior degrees, ſo as in general to be loweſt in the loweſt degree. The neceſſaries of life occaſion the great expence of the poor. They find it difficult to get food, and the greater part of their little revenue is ſpent in getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life occaſion the principal expence of the rich; and a magnificent houſe embelliſhes and ſets off to the beſt advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they poſſeſs. A tax upon houſe-rents, therefore, would in general fall heavieſt upon the rich; and in this ſort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreaſonable. It is not very unreaſonable that the rich ſhould contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but ſomething more than in that proportion.

The rent of houſes, though it in ſome reſpects reſembles the rent of land, is in one reſpect eſſentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the uſe of a productive ſubject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of houſes is paid for the uſe of an unproductive ſubject. Neither the houſe nor the ground which it ſtands upon produce any thing. The perſon who pays the rent, therefore, muſt draw it from ſome other ſource of revenue, diſtinct from, and independent of, this ſubject. A tax upon the rent of houſes, ſo far as it falls upon the inhabitants, muſt be drawn from the ſame ſource as the rent itſelf, and muſt be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the wages of labour, the profits of ſtock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls upon the inhabitants, it is one of thoſe taxes which fall, not upon one only, but indifferently upon all the three different ſources of revenue; and is in every reſpect of the ſame nature as a tax upon any other ſort of conſumable commodities. In general there is not, perhaps, any one article of expence or conſumption by which the liberality or narrowneſs of a man's whole expence can be better judged of, than by his houſe-rent. A proportional tax upon this

this particular article of expence might, perhaps, produce a more considerable revenue than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any part of Europe. If the tax indeed was very high, the greater part of people would endeavour to evade it as much as they could, by contenting themſelves with ſmaller houſes, and by turning the greater part of their expence into ſome other channel.

THE rent of houſes might eaſily be aſcertained with ſufficient accuracy, by a policy of the ſame kind with that which would be neceſſary for aſcertaining the ordinary rent of land. Houſes not inhabited ought to pay no tax. A tax upon them would fall altogether upon the proprietor, who would thus be taxed for a ſubject which afforded him neither conveniency nor revenue. Houſes inhabited by the proprietor ought to be rated, not according to the expence which they might have coſt in building, but according to the rent which an equitable arbitration might judge them likely to bring, if leaſed to a tenant. If rated according to the expence which they may have coſt in building, a tax of three or four ſhillings in the pound, joined with other taxes, would ruin almoſt all the rich and great families of this, and, I believe, of every other civilized country. Whoever will examine, with attention, the different town and country houſes of ſome of the richeſt and greateſt families in this country, will find that, at the rate of only ſix and a half, or ſeven per cent. upon the original expence of building, their houſe-rent is nearly equal to the whole neat rent of their eſtates. It is the accumulated expence of ſeveral ſucceſſive generations, laid out upon objects of great beauty and magnificence, indeed; but, in proportion to what they coſt, of very ſmall exchangeable value.

GROUND-RENTS are a ſtill more proper ſubject of taxation than the rent of houſes. A tax upon ground-rents would not raiſe

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raiſe the rents of houſes. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopoliſt, and exacts the greateſt rent which can be got for the uſe of his ground. More or leſs can be got for it according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular ſpot of ground at a greater or ſmaller expence. In every country the greateſt number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there accordingly that the higheſt ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of thoſe competitors would in no reſpect be increaſed by a tax upon ground-rents, they would not probably be diſpoſed to pay more for the uſe of the ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant or by the owner of the ground, would be of little importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the leſs he would incline to pay for the ground; ſo that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent. The ground-rents of uninhabited houſes ought to pay no tax.

Both ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are a ſpecies of revenue which the owner, in many caſes, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue ſhould be taken from him in order to defray the expences of the ſtate, no diſcouragement will thereby be given to any ſort of induſtry. The annual produce of the land and labour of the ſociety, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the people, might be the ſame after ſuch a tax as before. Ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are therefore, perhaps, the ſpecies of revenue which can beſt bear to have a peculiar tax impoſed upon them.

Ground-rents ſeem, in this reſpect, a more proper ſubject of peculiar taxation than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in many caſes, owing partly at leaſt to the attention

attention and good management of the landlord. A very heavy tax might diſcourage too much this attention and good management. Ground-rents, ſo far as they exceed the ordinary rent of land, are altogether owing to the good government of the ſovereign, which, by protecting the induſtry either of the whole people, or of the inhabitants of ſome particular place, enables them to pay ſo much more than its real value for the ground which they build their houſes upon; or to make to its owner ſo much more than compenſation for the loſs which he might ſuſtain by this uſe of it. Nothing can be more reaſonable than that a fund which owes its exiſtence to the good government of the ſtate, ſhould be taxed peculiarly, or ſhould contribute ſomething more than the greater part of other funds towards the ſupport of that government.

THOUGH, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been impoſed upon the rent of houſes, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have been conſidered as a ſeparate ſubject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes have, probably, found ſome difficulty in aſcertaining what part of the rent ought to be conſidered as ground-rent, and what part ought to be conſidered as building rent. It ſhould not, however, ſeem very difficult to diſtinguiſh thoſe two parts of the rent from one another.

IN Great Britain the rent of houſes is ſuppoſed to be taxed in the ſame proportion as the rent of land, by what is called the annual land tax. The valuation, according to which each different pariſh and diſtrict is aſſeſſed to this tax, is always the ſame. It was originally extremely unequal, and it ſtill continues to be ſo. Through the greater part of the kingdom this tax falls ſtill more lightly upon the rent of houſes than upon that of land. In ſome few diſtricts only, which were originally rated high, and in which the

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rents of houſes have fallen conſiderably, the land tax of three or four ſhillings in the pound, is ſaid to amount to an equal proportion of the real rent of the houſes. Untenanted houſes, though by law ſubject to the tax, are, in moſt diſtricts, exempted from it by the favour of the aſſeſſors; and this exemption ſometimes occaſions ſome little variation in the rate of particular houſes, though that of the diſtrict is always the ſame.

In the province of Holland * every houſe is taxed at two and a half per cent. of its value, without any regard either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the circumſtance of its being tenanted or untenanted. There ſeems to be a hardſhip in obliging the proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted houſe, from which he can derive no revenue; eſpecially ſo very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the market rate of intereſt does not exceed three per cent. two and a half per cent. upon the whole value of the houſe, muſt, in moſt caſes, amount to more than a third of the building-rent, perhaps of the whole rent. The valuation, indeed, according to which the houſes are rated, though very unequal, is ſaid to be always below the real value. When a houſe is rebuilt, improved, or enlarged, there is a new valuation, and the tax is rated accordingly.

The contrivers of the ſeveral taxes which in England have, at different times, been impoſed upon houſes, ſeem to have imagined that there was ſome great difficulty in aſcertaining, with tolerable exactneſs, what was the real rent of every houſe. They have regulated their taxes, therefore, according to ſome more obvious circumſtance, ſuch as they had probably imagined would, in moſt caſes, bear ſome proportion to the rent.

The firſt tax of this kind was hearth-money; or a tax of two ſhillings upon every hearth. In order to aſcertain how many hearths

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. p. 223.

hearths were in the houſe, it was neceſſary that the tax-gatherer ſhould enter every room in it. This odious viſit rendered the tax odious. Soon after the revolution, therefore, it was aboliſhed as a badge of ſlavery.

THE next tax of this kind was, a tax of two ſhillings upon every dwelling houſe inhabited. A houſe with ten windows to pay four ſhillings more. A houſe with twenty windows and upwards to pay eight ſhillings. This tax was afterwards ſo far altered, that houſes with twenty windows, and with leſs than thirty, were ordered to pay ten ſhillings, and thoſe with thirty windows and upwards to pay twenty ſhillings. The number of windows can, in moſt caſes, be counted from the outſide, and, in all caſes, without entering every room in the houſe. The viſit of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was leſs offenſive in this tax than in the hearth-money.

THIS tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was eſtabliſhed the window tax, which has undergone too ſeveral alterations and augmentations. The window tax, as it ſtands at preſent, (January, 1775) over and above the duty of three ſhillings upon every houſe in England, and of one ſhilling upon every houſe in Scotland, lays a duty upon every window, which, in England, augments gradually from two-pence, the loweſt rate, upon houſes with not more than ſeven windows; to two ſhillings, the higheſt rate, upon houſes with twenty-five windows and upwards.

THE principal objection to all ſuch taxes is their inequality, an inequality of the worſt kind, as they muſt frequently fall much heavier upon the poor than upon the rich. A houſe of ten pounds rent in a country town may ſometimes have more windows than a houſe of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet ſo far as his contribution is regulated by the

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window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state. Such taxes are, therefore, directly contrary to the first of the four maxims above mentioned. They do not seem to offend much against any of the other three.

The natural tendency of the window-tax, and of all other taxes upon houses, is to lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is evident, he can afford to pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the window-tax, however, the rents of houses have upon the whole risen, more or less, in almost every town and village of Great Britain with which I am acquainted. Such has been almost every where the increase of the demand for houses, that it has raised the rents more than the window-tax could sink them; one of the many proofs of the great prosperity of the country, and of the increasing revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents would probably have risen still higher.

Article II.

Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from Stock.

THE revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two parts; that which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the stock; and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest.

This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not taxable directly. It is the compensation, and in most cases it is no more than a very moderate compensation, for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must have this compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own interest, continue the employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore, in proportion to the whole profit, he would be obliged either to raise

raiſe the rate of his profit, or to charge the tax upon the intereſt of money; that is, to pay leſs intereſt. If he raiſed the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax, the whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be finally paid by one or other of two different ſets of people, according to the different ways in which he might employ the ſtock of which he had the management. If he employed it as a farming ſtock in the cultivation of land, he could raiſe the rate of his profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the ſame thing, the price of a greater portion of the produce of the land; and as this could be done only by a reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax would fall upon the landlord. If he employed it as a mercantile or manufacturing ſtock, he could raiſe the rate of his profit only by raiſing the price of his goods; in which caſe the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the conſumers of thoſe goods. If he did not raiſe the rate of his profit, he would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it which was allotted for the intereſt of money. He could afford leſs intereſt for whatever ſtock he borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would in this caſe fall ultimately upon the intereſt of money. So far as he could not relieve himſelf from the tax in the one way, he would be obliged to relieve himſelf in the other.

THE intereſt of money ſeems at firſt ſight a ſubject equally capable of being taxed directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land it is a neat produce which remains after completely compenſating the whole riſk and trouble of employing the ſtock. As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raiſe rents; becauſe the neat produce which remains after replacing the ſtock of the farmer, together with his reaſonable profit, cannot be greater after the tax than before it: ſo, for the ſame reaſon, a tax upon the

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the intereſt of money could not raiſe the rate of intereſt; the quantity of ſtock or money in the country, like the quantity of land, being ſuppoſed to remain the ſame after the tax as before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been ſhewn in the firſt book, is every where regulated by the quantity of ſtock to be employed in proportion to the quantity of the employment, or of the buſineſs which muſt be done by it. But the quantity of the employment, or of the buſineſs to be done by ſtock, could neither be increaſed nor diminiſhed by any tax upon the intereſt of money. If the quantity of the ſtock to be employed, therefore, was neither increaſed nor diminiſhed by it, the ordinary rate of profit would neceſſarily remain the ſame. But the portion of this profit neceſſary for compenſating the riſk and trouble of the employer, would likewiſe remain the ſame; that riſk and trouble being in no reſpect altered. The reſidue, therefore, that portion which belongs to the owner of the ſtock, and which pays the intereſt of money, would neceſſarily remain the ſame too. At firſt ſight, therefore, the intereſt of money ſeems to be a ſubject as fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land.

THERE are, however, two different circumſtances which render the intereſt of money a much leſs proper ſubject of direct taxation than the rent of land.

FIRST, the quantity and value of the land which any man poſſeſſes can never be a ſecret, and can always be aſcertained with great exactneſs. But the whole amount of the capital ſtock which he poſſeſſes is almoſt always a ſecret, and can ſcarce ever be aſcertained with tolerable exactneſs. It is liable, beſides, to almoſt continual variations. A year ſeldom paſſes away, frequently not a month, ſometimes ſcarce a ſingle day, in which it does not riſe or fall more or leſs. An inquiſition into every man's private circumſtances, and an inquiſition which, in order to accommodate

accommodate the tax to them, watched over all the fluctuations of his fortune, would be a ſource of ſuch continual and endleſs vexation as no people could ſupport.

SECONDLY, land is a ſubject which cannot be removed; whereas ſtock eaſily may. The proprietor of land is neceſſarily a citizen of the particular country in which his eſtate lies. The proprietor of ſtock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not neceſſarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was expoſed to a vexatious inquiſition, in order to be aſſeſſed to a burdenſome tax, and would remove his ſtock to ſome other country where he could either carry on his buſineſs or enjoy his fortune more at his eaſe. By removing his ſtock he would put an end to all the induſtry which it had maintained in the country which he left. Stock cultivates land; ſtock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive away ſtock from any particular country, would ſo far tend to dry up every ſource of revenue, both to the ſovereign and to the ſociety. Not only the profits of ſtock, but the rent of land and the wages of labour, would neceſſarily be more or leſs diminiſhed by its removal.

THE nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue ariſing from ſtock, inſtead of any ſevere inquiſition of this kind, have been obliged to content themſelves with ſome very looſe, and therefore more or leſs arbitrary eſtimation. The extreme inequality and uncertainty of a tax aſſeſſed in this manner, can be compenſated only by its extreme moderation, in conſequence of which every man finds himſelf rated ſo very much below his real revenue, that he gives himſelf little diſturbance though his neighbour ſhould be rated ſomewhat lower.

BY what is called the land-tax in England, it was intended that ſtock ſhould be taxed in the ſame proportion as land.

When

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When the tax upon land was at four ſhillings in the pound, or at one-fifth of the ſuppoſed rent, it was intended that ſtock ſhould be taxed at one-fifth of the ſuppoſed intereſt. When the preſent annual land-tax was firſt impoſed, the legal rate of intereſt was ſix per cent. Every hundred pounds ſtock, accordingly, was ſuppoſed to be taxed at twenty-four ſhillings, the fifth part of ſix pounds. Since the legal rate of intereſt has been reduced to five per cent. every hundred pounds ſtock is ſuppoſed to be taxed at twenty ſhillings only. The ſum to be raiſed, by what is called the land-tax, was divided between the country and the principal towns. The greater part of it was laid upon the country; and of what was laid upon the towns, the greater part was aſſeſſed upon the houſes. What remained to be aſſeſſed upon the ſtock or trade of the towns (for the ſtock upon the land was not meant to be taxed) was very much below the real value of that ſtock or trade. Whatever inequalities, therefore, there might be in the original aſſeſſiment, gave little diſturbance. Every pariſh and diſtrict ſtill continues to be rated for its land, its houſes, and its ſtock, according to the original aſſeſſment; and the almoſt univerſal proſperity of the country, which in moſt places has raiſed very much the value of all theſe, has rendered thoſe inequalities of ſtill leſs importance now. The rate too upon each diſtrict continuing always the ſame, the uncertainty of this tax, ſo far as it might be aſſeſſed upon the ſtock of any individual, has been very much diminiſhed, as well as rendered of much leſs conſequence. If the greater part of the lands of England are not rated to the land-tax at half their actual value, the greater part of the ſtock of England is perhaps ſcarce rated at the fiftieth part of its actual value. In ſome towns the whole land-tax is aſſeſſed upon houſes; as in Weſtminſter, where ſtock and trade are free. It is otherwiſe in London.

In all countries a ſevere inquiſition into the circumſtances of private perſons has been carefully avoided.

At Hamburgh * every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the ſtate, one-fourth per cent. of all that he poſſeſſes; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburgh conſiſts principally in ſtock, this tax may be conſidered as a tax upon ſtock. Every man aſſeſſes himſelf, and, in the preſence of the magiſtrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain ſum of money, which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth per cent. of all that he poſſeſſes, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that ſubject. This tax is generally ſuppoſed to be paid with great fidelity. In a ſmall republic, where the people have entire confidence in their magiſtrates, are convinced of the neceſſity of the tax for the ſupport of the ſtate, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpoſe, ſuch conſcientious and voluntary payment may ſometimes be expected. It is not peculiar to the people of Hamburgh.

The canton of Underwold in Switzerland is frequently ravaged by ſtorms and inundations, and is thereby expoſed to extraordinary expences. Upon ſuch occaſions the people aſſemble, and every one is ſaid to declare with the greateſt frankneſs what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich the law orders that in caſes of neceſſity every one ſhould be taxed in proportion to his revenue; the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no ſuſpicion, it is ſaid, that any of their fellow citizens will deceive them. At Baſil the principal revenue of the ſtate ariſes from a ſmall cuſtom upon goods exported. All the citizens make oath that they will pay every three months all the taxes impoſed by the law. All merchants and even all inn-keepers are truſted with keeping themſelves the

* Memoires concernant les Droits, tome i. p. 74.

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account of the goods which they ſell either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months they ſend this account to the treaſurer, with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not ſuſpected that the revenue ſuffers by this confidence *.

To oblige every citizen to declare publickly upon oath the amount of his fortune, muſt not, it ſeems, in thoſe Swiſs cantons, be reckoned a hardſhip. At Hamburgh it would be reckoned the greateſt. Merchants engaged in the hazardous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged at all times to expoſe the real ſtate of their circumſtances. The ruin of their credit and the miſcarriage of their projects, they foreſee, would too often be the conſequence. A ſober and parſimonious people, who are ſtrangers to all ſuch projects, do not feel that they have occaſion for any ſuch concealment.

In Holland, ſoon after the exaltation of the late prince of Orange to the ſtadtholderſhip, a tax of two per cent. or the fiftieth penny, as it was called, was impoſed upon the whole ſubſtance of every citizen. Every citizen aſſeſſed himſelf and paid his tax in the ſame manner as at Hamburgh; and it was in general ſuppoſed to have been paid with great fidelity. The people had at that time the greateſt affection for their new government, which they had juſt eſtabliſhed by a general inſurrection. The tax was to be paid but once; in order to relieve the ſtate in a particular exigency. It was, indeed, too heavy to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of intereſt ſeldom exceeds three per cent. a tax of two per cent. amounts to thirteen ſhillings and fourpence in the pound upon the higheſt neat revenue which is commonly drawn from ſtock. It is a tax

* Id. tome i. p. 163, 166, 171.

4 which

which very few people could pay without encroaching more or leſs upon their capitals. In a particular exigency the people may, from great public zeal, make a great effort, and give up even a part of their capital in order to relieve the ſtate. But it is impoſſible that they ſhould continue to do ſo for any conſiderable time; and if they did, the tax would ſoon ruin them ſo completely as to render them altogether incapable of ſupporting the ſtate.

THE tax upon ſtock impoſed by the land-tax bill in England, tho' it is proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminiſh or take away any part of that capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the intereſt of money proportioned to that upon the rent of land; ſo that when the latter is at four ſhillings in the pound, the former may be at four ſhillings in the pound too. The tax at Hamburgh, and the ſtill more moderate taxes of Underwold and Zurich, are meant, in the ſame manner, to be taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the intereſt or neat revenue of ſtock. That of Holland was meant to be a tax upon the capital.

Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.

IN ſome countries extraordinary taxes are impoſed upon the profits of ſtock; ſometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and ſometimes when employed in agriculture.

OF the former kind are in England the tax upon hawkers and pedlars, that upon hackney coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-houſes pay for a licence to retail ale and ſpirituous liquors. During the late war, another tax of the ſame kind was propoſed upon ſhops. The war having been undertaken, it was ſaid, in defence of the trade of the country, the merchants,

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who were to profit by it, ought to contribute towards the ſupport of it.

A TAX, however, upon the profits of ſtock employed in any particular branch of trade, can never fall finally upon the dealers (who muſt in all ordinary caſes have their reaſonable profit, and, where the competition is free, can ſeldom have more than that profit) but always upon the conſumers, who muſt be obliged to pay in the price of the goods the tax which the dealer advances; and generally with ſome over-charge.

A TAX of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer, is finally paid by the conſumer, and occaſions no oppreſſion to the dealer. When it is not ſo proportioned, but is the ſame upon all dealers, though in this caſe too it is finally paid by the conſumer, yet it favours the great, and occaſions ſome oppreſſion to the ſmall dealer. The tax of five ſhillings a week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten ſhillings a year upon every hackney chair, ſo far as it is advanced by the different keepers of ſuch coaches and chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their reſpective dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppreſſes the ſmaller dealer. The tax of twenty ſhillings a year for a licence to ſell ale; of forty ſhillings for a licence to ſell ſpirituous liquors; and of forty ſhillings more for a licence to ſell wine, being the ſame upon all retailers, muſt neceſſarily give ſome advantage to the great, and occaſion ſome oppreſſion to the ſmall dealers. The former muſt find it more eaſy to get back the tax in the price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, however, renders this inequality of leſs importance, and it may to many people appear not improper to give ſome diſcouragement to the multiplication of little ale-houſes. The tax upon ſhops, it was intended, ſhould be the ſame upon all ſhops. It could not well have been otherwiſe. It would

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would have been impoſſible to proportion with tolerable exactneſs the tax upon a ſhop to the extent of the trade carried on in it, without ſuch an inquiſition, as would have been altogether inſupportable in a free country. If the tax had been conſiderable, it would have oppreſſed the ſmall, and forced almoſt the whole retail trade into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the former being taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly of the trade; and like all other monopoliſts would ſoon have combined to raiſe their profits much beyond what was neceſſary for the payment of the tax. The final payment, inſtead of falling upon the ſhopkeeper, would have fallen upon the conſumer, with a conſiderable over-charge to the profit of the ſhopkeeper. For theſe reaſons, the project of a tax upon ſhops was laid aſide, and in the room of it was ſubſtituted the ſubſidy 1759.

WHAT in France is called the perſonal taille is, perhaps, the moſt important tax upon the profits of ſtock employed in agriculture that is levied in any part of Europe.

IN the diſorderly ſtate of Europe during the prevalence of the feudal government, the ſovereign was obliged to content himſelf with taxing thoſe who were too weak to refuſe to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to aſſiſt him upon particular emergencies, refuſed to ſubject themſelves to any conſtant tax, and he was not ſtrong enough to force them. The occupiers of land, all over Europe, were the greater part of them originally bond-men. Through the greater part of Europe they were gradually emancipated. Some of them acquired the property of landed eſtates which they held by ſome baſe or ignoble tenure, ſometimes under the king, and ſometimes under ſome other great lord, like the antient copy-holders of England. Others, without acquiring the property, obtained leaſes for terms of years of the lands which they occupied.

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pied under their lord, and thus became leſs dependent upon him. The great lords ſeem to have beheld the degree of proſperity and independency which this inferior order of men had thus come to enjoy, with malignant and contemptuous indignation, and willingly conſented that the ſovereign ſhould tax them. In ſome countries this tax was confined to the lands which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and, in this caſe, the taille was ſaid to be real. The land-tax eſtabliſhed by the late king of Sardinia, and the taille in the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphiné, and Brittany; in the generality of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as in ſome other diſtricts of France, are taxes upon lands held in property by an ignoble tenure. In other countries the tax was laid upon the ſuppoſed profits of all thoſe who held in farm or leaſe lands belonging to other people, whatever might be the tenure by which the proprietor held them; and in this caſe the taille was ſaid to be perſonal. In the greater part of thoſe provinces of France, which are called the Countries of Elections, the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is impoſed only upon a part of the lands of the country, is neceſſarily an unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax, though it is ſo upon ſome occaſions. The perſonal taille, as it is intended to be proportioned to the profits of a certain claſs of people, which can only be gueſſed at, is neceſſarily both arbitrary and unequal.

In France the perſonal taille at preſent, (1775,) annually impoſed upon the twenty generalities, called the Countries of Elections, amounts to 40,107,239 livres, 16 ſous *. The proportion in which this ſum is aſſeſſed upon thoſe different provinces, varies from year to year, according to the reports which are made to the king's council concerning the goodneſs or badneſs of the crop, as well as other circumſtances which may either increaſe or diminiſh their reſpective

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tome ii. p. 17.

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respective abilities to pay. Each generality is divided into a certain number of elections, and the proportion in which the sum imposed upon the whole generality is divided among those different elections, varies likewise from year to year, according to the reports made to the council concerning their respective abilities. It seems impossible that the council, with the best intentions, can ever proportion with tolerable exactness, either of those two assessments to the real abilities of the province or district upon which they are respectively laid. Ignorance and misinformation must always, more or less, mislead the most upright council. The proportion which each parish ought to support of what is assessed upon the whole election, and that which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon his particular parish, are both in the same manner varied, from year to year, according as circumstances are supposed to require. These circumstances are judged of, in the one case, by the officers of the election; in the other by those of the parish; and both the one and the other are, more or less, under the direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance and misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private resentment, are said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subject to such a tax, it is evident, can ever be certain, before he is assessed, of what he is to pay. He cannot even be certain after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed who ought to have been exempted; or if any person has been taxed beyond his proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they complain and make good their complaints, the whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse them. If any of the contributors become bankrupt or insolvent, the collector is obliged to advance his tax, and the whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse the collector. If the collector himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must answer for his conduct to the receiver-general of the election. But, as it might be troublesome for the

receiver-

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receiver to profecute the whole pariſh, he takes at his choice five or ſix of the richeſt contributors, and obliges them to make good what had been loſt by the inſolvency of the collector. The pariſh is afterwards reimpoſed in order to reimburſe thoſe five or ſix. Such reimpoſitions are always over and above the taille of the particular year in which they are laid on.

When a tax is impoſed upon the profits of ſtock in a particular branch of trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what they can ſell at a price ſufficient to reimburſe them for advancing the tax. Some of them withdraw a part of their ſtocks from the trade, and the market is more ſparingly ſupplied than before. The price of the goods riſes, and the final payment of the tax falls upon the conſumer. But when a tax is impoſed upon the profits of ſtock employed in agriculture, it is not the intereſt of the farmers to withdraw any part of their ſtock from that employment. Each farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the proper cultivation of this land a certain quantity of ſtock is neceſſary; and by withdrawing any part of this neceſſary quantity, the farmer is not likely to be more able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can never be his intereſt to diminiſh the quantity of his produce, nor conſequently to ſupply the market more ſparingly than before. The tax, therefore, will never enable him to raiſe the price of his produce, nor to reimburſe himſelf by throwing the final payment upon the conſumer. The farmer, however, muſt have his reaſonable profit as well as every other dealer, otherwiſe he muſt give up the trade. After the impoſition of a tax of this kind, he can get this reaſonable profit only by paying leſs rent to the landlord. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the leſs he can afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax of this kind impoſed during the currency of a leaſe may, no doubt, diſtreſs or ruin the farmer.

farmer. Upon the renewal of the leaſe it muſt always fall upon the landlord.

In the countries where the perſonal taille takes place, the farmer is commonly aſſeſſed in proportion to the ſtock which he appears to employ in cultivation. He is, upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horſes or oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meaneſt and moſt wretched inſtruments of huſbandry that he can. Such is his diſtruſt in the juſtice of his aſſeſſors, that he counterfeits poverty, and wiſhes to appear ſcarce able to pay any thing for fear of being obliged to pay too much. By this miſerable policy he does not, perhaps, always conſult his own intereſt in the moſt effectual manner; and he probably loſes more by the diminution of his produce than he ſaves by that of his tax. Though, in conſequence of this wretched cultivation the market is, no doubt, ſomewhat worſe ſupplied; yet the ſmall riſe of price which this may occaſion, as it is not likely even to indemnify the farmer for the diminution of his produce, it is ſtill leſs likely to enable him to pay more rent to the landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all ſuffer more or leſs by this degraded cultivation. That the perſonal taille tends, in many different ways, to diſcourage cultivation, and conſequently to dry up the principal ſource of the wealth of every great country, I have already had occaſion to obſerve in the third book of this inquiry.

What are called poll-taxes in the ſouthern provinces of North America, and in the Weſt India iſlands, annual taxes of ſo much a head upon every negro, are properly taxes upon the profits of a certain ſpecies of ſtock employed in agriculture. As the planters are, the greater part of them, both farmers and landlords, the final payment of the tax falls upon them in their quality of landlords without any retribution.

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TAXES of ſo much a head upon the bondmen employed in cultivation, ſeem antiently to have been common all over Europe. There ſubſiſts at preſent a tax of this kind in the empire of Ruſſia. It is probably upon this account that poll-taxes of all kinds have often been repreſented as badges of ſlavery. Every tax, however, is to the perſon who pays it a badge, not of ſlavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is ſubject to government, indeed, but that, as he has ſome property, he cannot himſelf be the property of a maſter. A poll-tax upon ſlaves is altogether different from a poll-tax upon freemen. The latter is paid by the perſons upon whom it is impoſed; the former by a different ſet of perſons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary or altogether unequal, and in moſt caſes is both the one and the other; the former, though in ſome reſpects unequal, different ſlaves being of different values, is in no reſpect arbitrary. Every maſter who knows the number of his own ſlaves, knows exactly what he has to pay. Thoſe different taxes, however, being called by the ſame name, have been conſidered as of the ſame nature.

TAXES upon the profits of ſtock in particular employments can never affect the intereſt of money. Nobody will lend his money for leſs intereſt to thoſe who exerciſe the taxed, than to thoſe who exerciſe the untaxed employments. Taxes upon the revenue ariſing from ſtock in all employments, where the government attempts to levy them with any degree of exactneſs, will, in many caſes, fall upon the intereſt of money. The Vingtieme or twentieth-penny in France, is a tax of the ſame kind with what is called the land-tax in England, and is aſſeſſed, in the ſame manner, upon the revenue ariſing from land, houſes, and ſtock. So far as it affects ſtock, it is aſſeſſed, though not with great rigour, yet with much more exactneſs than that part of the land-tax of England which is impoſed upon the ſame fund. It, in many caſes, falls altogether upon the inte-

reſt of money. Money is frequently ſunk in France upon what are called Contracts for the conſtitution of a rent, that is, perpetual annuities redeemable at any time by the debtor upon repayment of the ſum originally advanced, but of which this redemption is not exigible by the creditor except in particular caſes. The vingtieme ſeems not to have raiſed the rate of thoſe annuities, though it is exactly levied upon them all.

APPENDIX to ARTICLES I. and II.

Taxes upon the capital Value of Land, Houſes, and Stock.

WHILE property remains in the poſſeſſion of the ſame perſon, whatever permanent taxes may have been impoſed upon it, they have never been intended to diminiſh or take away any part of its capital value, but only ſome part of the revenue ariſing from it. But when property changes hands, when it is tranſmitted either from the dead to the living, or from the living to the living, ſuch taxes have frequently been impoſed upon it as neceſſarily take away ſome part of its capital value.

THE transference of all ſorts of property from the dead to the living, and that of immoveable property, of land and houſes, from the living to the living, are tranſactions which are in their nature either public and notorious, or ſuch as cannot be long concealed. Such tranſactions, therefore, may be taxed directly. The transference of ſtock or immoveable property from the living to the living by the lending of money, is frequently a ſecret tranſaction, and may always be made ſo. It cannot eaſily, therefore, be taxed directly. It has been taxed indirectly in two different ways; firſt, by requiring that the deed, containing the obligation to repay, ſhould be written upon paper or parchment, which had paid a

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certain ſtamp-duty, otherwiſe not to be valid; ſecondly, by requiring, under the like penalty of invalidity, that it ſhould be recorded either in a public or ſecret regiſter, and by impoſing certain duties upon ſuch regiſtration. Stamp-duties and duties of regiſtration have frequently been impoſed likewiſe upon the deeds transferring property of all kinds from the dead to the living, and upon thoſe transferring immoveable property from the living to the living, tranſactions which might eaſily have been taxed directly.

The Viceſima Hereditatum, the twentieth penny of inheritances, impoſed by Auguſtus upon the antient Romans, was a tax upon the transference of property from the dead to the living. Dion Caſſius†, the author who writes concerning it the leaſt indiſtinctly, ſays, that it was impoſed upon all ſucceſſions, legacies and donations, in caſe of death, except upon thoſe to the neareſt relations, and to the poor.

Of the ſame kind is the Dutch tax upon ſucceſſions *. Collateral ſucceſſions are taxed, according to the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of the ſucceſſion. Teſtamentary donations or legacies to collaterals, are ſubject to the like duties. Thoſe from huſband to wife, or from wife to huſband, to the fiftieth penny. The Luctuoſa Hereditas, the mournful ſucceſſion of aſcendents to deſcendents, to the twentieth penny only. Direct ſucceſſions, or thoſe of deſcendents to aſcendents, pay no tax. The death of a father, to ſuch of his children as live in the ſame houſe with him, is ſeldom attended with any increaſe, and frequently with a conſiderable diminution of revenue; by the loſs of his induſtry, of his office, or of ſome life-rent eſtate, of which he may have been in poſſeſſion. That tax would be cruel and oppreſſive which aggravated their loſs by taking from them any part of

† Lib. 55. See alſo Burman de Vectigalibus pop. Rom. cap. xi. and Bouchaud de l' impôt du vingtieme ſur les ſucceſſions.

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 225.

of his ſucceſſion. It may, however, ſometimes be otherwiſe with thoſe children who, in the language of the Roman law, are ſaid to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be foris-familiated; that is, who have received their portion, have got families of their own, and are ſupported by funds ſeparate and independent of thoſe of their father. Whatever part of his ſucceſſion might come to ſuch children, would be a real addition to their fortune, and might, therefore, perhaps, without more inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind, be liable to ſome tax.

The caſualties of the feudal law were taxes upon the tranſference of land, both from the dead to the living, and from the living to the living. In antient times they conſtituted in every part of Europe one of the principal branches of the revenue of the crown.

The heir of every immediate vaſſal of the crown paid a certain duty, generally a year's rent, upon receiving the inveſtiture of the eſtate. If the heir was a minor, the whole rents of the eſtate, during the continuance of the minority, devolved to the ſuperior without any other charge, beſides the maintenance of the minor, and the payment of the widow's dower, when there happened to be a dowager, upon the land. When the minor came to be of age, another tax, called Relief, was ſtill due to the ſuperior, which generally amounted likewiſe to a year's rent. A long minority, which in the preſent times ſo frequently diſburdens a great eſtate of all its incumbrances, and reſtores the family to their antient ſplendor, could in thoſe times have no ſuch effect. The waſte, and not the diſincumbrance of the eſtate, was the common effect of a long minority.

By the feudal law the vaſſal could not alienate without the conſent of his ſuperior, who generally extorted a fine or compoſition for granting it. This fine, which was at firſt arbitrary, came in many countries to be regulated at a certain portion

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of the price of the land. In ſome countries, where the greater part of the other feudal cuſtoms have gone into diſuſe, this tax upon the alienation of land ſtill continues to make a conſiderable branch of the revenue of the ſovereign. In the canton of Berne it is ſo high as a ſixth part of the price of all noble fiefs; and a tenth part of that of all ignoble ones *. In the canton of Lucerne the tax upon the ſale of lands is not univerſal, and takes place only in certain diſtricts. But if any perſon ſells his land, in order to remove out of the territory, he pays ten per cent. upon the whole price of the ſale †. Taxes of the ſame kind upon the ſale either of all lands, or of lands held by certain tenures, take place in many other countries, and make a more or leſs conſiderable branch of the revenue of the ſovereign.

Such tranſactions may be taxed indirectly by means either of ſtamp-duties, or of duties upon regiſtration; and thoſe duties either may or may not be proportioned to the value of the ſubject which is transferred.

In Great Britain the ſtamp-duties are higher or lower, not ſo much according to the value of the property transferred, (an eighteen penny or half crown ſtamp being ſufficient upon a bond for the largeſt ſum of money) as according to the nature of the deed. The higheſt do not exceed ſix pounds upon every ſheet of paper, or ſkin of parchment; and theſe high duties fall chiefly upon grants from the crown, and upon certain law proceedings; without any regard to the value of the ſubject. There are in Great Britain no duties on the regiſtration of deeds or writings, except the fees of the officers, who keep the regiſter; and theſe are ſeldom more than a reaſonable recompence for their labour. The crown derives no revenue from them.

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 154. † Id. p. 157.

In

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In Holland * there are both ſtamp-duties and duties upon regiſtration; which in ſome caſes are, and in ſome are not proportioned to the value of the property transferred. All teſtaments muſt be written upon ſtampt-paper, of which the price is proportioned to the property diſpoſed of, ſo that there are ſtamps which coſt from threepence, or three ſtivers a ſheet, to three hundred florins, equal to about twenty-ſeven pound ten ſhillings of our money. If the ſtamp is of an inferior price to what the teſtator ought to have made uſe of, his ſucceſſion is confiſcated. This is over and above all their other taxes on ſucceſſion. Except bills of exchange, and ſome other mercantile bills, all other deeds, bonds and contracts, are ſubject to a ſtamp-duty. This duty, however, does not riſe in proportion to the value of the ſubject. All ſales of land and of houſes, and all mortgages upon either, muſt be regiſtered, and, upon regiſtration, pay a duty to the ſtate of two and a half per cent. upon the amount of the price or the mortgage. This duty is extended to the ſale of all ſhips and veſſels of more than two tons burthen, whether decked or undecked. Theſe, it ſeems, are conſidered as a ſort of houſes upon the water. The ſale of moveables, when it is ordered by a court of juſtice, is ſubject to the like duty of two and a half per cent.

In France there are both ſtamp-duties and duties upon regiſtration. The former are conſidered as a branch of the aides or exciſe, and in the provinces where thoſe duties take place, are levied by the exciſe officers. The latter are conſidered as a branch of the domaine of the crown, and are levied by a different ſet of officers.

Those modes of taxation, by ſtamp-duties and by duties upon regiſtration, are of very modern invention. In the courſe of little more than a century, however, ſtamp-duties have, in Europe, become almoſt univerſal, and duties upon regiſtration

* Id. tom. i. p. 223, 224, 225.

extremely

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extremely common. There is no art which one government ſooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.

TAXES upon the transference of property from the dead to the living, fall finally as well as immediately upon the perſon to whom the property is transferred. Taxes upon the ſale of land fall altogether upon the ſeller. The ſeller is almoſt always under the neceſſity of ſelling, and muſt, therefore, take ſuch a price as he can get. The buyer is ſcarce ever under the neceſſity of buying, and will, therefore, give only ſuch a price as he likes. He conſiders what the land will coſt him in tax and price together. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the leſs he will be diſpoſed to give in the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almoſt always upon a neceſſitous perſon, and muſt, therefore, be frequently very cruel and oppreſſive. Taxes upon the ſale of new-built houſes, where the building is ſold without the ground, fall generally upon the buyer, becauſe the builder muſt generally have his profit; otherwiſe he muſt give up the trade. If he advances the tax, therefore, the buyer muſt generally repay it to him. Taxes upon the ſale of old houſes, for the ſame reaſon as thoſe upon the ſale of land, fall generally upon the ſeller; whom in moſt caſes either conveniency or neceſſity obliges to ſell. The number of new built houſes that are annually brought to market, is more or leſs regulated by the demand. Unleſs the demand is ſuch as to afford the builder his profit, after paying all expences, he will build no more houſes. The number of old houſes which happen at any time to come to market is regulated by accidents of which the greater part have no relation to the demand. Two or three great bankruptcies in a mercantile town, will bring many houſes to ſale, which muſt be ſold for what can be got for them. Taxes upon the ſale of ground-rents fall altogether upon the ſeller; for the ſame reaſon as thoſe upon

upon the ſale of land. Stamp duties, and duties upon the regiſtration of bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower, and, in fact, are always paid by him. Duties of the ſame kind upon law proceedings fall upon the ſuitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the ſubject in diſpute. The more it coſts to acquire any property, the leſs muſt be the value of it when acquired.

All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, ſo far as they diminiſh the capital value of that property, tend to diminiſh the funds deſtined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or leſs unthrifty taxes that increaſe the revenue of the ſovereign, which ſeldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expence of the capital of the people which maintains none but productive.

Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property transferred, are ſtill unequal; the frequency of tranſference not being always equal in property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this value, which is the caſe with the greater part of the ſtamp-duties, and duties of regiſtration, they are ſtill more ſo. They are in no reſpect arbitrary, but are or may be in all caſes perfectly clear and certain. Though they ſometimes fall upon the perſon who is not very able to pay; the time of payment is in moſt caſes ſufficiently convenient for him. When the payment becomes due, he muſt in moſt caſes have the money to pay. They are levied at very little expence, and in general ſubject the contributors to no other inconveniency beſides always the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

In France the ſtamp-duties are not much complained of. Thoſe of regiſtration, which they call the Contrôle, are. They give occaſion, it is pretended, to much extortion in the officers of the

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farmers general who collect the tax, which is in a great measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the greater part of the libels which have been written against the present system of finances in France, the abuses of the contrôle make a principal article. Uncertainty, however, does not seem to be necessarily inherent in the nature of such taxes. If the popular complaints are well founded, the abuse must arise, not so much from the nature of the tax, as from the want of precision and distinctness in the words of the edicts or laws which impose it.

The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immoveable property, as it gives great security both to creditors and purchasers, is extremely advantageous to the public. That of the greater part of deeds of other kinds is frequently inconvenient and even dangerous to individuals, without any advantage to the public. All registers which, it is acknowledged, ought to be kept secret, ought certainly never to exist. The credit of individuals ought certainly never to depend upon so very slender a security as the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But where the fees of registration have been made a source of revenue to the sovereign, register offices have commonly been multiplied without end, both for the deeds which ought to be registered, and for those which ought not. In France there are several different sorts of secret registers. This abuse, though not perhaps a necessary, it must be acknowledged, is a very natural effect of such taxes.

Such stamp-duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon news-papers and periodical pamphlets, &c. are properly taxes upon consumption; the final payment falls upon the persons who use or consume such commodities. Such stamp-duties as those upon licences to retail ale, wine and spirituous liquors, though intended perhaps to fall upon the profits of the retailers, are

likewiſe finally paid by the conſumers of thoſe liquors. Such taxes, though called by the ſame name, and levied by the ſame officers and in the ſame manner with the ſtamp-duties above mentioned upon the tranſference of property, are however of a quite different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.

ARTICLE III.

Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.

THE wages of the inferior claſſes of workmen, I have endeavoured to ſhow in the firſt book, are every where neceſſarily regulated by two different circumſtances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of proviſions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either increaſing, ſtationary, or declining; or to require an increaſing, ſtationary, or declining population, regulates the ſubſiſtence of the labourer, and determines in what degree it ſhall be, either liberal, moderate, or ſcanty. The ordinary or average price of proviſions determines the quantity of money which muſt be paid to the workman in order to enable him, one year with another, to purchaſe this liberal, moderate, or ſcanty ſubſiſtence. While the demand for labour and the price of proviſions, therefore, remain the ſame, a direct tax upon the wages of labour can have no other effect than to raiſe them ſomewhat higher than the tax. Let us ſuppoſe, for example, that in a particular place the demand for labour and the price of proviſions were ſuch as to render ten ſhillings a week the ordinary wages of labour; and that a tax of one-fifth, or four ſhillings in the pound, was impoſed upon wages. If the demand for labour and the price of proviſions remained the ſame, it would ſtill be neceſſary that the labourer ſhould in that place earn ſuch a ſubſiſtence as could be bought only for ten ſhillings a week, or that after

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paying the tax he ſhould have ten ſhillings a week free wages. But in order to leave him ſuch free wages after paying ſuch a tax, the price of labour muſt in that place ſoon riſe, not to twelve ſhillings a week only, but to twelve and ſixpence; that is, in order to enable him to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages muſt neceſſarily ſoon riſe, not one-fifth part only, but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour muſt in all caſes riſe, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax, for example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour muſt neceſſarily ſoon riſe, not one-tenth part only, but one-eighth.

A DIRECT tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might perhaps pay it out of his hand, could not properly be ſaid to be even advanced by him; at leaſt if the demand for labour and the average price of proviſions remained the ſame after the tax as before it. In all ſuch caſes, not only the tax, but ſomething more than the tax, would in reality be advanced by the perſon who immediately employed him. The final payment would in different caſes fall upon different perſons. The riſe which ſuch a tax might occaſion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the maſter manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this riſe of wages therefore, together with the additional profit of the maſter manufacturer, would fall upon the conſumer. The riſe which ſuch a tax might occaſion in the wages of country labour would be advanced by the farmer, who in order to maintain the ſame number of labourers as before would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of ſtock, it would be neceſſary that he ſhould retain a larger portion, or what comes to the ſame thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the land, and conſequently that he

ſhould pay leſs rent to the landlord. The final payment of this riſe of wages, therefore, would in this caſe fall upon the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had advanced it. In all caſes a direct tax upon the wages of labour muſt, in the long run, occaſion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater riſe in the price of manufactured goods, than would have followed from the proper aſſeſſment of a ſum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the rent of land, and partly upon conſumable commodities.

If direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occaſioned a proportionable riſe in thoſe wages, it is becauſe they have generally occaſioned a conſiderable fall in the demand for labour. The declenſion of induſtry, the decreaſe of employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been the effects of ſuch taxes. In conſequence of them, however, the price of labour muſt always be higher than it otherwiſe would have been in the actual ſtate of the demand: and this enhancement of price, together with the profit of thoſe who advance it, muſt always be finally paid by the landlords and conſumers.

A tax upon the wages of country labour does not raiſe the price of the rude produce of land; for the ſame reaſon that a tax upon the farmers profit does not raiſe that price.

Absurd and deſtructive as ſuch taxes are, however, they take place in many countries. In France that part of the taille which is charged upon the induſtry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax of this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the diſtrict in which they reſide, and that they may be as little liable as poſſible to any over-charge, their yearly gains are eſtimated at no more than two hundred

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hundred working days in the year *. The tax of each individual is varied from year to year according to different circumſtances, of which the collector or the commiſſary, whom the intendant appoints to aſſiſt him, are the judges. In Bohemia, in conſequence of the alteration in the ſyſtem of finances which was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is impoſed upon the induſtry of artificers. They are divided into four claſſes. The higheſt claſs pay a hundred florins a year; which, at two and twenty-pence halfpenny a florin, amounts to 9l. 7s. 6d. The ſecond claſs are taxed at ſeventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages and the loweſt claſs of thoſe in towns, at twenty-five florins †.

The recompence of ingenious artiſts and of men of liberal profeſſions, I have endeavoured to ſhow in the firſt book, neceſſarily keeps a certain proportion to the emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this recompence, therefore, could have no other effect than to raiſe it ſomewhat higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not riſe in this manner, the ingenious arts and the liberal profeſſions, being no longer upon a level with other trades, would be ſo much deſerted that they would ſoon return to that level.

The emoluments of offices are not, like thoſe of trades and profeſſions, regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always bear a juſt proportion to what the nature of the employment requires. They are, perhaps in moſt countries, higher than it requires; the perſons who have the adminiſtration of government being generally diſpoſed to reward both themſelves and their immediate dependents rather more than enough. The emoluments of offices, therefore, can in moſt caſes very well

* Id. tom. ii. p. 108. † Id. tom. iii. p. 87.

bear

bear to be taxed. The perſons, beſides, who enjoy public offices, eſpecially the more lucrative, are in all countries the objects of general envy; and a tax upon their emoluments, even though it ſhould be ſomewhat higher than upon any other ſort of revenue, is always a very popular tax. In England, for example, when by the land-tax every other ſort of revenue was ſuppoſed to be aſſeſſed at four ſhillings in the pound, it was very popular to lay a real tax of five ſhillings in the pound upon the ſalaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds a year; thoſe of the judges and a few others leſs obnoxious to envy excepted. There are in England no other direct taxes upon the wages of labour.

ARTICLE IV.

Taxes which, it is intended, ſhould fall indifferently upon every different Species of Revenue.

THE taxes which, it is intended, ſhould fall indifferently upon every different ſpecies of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon conſumable commodities. Theſe muſt be paid indifferently from whatever revenue the contributors may poſſeſs; from the rent of their land, from the profits of their ſtock, or from the wages of their labour.

Capitation Taxes.

CAPITATION taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The ſtate of a man's fortune varies from day to day, and without an inquiſition more intolerable than any tax, and renewed at leaſt once every year, can only be gueſſed at. His aſſeſſment, therefore, muſt in moſt caſes depend upon the good or bad humour of his aſſeſſors, and muſt, therefore, be altogether arbitrary and uncertain.

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CAPITATION taxes, if they are proportioned, not to the ſuppoſed fortune, but to the rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal; the degrees of fortune being frequently unequal in the ſame degree of rank.

SUCH taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become altogether arbitrary and uncertain; and if it is attempted to render them certain and not arbitrary, became altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or heavy, uncertainty is always a great grievance. In a light tax a conſiderable degree of inequality may be ſupported; in a heavy one it is altogether intolerable.

IN the different poll-taxes which took place in England, during the reign of William III. the contributors were, the greater part of them, aſſeſſed according to the degree of their rank; as dukes, marquiſſes, earls, viſcounts, barons, eſquires, gentlemen, the eldeſt and youngeſt ſons of peers, &c. All ſhopkeepers and tradeſmen worth more than three hundred pounds, that is, the better ſort of them, were ſubject to the ſame aſſeſſment; how great ſoever might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was more conſidered than their fortune. Several of thoſe who in the firſt poll-tax were rated according to their ſuppoſed fortune, were afterwards rated according to their rank. Sergeants, attornies, and proctors at law, who in the firſt poll-tax were aſſeſſed at three ſhillings in the pound of their ſuppoſed income, were afterwards aſſeſſed as gentlemen. In the aſſeſſment of a tax, which was not very heavy, a conſiderable degree of inequality had been found leſs inſupportable than any degree of uncertainty.

IN the capitation which has been levied in France without any interruption ſince the beginning of the preſent century, the higheſt orders of people are rated according to their rank by an invariable tariff;

tarif; the lower orders of people, according to what is ſuppoſed to be their fortune, by an aſſeſſment which varies from year to year. The officers of the king's court, the judges and other officers in the ſuperior courts of juſtice, the officers of the troops, &c. are aſſeſſed in the firſt manner. The inferior ranks of people in the provinces are aſſeſſed in the ſecond. In France the great eaſily ſubmit to a conſiderable degree of inequality in a tax which, ſo far as it affects them, is not a very heavy one; but could not brook the arbitrary aſſeſſment of an intendant. The inferior ranks of people muſt, in that country, ſuffer patiently the uſage which their ſuperiors think proper to give them.

In England the different poll-taxes never produced the ſum which had been expected from them, or which, it was ſuppoſed, they might have produced, had they been exactly levied. In France the capitation always produces the ſum expected from it. The mild government of England, when it aſſeſſed the different ranks of people to the poll-tax, contented itſelf with what that aſſeſſment happened to produce; and required no compenſation for the loſs which the ſtate might ſuſtain either by thoſe who could not pay, or by thoſe who would not pay, (for there were many ſuch), and who, by the indulgent execution of the law, were not forced to pay. The more ſevere government of France aſſeſſes upon each generality a certain ſum, which the intendant muſt find as he can. If any province complains of being aſſeſſed too high, it may, in the aſſeſſment of next year, obtain an abatement proportioned to the over-charge of the year before: But it muſt pay in the meantime. The intendant, in order to be ſure of finding the ſum aſſeſſed upon his generality, was impowered to aſſeſs it in a larger ſum, that the failure or inability of ſome of the contributors might be compenſated by the over-charge of the reſt; and till 1765, the fixation of this ſurplus aſſeſſment, was left altogether

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to his discretion. In that year indeed the council assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces, it is observed by the perfectly-well informed author of the Memoirs upon the impositions in France, the portion which falls upon the nobility, and upon those whose privileges exempt them from the taille, is the least considerable. The largest falls upon those subject to the taille, who are assessed to the capitation at so much a pound of what they pay to that other tax.

CAPITATION taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of people, are direct taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all the inconveniencies of such taxes.

CAPITATION taxes are levied at little expence; and, where they are rigorously exacted, afford a very sure revenue to the state. It is upon this account that in countries where the ease, comfort, and security of the inferior ranks of people are little attended to, capitation taxes are very common. It is in general, however, but a small part of the public revenue, which, in a great empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes; and the greatest sum which they have ever afforded, might always have been found in some other way much more convenient to the people.

Taxes upon consumable Commodities.

THE impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their expence, which, it is supposed, will in most cases be nearly in proportion to their revenue.

revenue. Their expence is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out.

CONSUMABLE commodities are either necessaries or luxuries.

BY necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, no body can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about bare-footed. In France, they are necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes bare-footed. Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things, I call luxuries; without meaning by this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without

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As the wages of labour are every where regulated partly by the demand for it, and partly by the average price of the neceſſary articles of ſubſiſtence; whatever raiſes this average price muſt neceſſarily raiſe thoſe wages, ſo that the labourer may ſtill be able to purchaſe that quantity of thoſe neceſſary articles which the ſtate of the demand for labour, whether increaſing, ſtationary, or declining, requires that he ſhould have †. A tax upon thoſe articles neceſſarily raiſes their price ſomewhat higher than the amount of the tax, becauſe the dealer, who advances the tax, muſt generally get it back with a profit. Such a tax muſt, therefore, occaſion a riſe in the wages of labour proportionable to this riſe of price.

It is thus that a tax upon the neceſſaries of life, operates exactly in the ſame manner as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though he may pay it out of his hand; cannot, for any conſiderable time at leaſt, be properly ſaid even to advance it. It muſt always in the long-run be advanced to him by his immediate employer in the advanced rate of his wages. His employer, if he is a manufacturer, will charge upon the price of his goods this riſe of wages, together with a profit; ſo that the final payment of the tax, together with this over-charge, will fall upon the conſumer. If his employer is a farmer, the final payment, together with a like over-charge, will fall upon the rent of the landlord.

It is otherwiſe with taxes upon what I call luxuries; even upon thoſe of the poor. The riſe in the price of the taxed commodities,

† See Book I. Cap. 8.

will not neceſſarily occaſion any riſe in the wages of labour. A tax upon tobacco, for example, though a luxury of the poor as well as of the rich, will not raiſe wages. Though it is taxed in England at three times, and in France at fifteen times its original price, thoſe high duties ſeem to have no effect upon the wages of labour. The ſame thing may be ſaid of the taxes upon tea and ſugar; which in England and Holland have become luxuries of the loweſt ranks of people; and of thoſe upon chocolate, which in Spain is ſaid to have become ſo. The different taxes which in Great Britain have in the courſe of the preſent century been impoſed upon ſpirituous liquors, are not ſuppoſed to have had any effect upon the wages of labour. The riſe in the price of porter, occaſioned by an additional tax of three ſhillings upon the barrel of ſtrong beer, has not raiſed the wages of common labour in London. Theſe were about eighteen-pence and twenty-pence a day before the tax, and they are not more now.

The high price of ſuch commodities does not neceſſarily diminiſh the ability of the inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the ſober and induſtrious poor, taxes upon ſuch commodities act as ſumptuary laws, and diſpoſe them either to moderate, or to refrain altogether from the uſe of ſuperfluities which they can no longer eaſily afford. Their ability to bring up families, in conſequence of this forced frugality, inſtead of being diminiſhed, is frequently, perhaps, increaſed by the tax. It is the ſober and induſtrious poor who generally bring up the moſt numerous families, and who principally ſupply the demand for uſeful labour. All the poor indeed are not ſober and induſtrious, and the diſſolute and diſorderly might continue to indulge themſelves in the uſe of ſuch commodities after this riſe of price in the ſame manner as before; without regarding the diſtreſs which this indulgence might bring upon their families. Such diſorderly perſons,

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ſons, however, ſeldom rear up numerous families; their children generally periſhing from neglect, miſmanagement, and the ſcantineſs or unwholeſomeneſs of their food. If by the ſtrength of their conſtitution they ſurvive the hardſhips to which the bad conduct of their parents expoſes them; yet the example of that bad conduct commonly corrupts their morals; ſo that, inſtead of being uſeful to ſociety by their induſtry, they become public nuiſances by their vices and diſorders. Though the advanced price of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might increaſe ſomewhat the diſtreſs of ſuch diſorderly families, and thereby diminiſh ſomewhat their ability to bring up children; it would not probably diminiſh much the uſeful population of the country.

ANY riſe in the average price of neceſſaries, unleſs it is compenſated by a proportionable riſe in the wages of labour, muſt neceſſarily diminiſh more or leſs the ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and conſequently to ſupply the demand for uſeful labour; whatever may be the ſtate of that demand, whether increaſing, ſtationary, or declining; or ſuch as requires an increaſing, ſtationary, or declining, population.

TAXES upon luxuries have no tendency to raiſe the price of any other commodities except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon neceſſaries, by raiſing the wages of labour, neceſſarily tend to raiſe the price of all manufactures, and conſequently to diminiſh the extent of their ſale and conſumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by the conſumers of the commodities taxed, without any retribution. They fall indifferently upon every ſpecies of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of ſtock, and the rent of land. Taxes upon neceſſaries, ſo far as they affect the labouring poor, are finally paid, partly by landlords in the diminiſhed rent of their lands, and partly by rich conſumers, whether landlords

landlords or others, in the advanced price of manufactured goods; and always with a conſiderable over-charge. The advanced price of ſuch manufactures as are real neceſſaries of life, and are deſtined for the conſumption of the poor, of coarſe woollens, for example, muſt be compenſated to the poor by a farther advancement of their wages. The middling and ſuperior ranks of people, if they underſtood their own intereſt, ought always to oppoſe all taxes upon the neceſſaries of life, as well as all direct taxes upon the wages of labour. The final payment of both the one and the other falls altogether upon themſelves, and always with a conſiderable overcharge. They fall heavieſt upon the landlords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that of landlords, by the reduction of their rent; and in that of rich conſumers, by the increaſe of their expence. The obſervation of Sir Mathew Decker, that certain taxes are in the price of certain goods ſometimes repeated and accumulated four or five times, is perfectly juſt with regard to taxes upon the neceſſaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you muſt pay, not only for the tax upon the leather of your own ſhoes, but for a part of that upon thoſe of the ſhoe-maker and the tanner. You muſt pay too for the tax upon the ſalt, upon the ſoap, and upon the candles which thoſe workmen conſume while employed in your ſervice, and for the tax upon the leather, which the ſalt-maker, the ſoap-maker, and the candle-maker conſume while employed in their ſervice.

In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the neceſſaries of life are thoſe upon the four commodities juſt now mentioned, ſalt, leather, ſoap, and candles.

Salt is a very antient and a very univerſal ſubject of taxation. It was taxed among the Romans, and it is ſo at preſent in, I believe, every part of Europe. The quantity annually conſumed by any

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any individual is so small, and may be purchased so gradually, that nobody, it seems to have been thought, could feel very sensibly even a pretty heavy tax upon it. It is in England taxed at three shillings a bushel; about three times the original price of the commodity. In some other countries the tax is still higher. Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap such. In countries where the winter nights are long, candles are a necessary instrument of trade. Leather and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a pound; candles at a penny; taxes which, upon the original price of leather may amount to about eight or ten per cent; upon that of soap to about twenty or five and twenty per cent; and upon that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per cent; taxes which, though lighter than that upon salt, are still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real necessaries of life, such heavy taxes upon them must increase somewhat the expence of the sober and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or less the wages of their labour.

In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is, during that season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of many different sorts of workmen who work within doors; and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has so important an influence upon that of labour, that all over Great Britain manufactures have confined themselves principally to the coal countries; other parts of the country, on account of the high price of this necessary article, not being able to work so cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal is a necessary instrument of trade; as in those of glass, iron, and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be reasonable, it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of coals from those parts of the country in which they abound, to those in which they are wanted.

But

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But the legiſlature, inſtead of a bounty, has impoſed a tax of three ſhillings and three-pence a ton upon coal carried coaſtways; which upon moſt ſorts of coal is more than ſixty per cent. of the original price at the coal-pit. Coals carried either by land or by inland navigation pay no duty. Where they are naturally cheap, they are conſumed duty free: Where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty.

Such taxes, though they raiſe the price of ſubſiſtence, and conſequently the wages of labour, yet they afford a conſiderable revenue to government, which it might not be eaſy to find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good reaſons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, ſo far as it tends in the actual ſtate of tillage to raiſe the price of that neceſſary article, produces all the like bad effects; and inſtead of affording any revenue, frequently occaſions a very great expence to government. The high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which in years of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition; and the abſolute prohibition of the importation either of live cattle or of ſalt proviſions, which takes place in the ordinary ſtate of the law, and which on account of the ſcarcity is at preſent ſuſpended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the Britiſh plantations, have all the bad effects of taxes upon the neceſſaries of life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing ſeems neceſſary for the repeal of ſuch regulations, but to convince the public of the futility of that ſyſtem in conſequence of which they have been eſtabliſhed.

Taxes upon the neceſſaries of life are much higher in many other countries than in Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon bread when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In Holland the money price of the bread conſumed in towns is ſuppoſed to be doubled by means of

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ſuch taxes. In lieu of a part of them, the people who live in the country pay every year ſo much a head, according to the ſort of bread they are ſuppoſed to conſume. Thoſe who conſume wheaten bread, pay three gilders fifteen ſtivers; about ſix ſhillings and nine-pence halfpenny. Theſe, and ſome other taxes of the ſame kind, by raiſing the price of labour, are ſaid to have ruined the greater part of the manufactures of Holland*. Similar taxes, though not quite ſo heavy, take place in the Milaneſe, in the ſtates of Genoa, in the dutchy of Modena, in the dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guaſtalla, and in the eccleſiaſtical ſtate. A French author † of ſome note has propoſed to reform the finances of his country, by ſubſtituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes this moſt ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing ſo abſurd, ſays Cicero, which has not ſometimes been aſſerted by ſome philoſophers.

TAXES upon butchers meat are ſtill more common than thoſe upon bread. It may indeed be doubted whether butchers meat is any where a neceſſary of life. Grain and other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheeſe, and butter, or oil where butter is not to be had, it is known from experience, can, without any butchers meat, afford the moſt plentiful, the moſt wholeſome, the moſt nouriſhing, and the moſt invigorating diet. Decency no where requires that any man ſhould eat butchers meat, as it in moſt places requires that he ſhould wear a linen ſhirt or a pair of leather ſhoes.

CONSUMABLE commodities, whether neceſſaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways. The conſumer may either pay an annual ſum on account of his uſing or conſuming goods of a certain kind; or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the conſumer. The conſumable goods which laſt a conſiderable time before they are conſumed altogether, are moſt properly taxed in the one way.

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. p. 210, 211. † Le reformateur.

Thoſe

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Thoſe of which the conſumption is either immediate or more ſpeedy, in the other. The coach-tax and plate-tax are examples of the former method of impoſing: The greater part of the other duties of exciſe and cuſtoms, of the latter.

A COACH may, with good management, laſt ten or twelve years. It might be taxed, once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coach-maker. But it is certainly more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a year for the privilege of keeping a coach, than to pay all at once forty or forty-eight pounds additional price to the coach-maker; or a ſum equivalent to what the tax is likely to coſt him during the time he uſes the ſame coach. A ſervice of plate, in the ſame manner, may laſt more than a century. It is certainly eaſier for the conſumer to pay five ſhillings a year for every hundred ounces of plate, near one per cent. of the value, than to redeem this long annuity at five and twenty or thirty years purchaſe, which would enhance the price at leaſt five and twenty or thirty per cent. The different taxes which affect houſes are certainly more conveniently paid by moderate annual payments, than by a heavy tax of equal value upon the firſt building or ſale of the houſe.

IT was the well known propoſal of Sir Mathew Decker that all commodities, even thoſe of which the conſumption is either immediate or very ſpeedy, ſhould be taxed in this manner; the dealer advancing nothing, but the conſumer paying a certain annual ſum for the licence to conſume certain goods. The object of his ſcheme was to promote all the different branches of foreign trade, particularly the carrying trade, by taking away all duties upon importation and exportation, and thereby enabling the merchant to employ his whole capital and credit in the purchaſe of goods and the freight of ſhips, no part of either being diverted towards the

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advancing of taxes. The project, however, of taxing, in this manner, goods of immediate or ſpeedy conſumption, ſeems liable to the four following very important objections. Firſt, the tax would be more unequal, or not ſo well proportioned to the expence and conſumption of the different contributors, as in the way in which it is commonly impoſed. The taxes upon ale, wine, and ſpirituous liquors, which are advanced by the dealers, are finally paid by the different conſumers exactly in proportion to their reſpective conſumption. But if the tax was to be paid by purchaſing a licence to drink thoſe liquors, the ſober would, in proportion to his conſumption, be taxed much more heavily than the drunken conſumer. A family which exerciſed great hoſpitality would be taxed much more lightly than one which entertained fewer gueſts. Secondly, this mode of taxation, by paying for an annual, half-yearly, or quarterly licence to conſume certain goods, would diminiſh very much one of the principal conveniencies of taxes upon goods of ſpeedy conſumption; the piece-meal payment. In the price of three-pence halfpenny, which is at preſent paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes upon malt, hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the brewer charges for having advanced them, may perhaps amount to about three halfpence. If a workman can conveniently ſpare thoſe three halfpence, he buys a pot of porter. If he cannot, he contents himſelf with a pint, and, as a penny ſaved is a penny got, he thus gains a farthing by his temperance. He pays the tax piece-meal, as he can afford to pay it, and when he can afford to pay it; and every act of payment is perfectly voluntary, and what he can avoid if he chuſes to do ſo. Thirdly, ſuch taxes would operate leſs as ſumptuary laws. When the licence was once purchaſed, whether the purchaſer drunk much or drunk little, his tax would be the ſame. Fourthly, if a workman was to pay all at once, by yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly payments, a tax equal to what he at preſent pays, with little or no inconveniency, upon all the different

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rent pots and pints of porter which he drinks in any ſuch period of time, the ſum might frequently diſtreſs him very much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it ſeems evident, could never, without the moſt grievous oppreſſion, produce a revenue nearly equal to what is derived from the preſent mode without any oppreſſion. In ſeveral countries, however, commodities of an immediate or very ſpeedy conſumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland, people pay ſo much a head for a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon bread, which, ſo far as it is conſumed in farm-houſes and country villages, is there levied in the ſame manner.

The duties of exciſe are impoſed chiefly upon goods of home produce deſtined for home conſumption. They are impoſed only upon a few ſorts of goods of the moſt general uſe. There can never be any doubt either concerning the goods which are ſubject to thoſe duties, or concerning the particular duty which each ſpecies of goods is ſubject to. They fall almoſt altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting always the four duties above-mentioned, upon ſalt, ſoap, leather, candles, and, perhaps, that upon green glaſs.

The duties of cuſtoms are much more antient than thoſe of exciſe. They ſeem to have been called cuſtoms, as denoting cuſtomary payments which had been in uſe from time immemorial. They appear to have been originally conſidered as taxes upon the profits of merchants. During the barbarous times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like all the other inhabitants of burghs, were conſidered as little better than emancipated bondmen, whoſe perſons were deſpiſed, and whoſe gains were envied. The great nobility, who had conſented that the king ſhould tallage the profits of their own tenants, were not unwilling that he ſhould tallage likewiſe thoſe of an order of men whom it was much leſs their intereſt to protect.

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protect. In those ignorant times it was not understood that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable directly; or that the final payment of all such taxes must fall, with a considerable overcharge, upon the consumers.

The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than those of English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the former should be taxed more heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between the duties upon aliens and those upon English merchants, which was begun from ignorance, has been continued from the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants an advantage both in the home and in the foreign market.

With this distinction the antient duties of customs were imposed equally upon all sorts of goods, necessaries as well as luxuries, goods exported as well as goods imported. Why should the dealers in one sort of goods, it seems to have been thought, be more favoured than those in another? or why should the merchant exporter be more favoured than the merchant importer?

The antient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and perhaps the most antient of all those duties, was that upon wool and leather. It seems to have been chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen manufacture came to be established in England, lest the king should lose any part of his customs upon wool by the exportation of woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon them. The other two branches were, first, a duty upon wine, which being imposed at so much a ton, was called a tonnage; and, secondly, a duty upon all other goods, which being imposed at so much a pound of their supposed value, was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward III.

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a duty of ſix-pence in the pound was impoſed upon all goods exported and imported, except wools, wool-fells, leather, and wines, which were ſubject to particular duties. In the fourteenth of Richard II. this duty was raiſed to one ſhilling in the pound; but, three years afterwards, it was again reduced to ſix-pence. It was raiſed to eight-pence in the ſecond year of Henry IV.; and in the fourth year of the ſame prince, to one ſhilling. From this time to the ninth year of William III. this duty continued at one ſhilling in the pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were generally granted to the king by one and the ſame act of parliament, and were called the Subſidy of Tonnage and Poundage. The ſubſidy of poundage having continued for ſo long a time at one ſhilling in the pound, or at five per cent.; a ſubſidy came, in the language of the cuſtoms, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This ſubſidy, which is now called the Old Subſidy, ſtill continues to be levied according to the book of rates eſtabliſhed in the twelfth of Charles II. The method of aſcertaining, by a book of rates, the value of goods ſubject to this duty, is ſaid to be older than the time of James I. The new ſubſidy impoſed by the ninth and tenth of William III., was an additional five per cent. upon the greater part of goods. The one-third and the two-third ſubſidy made up between them another five per cent. of which they were proportionable parts. The ſubſidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon the greater part of goods; and that of 1759, a fifth upon ſome particular ſorts of goods. Beſides thoſe five ſubſidies, a great variety of other duties have occaſionally been impoſed upon particular ſorts of goods, in order ſometimes to relieve the exigencies of the ſtate, and ſometimes to regulate the trade of the country, according to the principles of the mercantile ſyſtem.

That ſyſtem has come gradually more and more into faſhion. The old ſubſidy was impoſed indifferently upon exportation as well

as

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as importation. The four ſubſequent ſubſidies, as well as the other duties which have ſince been occaſionally impoſed upon particular ſorts of goods, have, with a few exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation. The greater part of the antient duties which had been impoſed upon the exportation of the goods of home produce and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away altogether. In moſt caſes they have been taken away. Bounties have even been given upon the exportation of ſome of them. Drawbacks too, ſometimes of the whole, and, in moſt caſes, of a part of the duties which are paid upon the importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their exportation. Only half the duties impoſed by the old ſubſidy upon importation are drawn back upon exportation: but the whole of thoſe impoſed by the later ſubſidies and other impoſts are, upon the greater part of goods, drawn back in the ſame manner. This growing favour of exportation, and diſcouragement of importation, have ſuffered only a few exceptions, which chiefly concern the materials of ſome manufactures. Theſe our merchants and manufacturers are willing ſhould come as cheap as poſſible to themſelves, and as dear as poſſible to their rivals and competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, upon this account, ſometimes allowed to be imported duty free; Spaniſh wool, for example, flax, and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce, and of thoſe which are the peculiar produce of our colonies, has ſometimes been prohibited, and ſometimes ſubjected to higher duties. The exportation of Engliſh wool has been prohibited. That of beaver ſkins, of beaver wool, and of gum Senega, has been ſubjected to higher duties; Great Britain, by the conqueſt of Canada and Senegal, having got almoſt the monopoly of thoſe commodities.

THAT the mercantile ſyſtem has not been very favourable to the revenue of the great body of the people, to the annual pro-

duce of the land and labour of the country, I have endeavoured to ſhew in the fourth book of this inquiry. It ſeems not to have been more favourable to the revenue of the ſovereign; ſo far at leaſt as that revenue depends upon the duties of cuſtoms.

In conſequence of that ſyſtem, the importation of ſeveral ſorts of goods has been prohibited altogether. This prohibition has in ſome caſes entirely prevented, and in others very much diminiſhed the importation of thoſe commodities, by reducing the importers to the neceſſity of ſmuggling. It has entirely prevented the importation of foreign woollens; and it has very much diminiſhed that of foreign ſilks and velvets. In both caſes it has entirely annihilated the revenue of cuſtoms which might have been levied upon ſuch importation.

The high duties which have been impoſed upon the importation of many different ſorts of foreign goods, in order to diſcourage their conſumption in Great Britain, have in many caſes ſerved only to encourage ſmuggling; and in all caſes have reduced the revenue of the cuſtoms below what more moderate duties would have afforded. The ſaying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms two and two, inſtead of making four, make ſometimes only one, holds perfectly true with regard to ſuch heavy duties, which never could have been impoſed had not the mercantile ſyſtem taught us in many caſes to employ taxation as an inſtrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly.

The bounties which are ſometimes given upon the exportation of home produce and manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-exportation of the greater part of foreign goods, have given occaſion to many frauds, and to a ſpecies of ſmuggling more deſtructive of the public revenue than

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any other. In order to obtain the bounty or drawback, the goods, it is well known, are ſometimes ſhipped and ſent to ſea; but ſoon afterwards clandeſtinely re-landed in ſome other part of the country. The defalcation of the revenue of cuſtoms occaſioned by bounties and drawbacks, of which a great part are obtained fraudulently, is very great. The groſs produce of the cuſtoms in the year which ended on the 5th of January, 1755, amounted to 5,068,000l. The bounties which were paid out of this revenue, though in that year there was no bounty upon corn, amounted to 167,800l. The drawbacks which were paid upon debentures and certificates to 2,156,800l. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted to 2,324,600l. In conſequence of theſe deductions the revenue of the cuſtoms amounted only to 2,743,400l.: from which deducting 287,900l. for the expence of management in ſalaries and other incidents, the neat revenue of the cuſtoms for that year comes out to be 2,455,500l. The expence of management amounts, in this manner, to between five and ſix per cent. upon the groſs revenue of the cuſtoms, and to ſomething more than ten per cent. upon what remains of that revenue, after deducting what is paid away in bounties and drawbacks.

Heavy duties being impoſed upon almoſt all goods imported, our merchant importers ſmuggle as much, and make entry of as little as they can. Our merchant exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they export; ſometimes out of vanity, and to paſs for great dealers in goods which pay no duty; and ſometimes to gain a bounty or a drawback. Our exports, in conſequence of theſe different frauds, appear upon the cuſtom-houſe books greatly to overbalance our imports; to the unſpeakable comfort of thoſe politicians who meaſure the national proſperity by what they call the balance of trade.

All

All goods imported, unleſs particularly exempted, and ſuch exemptions are not very numerous, are liable to ſome duties of cuſtoms. If any goods are imported not mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4 s. 9 d. $\frac{9}{19}$ for every twenty ſhillings value, according to the oath of the importer, that is, nearly at five ſubſidies, or five poundage duties. The book of rates is extremely comprehenſive, and enumerates a great variety of articles, many of them little uſed, and therefore not well known. It is upon this account frequently uncertain under what article a particular ſort of goods ought to be claſſed, and conſequently what duty they ought to pay. Miſtakes with regard to this ſometimes ruin the cuſtom-houſe officer, and frequently occaſion much trouble, expence and vexation to the importer. In point of perſpicuity, preciſion and diſtinctneſs, therefore, the duties of cuſtoms are much inferior to thoſe of exciſe.

In order that the greater part of the members of any ſociety ſhould contribute to the public revenue in proportion to their reſpective expence, it does not ſeem neceſſary that every ſingle article of that expence ſhould be taxed. The revenue which is levied by the duties of exciſe is ſuppoſed to fall as equally upon the contributors as that which is levied by the duties of cuſtoms; and the duties of exciſe are impoſed upon a few articles only of the moſt general uſe and conſumption. It has been the opinion of many people that, by proper management, the duties of cuſtoms might likewiſe, without any loſs to the public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign trade, be confined to a few articles only.

The foreign articles of the moſt general uſe and conſumption in Great Britain, ſeem at preſent to conſiſt chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in ſome of the productions of America and the Weſt Indies, ſugar, rum, tobacco, cacao-nuts, &c. and in

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ſome of thoſe of the Eaſt Indies, tea, coffee, china-ware, ſpiceries of all kinds, ſeveral ſorts of piece goods, &c. Theſe different articles afford perhaps at preſent the greater part of the revenue which is drawn from the duties of cuſtoms. The taxes which at preſent ſubſiſt upon foreign manufactures, if you except thoſe upon the few contained in the foregoing enumeration, have the greater part of them been impoſed for the purpoſe, not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an advantage in the home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by ſubjecting all foreign manufactures to ſuch moderate taxes as it was found from experience afforded upon each article the greateſt revenue to the public, our own workmen might ſtill have a conſiderable advantage in the home market, and many articles, ſome of which at preſent afford no revenue to government, and others a very inconſiderable one, might afford a very great one.

HIGH taxes, ſometimes by diminiſhing the conſumption of the taxed commodities, and ſometimes by encouraging ſmuggling, frequently afford a ſmaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.

WHEN the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminution of conſumption, there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the tax.

WHEN the diminution of revenue is the effect of the encouragement given to ſmuggling, it may perhaps be remedied in two ways; either by diminiſhing the temptation to ſmuggle, or by increaſing the difficulty of ſmuggling. The temptation to ſmuggle can be diminiſhed only by the lowering of the tax; and the difficulty of ſmuggling can be increaſed only by eſtabliſhing that ſyſtem of adminiſtration which is moſt proper for preventing it.

THE

THE exciſe laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obſtruct and embarraſs the operations of the ſmuggler much more effectually than thoſe of the cuſtoms. By introducing into the cuſtoms a ſyſtem of adminiſtration as ſimilar to that of the exciſe as the nature of the different duties will admit, the difficulty of ſmuggling might be very much increaſed. This alteration, it has been ſuppoſed by many people, might very eaſily be brought about.

THE importer of commodities liable to any duties of cuſtoms, it has been ſaid, might at his option be allowed either to carry them to his own private warehouſe, or to lodge them in a warehouſe provided either at his own expence or at that of the public, but under the key of the cuſtomhouſe officer, and never to be opened but in his preſence. If the merchant carried them to his own private warehouſe, the duties to be immediately paid, and never afterwards to be drawn back; and that warehouſe to be at all times ſubject to the viſit and examination of the cuſtomhouſe officer, in order to aſcertain how far the quantity contained in it correſponded with that for which the duty had been paid. If he carried them to the public warehouſe, no duty to be paid till they were taken out for home conſumption. If taken out for exportation, to be duty-free; proper ſecurity being always given that they ſhould be ſo exported. The dealers in thoſe particular commodities, either by wholeſale or retail, to be at all times ſubject to the viſit and examination of the cuſtomhouſe officer; and to be obliged to juſtify by proper certificates the payment of the duty upon the whole quantity contained in their ſhops or warehouſes. What are called the exciſe duties upon rum imported are at preſent levied in this manner, and the ſame ſyſtem of adminiſtration might perhaps be extended to all duties upon goods imported; provided always, that thoſe duties were, like the duties of exciſe, confined to a few ſorts of goods of the moſt

BOOK V. general uſe and conſumption. If they were extended to almoſt all ſorts of goods, as at preſent, public warehouſes of ſufficient extent could not eaſily be provided, and goods of a very delicate nature, or of which the preſervation required much care and attention, could not ſafely be truſted by the merchant in any warehouſe but his own.

If by ſuch a ſyſtem of adminiſtration ſmuggling to any conſiderable extent could be prevented even under pretty high duties, and if every duty was occaſionally either heightened or lowered according as it was moſt likely, either the one way or the other, to afford the greateſt revenue to the ſtate; taxation being always employed as an inſtrument of revenue and never of monopoly; it ſeems not improbable that a revenue at leaſt equal to the preſent neat revenue of the cuſtoms might be drawn from duties upon the importation of only a few ſorts of goods of the moſt general uſe and conſumption; and that the duties of cuſtoms might thus be brought to the ſame degree of ſimplicity, certainty and preciſion, as thoſe of exciſe. What the revenue at preſent loſes by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods which are afterwards re-landed and conſumed at home, would under this ſyſtem be ſaved altogether. If to this ſaving, which would alone be very conſiderable, was added the abolition of all bounties upon the exportation of home-produce, in all caſes in which thoſe bounties were not in reality drawbacks of ſome duties of exciſe which had before been advanced; it cannot well be doubted but that the neat revenue of cuſtoms might after an alteration of this kind be fully equal to what it had ever been before.

If by ſuch a change of ſyſtem the public revenue ſuffered no loſs; the trade and manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very conſiderable advantage. The trade in the commodities

not taxed, by far the greateſt number, would be perfectly free, and might be carried on to and from all parts of the world with every poſſible advantage. Among thoſe commodities would be comprehended all the neceſſaries of life, and all the materials of manufacture. So far as the free importation of the neceſſaries of life reduced their average money price in the home-market, it would reduce the money price of labour, but without reducing in any reſpect its real recompence. The value of money is in proportion to the quantity of the neceſſaries of life which it will purchaſe That of the neceſſaries of life is altogether independant of the quantity of money which can be had for them. The reduction in the money price of labour would neceſſarily be attended with a proportionable one in that of all home-manufactures, which would thereby gain ſome advantage in all foreign markets. The price of ſome manufactures would be reduced in a ſtill greater proportion by the free importation of the raw materials. If raw ſilk could be imported from China and Indoſtan duty-free, the ſilk manufacturers in England could greatly underſell thoſe of both France and Italy. There would be no occaſion to prohibit the importation of foreign ſilks and velvets. The cheapneſs of their goods would ſecure to our own workmen, not only the poſſeſſion of the home, but a very great command of the foreign market. Even the trade in the commodities taxed would be carried on with much more advantage than at preſent. If thoſe commodities were delivered out of the public warehouſe for foreign exportation, being in this caſe exempted from all taxes, the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carrying trade in all ſorts of goods would under this ſyſtem enjoy every poſſible advantage. If thoſe commodities were delivered out for home-conſumption, the importer not being obliged to advance the tax till he had an opportunity of ſelling his goods either to ſome dealer, or to ſome conſumer, he could always afford to ſell them cheaper than if he had been

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been obliged to advance it at the moment of importation. Under the ſame taxes, the foreign trade of conſumption even in the taxed commodities, might in this manner be carried on with much more advantage than it can at preſent.

It was the object of the famous exciſe ſcheme of Sir Robert Walpole to eſtabliſh, with regard to wine and tobacco, a ſyſtem not very unlike that which is here propoſed. But though the bill which was then brought into parliament, comprehended thoſe two commodities only; it was generally ſuppoſed to be meant as an introduction to a more extenſive ſcheme of the ſame kind. Faction, combined with the intereſt of ſmuggling merchants, raiſed ſo violent, though ſo unjuſt, a clamour againſt that bill, that the miniſter thought proper to drop it; and from a dread of exciting a clamour of the ſame kind, none of his ſucceſſors have dared to reſume the project.

The duties upon foreign luxuries imported for home-conſumption, though they ſometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of middling or more than middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign wines, upon coffee, chocolate, tea, ſugar, &c.

The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home-produce deſtined for home-conſumption, fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks in proportion to their reſpective expence. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and ale, upon their own conſumption: The rich, both upon their own conſumption and upon that of their ſervants.

The whole conſumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of thoſe below the middling rank, it muſt be obſerved, is in every country

country much greater, not only in quantity, but in value, than that of the middling and of thoſe above the middling rank. The whole expence of the inferior is much greater than that of the ſuperior ranks. In the firſt place, almoſt the whole capital of every country is annually diſtributed among the inferior ranks of people as the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue ariſing both from the rent of land and from the profits of ſtock, is annually diſtributed among the ſame rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial ſervants, and other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, ſome part of the profits of ſtock belongs to the ſame rank, as a revenue ariſing from the employment of their ſmall capitals. The amount of the profits annually made by ſmall ſhopkeepers, tradeſmen, and retailers of all kinds, is every where very conſiderable, and makes a very conſiderable portion of the annual produce. Fourthly, and laſtly, ſome part even of the rent of land belongs to the ſame rank; a conſiderable part to thoſe who are ſomewhat below the middling rank, and a ſmall part even to the loweſt rank; common labourers ſometimes poſſeſſing in property an acre or two of land. Though the expence of thoſe inferior ranks of people, therefore, taking them individually, is very ſmall, yet the whole maſs of it, taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largeſt portion of the whole expence of the ſociety; what remains of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country for the conſumption of the ſuperior ranks being always much leſs, not only in quantity but in value. The taxes upon expence, therefore, which fall chiefly upon that of the ſuperior ranks of people, upon the ſmaller portion of the annual produce, are likely to be much leſs productive than either thoſe which fall indifferently upon the expence of all ranks, or even thoſe which fall chiefly upon that of the inferior ranks; than either thoſe which fall indifferently upon the whole annual produce, or thoſe which fall chiefly upon the larger portion

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tion of it. The exciſe upon the materials and manufacture of home-made fermented and ſpirituous liquors is accordingly, of all the different taxes upon expence, by far the moſt productive; and this branch of the exciſe falls very much, perhaps principally, upon the expence of the common people. In the year which ended on the 5th of July, 1775, the groſs produce of this branch of the exciſe amounted to 3,314,223 l. 18 s. 10$\frac{1}{4}$ d.

It muſt always be remembered, however, that it is the luxurious and not the neceſſary expence of the inferior ranks of people that ought ever to be taxed. The final payment of any tax upon their neceſſary expence would fall altogether upon the ſuperior ranks of people; upon the ſmaller portion of the annual produce, and not upon the greater. Such a tax muſt in all caſes either raiſe the wages of labour, or leſſen the demand for it. It could not raiſe the wages of labour, without throwing the final payment of the tax upon the ſuperior ranks of people. It could not leſſen the demand for labour, without leſſening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the fund from which all taxes muſt be finally paid. Whatever might be the ſtate to which a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it muſt always raiſe wages higher than they otherwiſe would be in that ſtate; and the final payment of this enhancement of wages muſt in all caſes fall upon the ſuperior ranks of people.

Fermented liquors brewed and ſpirituous liquors diſtilled, not for ſale, but for private uſe, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of exciſe. This exemption, of which the object is not to expoſe private families to the odious viſit and examination of the tax-gatherer, occaſions the burden of thoſe duties to fall frequently much lighter upon the rich than upon the poor. It is not, indeed, very common to diſtill for private uſe, though it is

done ſometimes. But in the country, many middling and almoſt all rich and great families brew their own beer. Their ſtrong beer, therefore, coſts them eight ſhillings a barrel leſs than it coſts the common brewer, who muſt have his profit upon the tax, as well as upon all the other expence which he advances. Such families, therefore, muſt drink their beer at leaſt nine or ten ſhillings a barrel cheaper than any liquor of the ſame quality can be drunk by the common people, to whom it is every where more convenient to buy their beer, by little and little, from the brewery or the ale-houſe. Malt, in the ſame manner, that is made for the uſe of a private family, is not liable to the viſit or examination of the tax-gatherer; but in this caſe the family muſt compound at ſeven ſhillings and ſixpence a head for the tax. Seven ſhillings and ſixpence are equal to the exciſe upon ten buſhels of malt; a quantity fully equal to what all the different members of any ſober family, men, women, and children, are at an average likely to conſume. But in rich and great families, where country hoſpitality is much practiſed, the malt liquors conſumed by the members of the family make but a ſmall part of the conſumption of the houſe. Either on account of this compoſition, however, or for other reaſons, it is not near ſo common to malt as to brew for private uſe. It is difficult to imagine any equitable reaſon why thoſe who either brew or diſtill for private uſe, ſhould not be ſubject to a compoſition of the ſame kind.

A GREATER revenue than what is at preſent drawn from all the heavy taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, might be raiſed, it has frequently been ſaid, by a much lighter tax upon malt; the opportunities of defrauding the revenue being much greater in a brewery than in a malt-houſe; and thoſe who brew for private uſe being exempted from all duties or compoſition for duties, which is not the caſe with thoſe who malt for private uſe.

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In the porter brewery of London, a quarter of malt is commonly brewed into more than two barrels and a half, ſometimes into three barrels of porter. The different taxes upon malt amount to ſix ſhillings a quarter; thoſe upon ſtrong beer and ale to eight ſhillings a barrel. In the porter brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, amount to between twenty-ſix and thirty ſhillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. In the country brewery for common country ſale, a quarter of malt is ſeldom brewed into leſs than two barrels of ſtrong and one barrel of ſmall beer; frequently into two barrels and a half of ſtrong beer. The different taxes upon ſmall beer amount to one ſhilling and four-pence a barrel. In the country brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, ſeldom amount to leſs than twenty-three ſhillings and four-pence, frequently to twenty-ſix ſhillings, upon the produce of a quarter of malt. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, therefore, the whole amount of the duties upon malt, beer, and ale, cannot be eſtimated at leſs than twenty-four or twenty-five ſhillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. But by taking off all the different duties upon beer and ale, and by tripling the malt-tax, or by raiſing it from ſix to eighteen ſhillings upon the quarter of malt, a greater revenue, it is ſaid, might be raiſed by this ſingle tax than what is at preſent drawn from all thoſe heavier taxes.

In

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		l.	s.	d.
In 1772,	the old malt tax produced —	722,023	11	11
	The additional — —	356,776	7	9¾
In 1773,	the old tax produced —	561,627	3	7¼
	The additional — —	278,650	15	3¾
In 1774,	the old tax produced —	624,614	17	5¾
	The additional — —	310,745	2	8½
In 1775,	the old tax produced — —	657,357	—	8½
	The additional — —	323,785	12	6¼
		4)3,835,580	12	—¾
	Average of these four years —	958,895	3	—¾
In 1772,	the country excise produced —	1,243,128	5	3
	The London brewery —	408,260	7	2¾
In 1773,	the country excise ——	1,245,808	3	3
	The London brewery —	405,406	17	10½
In 1774,	the country excise — —	1,246,373	14	5½
	The London brewery —	320,601	18	—¾
In 1775,	the country excise — —	1,214,583	6	1
	The London brewery —	463,670	7	—¼
		4)6,547,832	19	2¼
	Average of these four years ——	1,636,958	4	9½
	To which adding the average malt tax, or	958,895	3	—¾
	The whole amount of those different taxes comes out to be — —	2,595,853	7	9¹¹⁄₁₂
	But by tripling the malt tax, or by raising it from six to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, that single tax would produce — — — —	2,876,685	9	—¾
	A sum which exceeds the foregoing by —	280,832	1	2¹⁄₁₂

UNDER

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UNDER the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four ſhillings upon the hogſhead of cyder, and another of ten ſhillings upon the barrel of mum. In 1774, the tax upon cyder produced only 3083 l. 6 s. 8 d. It probably fell ſomewhat ſhort of its uſual amount; all the different taxes upon cyder having that year produced leſs than ordinary. The tax upon mum, though much heavier, is ſtill leſs productive, on account of the ſmaller conſumption of that liquor. But to balance whatever may be the ordinary amount of thoſe two taxes; there is comprehended under what is called The country exciſe, firſt, the old exciſe of ſix ſhillings and eight-pence upon the hogſhead of cyder; ſecondly, a like tax of ſix ſhillings and eight-pence upon the hogſhead of verjuice; thirdly, another of eight ſhillings and nine-pence upon the hogſhead of vinegar; and, laſtly, a fourth tax of eleven-pence upon the gallon of mead or metheglin: The produce of thoſe different taxes will probably much more than counterbalance that of the duties impoſed, by what is called The annual malt tax, upon cyder and mum.

MALT is conſumed not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the manufacture of low wines and ſpirits. If the malt tax was to be raiſed to eighteen ſhillings upon the quarter, it might be neceſſary to make ſome abatement in the different exciſes which are impoſed upon thoſe particular ſorts of low wines and ſpirits of which malt makes any part of the materials. In what are called Malt ſpirits, it makes commonly but a third part of the materials; the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-third barley and one-third wheat. In the diſtillery of malt ſpirits, both the opportunity, and the temptation to ſmuggle, are much greater than either in a brewery or in a malt-houſe; the opportunity, on account of the ſmaller bulk and greater value of the commodity; and the temptation, on account of the ſuperior height

height of the duties, which amount to 2 s. 6 d. upon the gallon of ſpirits. By increaſing the duties upon malt, and reducing thoſe upon the diſtillery, both the opportunities and the temptation to ſmuggle would be diminiſhed, which might occaſion a ſtill further augmentation of revenue.

It has for ſome time paſt been the policy of Great Britain to diſcourage the conſumption of ſpirituous liquors, on account of their ſuppoſed tendency to ruin the health and to corrupt the morals of the common people. According to this policy, the abatement of the taxes upon the diſtillery ought not to be ſo great as to reduce in any reſpect the price of thoſe liquors. Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever; while at the ſame time the wholeſome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be conſiderably reduced in their price. The people might thus be in part relieved from one of the burdens of which they at preſent complain the moſt; while at the ſame time the revenue might be conſiderably augmented.

The objections of Doctor Davenant to this alteration in the preſent ſyſtem of exciſe duties, ſeem to be without foundation. Thoſe objections are, that the tax, inſtead of dividing itſelf as at preſent pretty equally upon the profit of the maltſter, upon that of the brewer, and upon that of the retailer, would, ſo far as it affected profit, fall altogether upon that of the maltſter; that the maltſter could not ſo eaſily get back the amount of the tax in the advanced price of his malt, as the brewer and retailer in the advanced price of their liquor; and that ſo heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent and profit of barley land.

No tax can ever reduce, for any conſiderable time, the rate of profit in any particular trade, which muſt always keep its level with

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with other trades in the neighbourhood. The preſent duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not affect the profits of the dealers in thoſe commodities, who all get back the tax with an additional profit, in the enhanced price of their goods. A tax indeed may render the goods upon which it is impoſed ſo dear as to diminiſh the conſumption of them. But the conſumption of malt is in malt liquors; and a tax of eighteen ſhillings upon the quarter of malt could not well render thoſe liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to twenty-four or twenty-five ſhillings, do at preſent. Thoſe liquors, on the contrary, would probably become cheaper, and the conſumption of them would be more likely to increaſe than to diminiſh.

It is not very eaſy to underſtand why it ſhould be more difficult for the maltſter to get back eighteen ſhillings in the advanced price of his malt, than it is at preſent for the brewer to get back twenty-four or twenty-five, ſometimes thirty ſhillings, in that of his liquor. The maltſter, indeed, inſtead of a tax of ſix ſhillings, would be obliged to advance one of eighteen ſhillings upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at preſent obliged to advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, ſometimes thirty ſhillings, upon every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more inconvenient for the maltſter to advance a lighter tax, than it is at preſent for the brewer to advance a heavier one. The maltſter doth not always keep in his granaries a ſtock of malt which it will require a longer time to diſpoſe of, than the ſtock of beer and ale which the brewer frequently keeps in his cellars. The former, therefore, may frequently get the returns of his money as ſoon as the latter. But whatever inconveniency might ariſe to the maltſter from being obliged to advance a heavier tax, could eaſily be remedied by granting him a few months longer credit than is at preſent commonly given to the brewer.

NOTHING could reduce the rent and profit of barley land which did not reduce the demand for barley. But a change of ſyſtem which reduced the duties upon a quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale from twenty-four and twenty-five ſhillings to eighteen ſhillings, would be more likely to increaſe than diminiſh that demand. The rent and profit of barley land, beſides, muſt always be nearly equal to thoſe of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. If they were leſs, ſome part of the barley land would ſoon be turned to ſome other purpoſe; and if they were greater, more land would ſoon be turned to the raiſing of barley. When the ordinary price of any particular produce of land is at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax upon it neceſſarily reduces the rent and profit of the land which grows it. A tax upon the produce of thoſe precious vineyards, of which the wine falls ſo much ſhort of the effectual demand, that its price is always above the natural proportion to that of the produce of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land, would neceſſarily reduce the rent and profit of thoſe vineyards. The price of the wines, being already the higheſt that could be got for the quantity commonly ſent to market, it could not be raiſed higher without diminiſhing that quantity; and the quantity could not be diminiſhed without ſtill greater loſs, becauſe the lands could not be turned to any other equally valuable produce. The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall upon the rent and profit; properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has been propoſed to lay any new tax upon ſugar, our ſugar planters have frequently complained that the whole weight of ſuch taxes fell, not upon the conſumer, but upon the producer; they never having been able to raiſe the price of their ſugar after the tax higher than it was before. The price had, it ſeems, before the tax been a monopoly price; and the argument adduced to ſhow that ſugar was an improper ſubject of taxation, demonſtrated perhaps that it was a proper one; the gains of monopoliſts, whenever they can be come at, being cer-

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tainly of all ſubjects the moſt proper. But the ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly price; and the rent and profit of barley land have never been above their natural proportion to thoſe of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. The different taxes which have been impoſed upon malt, beer, and ale, have never lowered the price of barley, have never reduced the rent and profit of barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has conſtantly riſen in proportion to the taxes impoſed upon it; and thoſe taxes, together with the different duties upon beer and ale, have conſtantly either raiſed the price, or what comes to the ſame thing, reduced the quality of thoſe commodities to the conſumer. The final payment of thoſe taxes has fallen conſtantly upon the conſumer, and not upon the producer.

The only people likely to ſuffer by the change of ſyſtem here propoſed, are thoſe who brew for their own private uſe. But the exemption which this ſuperior rank of people at preſent enjoy from very heavy taxes which are paid by the poor labourer and artificer, is ſurely moſt unjuſt and unequal, and ought to be taken away, even though this change was never to take place. It has probably been the intereſt of this ſuperior order of people, however, which has hitherto prevented a change of ſyſtem that could not well fail both to increaſe the revenue and to relieve the people.

Beſides ſuch duties as thoſe of cuſtoms and exciſe above-mentioned, there are ſeveral others which affect the price of goods more unequally and more indirectly. Of this kind are the duties which in French are called Peages, which in old Saxon times were called duties of Paſſage, and which ſeem to have been originally eſtabliſhed for the ſame purpoſe as our turnpike tolls or the tolls upon our canals and navigable rivers; for the maintenance of the road or of the navigation. Thoſe duties, when applied to ſuch purpoſes, are

moſt

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moſt properly impoſed according to the bulk or weight of the goods. As they were originally local and provincial duties, applicable to local and provincial purpoſes, the adminiſtration of them was in moſt caſes entruſted to the particular town, pariſh, or lordſhip, in which they were levied; ſuch communities being in ſome way or other ſuppoſed to be accountable for the application. The ſovereign, who is altogether unaccountable, has in many countries aſſumed to himſelf the adminiſtration of thoſe duties; and though he has in moſt caſes enhanced very much the duty, he has in many entirely neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of Great Britain ſhould ever become one of the reſources of government, we may learn, by the example of many other nations, what would probably be the conſequence. Such tolls are no doubt finally paid by the conſumer; but the conſumer is not taxed in proportion to his expence when he pays, not according to the value, but according to the bulk or weight of what he conſumes. When ſuch duties are impoſed, not according to the bulk or weight, but according to the ſuppoſed value of the goods, they become properly a ſort of inland cuſtoms or exciſes, which obſtruct very much the moſt important of all branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the country.

In ſome ſmall ſtates duties ſimilar to thoſe paſſage duties are impoſed upon goods carried acroſs the territory, either by land or by water, from one foreign country to another. Theſe are in ſome countries called tranſit-duties. Some of the little Italian ſtates, which are ſituated upon the Po, and the rivers which run into it, derive ſome revenue from duties of this kind, which are paid altogether by foreigners, and which are perhaps the only duties that one ſtate can impoſe upon the ſubjects of another without obſtructing in any reſpect the induſtry or commerce of its own. The moſt important tranſit-duty in the world is that levied by the king of Denmark upon all merchant ſhips which paſs through the Sound.

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Such taxes upon luxuries as the greater part of the duties of cuſtoms and exciſe, though they fall indifferently upon every different ſpecies of revenue, and are paid finally, or without any retribution, by whoever conſumes the commodities upon which they are impoſed, yet they do not always fall equally or proportionably upon the revenue of every individual. As every man's humour regulates the degree of his conſumption, every man contributes rather according to his humour than in proportion to his revenue; the profuſe contribute more, the parſimonious leſs, than their proper proportion. During the minority of a man of great fortune, he contributes commonly very little by his conſumption towards the ſupport of that ſtate from whoſe protection he derives a great revenue. Thoſe who live in another country contribute nothing by their conſumption towards the ſupport of the government of that country in which is ſituated the ſource of their revenue. If in this latter country there ſhould be no land-tax, nor any conſiderable duty upon the transference either of moveable or of immoveable property, as is the caſe in Ireland, ſuch abſentees may derive a great revenue from the protection of a government to the ſupport of which they do not contribute a ſingle ſhilling. This inequality is likely to be greateſt in a country of which the government is in ſome reſpects ſubordinate and dependent upon that of ſome other. The people who poſſeſs the moſt extenſive property in the dependent, will in this caſe generally chuſe to live in the governing country. Ireland is preciſely in this ſituation, and we cannot therefore wonder that the propoſal of a tax upon abſentees ſhould be ſo very popular in that country. It might perhaps be a little difficult to aſcertain either what ſort, or what degree of abſence ſhould ſubject a man to be taxed as an abſentee, or at what preciſe time the tax ſhould either begin or end. If you except, however, this very peculiar ſituation, any inequality in the contribution of individuals, which can ariſe from ſuch taxes, is much

much more than compenſated by the very circumſtance which occaſions that inequality; the circumſtance that every man's contribution is altogether voluntary; it being altogether in his power either to conſume or not to conſume the commodity taxed. Where ſuch taxes, therefore, are properly aſſeſſed and upon proper commodities, they are paid with leſs grumbling than any other. When they are advanced by the merchant or manufacturer, the conſumer, who finally pays them, ſoon comes to confound them with the price of the commodities, and almoſt forgets that he pays any tax.

SUCH taxes are or may be perfectly certain, or may be aſſeſſed ſo as to leave no doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or when it ought to be paid; concerning either the quantity or the time of payment. Whatever uncertainty there may ſometimes be, either in the duties of cuſtoms in Great Britain, or in other duties of the ſame kind in other countries, it cannot ariſe from the nature of thoſe duties, but from the inaccurate or unſkilful manner in which the law that impoſes them is expreſſed.

TAXES upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piece-meal, or in proportion as the contributors have occaſion to purchaſe the goods upon which they are impoſed. In the time and mode of payment they are, or may be, of all taxes the moſt convenient. Upon the whole, ſuch taxes, therefore, are, perhaps, as agreeable to the three firſt of the four general maxims concerning taxation, as any other. They offend in every reſpect againſt the fourth.

SUCH taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treaſury of the ſtate, always take out or keep out of the pockets of the people more than almoſt any other taxes. They ſeem to do this in all the four different ways in which it is poſſible to do it.

FIRST,

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First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious manner, requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers, whose salaries and perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings nothing into the treasury of the state. This expence, however, it must be acknowledged, is more moderate in Great Britain than in most other countries. In the year which ended on the fifth of July, 1775, the gross produce of the different duties, under the management of the commissioners of excise in England, amounted to 5,479,695l. 7s. 10d. which was levied at an expence of little more than five and a half per cent. From this gross produce, however, there must be deducted what was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the exportation of exciseable goods, which will reduce the neat produce below five millions. The levying of the salt duty, an excise duty, but under a different management, is much more expensive. The neat revenue of the customs does not amount to two millions and a half, which is levied at an expence of more than ten per cent. in the salaries of officers, and other incidents. But the perquisites of custom-house officers are every where much greater than their salaries; at some ports more than double or triple those salaries. If the salaries of officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to more than ten per cent. upon the neat revenue of the customs; the whole expence of levying that revenue may amount, in salaries and perquisites together, to more than twenty or thirty per cent. The officers of excise receive few or no perquisites; and the administration of that branch of the revenue, being of more recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than that of the customs, into which length of time has introduced and authorised many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue which is at present levied by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a saving, it is supposed, of more than fifty thousand pounds might be made in the annual expence of the excise. By confining the

duties of cuſtoms to a few ſorts of goods, and by levying thoſe duties according to the exciſe laws, a much greater ſaving might probably be made in the annual expence of the cuſtoms.

SECONDLY, ſuch taxes neceſſarily occaſion ſome obſtruction or diſcouragement to certain branches of induſtry. As they always raiſe the price of the commodity taxed, they ſo far diſcourage its conſumption, and conſequently its production. If it is a commodity of home growth or manufacture, leſs labour comes to be employed in raiſing and producing it. If it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increaſes in this manner the price, the commodities of the ſame kind which are made at home may thereby, indeed, gain ſome advantage in the home market, and a greater quantity of domeſtic induſtry may thereby be turned towards preparing them. But though this riſe of price in a foreign commodity may encourage domeſtic induſtry in one particular branch, it neceſſarily diſcourages that induſtry in almoſt every other. The dearer the Birmingham manufacturer buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he neceſſarily ſells that part of his hardware with which, or, what comes to the ſame thing, with the price of which he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of leſs value to him, and he has leſs encouragement to work at it. The dearer the conſumers in one country pay for the ſurplus produce of another, the cheaper they neceſſarily ſell that part of their own ſurplus produce with which, or, what comes to the ſame thing, with the price of which they buy it. That part of their own ſurplus produce becomes of leſs value to them, and they have leſs encouragement no increaſe its quantity. All taxes upon conſumable commodities, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive labour below what it otherwiſe would be, either in preparing the commodities taxed, if they are home commodities; or in preparing thoſe with which they are purchaſed, if they are foreign commodities. Such taxes too

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always alter, more or leſs, the natural direction of national induſtry, and turn it into a channel always different from, and generally leſs advantageous than that in which it would have run of its own accord.

THIRDLY, the hope of evading ſuch taxes by ſmuggling gives frequent occaſion to forfeitures and other penalties, which entirely ruin the ſmuggler; a perſon who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating thoſe of natural juſtice, and would have been, in every reſpect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be ſo. In thoſe corrupted governments where there is at leaſt a general ſuſpicion of much unneceſſary expence, and great miſapplication of the public revenue, the laws which guard it are little reſpected. Not many people are ſcrupulous about ſmuggling when, without perjury, they can find any eaſy and ſafe opportunity of doing ſo. To pretend to have any ſcruple about buying ſmuggled goods, though a manifeſt encouragement to the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which almoſt always attends it, would in moſt countries be regarded as one of thoſe pedantic pieces of hypocriſy which, inſtead of gaining credit with any body, ſerve only to expoſe the perſon who affects to practiſe them, to the ſuſpicion of being a greater knave than moſt of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the public, the ſmuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade which he is thus taught to conſider as in ſome meaſure innocent; and when the ſeverity of the revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, he is frequently diſpoſed to defend with violence, what he has been accuſtomed to regard as his juſt property. From being at firſt, perhaps, rather imprudent than criminal, he at laſt too often becomes, one of the hardieſt and moſt determined violaters of the laws of ſociety. By the ruin of the ſmug-

gler, his capital, which had before been employed in maintaining productive labour, is abſorbed either in the revenue of the ſtate or in that of the revenue-officer, and is employed in maintaining unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the ſociety, and of the uſeful induſtry which it might otherwiſe have maintained. CHAP. II.

Fourthly, ſuch taxes, by ſubjecting at leaſt the dealers in the taxed commodities to the frequent viſits and odious examination of the tax gatherers, expoſe them ſometimes, no doubt, to ſome degree of oppreſſion, and always to much trouble and vexation; and though vexation, as has already been ſaid, is not ſtrictly ſpeaking expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himſelf from it. The laws of exciſe, though more effectual for the purpoſe for which they were inſtituted, are, in this reſpect, more vexatious than thoſe of the cuſtoms. When a merchant has imported goods ſubject to certain duties of cuſtoms, when he has paid thoſe duties, and lodged the goods in his warehouſe, he is not in moſt caſes liable to any further trouble or vexation from the cuſtom-houſe officer. It is otherwiſe with goods ſubject to duties of exciſe. The dealers have no reſpite from the continual viſits and examination of the exciſe officers. The duties of exciſe are, upon this account, more unpopular than thoſe of the cuſtoms; and ſo are the officers who levy them. Thoſe officers, it is pretended, though in general, perhaps, they do their duty fully as well as thoſe of the cuſtoms; yet, as that duty obliges them to be frequently very troubleſome to ſome of their neighbours, commonly contract a certain hardneſs of character which the others frequently have not. This obſervation, however, may very probably be the meer ſuggeſtion of fraudulent dealers, whoſe ſmuggling is either prevented or detected by their diligence.

The inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in ſome degree inſeparable from taxes upon conſumable commodities, fall as

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light upon the people of Great Britain as upon thoſe of any other country of which the government is nearly as expenſive. Our ſtate is not perfect, and might be mended; but it is as good or better than that of moſt of our neighbours.

In conſequence of the notion that duties upon conſumable goods were taxes upon the profits of merchants, thoſe duties have, in ſome countries, been repeated upon every ſucceſſive ſale of the goods. If the profits of the merchant importer or merchant manufacturer were taxed, equality ſeemed to require that thoſe of all the middle buyers, who intervened between either of them and the conſumer, ſhould likewiſe be taxed. The famous Alcavala of Spain ſeems to have been eſtabliſhed upon this principle. It was at firſt a tax of ten per cent. afterwards of fourteen per cent. and is at preſent of only ſix per cent. upon the ſale of every ſort of property, whether moveable or immoveable; and it is repeated every time the property is ſold. * The levying of this tax requires a multitude of revenue officers ſufficient to guard the tranſportation of goods, not only from one province to another, but from one ſhop to another. It ſubjects not only the dealers in ſome ſorts of goods, but thoſe in all ſorts, every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and ſhop-keeper, to the continual viſits and examination of the tax gatherers. Through the greater part of a country in which a tax of this kind is eſtabliſhed, nothing can be produced for diſtant ſale. The produce of every part of the country muſt be proportioned to the conſumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the Alcavala, accordingly, that Uſtaritz imputes the ruin of the manufactures of Spain. He might have imputed to it likewiſe the declenſion of agriculture, it being impoſed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land.

In the kingdom of Naples there is a ſimilar tax of three per cent. upon the value of all contracts, and conſequently upon that of

* Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 455.

of all contracts of ſale. It is both lighter than the Spaniſh tax, and the greater part of towns and pariſhes are allowed to pay a compoſition in lieu of it. They levy this compoſition in what manner they pleaſe, generally in a way that gives no interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The Neapolitan tax, therefore, is not near ſo ruinous as the Spaniſh one.

The uniform ſyſtem of taxation, which, with a few exceptions of no great conſequence, takes place in all the different parts of the united kingdom of Great Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and coaſting trade, almoſt entirely free. The inland trade is almoſt perfectly free, and the greater part of goods may be carried from one end of the kingdom to the other, without requiring any permit or let-paſs, without being ſubject to queſtion, viſit or examination from the revenue officers. There are a few exceptions, but they are ſuch as can give no interruption to any important branch of the inland commerce of the country. Goods carried coaſtwiſe, indeed, require certificates or coaſt-cockets. If you except coals, however, the reſt are almoſt all duty-free. This freedom of interior commerce, the effect of the uniformity of the ſyſtem of taxation, is perhaps one of the principal cauſes of the proſperity of Great Britain; every great country being neceſſarily the beſt and moſt extenſive market for the greater part of the productions of its own induſtry. If the ſame freedom, in conſequence of the ſame uniformity, could be extended to Ireland and the plantations, both the grandeur of the ſtate and the proſperity of every part of the empire, would probably be ſtill greater than at preſent.

In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different provinces, require a multitude of revenue officers to ſurround, not only the frontiers of the kingdom, but thoſe of almoſt each particular province, in order either to prevent the

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importation of certain goods, or to ſubject it to the payment of certain duties, to the no ſmall interruption of the interior commerce of the country. Some provinces are allowed to compound for the gabelle or ſalt-tax. Others are exempted from it altogether. Some provinces are exempted from the excluſive ſale of tobacco, which the farmers-general enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which correſpond to the exciſe in England, are very different in different provinces. Some provinces are exempted from them, and pay a compoſition or equivalent. In thoſe in which they take place and are in farm, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or diſtrict. The Traites, which correſpond to our cuſtoms, divide the kingdom into three great parts; firſt, the provinces ſubject to the tarif of 1664, which are called the provinces of the five great farms, and under which are comprehended Picardy, Normandy, and the greater part of the interior provinces of the kingdom; ſecondly, the provinces ſubject to the tarif of 1667, which are called the provinces reckoned foreign, and under which are comprehended the greater part of the frontier provinces; and, thirdly, thoſe provinces which are ſaid to be treated as foreign, or which, becauſe they are allowed a free commerce with foreign countries, are in their commerce with the other provinces of France ſubjected to the ſame duties as other foreign countries. Theſe are Alſace, the three biſhopricks of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marſeilles. Both in the provinces of the five great farms, (called ſo on account of an antient diviſion of the duties of cuſtoms into five great branches, each of which was originally the ſubject of a particular farm, though they are now all united into one) and in thoſe which are ſaid to be reckoned foreign, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or diſtrict. There are ſome ſuch even in the

provinces which are ſaid to be treated as foreign, particularly in the city of Marſeilles. It is unneceſſary to obſerve how much both the reſtraints upon the interior commerce of the country, and the number of the revenue officers muſt be multiplied, in order to guard the frontiers of thoſe different provinces and diſtricts, which are ſubject to ſuch different ſyſtems of taxation. CHAP. II.

Over and above the general reſtraints ariſing from this complicated ſyſtem of revenue laws, the commerce of wine, after corn perhaps the moſt important production of France, is in the greater part of the provinces ſubject to particular reſtraints ariſing from the favour which has been ſhewn to the vineyards of particular provinces and diſtricts, above thoſe of others. The provinces moſt famous for their wines, it will be found, I believe, are thoſe in which the trade in that article is ſubject to the feweſt reſtraints of this kind. The extenſive market which ſuch provinces enjoy, encourages good management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and in the ſubſequent preparation of their wines.

Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France. The little dutchy of Milan is divided into ſix provinces, in each of which there is a different ſyſtem of taxation with regard to ſeveral different ſorts of conſumable goods. The ſtill ſmaller territories of the duke of Parma are divided into three or four, each of which has, in the ſame manner, a ſyſtem of its own. Under ſuch abſurd management, nothing but the great fertility of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate could preſerve ſuch countries from ſoon relapſing into the loweſt ſtate of poverty and barbariſm.

Taxes upon conſumable commodities may either be levied by an adminiſtration of which the officers are appointed by government,

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ment, and are immediately accountable to government, of which the revenue muſt in this caſe vary from year to year, according to the occaſional variations in the produce of the tax; or they may be lett in farm for a rent certain, the farmer being allowed to appoint his own officers, who, though obliged to levy the tax in the manner directed by the law, are under his immediate inſpection, and are immediately accountable to him. The beſt and moſt frugal way of levying a tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is neceſſary for paying the ſtipulated rent, the ſalaries of the officers, and the whole expence of adminiſtration, the farmer muſt always draw from the produce of the tax a certain profit proportioned at leaſt to the advance which he makes, to the riſk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at, and to the knowledge and ſkill which it requires to manage ſo very complicated a concern. Government, by eſtabliſhing an adminiſtration under their own immediate inſpection of the ſame kind with that which the farmer eſtabliſhes, might at leaſt ſave this profit which is almoſt always exorbitant. To farm any conſiderable branch of the public revenue, requires either a great capital or a great credit; circumſtances which would alone reſtrain the competition for ſuch an undertaking to a very ſmall number of people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a ſtill ſmaller number have the neceſſary knowledge or experience; another circumſtance which reſtrains the competition ſtill further. The very few who are in condition to become competitors find it more for their intereſt to combine together; to become copartners inſtead of competitors, and when the farm is ſet up to auction to offer no rent, but what is much below the real value. In countries where the public revenues are in farm, the farmers are generally the moſt opulent people. Their wealth would alone excite the public indignation, and the vanity which almoſt always accompanies ſuch upſtart fortunes, the fooliſh oſtentation with

with which they commonly display that wealth, excites that indignation still more. CHAP. II.

The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe, which punish any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day after their farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the sovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the greatest, they seldom fail to complain that without laws more rigorous than those which actually take place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress their demands cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more severe. The most sanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the public revenue is in farm. The mildest, in countries where it is levied under the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows that the permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of his people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake of any momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers of his revenue, whose grandeur may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and not of the prosperity of his people.

A tax is sometimes, not only farmed for a rent certain, but the farmer has, besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the taxes upon tobacco and salt are levied in this manner. In such cases the farmer, instead of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon the people; the profit of the farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a luxury,

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a luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuſes. But ſalt being a neceſſary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a certain quantity of it; becauſe if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he would, it is preſumed, buy it of ſome ſmuggler. The taxes upon both commodities are exorbitant. The temptation to ſmuggle conſequently is to many people irreſiſtable, while at the ſame time the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of the farmer's officers, render the yielding to that temptation almoſt certainly ruinous. The ſmuggling of ſalt and tobacco ſends every year ſeveral hundred people to the gallies, beſides a very conſiderable number whom it ſends to the gibbet. Thoſe taxes levied in this manner yield a very conſiderable revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of tobacco was lett for twenty-two millions five hundred and forty-one thouſand two hundred and ſeventy-eight livres a year. That of ſalt, for thirty-ſix millions four hundred and ninety-two thouſand four hundred and four livres. The farm in both caſes was to commence in 1768, and to laſt for ſix years. Thoſe who conſider the blood of the people as nothing in compariſon with the revenue of the prince, may perhaps approve of this method of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of ſalt and tobacco, have been eſtabliſhed in many other countries; particularly in the Auſtrian and Pruſſian dominions, and in the greater part of the ſtates of Italy.

In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived from eight different ſources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco. The five laſt are, in the greater part of the provinces, under farm. The three firſt are every where levied by an adminiſtration under the immediate inſpection and direction of government, and it is univerſally acknowledged that in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they bring more into the treaſury of the prince than the

the other five, of which the administration is much more wasteful and expensive. CHAP. II.

The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and by increasing the number of vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of those other taxes, the revenue of the crown might be preserved; the expence of collection might be much diminished; the vexation of the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation occasion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior ranks might not be more burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The vingtieme, I have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the same kind with what is called the land-tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation is assessed upon those who are subject to the taille at so much a pound of that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must likewise fall upon the same order of people. Though the number of the vingtiemes, therefore, was increased so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of both those taxes, the superior ranks of people might not be more burdened than they are at present. Many individuals no doubt would; on account of the great inequalities with which the taille is commonly assessed upon the estates and tenants of different individuals. The interest and opposition of such favoured subjects are the obstacles most likely to prevent this or any other reformation of the same kind. Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, the taxes upon tobacco, all their different customs and excises uniform in all the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at much less expence, and the interior commerce of the kingdom might be rendered as free as that of England. Thirdly, and lastly,

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by ſubjecting all thoſe taxes to an adminiſtration under the immediate inſpection and direction of government, the exorbitant profits of the farmers general might be added to the revenue of the ſtate. The oppoſition ariſing from the private intereſt of individuals, is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two laſt as the firſt mentioned ſcheme of reformation.

THE French ſyſtem of taxation ſeems, in every reſpect, inferior to the Britiſh. In Great Britain ten millions ſterling are annually levied upon leſs than eight millions of people, without its being poſſible to ſay that any particular order is oppreſſed. From the collections of the abbè Expilly, and the obſervations of the author of the Eſſay upon the legiſlation and commerce of corn, it appears probable that France, including the provinces of Lorraine and Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of people; three times the number perhaps contained in great Britain. The ſoil and climate of France are better than thoſe of Great Britain. The country has been much longer in a ſtate of improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that account, better ſtocked with all thoſe things which it requires a long time to raiſe up and accumulate, ſuch as great towns, and convenient and well-built houſes, both in town and country. With theſe advantages it might be expected that in France a revenue of thirty millions might be levied for the ſupport of the ſtate, with as little inconveniency as a revenue of ten millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and 1766, the whole revenue paid into the treaſury of France, according to the beſt, though, I acknowledge, very imperfect accounts which I could get of it, uſually run between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it did not amount to fifteen millions ſterling; not the half of what might have been expected, had the people contributed in the ſame proportion to their numbers as the people of Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally acknowledged, are much more

oppreſſed

oppreſſed by taxes than the people of Great Britain. France, however, is certainly the great empire in Europe which, after that of Great Britain, enjoys the mildeſt and moſt indulgent government.

In Holland the heavy taxes upon the neceſſaries of life have ruined, it is ſaid, their principal manufactures, and are likely to diſcourage gradually even their fiſheries and their trade in ſhip building. The taxes upon the neceſſaries of life are inconſiderable in Great Britain, and no manufacture has hitherto been ruined by them. The Britiſh taxes which bear hardeſt on manufactures are ſome duties upon the importation of raw materials, particularly upon that of raw ſilk. The revenue of the ſtates general and of the different cities, however, is ſaid to amount to more than five millions two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling; and as the inhabitants of the United Provinces cannot well be ſuppoſed to amount to more than a third part of thoſe of Great Britain, they muſt, in proportion to their number, be much more heavily taxed.

After all the proper ſubjects of taxation have been exhauſted, if the exigencies of the ſtate ſtill continue to require new taxes, they muſt be impoſed upon improper ones. The taxes upon the neceſſaries of life, therefore, may be no impeachment of the wiſdom of that republic, which, in order to acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in ſpite of its great frugality, been involved in ſuch expenſive wars as have obliged it to contract great debts. The ſingular countries of Holland and Zealand, beſides, require a conſiderable expence even to preſerve their exiſtence, or to prevent their being ſwallowed up by the ſea, which muſt have contributed to increaſe conſiderably the load of taxes in thoſe two provinces. The republican form of government ſeems to be the principal ſupport of the preſent grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile families, have generally either ſome

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direct ſhare, or ſome indirect influence in the adminiſtration of that government. For the ſake of the reſpect and authority which they derive from this ſituation, they are willing to live in a country where their capital, if they employ it themſelves, will bring them leſs profit, and if they lend it to another, leſs intereſt; and where the very moderate revenue which they can draw from it will purchaſe leſs of the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life than in any other part of Europe. The reſidence of ſuch wealthy people neceſſarily keeps alive, in ſpite of all diſadvantages, a certain degree of induſtry in the country. Any public calamity which ſhould deſtroy the republican form of government, which ſhould throw the whole adminiſtration into the hands of nobles and of ſoldiers, which ſhould annihilate altogether the importance of thoſe wealthy merchants, would ſoon render it diſagreeable to them to live in a country where they were no longer likely to be much reſpected. They would remove both their reſidence and their capital to ſome other country, and the induſtry and commerce of Holland would ſoon follow the capitals which ſupported them.

CHAP. III.

Of publick Debts.

IN that rude ſtate of ſociety which precedes the extenſion of commerce and the improvement of manufactures, when thoſe expenſive luxuries which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce, are altogether unknown, the perſon who poſſeſſes a large revenue, I have endeavoured to ſhow in the third book of this inquiry, can ſpend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain. A large revenue may at all times be ſaid to conſiſt in the command of a large quantity of the neceſſaries of life. In that rude ſtate of things it is commonly paid in a large quantity of thoſe neceſſaries, in the materials of plain food and coarſe cloathing, in corn and cattle, in wool and raw hides. When neither commerce, nor manufactures furniſh any thing for which the owner can exchange the greater part of thoſe materials which are over and above his own conſumption, he can do nothing with the ſurplus but feed and cloathe nearly as many people as it will feed and cloathe. A hoſpitality in which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is no oſtentation, occaſion, in this ſituation of things, the principal expences of the rich and the great. But theſe, I have likewiſe endeavoured to ſhow in the ſame book, are expences by which people are not very apt to ruin themſelves. There is not perhaps any ſelfiſh pleaſure ſo frivolous, of which the purſuit has not ſometimes ruined even ſenſible men. A paſſion for cock-fighting has ruined many. But the inſtances, I believe, are not very numerous of people who have been ruined by a hoſpitality or liberality of this kind; though the hoſpitality of luxury and the liberality of oſtentation have ruined many. Among our feudal anceſtors, the long time during which

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eſtates uſed to continue in the ſame family ſufficiently demonſtrates the general diſpoſition of people to live within their income. Though the ruſtic hoſpitality conſtantly exerciſed by the great landholders may not to us in the preſent times ſeem conſiſtent with that order which we are apt to conſider as inſeparably connected with good oeconomy, yet we muſt certainly allow them to have been at leaſt ſo far frugal as not commonly to have ſpent their whole income. A part of their wool and raw hides they had generally an opportunity of ſelling for money. Some part of this money perhaps they ſpent in purchaſing the few objects of vanity and luxury with which the circumſtances of the times could furniſh them; but ſome part of it they ſeem commonly to have hoarded. They could not well indeed do any thing elſe but hoard whatever money they ſaved. To trade was diſgraceful to a gentleman, and to lend money at intereſt, which at that time was conſidered as uſury and prohibited by law, would have been ſtill more ſo. In thoſe times of violence and diſorder, beſides, it was convenient to have a hoard of money at hand, that in caſe they ſhould be driven from their own home they might have ſomething of known value to carry with them to ſome place of ſafety. The ſame violence which made it convenient to hoard, made it equally convenient to conceal the hoard. The frequency of treaſure trove, or of treaſure found of which no owner was known, ſufficiently demonſtrates the frequency in thoſe times both of hoarding and of concealing the hoard. Treaſure-trove was then conſidered as an important branch of the revenue of the ſovereign. All the treaſure-trove of the kingdom would ſcarce perhaps in the preſent times make an important branch of the revenue of a private gentleman of a good eſtate.

THE ſame diſpoſition to ſave and to hoard prevailed in the ſovereign, as well as in the ſubjects. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the ſovereign, it has already

already been obſerved in the fourth book, is in a ſituation which naturally diſpoſes him to the parſimony requiſite for accumulation. In that ſituation the expence even of a ſovereign cannot be directed by that vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court. The ignorance of the times affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery conſiſts. Standing armies are not then neceſſary, ſo that the expence even of a ſovereign, like that of any other great lord, can be employed in ſcarce any thing but bounty to his tenants, and hoſpitality to his retainers. But bounty and hoſpitality very ſeldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almoſt always does. All the antient ſovereigns of Europe accordingly, it has already been obſerved, had treaſures. Every Tartar chief in the preſent times is ſaid to have one.

In a commercial country abounding with every ſort of expenſive luxury, the ſovereign, in the ſame manner as almoſt all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally ſpends a great part of his revenue in purchaſing thoſe luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries ſupply him abundantly with all the coſtly trinkets which compoſe the ſplendid, but inſignificant pageantry of a court. For the ſake of an inferior pageantry of the ſame kind, his nobles diſmiſs their retainers, make their tenants independent, and become gradually themſelves as inſignificant as the greater part of the wealthy burghers in his dominions. The ſame frivolous paſſions which influence their conduct influence his. How can it be ſuppoſed that he ſhould be the only rich man in his dominions who is inſenſible to pleaſures of this kind? If he does not, what he is very likely to do, ſpend upon thoſe pleaſures ſo great a part of his revenue as to debilitate very much the defenſive power of the ſtate, it cannot well be expected that he ſhould not ſpend upon them all that part of it which is over and above what is neceſſary for ſupporting that defenſive power. His ordinary expence be-

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comes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it. The amaſſing of treaſure can no longer be expected, and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expences, he muſt neceſſarily call upon his ſubjects for an extraordinary aid. The preſent and the late king of Pruſſia are the only great princes of Europe who, ſince the death of Henry IV. of France in 1610, are ſuppoſed to have amaſſed any conſiderable treaſure. The parſimony which leads to accumulation has become almoſt as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. The Italian republics, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt. The canton of Berne is the ſingle republic in Europe which has amaſſed any conſiderable treaſure. The other Swiſs republics have not. The taſte for ſome ſort of pageantry, for ſplendid buildings, at leaſt, and other publick ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently ſober ſenate-houſe of a little republic as in the diſſipated court of the greateſt king.

THE want of parſimony in time of peace, impoſes the neceſſity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treaſury but what is neceſſary for carrying on the ordinary expence of the peace eſtabliſhment. In war an eſtabliſhment of three or four times that expence becomes neceſſary for the defence of the ſtate, and conſequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Suppoſing that the ſovereign ſhould have, what he ſcarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expence, yet ſtill the produce of the taxes from which this increaſe of revenue muſt be drawn will not begin to come into the treaſury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are impoſed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army muſt be augmented, the fleet muſt be fitted out, the garriſoned towns muſt be put into a poſture of defence;

that

that army, that fleet, thoſe garriſoned towns muſt be furniſhed with arms, ammunition and proviſions. An immediate and great expence muſt be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and ſlow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency government can have no other reſource but in borrowing.

THE ſame commercial ſtate of ſociety which, by the operation of moral cauſes, brings government in this manner into the neceſſity of borrowing, produces in the ſubjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it commonly brings along with it the neceſſity of borrowing, it likewiſe brings along with it the facility of doing ſo.

A COUNTRY abounding with merchants and manufacturers, neceſſarily abounds with a ſet of people through whoſe hands, not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all thoſe who either lend them money, or truſt them with goods, paſs as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or buſineſs, lives upon his income, paſſes through his hands. The revenue of ſuch a man can regularly paſs through his hands only once in the year. But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant who deals in a trade of which the returns are very quick, may ſometimes paſs through his hands two, three, or four times in a year. A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, neceſſarily abounds with a ſet of people who have it at all times in their power to advance, if they chuſe to do ſo, a very large ſum of money to government. Hence the ability in the ſubjects of a commercial ſtate to lend.

COMMERCE and manufactures can ſeldom flouriſh long in any ſtate which does not enjoy a regular adminiſtration of juſtice, in which the people do not feel themſelves ſecure in the poſſeſſion of

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their property, in which the faith of contracts is not ſupported by law, and in which the authority of the ſtate is not ſuppoſed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all thoſe who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in ſhort, can ſeldom flouriſh in any ſtate in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the juſtice of government. The ſame confidence which diſpoſes great merchants and manufacturers, upon ordinary occaſions, to truſt their property to the protection of a particular government; diſpoſes them, upon extraordinary occaſions, to truſt that government with the uſe of their property. By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminiſh their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures. On the contrary, they commonly augment it. The neceſſities of the ſtate render government upon moſt occaſions willing to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous to the lender. The ſecurity which it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor, and, from the univerſal confidence in the juſtice of the ſtate, generally ſells in the market for more than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and inſtead of diminiſhing, increaſes his trading capital. He generally conſiders it as a favour, therefore, when the adminiſtration admits him to a ſhare in the firſt ſubſcription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or willingneſs in the ſubjects of a commercial ſtate to lend.

The government of ſuch a ſtate is very apt to repoſe itſelf upon this ability and willingneſs of its ſubjects to lend it their money on extraordinary occaſions. It foreſees the facility of borrowing, and therefore diſpenſes itſelf from the duty of ſaving.

In a rude ſtate of ſociety there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals. The individuals who hoard whatever money

money they can ſave, and who conceal their hoard, do ſo from a diſtruſt of the juſtice of government, from a fear that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered. In ſuch a ſtate of things few people would be able, and nobody would be willing to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies. The ſovereign feels that he muſt provide for ſuch exigencies by ſaving, becauſe he foreſees the abſolute impoſſibility of borrowing. This foreſight increaſes ſtill further his natural diſpoſition to ſave.

The progreſs of the enormous debts which at preſent oppreſs, and will in the long-run probably ruin all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty uniform. Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called perſonal credit, without aſſigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this reſource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon aſſignments or mortgages of particular funds.

What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain, is contracted in the former of thoſe two ways. It conſiſts partly in a debt which bears or is ſuppoſed to bear no intereſt, and which reſembles the debts that a private man contracts upon account; and partly in a debt which bears intereſt, and which reſembles what a private man contracts upon his bill or promiſſory note. The debts which are due either for extraordinary ſervices, or for ſervices either not provided for, or not paid at the time when they are performed; part of the extraordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, the arrears of ſubſidies to foreign princes, thoſe of ſeamens wages, &c. uſually conſtitute a debt of the firſt kind. Navy and exchequer bills, which are iſſued ſometimes in payment of a part of ſuch debts, and ſometimes for other purpoſes,

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conſtitute a debt of the ſecond kind; exchequer bills bearing intereſt from the day on which they are iſſued, and navy bills ſix months after they are iſſued. The bank of England, either by voluntarily diſcounting thoſe bills at their current value; or by agreeing with government for certain conſiderations to circulate Exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par, paying the intereſt which happens to be due upon them, keeps up their value and facilitates their circulation, and thereby frequently enables government to contract a very large debt of this kind. In France, where there is no bank, the ſtate bills (billets d'etat) † have ſometimes ſold at ſixty and ſeventy per cent. diſcount. During the great re-coinage in king William's time, when the bank of England thought proper to put a ſtop to its uſual tranſactions, exchequer bills and tallies are ſaid to have ſold from twenty-five to ſixty per cent. diſcount; owing partly, no doubt, to the ſuppoſed inſtability of the new government eſtabliſhed by the revolution, but partly too to the want of the ſupport of the bank of England.

When this reſource is exhauſted, and it becomes neceſſary, in order to raiſe money, to aſſign or mortgage ſome particular branch of the public revenue for the payment of the debt, government has upon different occaſions done this in two different ways. Sometimes it has made this aſſignment or mortgage for a ſhort period of time only, a year or a few years, for example; and ſometimes for perpetuity. In the one caſe the fund was ſuppoſed ſufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and intereſt of the money borrowed. In the other it was ſuppoſed ſufficient to pay the intereſt only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the intereſt, government being at liberty to redeem at any time this annuity upon paying back the principal ſum borrowed. When money was raiſed in the one way, it was ſaid to be raiſed by anticipation; when in the other, by perpetual funding, or, more ſhortly, by funding.

† See Examen des Reflexions politiques ſur les finances.

In

In Great Britain the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clauſe conſtantly inſerted into the acts which impoſe them. The bank of England generally advances at an intereſt, which ſince the revolution has varied from eight to three per cent. the ſums for which thoſe taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is, it is provided for in the ſupplies of the enſuing year. The only conſiderable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged is thus regularly ſpent before it comes in. Like an unprovident ſpendthrift, whoſe preſſing occaſions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the ſtate is in the conſtant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying intereſt for the uſe of its own money.

In the reign of king William, and during a great part of that of queen Anne, before we had become ſo familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were impoſed but for a ſhort period of time, (for four, five, ſix, or ſeven years only) and a great part of the grants of every year conſiſted in loans upon anticipations of the produce of thoſe taxes. The produce being frequently inſufficient for paying within the limited term the principal and intereſt of the money borrowed, deficiencies aroſe, to make good which it became neceſſary to prolong the term.

In 1697, by the 8th of William III. c. 20. the deficiencies of ſeveral taxes were charged upon what was then called the firſt general mortgage or fund, conſiſting of a prolongation to the firſt of Auguſt, 1706, of ſeveral different taxes, which would have expired within a ſhorter term, and of which the produce was accumulated into one general fund. The deficiencies charged upon this prolonged term amounted to 5,160,459 l. 14 s. 9½ d.

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In 1701 thoſe duties with ſome others were ſtill further prolonged for the like purpoſes till the firſt of Auguſt, 1710, and were called the ſecond general mortgage or fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to 2,055,999 l. 7 s. 11½ d.

In 1707, thoſe duties were ſtill further prolonged, as a fund for new loans, to the firſt of Auguſt, 1712, and were called the third general mortgage or fund. The ſum borrowed upon it was 983,254 l. 11 s. 9½ d.

In 1708, thoſe duties were all (except the old ſubſidy of tonnage and poundage, of which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a duty upon the importation of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the articles of union) ſtill further continued, as a fund for new loans, to the firſt of Auguſt, 1714, and were called the fourth general mortgage or fund. The ſum borrowed upon it was 925,176 l. 9 s. 2½ d.

In 1709, thoſe duties were all (except the old ſubſidy of tonnage and poundage, which was now left out of this fund altogether) ſtill further continued for the ſame purpoſe to the firſt of Auguſt, 1716, and were called the fifth general mortgage or fund. The ſum borrowed upon it was 922,029 l. 6 s. 0d.

In 1710, thoſe duties were again prolonged to the firſt of Auguſt, 1720, and were called the ſixth general mortgage or fund. The ſum borrowed upon it was 1,296,552 l. 9 s. 11½ d.

In 1711, the ſame duties (which at this time were thus ſubject to four different anticipations) together with ſeveral others were continued for ever, and made a fund for paying the intereſt of the capital of the South Sea company, which had that year advanced to government, for paying debts and making good deficiencies, the ſum of 9,177,967 l. 15 s. 4 d. the greateſt loan which at that time had ever been made.

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Before this period, the principal, so far as I have been able to observe, the only taxes which in order to pay the interest of a debt had been imposed for perpetuity, were those for paying the interest of the money which had been advanced to government by the Bank and East India company, and of what it was expected would be advanced, but which was never advanced, by a projected land-bank. The bank fund at this time amounted to 3,375,027l. 17s. 10½d. for which was paid an annuity or interest of 206,501l. 13s. 5d. The East India fund amounted to 3,200,000l. for which was paid an annuity or interest of 160,000l.; the bank fund being at six per cent. the East India fund at five per cent. interest.

In 1715, by the first of George I. c. 12. the different taxes which had been mortgaged for paying the bank annuity, together with several others which by this act were likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into one common fund called The Aggregate Fund, which was charged, not only with the payment of the bank annuity, but with several other annuities and burdens of different kinds. This fund was afterwards augmented by the third of George I. c. 8. and by the fifth of George I. c. 3. and the different duties which were then added to it were likewise rendered perpetual.

In 1717, by the third of George I. c. 7. several other taxes were rendered perpetual, and accumulated into another common fund, called The General Fund, for the payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to 724,849l. 6s. 10½d.

In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes which before had been anticipated only for a short term of years, were rendered perpetual as a fund for paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive anticipations.

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HAD money never been raiſed but by anticipation, the courſe of a few years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of government beſides that of not overloading the fund by charging it with more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and of not anticipating a ſecond time before the expiration of the firſt anticipation. But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of thoſe attentions. They have frequently overloaded the fund even upon the firſt anticipation; and when this happened not to be the caſe, they have generally taken care to overload it by anticipating a ſecond and a third time before the expiration of the firſt anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether inſufficient for paying both principal and intereſt of the money borrowed upon it, it became neceſſary to charge it with the intereſt only, or a perpetual annuity equal to the intereſt, and ſuch unprovident anticipations neceſſarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of perpetual funding. But though this practice neceſſarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period to one ſo indefinite that it is not very likely ever to arrive; yet as a greater ſum can in all caſes be raiſed by this new practice than by the old one of anticipations, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has in the great exigencies of the ſtate been univerſally preferred to the latter. To relieve the preſent exigency is always the object which principally intereſts thoſe immediately concerned in the adminiſtration of public affairs. The future liberation of the public revenue, they leave to the care of poſterity.

DURING the reign of queen Anne, the market rate of intereſt had fallen from ſix to five per cent. and in the twelfth year of her reign five per cent. was declared to be the higheſt rate which could lawfully be taken for money borrowed upon private ſecurity. Soon after the greater part of the temporary taxes of Great Britain had been rendered perpetual, and diſtributed into the Aggregate, South Sea, and General Funds, the creditors of the public,

publick, like thoſe of private perſons, were induced to accept of five per cent. for the intereſt of their money, which occaſioned a ſaving of one per cent. upon the capital of the greater part of the debts which had been thus funded for perpetuity, or of one-ſixth of the greater part of the annuities which were paid out of the three great funds above mentioned. This ſaving left a conſiderable ſurplus in the produce of the different taxes which had been accumulated into thoſe funds, over and above what was neceſſary for paying the annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid the foundation of what has ſince been called the Sinking Fund. In 1717, it amounted to 323,434l. 7s. 7½d. In 1727, the intereſt of the greater part of the public debts was ſtill further reduced to four per cent.; and in 1753 and 1757, to three and a half and three per cent.; which reductions ſtill further augmented the ſinking fund.

A SINKING fund, though inſtituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much the contracting of new debts. It is a ſubſidiary fund always at hand to be mortgaged in aid of any other doubtful fund, upon which money is propoſed to be raiſed in any exigency of the ſtate. Whether the ſinking fund of Great Britain has been more frequently applied to the one or to the other of thoſe two purpoſes, will ſufficiently appear by and by.

BESIDES thoſe two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a ſort of middle place between them. Theſe are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

DURING the reigns of king William and queen Anne, large ſums were frequently borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which

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were ſometimes longer and ſometimes ſhorter. In 1693, an act was paſſed for borrowing one million upon an annuity of fourteen per cent. or of 140,000l. a year for ſixteen years. In 1691, an act was paſſed for borrowing a million upon annuities for lives, upon terms which in the preſent times would appear very advantageous. But the ſubſcription was not filled up. In the following year the deficiency was made good by borrowing upon annuities for lives at fourteen per cent. or at little more than ſeven years purchaſe. In 1695, the perſons who had purchaſed thoſe annuities were allowed to exchange them for others of ninety-ſix years, upon paying into the Exchequer ſixty-three pounds in the hundred; that is, the difference between fourteen per cent. for life, and fourteen per cent. for ninety-ſix years, was ſold for ſixty-three pounds, or for four and a half years purchaſe. Such was the ſuppoſed inſtability of government, that even theſe terms procured few purchaſers. In the reign of queen Anne, money was upon different occaſions borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities for terms of thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninety-eight, and of ninety-nine years. In 1719, the proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were induced to accept in lieu of them South-ſea ſtock to the amount of eleven and a half years purchaſe of the annuities, together with an additional quantity of ſtock equal to the arrears which happened then to be due upon them. In 1720, the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years both long and ſhort were ſubſcribed into the ſame fund. The long annuities at that time amounted to 666,821l. 8s. 3½d. a year. On the 5th of January, 1775, the remainder of them, or what was not ſubſcribed at that time, amounted only to 136,453l. 12s. 8d.

DURING the two wars which begun in 1739, and in 1755, little money was borrowed either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon

upon thoſe for lives. An annuity for ninety-eight or ninety-nine years, however, is worth nearly as much money as a perpetuity, and ſhould therefore, one might think, be a fund for borrowing nearly as much. But thoſe who, in order to make family ſettlements, and to provide for remote futurity, buy into the public ſtocks, would not care to purchaſe into one of which the value was continually diminiſhing; and ſuch people make a very conſiderable proportion both of the proprietors and purchaſers of ſtock. An annuity for a long term of years therefore, though its intrinſic value may be very nearly the ſame with that of a perpetual annuity, will not find nearly the ſame number of purchaſers. The ſubſcribers to a new loan, who mean generally to ſell their ſubſcription as ſoon as poſſible, prefer greatly a perpetual annuity redeemable by parliament, to an irredeemable annuity for a long term of years of only equal amount. The value of the former may be ſuppoſed always the ſame or very nearly the ſame, and it makes therefore a more convenient transferable ſtock than the latter.

DURING the two laſt mentioned wars, annuities either for terms of years or for lives were ſeldom granted but as premiums to the ſubſcribers to a new loan, over and above the redeemable annuity or intereſt upon the credit of which the loan was ſuppoſed to be made. They were granted, not as the proper fund upon which the money was borrowed; but as an additional encouragement to the lender.

ANNUITIES for lives have occaſionally been granted in two different ways; either upon ſeparate lives, or upon lots of lives, which in French are called Tontines, from the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon ſeparate lives, the death of every individual annuitant diſburthens the public revenue ſo far as it was affected by his annuity. When annuities are

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granted upon tontines, the liberation of the public revenue does not commence till the death of all the annuitants comprehended in one lot, which may ſometimes conſiſt of twenty or thirty perſons, of whom the ſurvivors ſucceed to the annuities of all thoſe who die before them; the laſt ſurvivor ſucceeding to the annuities of the whole lot. Upon the ſame revenue more money can always be raiſed by tontines than by annuities for ſeparate lives. An annuity, with a right of ſurvivorſhip, is really worth more than an equal annuity for a ſeparate life, and from the confidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle upon which is founded the ſucceſs of all lotteries, ſuch an annuity generally ſells for ſomething more than it is worth. In countries where it is uſual for government to raiſe money by granting annuities, tontines are upon this account generally preferred to annuities for ſeparate lives. The expedient which will raiſe moſt money, is almoſt always preferred to that which is likely to bring about in the ſpeedieſt manner the liberation of the public revenue.

In France a much greater proportion of the public debts conſiſts in annuities for lives than in England. According to a memoir preſented by the parliament of Bourdeaux to the king in 1764, the whole public debt of France is eſtimated at twenty-four hundred millions of livres; of which the capital for which annuities for lives had been granted, is ſuppoſed to amount to three hundred millions, the eighth-part of the whole public debt. The annuities themſelves are computed to amount to thirty millions a year, the fourth part of one hundred and twenty millions, the ſuppoſed intereſt of that whole debt. Theſe eſtimations, I know very well, are not exact, but having been preſented by ſo very reſpectable a body as approximations to the truth, they may, I apprehend, be conſidered as ſuch. It is not the different degrees of anxiety in the two governments of France

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and England for the liberation of the public revenue, which occaſions this difference in their reſpective modes of borrowing. It ariſes altogether from the different views and intereſts of the lenders.

In England, the ſeat of government being in the greateſt mercantile city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government. By advancing it they do not mean to diminiſh, but, on the contrary, to increaſe their mercantile capitals; and unleſs they expected to ſell with ſome profit their ſhare in the ſubſcription for a new loan, they never would ſubſcribe. But if by advancing their money they were to purchaſe, inſtead of perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, whether their own or thoſe of other people, they would not always be ſo likely to ſell them with a profit. Annuities upon their own lives they would always ſell with loſs; becauſe no man will give for an annuity upon the life of another, whoſe age and ſtate of health are nearly the ſame with his own, the ſame price which he would give for one upon his own. An annuity upon the life of a third perſon, indeed, is, no doubt, of equal value to the buyer and the ſeller; but its real value begins to diminiſh from the moment it is granted, and continues to do ſo more and more as long as it ſubſiſts. It can never, therefore, make ſo convenient a transferable ſtock as a perpetual annuity, of which the real value may be ſuppoſed always the ſame, or very nearly the ſame.

In France, the ſeat of government not being in a great mercantile city, merchants do not make ſo great a proportion of the people who advance money to government. The people concerned in the finances, the farmers general, the receivers of the taxes which are not in farm, the court bankers, &c. make the greater part of thoſe who advance their money in all public exigencies. Such people are commonly men of mean birth, but of great wealth, and fre-

quently of great pride. They are too proud to marry their equals, and women of quality disdain to marry them. They frequently resolve, therefore, to live bachelors, and having neither any families of their own, nor much regard for those of their relations, whom they are not always very fond of acknowledging, they desire only to live in splendor during their own time, and are not unwilling that their fortune should end with themselves. The number of rich people, besides, who are either averse to marry, or whose condition of life renders it either improper or inconvenient for them to do so, is much greater in France than in England. To such people, who have little or no care for posterity, nothing can be more convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue, which is to last just as long as, and no longer than, they wish it to do.

The ordinary expence of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expence. They are unwilling, for fear of offending the people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing they are enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetual funding they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest possible sum of money. In great empires the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from the

war; but enjoy, at their eaſe, the amuſement of reading in the news-papers the exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amuſement compenſates the ſmall difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and thoſe which they had been accuſtomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly diſſatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an end to their amuſement, and to a thouſand viſionary hopes of conqueſt, and national glory, from a longer continuance of the war.

THE return of peace, indeed, ſeldom relieves them from the greater part of the taxes impoſed during the war. Theſe are mortgaged for the intereſt of the debt contracted in order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the intereſt of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expence of government, the old revenue, together with the new taxes, produce ſome ſurplus revenue, it may perhaps be converted into a ſinking fund for paying off the debt. But, in the firſt place, this ſinking fund, even ſuppoſing it ſhould be applied to no other purpoſe, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the courſe of any period during which it can reaſonably be expected that peace ſhould continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the ſecond place, this fund is almoſt always applied to other purpoſes.

THE new taxes were impoſed for the ſole purpoſe of paying the intereſt of the money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally ſomething which was neither intended nor expected, and is therefore ſeldom very conſiderable. Sinking funds have generally ariſen, not ſo much from any ſurplus of the taxes which was over and above what was neceſſary for paying the intereſt or annuity originally charged upon them, as from a ſubſequent reduction of that intereſt. That of Holland in 1655, and that of the eccleſiaſtical ſtate in 1685, were both formed in this manner. Hence the uſual inſufficiency of ſuch funds.

DURING

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During the moſt profound peace, various events occur which require an extraordinary expence, and government finds it always more convenient to defray this expence by miſapplying the ſinking fund than by impoſing a new tax. Every new tax is immediately felt more or leſs by the people. It occaſions always ſome murmur, and meets with ſome oppoſition. The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raiſed upon every different ſubject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more difficult it becomes too either to find out new ſubjects of taxation, or to raiſe much higher the taxes already impoſed upon the old. A momentary ſuſpenſion of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and occaſions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of the ſinking fund is always an obvious and eaſy expedient for getting out of the preſent difficulty. The more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more neceſſary it may have become to ſtudy to reduce them, the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to miſapply any part of the ſinking fund; the leſs likely is the public debt to be reduced to any conſiderable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is the ſinking fund to be miſapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expences which occur in time of peace. When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the neceſſities of a new war, nothing but either the animoſity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national ſecurity, can induce the people to ſubmit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax. Hence the uſual miſapplication of the ſinking fund.

In Great Britain, from the time that we had firſt recourſe to the ruinous expedient of perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt in time of peace, has never borne any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It was in the war which began in 1688, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryſwick in 1697, that the foundation of the preſent enormous debt of Great Britain was firſt laid.

On

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On the 31ſt of December, 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded and unfunded, amounted to 21,515,742l. 13s. 8½d. A great part of thoſe debts had been contracted upon ſhort anticipations, and ſome part upon annuities for lives; ſo that before the 31ſt of December, 1701, in leſs than four years, there had partly been paid off, and partly reverted to the public, the ſum of 5,121,041 l. 12 s. 0¾ d.; a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever ſince been brought about in ſo ſhort a period of time. The remaining debt, therefore, amounted only to 16,394,701 l. 1 s. 7¼ d.

In the war which began in 1702, and which was concluded by the treaty of Utrecht, the public debts were ſtill more accumulated. On the 31ſt of December, 1714, they amounted to 53,681,076 l. 5 s. 6 1/12 d. The ſubſcription into the South Sea fund of the long and ſhort annuities increaſed the capital of the public debts, ſo that on the 31ſt of December, 1722, it amounted to 55,282,978 l. 1 s. 3⅝ d. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, and went on ſo ſlowly that, on the 31ſt of December, 1739, during ſeventeen years of profound peace, the whole ſum paid off was no more than 8,328,354 l. 17 s. 11 1/12 d. the capital of the public debt at that time amounting to 46,954,623 l. 3 s. 4 7/12 d.

The Spaniſh war, which began in 1739, and the French war which ſoon followed it, occaſioned a further encreaſe of the debt, which, on the 31ſt of December, 1748, after the war had been concluded by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, amounted to 78,293,313 l. 1 s. 10¾ d. The moſt profound peace of ſeventeen years continuance had taken no more than 8,328,354l. 17s. 11 1/12 d. from it. A war of leſs than nine years continuance added 31,338,689 l. 18 s. 6⅛ d. to it *.

During the adminiſtration of Mr. Pelham, the intereſt of the public debt was reduced, or at leaſt meaſures were taken for reducing

* See James Poſtlethwaite's hiſtory of the public revenue.

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ing it, from four to three per cent.; the ſinking fund was increaſed, and ſome part of the public debt was paid off. In 1755, before the breaking out of the late war, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 72,289,673 l. On the 5th of January, 1763, at the concluſion of the peace, the funded debt amounted to 122,603,336 l. 8 s. 2½ d. The unfunded debt has been ſtated at 13,927,589 l. 2 s. 2 d. But the expence occaſioned by the war did not end with the concluſion of the peace; ſo that though on the 5th of January, 1764, the funded debt was increaſed (partly by a new loan, and partly by funding a part of the unfunded debt) to 129,586,789 l. 10 s. 1½ d. there ſtill remained (according to the very well informed author of the Conſiderations on the trade and finances of Great Britain) an unfunded debt, which was brought to account in that and the following year, of 9,975,017 l. 12 s. 2 5/4 d. In 1764, therefore, the public debt of Great Britain, funded and unfunded together, amounted, according to this author, to 139,561,807 l. 2 s. 4 d. The annuities for lives too, which had been granted as premiums to the ſubſcribers to the new loans in 1757, eſtimated at fourteen years purchaſe, were valued at 472,500 l.; and the annuities for long terms of years, granted as premiums likewiſe, in 1761 and 1762, eſtimated at 27½ years purchaſe, were valued at 6,826,875 l. During a peace of about ſeven years continuance, the prudent and truly patriot adminiſtration of Mr. Pelham, was not able to pay off an old debt of ſix millions. During a war of nearly the ſame continuance, a new debt of more than ſeventy-five millions was contracted.

On the 5th of January, 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 124,996,086 l. 1 s. 6½ d. The unfunded, excluſive of a large civil liſt debt, to 4,150,236 l. 3 s. 11 7/8 d. Both together, to 129,146,322 l. 5 s. 6 d. According to this account the whole debt paid off during eleven years profound peace amounted only to 10,415,474 l. 16 s. 9 7/8 d. Even this

ſmall

ſmall reduction of debt, however, has not been all made from the ſavings out of the ordinary revenue of the ſtate. Several extraneous ſums, altogether independant of that ordinary revenue, have contributed towards it. Among theſe we may reckon an additional ſhilling in the pound land tax for three years; the two millions received from the Eaſt India company, as indemnification for their territorial acquiſitions; and the one hundred and ten thouſand pounds received from the bank for the renewal of their charter. To theſe muſt be added ſeveral other ſums which, as they aroſe out of the late war, ought perhaps to be conſidered as deductions from the expences of it. The principal are,

	l.	s.	d.
The produce of French prizes ——	690,449	18	9
Compoſition for French priſoners —	670,000	0	0
What has been received from the ſale of the ceded iſlands —— ——	95,500	0	0
Total,	1,455,949	18	9

If we add to this ſum the balance of the earl of Chatham's and Mr. Calcraft's accounts, and other army ſavings of the ſame kind, together with what has been received from the bank, the Eaſt India company, and the additional ſhilling in the pound, land tax; the whole muſt be a good deal more than five millions. The debt, therefore, which ſince the peace has been paid out of the ſavings from the ordinary revenue of the ſtate, has not, one year with another, amounted to half a million a year. The ſinking fund has, no doubt, been conſiderably augmented ſince the peace, by the debt which has been paid off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents. to three per cents. and by the annuities for lives which have fallen in, and, if peace was to continue,

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a million perhaps might now be annually ſpared out of it towards the diſcharge of the debt. Another million, accordingly, was paid in the courſe of laſt year; but, at the ſame time, a large civil liſt debt was left unpaid, and we are now involved in a new war which, in its progreſs, may prove as expenſive as any of our former wars. The new debt which will probably be contracted before the end of the next campaign, may perhaps be nearly equal to all the old debt which has been paid off from the ſavings out of the ordinary revenue of the ſtate. It would be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect that the public debt ſhould ever be completely diſcharged by any ſavings which are likely to be made from that ordinary revenue as it ſtands at preſent.

THE public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly thoſe of England, have by one author been repreſented as the accumulation of a great capital ſuper-added to the other capital of the country, by means of which its trade is extended, its manufactures multiplied, and its lands cultivated and improved much beyond what they could have been by means of that other capital only. He does not conſider that the capital which the firſt creditors of the public advanced to government, was, from the moment in which they advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce turned away from ſerving in the function of a capital, to ſerve in that of a revenue; from maintaining productive labourers to maintain unproductive ones, and to be ſpent and waſted, generally in the courſe of the year, without even the hope of any future reproduction. In return for the capital which they advanced they obtained, indeed, an annuity in the public funds in moſt caſes of more than equal value. This annuity, no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to carry on their trade and buſineſs to the ſame or perhaps to a greater extent than before; that is, they were enabled either

to borrow of other people a new capital upon the credit of this annuity, or by ſelling it to get from other people a new capital of their own, equal or ſuperior to that which they had advanced to government. This new capital, however, which they in this manner either bought or borrowed of other people, muſt have exiſted in the country before, and muſt have been employed, as all capitals are, in maintaining productive labour. When it came into the hands of thoſe who had advanced their money to government, though it was in ſome reſpects a new capital to them, it was not ſo to the country; but was only a capital withdrawn from certain employments in order to be turned towards others. Though it replaced to them what they had advanced to government, it did not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced this capital to government, there would have been in the country two capitals, two portions of the annual produce, inſtead of one, employed in maintaining productive labour.

When for defraying the expence of government a revenue is raiſed within the year from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain portion of the revenue of private people is only turned away from maintaining one ſpecies of unproductive labour, towards maintaining another. Some part of what they pay in thoſe taxes might no doubt have been accumulated into capital, and conſequently employed in maintaining productive labour; but the greater part would probably have been ſpent and conſequently employed in maintaining unproductive labour. The public expence however, when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders more or leſs the further accumulation of new capital; but it does not neceſſarily occaſion the deſtruction of any actually exiſting capital.

When the publick expence is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual deſtruction of ſome capital which had before exiſted

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in the country; by the perverſion of ſome portion of the annual produce which had before been deſtined for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of unproductive labour. As in this caſe, however, the taxes are lighter than they would have been, had a revenue ſufficient for defraying the ſame expence been raiſed within the year; the private revenue of individuals is neceſſarily leſs burthened, and conſequently their ability to ſave and accumulate ſome part of that revenue into capital is a good deal leſs impaired. If the method of funding deſtroys more old capital, it at the ſame time hinders leſs the accumulation or acquiſition of new capital, than that of defraying the public expence by a revenue raiſed within the year. Under the ſyſtem of funding, the frugality and induſtry of private people can more eaſily repair the breaches which the waſte and extravagance of government may occaſionally make in the general capital of the ſociety.

It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the ſyſtem of funding has this advantage over the other ſyſtem. Were the expence of war to be defrayed always by a revenue raiſed within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would laſt no longer than the war. The ability of private people to accumulate, though leſs during the war, would have been greater during the peace than under the ſyſtem of funding. War would not neceſſarily have occaſioned the deſtruction of any old capitals, and peace would have occaſioned the accumulation of many more new. Wars would in general be more ſpeedily concluded, and leſs wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during the continuance of the war, the complete burden of it, would ſoon grow weary of it, and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the neceſſity of carrying it on longer than it was neceſſary to do ſo. The foreſight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people

people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or ſolid intereſt to fight for. The ſeaſons during which the ability of private people to accumulate was ſomewhat impaired, would occur more rarely, and be of ſhorter continuance. Thoſe, on the contrary, during which that ability was in the higheſt vigour, would be of much longer duration than they can well be under the ſyſtem of funding.

When funding, beſides, has made a certain progreſs, the multiplication of taxes which it brings along with it ſometimes impairs as much the ability of private people to accumulate even in time of peace, as the other ſyſtem would in time of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at preſent to more than ten millions a year. If free and unmortgaged, it might be ſufficient, with proper management and without contracting a ſhilling of new debt, to carry on the moſt vigorous war. The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at preſent as much encumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired as it would have been in the time of the moſt expenſive war, had the pernicious ſyſtem of funding never been adopted.

In the payment of the intereſt of the public debt, it has been ſaid, it is the right hand which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It is only a part of the revenue of one ſet of the inhabitants which is transferred to another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This apology is founded altogether in the ſophiſtry of the mercantile ſyſtem, and after the long examination which I have already beſtowed upon that ſyſtem, it may perhaps be unneceſſary to ſay any thing further about it. It ſuppoſes, beſides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as ſeveral other foreign nations, having a very conſiderable

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ſhare in our public funds. But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon that account be leſs pernicious.

LAND and capital ſtock are the two original ſources of all revenue both private and public. Capital ſtock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The management of thoſe two original ſources of revenue belongs to two different ſetts of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital ſtock.

THE proprietor of land is intereſted for the ſake of his own revenue to keep his eſtate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants houſes, by making and maintaining the neceſſary drains and encloſures, and all thoſe other expenſive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and maintain. But by different land-taxes the revenue of the landlord may be ſo much diminiſhed; and by different duties upon the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, that diminiſhed revenue may be rendered of ſo little real value, that he may find himſelf altogether unable to make or maintain thoſe expenſive improvements. When the landlord, however, ceaſes to do his part, it is altogether impoſſible that the tenant ſhould continue to do his. As the diſtreſs of the landlord increaſes, the agriculture of the country muſt neceſſarily decline.

WHEN by different taxes upon the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, the owners and employers of capital ſtock find, that whatever revenue they derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchaſe the ſame quantity of thoſe neceſſaries and conveniencies, which an equal revenue would in almoſt any other; they will be diſpoſed to remove to ſome other. And when, in order to raiſe thoſe taxes,

taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be continually expoſed to the mortifying and vexatious viſits of the tax gatherers; this diſpoſition to remove will ſoon be changed into an actual removal. The induſtry of the country will neceſſarily fall with the removal of the capital which ſupported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the declenſion of agriculture.

To transfer from the owners of thoſe two great ſources of revenue, land and capital ſtock, from the perſons immediately intereſted in the good condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of capital ſtock, to another ſett of perſons, (the creditors of the public, who have no ſuch particular intereſt) the greater part of the revenue ariſing from either, muſt, in the long-run, occaſion both the neglect of land, and the waſte or removal of capital ſtock. A creditor of the public has no doubt a general intereſt in the proſperity of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and conſequently in the good condition of its lands, and in the good management of its capital ſtock. Should there be any general failure or declenſion in any of theſe things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be ſufficient to pay him the annuity or intereſt which is due to him. But a creditor of the public, conſidered merely as ſuch, has no intereſt in the good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital ſtock. As a creditor of the public he has no knowledge of any ſuch particular portion. He has no inſpection of it. He can have no care about it. Its ruin may in moſt caſes be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every ſtate which has adopted it. The Italian republics ſeem to have begun it.

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Genoa and Venice, the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent exiſtence, have both been enfeebled by it. Spain ſeems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics, and (its taxes being probably leſs judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural ſtrength, been ſtill more enfeebled. The debts of Spain are of very old ſtanding. It was deeply in debt before the end of the ſixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a ſhilling. France, notwithſtanding all its natural reſources, languiſhes under an oppreſſive load of the ſame kind. The republic of the United Provinces is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that in Great Britain alone a practice, which has brought either weakneſs or deſolation into every other country, ſhould prove altogether innocent?

The ſyſtem of taxation eſtabliſhed in thoſe different countries, it may be ſaid, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is ſo. But it ought to be remembered, that when the wiſeſt government has exhauſted all the proper ſubjects of taxation, it muſt, in caſes of urgent neceſſity, have recourſe to improper ones. The wiſe republic of Holland has upon ſome occaſions been obliged to have recourſe to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of thoſe of Spain. Another war begun before any conſiderable liberation of the publick revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progreſs as expenſive as the laſt war, may, from irreſiſtable neceſſity, render the Britiſh ſyſtem of taxation as oppreſſive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain. To the honour of our preſent ſyſtem of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given ſo little embarraſſment to induſtry, that, during the courſe even of the moſt expenſive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals ſeems to have been able, by ſaving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the waſte and extravagance of government had made

made in the general capital of the ſociety. At the concluſion of the late war, the moſt expenſive that Great Britain ever waged, her agriculture was as flouriſhing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as extenſive, as they had ever been before. The capital, therefore, which ſupported all thoſe different branches of induſtry, muſt have been equal to what it had ever been before. Since the peace, agriculture has been ſtill further improved, the rents of houſes have riſen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increaſing wealth and revenue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal branches of the exciſe and cuſtoms in particular, has been continually increaſing, an equally clear proof of an increaſing conſumption, and conſequently of an increaſing produce, which could alone ſupport that conſumption. Great Britain ſeems to ſupport with eaſe, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of ſupporting. Let us not, however, upon this account raſhly conclude that ſhe is capable of ſupporting any burden; nor even be too confident that ſhe could ſupport, without great diſtreſs, a burden a little greater than what has already been laid upon her.

When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is ſcarce, I believe, a ſingle inſtance of their having been fairly and completely paid. The liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been brought about at all, has always been brought about by a bankruptcy; ſometimes by an avowed one, but always by a real one, though frequently by a pretended payment.

The raiſing of the denomination of the coin has been the moſt uſual expedient by which a real public bankruptcy has been diſguiſed under the appearance of a pretended payment. If a ſixpence,

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for example, ſhould either by act of parliament or royal proclamation be raiſed to the denomination of a ſhilling, and twenty ſixpences to that of a pound ſterling; the perſon who under the old denomination had borrowed twenty ſhillings, or near four ounces of ſilver, would, under the new, pay with twenty ſixpences, or with ſomething leſs than two ounces. A national debt of about a hundred and twenty-eight millions, nearly the capital of the funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, might in this manner be paid with about ſixty-four millions of our preſent money. It would indeed be a pretended payment only, and the creditors of the public would really be defrauded of ten ſhillings in the pound of what was due to them. The calamity too would extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and thoſe of every private perſon would ſuffer a proportionable loſs; and this without any advantage, but in moſt caſes with a great additional loſs, to the creditors of the public. If the creditors of the public indeed were generally much in debt to other people, they might in ſome meaſure compenſate their loſs by paying their creditors in the ſame coin in which the public had paid them. But in moſt countries the creditors of the public are, the greater part of them, wealthy people, who ſtand more in the relation of creditors than in that of debtors towards the reſt of their fellow citizens. A pretended payment of this kind, therefore, inſtead of alleviating, aggravates in moſt caſes the loſs of the creditors of the public; and without any advantage to the public extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people. It occaſions a general and moſt pernicious ſubverſion of the fortunes of private people; enriching in moſt caſes the idle and profuſe debtor at the expence of the induſtrious and frugal creditor, and tranſporting a great part of the national capital, from the hands which were likely to encreaſe and improve it, to thoſe which are likely to diſſipate and deſtroy it. When it becomes neceſſary for a ſtate to declare

declare itſelf bankrupt, in the ſame manner as when it becomes neceſſary for an individual to do ſo, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the meaſure which is both leaſt diſhonourable to the debtor, and leaſt hurtful to the creditor. The honour of a ſtate is ſurely very poorly provided for, when, in order to cover the diſgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourſe to a juggling trick of this kind, ſo eaſily ſeen through, and at the ſame time ſo extremely pernicious.

Almost all ſtates, however, antient as well as modern, when reduced to this neceſſity, have, upon ſome occaſions, played this very juggling trick. The Romans, at the end of the firſt punic war, reduced the As, the coin or denomination by which they computed the value of all their other coins, from containing twelve ounces of copper to contain only two ounces; that is, they raiſed two ounces of copper to a denomination which had always before expreſſed the value of twelve ounces. The republic was, in this manner, enabled to pay the great debts which it had contracted with the ſixth part of what it really owed. So ſudden and ſo great a bankruptcy, we ſhould in the preſent times be apt to imagine, muſt have occaſioned a very violent popular clamour. It does not appear to have occaſioned any. The law which enacted it was, like all other laws relating to the coin, introduced and carried through the aſſembly of the people by a tribune, and was probably a very popular law. In Rome, as in all the other antient republics, the poor people were conſtantly in debt to the rich and the great, who, in order to ſecure their votes at the annual elections, uſed to lend them money at exorbitant intereſt, which, being never paid, ſoon accumulated into a ſum too great either for the debtor to pay, or for any body elſe to pay for him. The debtor, for fear of a very ſevere execution, was obliged, without any further gratuity, to vote for the candidate whom the creditor recommended. In ſpite of all the

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laws againſt bribery and corruption, the bounty of the candidates, together with the occaſional diſtributions of corn, which were ordered by the ſenate, were the principal funds from which, during the later times of the Roman republic, the poorer citizens derived their ſubſiſtence. To deliver themſelves from this ſubjection to their creditors, the poorer citizens were continually calling out either for an entire abolition of debts, or for what they called New Tables; that is, for a law which ſhould entitle them to a complete acquittance, upon paying only a certain proportion of their accumulated debts. The law which reduced the coin of all denominations to a ſixth part of its former value, as it enabled them to pay their debts with a ſixth part of what they really owed, was equivalent to the moſt advantageous new tables. In order to ſatisfy the people, the rich and the great were, upon ſeveral different occaſions, obliged to conſent to laws both for aboliſhing debts, and for introducing new tables; and they probably were induced to conſent to this law, partly for the ſame reaſon, and partly that by liberating the public revenue, they might reſtore vigour to that government of which they themſelves had the principal direction. An operation of this kind would at once reduce a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions to twenty-one millions, three hundred and thirty-three thouſand, three hundred and thirty-three pounds, ſix ſhillings and eight-pence. In the courſe of the ſecond punic war the As was ſtill further reduced, firſt, from two ounces of copper to one ounce; and afterwards from one ounce to half an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth part of its original value. By combining the three Roman operations into one, a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions of our preſent money, might in this manner be reduced all at once to a debt of five millions, three hundred and thirty-three thouſand, three hundred and thirty-three pounds, ſix ſhillings and eight-pence. Even the enormous debt of Great Britain might in this manner ſoon be paid.

By means of ſuch expedients the coin of, I believe, all nations has been gradually reduced more and more below its original value, and the ſame nominal ſum has been gradually brought to contain a ſmaller and a ſmaller quantity of ſilver.

Nations have ſometimes, for the ſame purpoſe, adulterated the ſtandard of their coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of alloy in it. If in the pound weight of our ſilver coin, for example, inſtead of eighteen penny weight, according to the preſent ſtandard, there was mixed eight ounces of alloy; a pound ſterling, or twenty ſhillings of ſuch coin, would be worth little more than ſix ſhillings and eight-pence of our preſent money. The quantity of ſilver contained in ſix ſhillings and eight-pence of our preſent money, would thus be raiſed very nearly to the denomination of a pound ſterling. The adulteration of the ſtandard has exactly the ſame effect with what the French call an augmentation, or a direct raiſing of the denomination of the coin.

An augmentation, or a direct raiſing of the denomination of the coin, always is, and from its nature muſt be, an open and avowed operation. By means of it pieces of a ſmaller weight and bulk are called by the ſame name which had before been given to pieces of a greater weight and bulk. The adulteration of the ſtandard, on the contrary, has generally been a concealed operation. By means of it pieces were iſſued from the mint of the ſame denominations, and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the ſame weight, bulk, and appearance, with pieces which had been current before of much greater value. When king John of France *, in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were ſworn to ſecreſy. Both operations are unjuſt. But a ſimple augmentation is an injuſtice of open violence; whereas an adulteration is an injuſtice of treacherous fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as ſoon

* See du Cange Gloſſary, voce Moneta; the Benedictine edition.

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ſoon as it has been diſcovered, and it could never be concealed very long, has always excited much greater indignation than the former. The coin, after any conſiderable augmentation, has very ſeldom been brought back to its former weight; but after the greateſt adulterations it has almoſt always been brought back to its former fineneſs. It has ſcarce ever happened that the fury and indignation of the people could otherwiſe be appeaſed.

In the end of the reign of Henry VIII. and in the beginning of that of Edward VI. the Engliſh coin was not only raiſed in its denomination, but adulterated in its ſtandard. The like frauds were practiſed in Scotland during the minority of James VI. They have occaſionally been practiſed in moſt other countries.

That the public revenue of Great Britain can ever be completely liberated, or even that any conſiderable progreſs can ever be made towards that liberation, while the ſurplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expence of the peace eſtabliſhment, is ſo very ſmall, it ſeems altogether in vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never be brought about without either ſome very conſiderable augmentation of the public revenue, or ſome equally conſiderable reduction of the public expence.

A more equal land-tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houſes, and ſuch alterations in the preſent ſyſtem of cuſtoms and exciſe as thoſe which have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might, perhaps, without increaſing the burden of the greater part of the people, but only diſtributing the weight of it more equally upon the whole, produce a conſiderable augmentation of revenue. The moſt ſanguine projector, however, could ſcarce flatter himſelf that any augmentation of this kind would be ſuch as could give any reaſonable hopes either of liberating the public revenue altogether,

gether, or even of making ſuch progreſs towards that liberation in time of peace, as either to prevent or to compenſate the further accumulation of the public debt in the next war.

By extending the Britiſh ſyſtem of taxation to all the different provinces of the empire inhabited by people either of Britiſh or European extraction, a much greater augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however, could ſcarce perhaps be done, conſiſtently with the principles of the Britiſh conſtitution, without admitting into the Britiſh parliament, or if you will into the ſtates general of the Britiſh Empire, a fair and equal repreſentation of all thoſe different provinces, that of each province bearing the ſame proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the repreſentation of Great Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great Britain. The private intereſt of many powerful individuals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies of people ſeem, indeed, at preſent, to oppoſe to ſo great a change ſuch obſtacles as it may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impoſſible, to ſurmount. Without, however, pretending to determine whether ſuch a union be practicable or impracticable, it may not, perhaps, be improper, in a ſpeculative work of this kind, to conſider how far the Britiſh ſyſtem of taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the empire; what revenue might be expected from it if ſo applied, and in what manner a general union of this kind might be likely to affect the happineſs and proſperity of the different provinces comprehended within it. Such a ſpeculation can at worſt be regarded but as a new Utopia, leſs amuſing certainly, but not more uſeleſs and chimerical than the old one.

The land-tax, the ſtamp duties, and the different duties of cuſtoms and exciſe, conſtitute the four principal branches of the Britiſh taxes.

IRELAND is certainly as able, and our American and Weſt Indian plantations more able to pay a land-tax than Great Britain. Where the landlord is ſubject neither to tithe nor poors rate, he muſt certainly be more able to pay ſuch a tax, than where he is ſubject to both thoſe other burdens. The tithe, where there is no modus, and where it is levied in kind, diminiſhes more what would otherwiſe be the rent of the landlord, than a land-tax which really amounted to five ſhillings in the pound. Such a tithe will be found in moſt caſes to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the land, or of what remains after replacing compleatly the capital of the farmer, together with his reaſonable profit. If all moduſes and all impropriations were taken away, the complete church tithe of Great Britain and Ireland, could not well be eſtimated at leſs than ſix or ſeven millions. If there was no tithe either in Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords could afford to pay ſix or ſeven millions additional land-tax, without being more burdened than a very great part of them are at preſent. America pays no tithe, and could therefore very well afford to pay a land-tax. The lands in America and the Weſt Indies, indeed, are in general not tenanted or leaſed out to farmers. They could not therefore be aſſeſſed according to any rent-roll. But neither were the lands of Great Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, aſſeſſed according to any rent-roll, but according to a very looſe and inaccurate eſtimation. The lands in America might be aſſeſſed either in the ſame manner, or according to an equitable valuation in conſequence of an accurate ſurvey, like that which was lately made in the Milaneſe, and in the dominions of Auſtria, Pruſſia, and Sardinia.

STAMP-DUTIES, it is evident, might be levied without any variation in all countries where the forms of law proceſs, and the deeds by which property both real and perſonal is transferred, are the ſame or nearly the ſame.

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THE extenſion of the cuſtomhouſe laws of Great Britain to Ireland and the plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in juſtice it ought to be, with an extenſion of the freedom of trade, would be in the higheſt degree advantageous to both. All the invidious reſtraints which at preſent oppreſs the trade of Ireland, the diſtinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities of America, would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finiſterre would be as open to every part of the produce of America, as thoſe ſouth of that cape are to ſome parts of that produce at preſent. The trade between all the different parts of the Britiſh empire would, in conſequence of this uniformity in the cuſtomhouſe laws, be as free as the coaſting trade of Great Britain is at preſent. The Britiſh empire would thus afford within itſelf an immenſe internal market for every part of the produce of all its different provinces. So great an extenſion of market would ſoon compenſate both to Ireland and the plantations, all that they could ſuffer from the increaſe of the duties of cuſtoms.

THE exciſe is the only part of the Britiſh ſyſtem of taxation, which would require to be varied in any reſpect according as it was applied to the different provinces of the empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any variation; the produce and conſumption of that kingdom being exactly of the ſame nature with thoſe of Great Britain. In its application to America and the Weſt Indies, of which the produce and conſumption are ſo very different from thoſe of Great Britain, ſome modification might be neceſſary, in the ſame manner as in its application to the cyder and beer counties of England.

A FERMENTED liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of melaſſes, bears very little reſemblance to our beer, makes a conſiderable part of the common drink of the people in America. This liquor, as it can be kept only for a few

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days, cannot, like our beer, be prepared and ſtored up for ſale in great breweries; but every private family muſt brew it for their own uſe, in the ſame manner as they cook their victuals. But to ſubject every private family to the odious viſits and examination of the tax gatherers, in the ſame manner as we ſubject the keepers of alehouſes and the brewers for public ſale, would be altogether inconſiſtent with liberty. If for the ſake of equality it was thought neceſſary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be taxed by taxing the material of which it is made, either at the place of manufacture, or, if the circumſtances of the trade rendered ſuch an exciſe improper, by laying a duty upon its importation into the colony in which it was to be conſumed. Beſides the duty of one penny a gallon impoſed by the Britiſh parliament upon the importation of melaſſes into America; there is a provincial tax of this kind upon their importation into Maſſachuſets Bay, in ſhips belonging to any other colony, of eight-pence the hogſhead; and another upon their importation, from the northern colonies, into South Carolina of five-pence the gallon. Or if neither of theſe methods was found convenient, each family might compound for its conſumption of this liquor, either according to the number of perſons of which it conſiſted, in the ſame manner as private families compound for the malt-tax in England; or according to the different ages and ſexes of thoſe perſons, in the ſame manner as ſeveral different taxes are levied in Holland; or nearly as Sir Mathew Decker propoſes that all taxes upon conſumable commodities ſhould be levied in England. This mode of taxation, it has already been obſerved, when applied to objects of a ſpeedy conſumption, is not a very convenient one. It might be adopted, however, in caſes where no better could be done.

SUGAR, rum, and tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere neceſſaries of life, which are become objects of almoſt univerſal conſumption, and which are therefore extreamly proper ſubjects

jects of taxation. If a union with the colonies was to take place, those commodities might be taxed either before they go out of the hands of the manufacturer or grower; or if this mode of taxation did not suit the circumstances of those persons, they might be deposited in public warehouses both at the place of manufacture, and at all the different ports of the empire to which they might afterwards be transported, to remain there, under the joint custody of the owner and the revenue officer, till such time as they should be delivered out either to the consumer, to the merchant retailer for home consumption, or to the merchant exporter; the tax not to be advanced till such delivery. When delivered out for exportation, to go duty free; upon proper security being given that they should really be exported out of the empire. These are perhaps the principal commodities with regard to which a union with the colonies might require some considerable change in the present system of British taxation.

What might be the amount of the revenue which this system of taxation extended to all the different provinces of the empire might produce, it must, no doubt, be altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable exactness. By means of this system there is annually levied in Great Britain, upon less than eight millions of people, more than ten millions of revenue. Ireland contains more than two millions of people, and according to the accounts laid before the congress, the twelve associated provinces of America contain more than three. Those accounts, however, may have been exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either to encourage their own people, or to intimidate those of this country, and we shall suppose therefore that our North American and West Indian colonies taken together contain no more than three millions; or that the whole British empire, in Europe and America, contains no more than thirteen millions of inhabitants. If upon less than eight

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eight millions of inhabitants this ſyſtem of taxation raiſes a revenue of more than ten millions ſterling; it ought upon thirteen millions of inhabitants to raiſe a revenue of more than ſixteen millions two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling. From this revenue, ſuppoſing that this ſyſtem could produce it, muſt be deducted, the revenue uſually raiſed in Ireland and the plantations for defraying the expence of their reſpective civil governments. The expence of the civil and military eſtabliſhment of Ireland, together with the intereſt of the public debt, amounts at a medium of the two years which ended March, 1775, to ſomething leſs than ſeven hundred and fifty thouſand pounds a year. By a very exact account of the revenue of the principal colonies of America and the Weſt Indies, it amounted, before the commencement of the late diſturbances, to a hundred and forty-one thouſand eight hundred pounds. In this account, however, the revenue of Maryland, of North Carolina, and of all our late acquiſitions both upon the continent and in the iſlands, is omitted, which may perhaps make a difference of thirty or forty thouſand pounds. For the ſake of even numbers therefore, let us ſuppoſe that the revenue neceſſary for ſupporting the civil government of Ireland, and the plantations, may amount to a million. There would remain conſequently a revenue of fifteen millions two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, to be applied towards defraying the general expence of the empire, and towards paying the public debt. But if from the preſent revenue of Great Britain a million could in peaceable times be ſpared towards the payment of that debt, ſix millions two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds could very well be ſpared from this improved revenue. This great ſinking fund too might be augmented every year by the intereſt of the debt which had been diſcharged the year before, and might in this manner increaſe ſo very rapidly, as to be ſufficient in a few years to diſcharge the whole debt, and thus to reſtore compleatly the at preſent debilitated and languiſhing vigour of the empire.

In the meantime the people might be relieved from ſome of the moſt burdenſome taxes; from thoſe which are impoſed either upon the neceſſaries of life, or upon the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be enabled to live better, to work cheaper, and to ſend their goods cheaper to market. The cheapneſs of their goods would increaſe the demand for them, and conſequently for the labour of thoſe who produced them. This increaſe in the demand for labour, would both increaſe the numbers and improve the circumſtances of the labouring poor. Their conſumption would increaſe, and together with it the revenue ariſing from all thoſe articles of their conſumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain.

The revenue ariſing from this ſyſtem of taxation, however, might not immediately increaſe in proportion to the number of people who were ſubjected to it. Great indulgence would for ſome time be due to thoſe provinces of the empire which were thus ſubjected to burthens to which they had not before been accuſtomed, and even when the ſame taxes came to be levied every where as exactly as poſſible, they would not every where produce a revenue proportioned to the numbers of the people. In a poor country the conſumption of the principal commodities ſubject to the duties of cuſtoms and exciſe is very ſmall; and in a thinly inhabited country the opportunities of ſmuggling are very great. The conſumption of malt liquors among the inferior ranks of people in Scotland is very ſmall, and the exciſe upon malt, beer, and ale, produces leſs there than in England in proportion to the numbers of the people and the rate of the duties, which upon malt is different on account of a ſuppoſed difference of quality. In theſe particular branches of the exciſe there is not, I apprehend, much more ſmuggling in the one country than in the other. The duties upon the diſtillery, and the greater part of the duties of cuſtoms, in

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in proportion to the numbers of people in the reſpective countries, produce leſs in Scotland than in England, not only on account of the ſmaller conſumption of the taxed commodities, but of the much greater facility of ſmuggling. In Ireland, the inferior ranks of people are ſtill poorer than in Scotland, and many parts of the country are almoſt as thinly inhabited. In Ireland, therefore, the conſumption of the taxed commodities might, in proportion to the number of the people, be ſtill leſs than in Scotland, and the facility of ſmuggling nearly the ſame. In America and the Weſt Indies the white people even of the loweſt rank are in much better circumſtances than thoſe of the ſame rank in England, and their conſumption of all the luxuries in which they uſually indulge themſelves is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who make the greater part of the inhabitants both of the ſouthern colonies upon the continent and of the Weſt Indian iſlands, as they are in a ſtate of ſlavery, are, no doubt, in a worſe condition than the pooreſt people either in Scotland or Ireland. We muſt not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are worſe fed, or that their conſumption of articles which might be ſubjected to moderate duties, is leſs than that even of the lower ranks of people in England. In order that they may work well, it is the intereſt of their maſter that they ſhould be fed well and kept in good heart, in the ſame manner as it is his intereſt that his working cattle ſhould be ſo. The blacks accordingly have almoſt every where their allowance of rum and of melaſſes or ſpruce beer, in the ſame manner as the white ſervants; and this allowance would not probably be withdrawn, though thoſe articles ſhould be ſubjected to moderate duties. The conſumption of the taxed commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, would probably be as great in America and the Weſt Indies as in any part of the Britiſh empire. The opportunities of ſmuggling, indeed, would be much greater; America, in proportion to the extent

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extent of the country, being much more thinly inhabited than either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue, however, which is at preſent raiſed by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, was to be levied by a ſingle duty upon malt, the opportunity of ſmuggling in the moſt important branch of the exciſe would be almoſt entirely taken away: And if the duties of cuſtoms, inſtead of being impoſed upon almoſt all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few of the moſt general uſe and conſumption, and if the levying of thoſe duties was ſubjected to the exciſe laws, the opportunity of ſmuggling, though not ſo entirely taken away, would be very much diminiſhed. In conſequence of thoſe two, apparently, very ſimple and eaſy alterations, the duties of cuſtoms and exciſe might probably produce a revenue as great in proportion to the conſumption of the moſt thinly inhabited province as they do at preſent in proportion to that of the moſt populous.

THE Americans, it has been ſaid, indeed, have no gold or ſilver money; the interior commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency, and the gold and ſilver which occaſionally come among them being all ſent to Great Britain in return for the commodities which they receive from us. But without gold and ſilver, it is added, there is no poſſibility of paying taxes. We already get all the gold and ſilver which they have. How is it poſſible to draw from them what they have not?

THE preſent ſcarcity of gold and ſilver money in America is not the effect of the poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to purchaſe thoſe metals. In a country where the wages of labour are ſo much higher, and the price of proviſions ſo much lower than in England, the greater part of the people muſt ſurely have wherewithal to purchaſe a greater quantity,

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if it was either neceſſary or convenient for them to do ſo. The ſcarcity of thoſe metals, therefore, muſt be the effect of choice, and not of neceſſity.

It is for tranſacting either domeſtic or foreign buſineſs, that gold and ſilver money is either neceſſary or convenient.

The domeſtic buſineſs of every country, it has been ſhewn in the ſecond book of this inquiry, may, at leaſt in peaceable times, be tranſacted by means of a paper currency, with nearly the ſame degree of conveniency as by gold and ſilver money. It is convenient for the Americans, who could always employ with profit in the improvement of their lands a greater ſtock than they can eaſily get, to ſave as much as poſſible the expence of ſo coſtly an inſtrument of commerce as gold and ſilver, and rather to employ that part of their ſurplus produce which would be neceſſary for purchaſing thoſe metals, in purchaſing the inſtruments of trade, the materials of cloathing, ſeveral parts of houſhold furniture, and the iron-work neceſſary for building and extending their ſettlements and plantations; in purchaſing, not dead ſtock, but active and productive ſtock. The colony governments find it for their intereſt to ſupply people with ſuch a quantity of paper-money as is fully ſufficient and generally more than ſufficient for tranſacting their domeſtic buſineſs. Some of thoſe governments, that of Penſylvania particularly, derive a revenue from lending this paper-money to their ſubjects at an intereſt of ſo much per cent. Others, like that of Maſſachuſet's Bay, advance upon extraordinary emergencies a paper-money of this kind for defraying the public expence, and afterwards, when it ſuits the conveniency of the colony, redeem it at the depreciated value to which it gradually falls. In 1747 * that colony paid, in this manner, the greater part of its public debts, with the tenth part of the

* See Hutchinſon's Hiſtory of Maſſachuſet's Bay, Vol. II. Page 436. & ſeq.

the money for which its bills had been granted. It ſuits the conveniency of the planters to ſave the expence of employing gold and ſilver money in their domeſtic tranſactions; and it ſuits the conveniency of the colony governments to ſupply them with a medium, which, though attended with ſome very conſiderable diſadvantages, enables them to ſave that expence. The redundancy of paper money neceſſarily baniſhes gold and ſilver from the domeſtic tranſactions of the colonies, for the ſame reaſon that it has baniſhed thoſe metals from the greater part of the domeſtic tranſactions of Scotland; and in both countries it is not the poverty, but the enterpriſing and projecting ſpirit of the people, their deſire of employing all the ſtock which they can get as active and productive ſtock, which has occaſioned this redundancy of paper money.

In the exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with Great Britain, gold and ſilver are more or leſs employed, exactly in proportion as they are more or leſs neceſſary. Where thoſe metals are not neceſſary, they ſeldom appear. Where they are neceſſary, they are generally found.

In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, the Britiſh goods are generally advanced to the coloniſts at a pretty long credit, and are afterwards paid for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more convenient for the coloniſts to pay in tobacco than in gold and ſilver. It would be more convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods which his correſpondents had ſold to him in ſome other ſort of goods which he might happen to deal in, than in money. Such a merchant would have no occaſion to keep any part of his ſtock by him unemployed, and in ready money, for anſwering occaſional demands. He could have, at all times, a larger quantity of goods in his ſhop or warehouſe, and he could deal to a greater extent. But it ſeldom happens to be con-

venient for all the correſpondents of a merchant to receive payment for the goods which they ſell to him, in goods of ſome other kind which he happens to deal in. The Britiſh merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland happen to be a particular ſett of correſpondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for the goods which they ſell to thoſe colonies in tobacco than in gold and ſilver. They expect to make a profit by the ſale of the tobacco. They could make none by that of the gold and ſilver. Gold and ſilver, therefore, very ſeldom appear in the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and Virginia have as little occaſion for thoſe metals in their foreign as in their domeſtic commerce. They are ſaid, accordingly, to have leſs gold and ſilver money than any other colonies in America. They are reckoned, however, as thriving, and conſequently as rich as any of their neighbours.

In the northern colonies, Penſylvania, New York, New Jerſey, the four governments of New England, &c. the value of their own produce which they export to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which they import for their own uſe, and for that of ſome of the other colonies to which they are the carriers. A balance, therefore, muſt be paid to the mother country in gold and ſilver, and this balance they generally find.

In the ſugar colonies the value of the produce annually exported to Great Britain is much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If the ſugar and rum annually ſent to the mother country were paid for in thoſe colonies, Great Britain would be obliged to ſend out every year a very large balance in money, and the trade to the Weſt Indies would, by a certain ſpecies of politicians, be conſidered as extremely diſadvantageous. But it ſo happens, that many of the principal proprietors of the ſugar plantations reſide in Great Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in

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ſugar and rum, the produce of their eſtates. The ſugar and rum which the Weſt India merchants purchaſe in thoſe colonies upon their own account, are not equal in value to the goods which they annually ſell there. A balance, therefore, muſt generally be paid to them in gold and ſilver, and this balance too is generally found.

The difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to Great Britain, have not been at all in proportion to the greatneſs or ſmallneſs of the balances which were reſpectively due from them. Payments have in general been more regular from the northern than from the tobacco colonies, though the former have generally paid a pretty large balance in money, while the latter have paid either no balance, or a much ſmaller one. The difficulty of getting payment from our different ſugar colonies has been greater or leſs in proportion, not ſo much to the extent of the balances reſpectively due from them, as to the quantity of uncultivated land which they contained; that is, to the greater or ſmaller temptation which the planters have been under of over-trading, or of undertaking the ſettlement and plantation of greater quantities of waſte land than ſuited the extent of their capitals. The returns from the great iſland of Jamaica, where there is ſtill much uncultivated land, have, upon this account, been in general more irregular and uncertain than thoſe from the ſmaller iſlands of Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Chriſtophers, which have for theſe many years been completely cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded leſs field for the ſpeculations of the planter. The new acquiſitions of Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincents, and Dominica, have opened a new field for ſpeculations of this kind; and the returns from thoſe iſlands have of late been as irregular and uncertain as thoſe from the great iſland of Jamaica.

It is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occaſions, in the greater part of them, the preſent ſcarcity of gold and ſilver money,

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money. Their great demand for active and productive ſtock makes it convenient for them to have as little dead ſtock as poſſible; and diſpoſes them upon that account to content themſelves with a cheaper, though leſs commodious inſtrument of commerce than gold and ſilver. They are thereby enabled to convert the value of that gold and ſilver into the inſtruments of trade, into the materials of cloathing, into houſhold furniture, and into the iron work neceſſary for building and extending their ſettlements and plantations. In thoſe branches of buſineſs which cannot be tranſacted without gold and ſilver money, it appears that they can always find the neceſſary quantity of thoſe metals; and if they frequently do not find it, their failure is generally the effect, not of their neceſſary poverty, but of their unneceſſary and exceſſive enterprize. It is not becauſe they are poor that their payments are irregular and uncertain; but becauſe they are too eager to become exceſſively rich. Though all that part of the produce of the colony taxes, which was over and above what was neceſſary for defraying the expence of their own civil and military eſtabliſhments, were to be remitted to Great Britain in gold and ſilver, the colonies have abundantly wherewithal to purchaſe the requiſite quantity of thoſe metals. They would in this caſe be obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their ſurplus produce, with which they now purchaſe active and productive ſtock, for dead ſtock. In tranſacting their domeſtic buſineſs they would be obliged to employ a coſtly inſtead of a cheap inſtrument of commerce; and the expence of purchaſing this coſtly inſtrument might damp ſomewhat the vivacity and ardour of their exceſſive enterprize in the improvement of land. It might not, however, be neceſſary to remit any part of the American revenue in gold and ſilver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon and accepted by particular merchants or companies in Great Britain, to whom a part of the ſurplus produce of America had been conſigned, who would pay into the treaſury the American revenue in money, after having themſelves received

the value of it in goods; and the whole buſineſs might frequently be tranſacted without exporting a ſingle ounce of gold and ſilver from America.

It is not contrary to juſtice that both Ireland and America ſhould contribute towards the diſcharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That debt has been contracted in ſupport of the government eſtabliſhed by the revolution, a government to which the proteſtants of Ireland owe, not only the whole authority which they at preſent enjoy in their own country, but every ſecurity which they poſſeſs for their liberty, their property, and their religion; a government to which ſeveral of the colonies of America owe their preſent charters, and conſequently their preſent conſtitution, and to which all the colonies of America owe the liberty, ſecurity, and property, which they have ever ſince enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire; the immenſe debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that contracted in the war before, were both properly contracted in defence of America.

By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, beſides the freedom of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compenſate any increaſe of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union with England, the middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from the power of an ariſtocracy which had always before oppreſſed them. By a union with Great Britain the greater part of the people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally complete deliverance from a much more oppreſſive ariſtocracy; an ariſtocracy not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and reſpectable diſtinctions of birth and fortune; but in the

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the moſt odious of all diſtinctions, thoſe of religious and political prejudices; diſtinctions which more than any other animate both the inſolence of the oppreſſors and the hatred and indignation of the oppreſſed, and which commonly render the inhabitants of the ſame country more hoſtile to one another than thoſe of different countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are not likely for many ages to conſider themſelves as one people.

No oppreſſive ariſtocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they, however, would, in point of happineſs and tranquillity, gain conſiderably by a union with Great Britain. It would, at leaſt, deliver them from thoſe rancorous and virulent factions which are inſeparable from ſmall democracies, and which have ſo frequently divided the affections of their people, and diſturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form ſo nearly democratical. In the caſe of a total ſeparation from Great Britain, which, unleſs prevented by a union of this kind, ſeems very likely to take place, thoſe factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the commencement of the preſent diſturbances, the coercive power of the mother country had always been able to reſtrain thoſe factions from breaking out into any thing worſe than groſs brutality and inſult. If that coercive power was entirely taken away, they would probably ſoon break out into open violence and bloodſhed. In all great countries which are united under one uniform government, the ſpirit of party commonly prevails leſs in the remote provinces, than in the center of the empire. The diſtance of thoſe provinces from the capital, from the principal ſeat of the great ſcramble of faction and ambition, makes them enter leſs into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders them more indifferent and impartial ſpectators of the conduct of all. The ſpirit of party prevails leſs in Scotland than in England.

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In the caſe of a union it would probably prevail leſs in Ireland than in Scotland, and the colonies would probably ſoon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity at preſent unknown in any part of the Britiſh empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be ſubjected to heavier taxes than any which they at preſent pay. In conſequence, however, of a diligent and faithful application of the public revenue towards the diſcharge of the national debt, the greater part of thoſe taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of Great Britain might ſoon be reduced to what was neceſſary for maintaining a moderate peace eſtabliſhment.

The territorial acquiſitions of the Eaſt India company, the undoubted right of the crown, that is, of the ſtate and people of Great Britain, might be rendered another ſource of revenue more abundant perhaps than all thoſe already mentioned. Thoſe countries are repreſented as more fertile, more extenſive; and in proportion to their extent much richer and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not probably be neceſſary to introduce any new ſyſtem of taxation into countries which are already ſufficiently and more than ſufficiently taxed. It might perhaps be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of thoſe unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them, not by impoſing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and miſapplication of the greater part of thoſe which they already pay.

If it ſhould be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any conſiderable augmentation of revenue from any of the reſources above-mentioned; the only reſource which can remain to her is a diminution of her expence. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public revenue; though in both

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there may be ſtill room for improvement; Great Britain ſeems to be at leaſt as oeconomical as any of her neighbours. The military eſtabliſhment which ſhe maintains for her own defence in time of peace, is more moderate than that of any European ſtate which can pretend to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of thoſe articles, therefore, ſeem to admit of any conſiderable reduction of expence. The expence of the peace eſtabliſhment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the preſent diſturbances, very conſiderable, and is an expence which may, and if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought certainly to be ſaved altogether. This conſtant expence in time of peace, though very great, is inſignificant in compariſon with what the defence of the colonies has coſt us in time of war. The laſt war, which was undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, coſt Great Britain, it has already been obſerved, upwards of ninety millions. The Spaniſh war of 1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the French war that was the conſequence of it, Great Britain ſpent upwards of forty millions, a great part of which ought juſtly to be charged to the colonies. In thoſe two wars the colonies coſt Great Britain much more than double the ſum which the national debt amounted to before the commencement of the firſt of them. Had it not been for thoſe wars that debt might, and probably would by this time have been compleatly paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of thoſe wars might not, and the latter certainly would not have been undertaken. It was becauſe the colonies were ſuppoſed to be provinces of the Britiſh empire, that this expence was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the ſupport of the empire, cannot be conſidered as provinces. They may perhaps be conſidered as appendages, as a ſort of ſplendid and ſhowy equipage of the empire. But if the

empire

empire can no longer ſupport the expence of keeping up this equipage, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raiſe its revenue in proportion to its expence, it ought, at leaſt, to accommodate its expence to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithſtanding their refuſal to ſubmit to Britiſh taxes, are ſtill to be conſidered as provinces of the Britiſh empire, their defence in ſome future war may coſt Great Britain as great an expence as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great Britain have for more than a century paſt amuſed the people with the imagination that they poſſeſſed a great empire on the weſt ſide of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto exiſted in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has coſt, which continues to coſt, and which if purſued in the ſame way as it has been hitherto, is likely to coſt immenſe expence, without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been ſhewn, are, to the great body of the people, mere loſs inſtead of profit. It is ſurely now time that our rulers ſhould either realize this golden dream, in which they have been indulging themſelves, perhaps, as well as the people; or, that they ſhould awake from it themſelves, and endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be compleated, it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the Britiſh empire cannot be made to contribute towards the ſupport of the whole empire, it is ſurely time that Great Britain ſhould free herſelf from the expence of defending thoſe provinces in time of war, and of ſupporting any part of their civil or military eſtabliſhments in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views and deſigns to the real mediocrity of her circumſtances.

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