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# An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations

In Two Volumes

**Smith, Adam** 

**London, 1776** 

Article III. Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.

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#### THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.

likewife finally paid by the confumers of those liquors. Such CHAR taxes, though called by the fame name, and levied by the fame officers and in the same manner with the stamp-duties above mentioned upon the transference of property, are however of a quite different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.

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# Taxes upon the Wages of Labour. Addings on the Wages of Labour.

THE wages of the inferior classes of workmen, I have endeavoured to show in the first book, are every where necessarily regulated by two different circumstances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of provisions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either increasing, stationary, or declining; or to require an increasing, stationary, or declining population, regulates the fublishence of the labourer, and determines in what degree it shall be, either liberal, moderate, or scanty. The ordinary or average price of provisions determines the quantity of money which must be paid to the workman in order to enable him, one year with another, to purchase this liberal, moderate, or feanty subsistence. While the demand for labour and the price of provisions, therefore, remain the same, a direct tax upon the wages of labour can have no other effect than to raise them somewhat higher than the tax. Let us suppose, for example, that in a particular place the demand for labour and the price of provifions were fuch as to render ten shillings a week the ordinary wages of labour; and that a tax of one-fifth, or four Thillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages. If the demand for labour and the price of provisions remained the same, it would still be necessary that the labourer should in that place earn such a subsistence as could be bought only for ten shillings a week, or that after

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paying the tax he should have ten shillings a week free wages. But in order to leave him such free wages after paying such a tax, the price of labour must in that place soon rise, not to twelve shillings a week only, but to twelve and sixpence; that is, in order to enable him to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages must necessarily soon rise, not one-fifth part only, but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour must in all cases rise, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax, for example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour must necessarily soon rise, not one-tenth part only, but one-eighth.

A DIRECT tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might perhaps pay it out of his hand, could not properly be faid to be even advanced by him; at least if the demand for labour and the average price of provisions remained the same after the tax as before it. In all fuch cases, not only the tax, but fomething more than the tax, would in reality be advanced by the person who immediately employed him. The final payment would in different cases fall upon different persons. The rife which fuch a tax might occasion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the mafter manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this rife of wages therefore, together with the additional profit of the mafter manufacturer, would fall upon the confumer. The rife which fuch a tax might occasion in the wages of country labour would be advanced by the farmer, who in order to maintain the fame number of labourers as before would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, it would be necessary that he should retain a larger portion, or what comes to the same thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the land, and confequently that he should

should pay less rent to the landlord. The final payment of this CHAP. rife of wages, therefore, would in this case fall upon the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had advanced it. In all cases a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the long run, occasion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater rife in the price of manufactured goods, than would have followed from the proper affeffment of a fum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the rent of land, and partly upon confumable commodities.

IF direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occafioned a proportionable rife in those wages, it is because they have generally occasioned a considerable fall in the demand for labour. The declention of industry, the decrease of employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been the effects of such taxes. In confequence of them, however, the price of labour must always be higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the demand: and this enhancement of price, together with the profit of those who advance it, must always be finally paid by the landlords and confumers.

A TAX upon the wages of country labour does not raife the price of the rude produce of land; for the same reason that a tax upon the farmers profit does not raife that price.

ABSURD and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in many countries. In France that part of the taille which is charged upon the industry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax of this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the diffrict in which they refide, and that they may be as little liable as possible to any over-charge, their yearly gains are estimated at no more than two hundred



BOOK hundred working days in the year \*. The tax of each individual is varied from year to year according to different circumstances, of which the collector or the commissary, whom the intendant appoints to affift him, are the judges. In Bohemia, in confequence of the alteration in the fystem of finances which was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of artificers. They are divided into four classes. The highest class pay a hundred florins a year; which, at two and twenty-pence halfpenny a florin, amounts to 91. 7 s. 6 d. The fecond class are taxed at feventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages and the lowest class of those in towns, at twenty-five beauties proportionable rule un thole wages, in remerally occationed a confidencial full in the demand for labour,

> THE recompence of ingenious artists and of men of liberal professions, I have endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain proportion to the emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this recompence, therefore, could have no other effect than to raife it fomewhat higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not rife in this manner, the ingenious arts and the liberal professions, being no longer upon a level with other trades, would be fo much deferted that they would foon return to that level.

THE emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions, regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always bear a just proportion to what the nature of the employment requires. They are, perhaps in most countries, higher than it requires; the persons who have the administration of government being generally disposed to reward both themselves and their immediate dependents rather more than enough. The emoluments of offices, therefore, can in most cases very well

they relide, and that they may be as lattle liable as pollible to any

\* Id, tom. ii, p. 108. + Id. tom. iii. p. 87.

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